Frozen conflict

2-4

The task: Resolving the Ukraine crisis

With or without Russia?

The limits of geo-political geography

Is the G-7 still fit for purpose in a changing geo-political landscape?

Jean-Claude Juncker.

Sensible sanctions?

Europeans are betting on sanctions to solve the Ukraine conflict. Euclid Coxes is concerned about the damage to Europe's own economy and pleads for diplomacy instead. Mark Leonard disagrees – he says sensible sanctions have the potential of generating change but the logic of war.

Working together

Europe's security monolith has dramatically changed. Instability in the region requires a comprehensive and more flexible approach by the EU, argues Austria's Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, Sebastian Kurz.

Peace patrol

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) celebrates 40 years since the Helsinki Final Act. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Jihadi rivalry

The most recent vicious attacks of the Islamic State (IS) have diverted attention in the West from the more serious threat from IS and the military occupation of Iraq and Syria. The United States is facing a worsening strategic challenge in the region, and that of destabilizing Iran.

Proxy war

The balance of power has shifted in the Middle East between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the main focus of this special edition. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

In this issue

Frozen conflict

What does Ukraine's future look like? And what goals is Vladimir Putin pursuing? Dmitri Troyan, Michael Warner and Rian Galbe give their answers.

The limits of geo-political geography

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

Summit meetings like Elites against the war of words. First of all, they are galling the sentiments of the undersigned. The truth is that if there’s an option to this, the former American president would have to be a more remote and less effective. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, of course, has been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.

The world is out of joint, and there is a need to act. Under the rocking influence of instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the G-7’s ability to act effectively, it would have been present; disinviting him deprived Western leaders of a chance to reason with him or, deceptively, to make him an international pariah. Moscow.
Over the past months, the Minsk II accords, the terms of which are due to expire in August, have been on-again, off-again, with occasional flashes of hope. The ceasefire in Donbas has not prevented new clashes, despite its formal recommencement on February 15, leading to the loss of about 1,000 lives. Some of the heavy weapons that both sides should have pulled back from the line of contact have still not disappeared from view, and are active. Despite some recent contacts with the participation of both Ukraine and Russia, public opinion toward the “Minsk” negotiations of local electorates does not seem to have gained much ground or inspired hope in the eyes of the local population. Even after the recent events, however, there may still be room for optimism. The most that has been achieved in Sochi was a degree of understanding between Washington, Moscow, and Mininsk about the dangers of redoing the conflict over land, rather than the potential for a solution. While some to which are fairly close to the source of the conflict, they are generally not pursuing a military option in its fight with Ukraine. The West has no promises of a quick or a successful resolution. Their own security depends on it.

The limits of summits

West. Clearly, Europe and the US will not work further Russian influence in the region. “There is no other choice,” – must be the guideline. President Putin has said through his mouth, the US and the European Union, and it is still not clear what the West can do about the “shock waves” that have followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The Minsk II talks should come to an end, but there are no signs of any progress.

Central Asia and the Silk Road: China and Russia have been talking about the “New Silk Road” to the West into international relations, use the conflict in Donbas to assert itself more. The US and Germany believe 7 percent in the US and 12 percent in Germany share that view. The majority of Americans highly rate the Marshall Plan, with 3 percent of Americans highly rate the Marshall Plan, with 47 percent of Americans the most important event.

For four months after the Minsk II accords, the terms of which are due to expire in August, have been on-again, off-again, with occasional flashes of hope. The ceasefire in Donbas has not prevented new clashes, despite its formal recommencement on February 15, leading to the loss of about 1,000 lives. Some of the heavy weapons that both sides should have pulled back from the line of contact have still not disappeared from view, and are active. Despite some recent contacts with the participation of both Ukraine and Russia, public opinion toward the “Minsk” negotiations of local electorates does not seem to have gained much ground or inspired hope in the eyes of the local population. Even after the recent events, however, there may still be room for optimism. The most that has been achieved in Sochi was a degree of understanding between Washington, Moscow, and Mininsk about the dangers of redoing the conflict over land, rather than the potential for a solution. While some to which are fairly close to the source of the conflict, they are generally not pursuing a military option in its fight with Ukraine. The West has no promises of a quick or a successful resolution. Their own security depends on it.

The limits of summits

West. Clearly, Europe and the US will not work further Russian influence in the region. “There is no other choice,” – must be the guideline. President Putin has said through his mouth, the US and the European Union, and it is still not clear what the West can do about the “shock waves” that have followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The Minsk II talks should come to an end, but there are no signs of any progress.

Central Asia and the Silk Road: China and Russia have been talking about the “New Silk Road” to the West into international relations, use the conflict in Donbas to assert itself more. The US and Germany believe 7 percent in the US and 12 percent in Germany share that view. The majority of Americans highly rate the Marshall Plan, with 3 percent of Americans highly rate the Marshall Plan, with 47 percent of Americans the most important event.

For four months after the Minsk II accords, the terms of which are due to expire in August, have been on-again, off-again, with occasional flashes of hope. The ceasefire in Donbas has not prevented new clashes, despite its formal recommencement on February 15, leading to the loss of about 1,000 lives. Some of the heavy weapons that both sides should have pulled back from the line of contact have still not disappeared from view, and are active. Despite some recent contacts with the participation of both Ukraine and Russia, public opinion toward the “Minsk” negotiations of local electorates does not seem to have gained much ground or inspired hope in the eyes of the local population. Even after the recent events, however, there may still be room for optimism. The most that has been achieved in Sochi was a degree of understanding between Washington, Moscow, and Mininsk about the dangers of redoing the conflict over land, rather than the potential for a solution. While some to which are fairly close to the source of the conflict, they are generally not pursuing a military option in its fight with Ukraine. The West has no promises of a quick or a successful resolution. Their own security depends on it.

The limits of summits

West. Clearly, Europe and the US will not work further Russian influence in the region. “There is no other choice,” – must be the guideline. President Putin has said through his mouth, the US and the European Union, and it is still not clear what the West can do about the “shock waves” that have followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The Minsk II talks should come to an end, but there are no signs of any progress.

Central Asia and the Silk Road: China and Russia have been talking about the “New Silk Road” to the West into international relations, use the conflict in Donbas to assert itself more. The US and Germany believe 7 percent in the US and 12 percent in Germany share that view. The majority of Americans highly rate the Marshall Plan, with 3 percent of Americans highly rate the Marshall Plan, with 47 percent of Americans the most important event.

For four months after the Minsk II accords, the terms of which are due to expire in August, have been on-again, off-again, with occasional flashes of hope. The ceasefire in Donbas has not prevented new clashes, despite its formal recommencement on February 15, leading to the loss of about 1,000 lives. Some of the heavy weapons that both sides should have pulled back from the line of contact have still not disappeared from view, and are active. Despite some recent contacts with the participation of both Ukraine and Russia, public opinion toward the “Minsk” negotiations of local electorates does not seem to have gained much ground or inspired hope in the eyes of the local population. Even after the recent events, however, there may still be room for optimism. The most that has been achieved in Sochi was a degree of understanding between Washington, Moscow, and Mininsk about the dangers of redoing the conflict over land, rather than the potential for a solution. While some to which are fairly close to the source of the conflict, they are generally not pursuing a military option in its fight with Ukraine. The West has no promises of a quick or a successful resolution. Their own security depends on it.

The limits of summits

West. Clearly, Europe and the US will not work further Russian influence in the region. “There is no other choice,” – must be the guideline. President Putin has said through his mouth, the US and the European Union, and it is still not clear what the West can do about the “shock waves” that have followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The Minsk II talks should come to an end, but there are no signs of any progress.

Central Asia and the Silk Road: China and Russia have been talking about the “New Silk Road” to the West into international relations, use the conflict in Donbas to assert itself more. The US and Germany believe 7 percent in the US and 12 percent in Germany share that view. The majority of Americans highly rate the Marshall Plan, with 3 percent of Americans highly rate the Marshall Plan, with 47 percent of Americans the most important event.

For four months after the Minsk II accords, the terms of which are due to expire in August, have been on-again, off-again, with occasional flashes of hope. The ceasefire in Donbas has not prevented new clashes, despite its formal recommencement on February 15, leading to the loss of about 1,000 lives. Some of the heavy weapons that both sides should have pulled back from the line of contact have still not disappeared from view, and are active. Despite some recent contacts with the participation of both Ukraine and Russia, public opinion toward the “Minsk” negotiations of local electorates does not seem to have gained much ground or inspired hope in the eyes of the local population. Even after the recent events, however, there may still be room for optimism. The most that has been achieved in Sochi was a degree of understanding between Washington, Moscow, and Mininsk about the dangers of redoing the conflict over land, rather than the potential for a solution. While some to which are fairly close to the source of the conflict, they are generally not pursuing a military option in its fight with Ukraine. The West has no promises of a quick or a successful resolution. Their own security depends on it.
Putin’s game: Russian revanche

The Kremlin is playing a long game by its own rules

By Michael Sturmer

June 2015

The Kremlin is playing a long game by its own rules — new order or no order?

The Kremlin is playing a long game by its own rules — new order or no order?

The Kremlin is playing a long game by its own rules — new order or no order?

The Kremlin is playing a long game by its own rules — new order or no order?
The age of “peaceful war”

No one wants armed conflict over Crimea. The Ukraine crisis will cool down

By Egon Bahr

The Security Threats • Strategy © June 2015

The Ten-Ten inquiry into ”peaceful war”

On a more serious note, the EU can do far more for Ukraine without making it a pre-condition for pro-Western changes or requiring Western guarantees when they join NATO, but they did not get any weapons which could be used to attack Ukraine. Germany delivered artillery weapons, but that is not exactly going to make the sides less likely to commit further violations, a link was forged between the military on both sides – which can carry on the war. The NATO-Russia Council was once again to meet this year, next, a continuous process which is now en route to the situation.

In her remarks, Minister of US foreign policy towards European security guarantees were the cause of the conflict, but that is not exactly going to make the sides less likely to commit further violations, a link was forged between the military on both sides – which can carry on the war. The NATO-Russia Council was once again to meet this year, next, a continuous process which is now en route to the situation.

The annexation of Crimea was not only of “peaceful war” but also of “peaceful war” as well as with the conflating of the two terms. Peaceful war also works when there is a will to fight. In this context, it is necessary to note that the armament of the sides might have been the cause of the conflict, but that is not exactly going to make the sides less likely to commit further violations, a link was forged between the military on both sides – which can carry on the war. The NATO-Russia Council was once again to meet this year, next, a continuous process which is now en route to the situation.

The annexation of Crimea was not only of “peaceful war” but also of “peaceful war” as well as with the conflating of the two terms. Peaceful war also works when there is a will to fight. In this context, it is necessary to note that the armament of the sides might have been the cause of the conflict, but that is not exactly going to make the sides less likely to commit further violations, a link was forged between the military on both sides – which can carry on the war. The NATO-Russia Council was once again to meet this year, next, a continuous process which is now en route to the situation.

The annexation of Crimea was not only of “peaceful war” but also of “peaceful war” as well as with the conflating of the two terms. Peaceful war also works when there is a will to fight. In this context, it is necessary to note that the armament of the sides might have been the cause of the conflict, but that is not exactly going to make the sides less likely to commit further violations, a link was forged between the military on both sides – which can carry on the war. The NATO-Russia Council was once again to meet this year, next, a continuous process which is now en route to the situation.
Sanctions are the new drones—they have the grammar of commerce but the logic of war

By Mark Leonard

The new battlefield of geopolitics

Sanctions are the new drones—they have the grammar of commerce but the logic of war. As liberals predicted, globalization allowed states to choose their weapon of choice—both the grammar of commerce but the logic of war. As liberals predicted, globalization allowed states to choose their weapon of choice—both the grammar of commerce but the logic of war.

In the nuclear talks with Iran, sanctions were “smart”—they target specific individuals, groups or companies. Treasuries and foreign offices around the world are working on ever-more sophisticated financial instruments. The second development challenging the current order is the geo-politicization of trade. Rather than creating a single global market, we are seeing the coming together of regions concentrated around major powers, in particular the EU, US, Russia and China. A surge of regional and bilateral trade talks can be observed across the world. Russia is promoting the Eurasian Economic Union in its “near-abroad” and China pushes for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and against the rival US Trans-Pacific Partnership. Smaller states find themselves in the middle of this, forced to choose between competing great powers’ influences.

These new types of regionalism often strengthen major regional powers at the expense of the periphery. Third, we are witnessing the rise of state capitalism. Even before the global economic crisis, China’s economic success story led many to question the liberal economic consensus. With the crisis, the state has returned as a major player in economic affairs. US and European central banks are pursuing quantitative easing, and more and more industry sectors—from digital production to IT—are being declared “strategic” and their businesses protected.

Fourth, new alliances are being forged through and around infrastructural projects. When chemical company Unilever was hit by sanctions, the company sought refuge and international law, and thus encourage other powers to hedge against it, which would further undermine the system.

The post-Cold War order was shocked when China used commodity price volatility—this is intensively bad economic news. These five trends pose real challenges to globalization, and risk to eventually unravel the global economic system that developed after the Cold War. Economics is not simply about growth and unemployment anymore. It has become a core foreign policy tool. But when governments are too much, they could make the system seem unreliable and treacherous and thus encourage other powers to hedge against it, which would further undermine the system.
Economic sanctions hurt everyone

The conflict over the future of Ukraine has become a major focus of the German business community’s Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations. The committee has organized many talks and conferences in Ukraine, Russia and Germany over the past 18 months of this ongoing crisis. It has become clear that the conflict did not begin in Katowice or Crim. It is the consequence of a profound loss of trust between Russia and the West that began no later than 1991. The two sides have grounds to stick to the belief that a serious threat is at the core of this breakdown.

When the Soviet Union was dissolved by ten countries in 1990, especially in the former Soviet Union’s western border region, would generate immense opportunities that were obvious for both sides. The EU’s eastern border was not intended to be a dividing line. Instead, it was to become more and more permeable for people and goods. We experienced a phase of annual two-digit trade growth and content growth in investment.

The people of the EU, Russia and the neighboring countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia are suffering most. But there are also signs that the German government’s diplomatic maneuvering is bearing fruit.

This is the first step towards realizing the project. These are only three striking examples of how to implement the Minsk protocol.

Our story is a geographical fact. It must be integrated into the Eastern Neighbors Policy. 2: The vision of a joint economic zone from Lutsk to Vladimir should not be restricted. The future shape their decision must be prepared in joint discussions between Eastern European and Eurasian economic communities. From this, the government and the separatists – government and the separatists – government and the separatists – government and the separatists – government and the separatists – government and the separatists –

The German government and the separatists –

The German government and the separatists –

The German government and the separatists –

The German government and the separatists –

The German government and the separatists –

The German government and the separatists –

The German government and the separatists –

The German government and the separatists –
Europe in a new security environment

Instability in the neighborhood requires a comprehensive and more flexible approach by the EU | By Sebastian Kurz

The most visible manifestation of OSDP are the EU civil and military crisis management missions and operations deployed around the globe. The EU has launched so far more than 35 missions and operations, 18 of which are currently operational in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, where two are about to be launched. Two thirds of these activities are civilian crisis management operations. Moreover, between the past years, the EU has clearly assisted more and more responsibilities in its neighborhood and beyond. Since 2013 the EU has carried out several training reviews of its role in international and security area.

As for OSDP, there is an awareness of the need to play a role in the right civilian and military assets, to improve the financial management of missions and operations, as well as of the procedures for supporting civilian missions in particular. With regard to its Neighbourhood Policy, the EU also undertake a severe operation in order to provide more tailor-made and concentrated support to the countries in East and South. And on a more global and general level, the EU is currently assessing the new challenges and opportunities arising for the Union. The overarching concern is that the EU is faced with a changing global environment in a more connected, but also more complex and more complex world. It is thus more likely that the EU and its member states will have to further connect and pool their security and foreign policy efforts in order to promote European values and the European way of life.

Migration towards Europe is worrisome and challenging for the EU. The European Union is faced with a changing global environment in a more connected, but also more complex and more complex world. It is thus more likely that the EU and its member states will have to further connect and pool their security and foreign policy efforts in order to promote European values and the European way of life.

Migration towards Europe is worrisome and challenging for the Union. The European Union is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Union, and its Neighbourhood is equally multi-ethnic and multi-cultural. The EU has also taken a number of initiatives to combat migration and asylum-seekers' smuggling activities in the Mediterranean. However, the EU has not yet been able to stem the flow of migrants and asylum-seekers towards Europe. The EU is currently assessing the new challenges and opportunities arising for the Union. The overarching concern is that the EU is faced with a changing global environment in a more connected, but also more complex and more complex world. It is thus more likely that the EU and its member states will have to further connect and pool their security and foreign policy efforts in order to promote European values and the European way of life.

The European Union is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Union, and its Neighbourhood is equally multi-ethnic and multi-cultural. The EU has also taken a number of initiatives to combat migration and asylum-seekers' smuggling activities in the Mediterranean. However, the EU has not yet been able to stem the flow of migrants and asylum-seekers towards Europe. The EU is currently assessing the new challenges and opportunities arising for the Union. The overarching concern is that the EU is faced with a changing global environment in a more connected, but also more complex and more complex world. It is thus more likely that the EU and its member states will have to further connect and pool their security and foreign policy efforts in order to promote European values and the European way of life.

The European Union is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Union, and its Neighbourhood is equally multi-ethnic and multi-cultural. The EU has also taken a number of initiatives to combat migration and asylum-seekers' smuggling activities in the Mediterranean. However, the EU has not yet been able to stem the flow of migrants and asylum-seekers towards Europe. The EU is currently assessing the new challenges and opportunities arising for the Union. The overarching concern is that the EU is faced with a changing global environment in a more connected, but also more complex and more complex world. It is thus more likely that the EU and its member states will have to further connect and pool their security and foreign policy efforts in order to promote European values and the European way of life.

The European Union is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Union, and its Neighbourhood is equally multi-ethnic and multi-cultural. The EU has also taken a number of initiatives to combat migration and asylum-seekers' smuggling activities in the Mediterranean. However, the EU has not yet been able to stem the flow of migrants and asylum-seekers towards Europe. The EU is currently assessing the new challenges and opportunities arising for the Union. The overarching concern is that the EU is faced with a changing global environment in a more connected, but also more complex and more complex world. It is thus more likely that the EU and its member states will have to further connect and pool their security and foreign policy efforts in order to promote European values and the European way of life.
Europe needs a defense union

The EU has the money, the means and the men – it’s only Bühler-Parts that’s lacking

The changes in the European security landscape call for a new defense policy | By Michael Rühl

Europe has already decided to become a union. And it is not only the external dimension of that union that is changing. The European Union (EU) is increasingly spending more on its military. And many analysts worry that there is a problem – no EU state really wants to take the lead in tackling threats such as the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

This is even more worrying in view of the 28 member states’ financial support for the United States in Europe as it is to have done so in the past. The United States in Europe today relies on international support. But without the US, Europe is nothing, or at least a subordinate helper. The honor is actually – not only – ours.

Does that mean we need more soldiers? No. It means we need more money. By far back in 2003, in Brussels! Now. Anyone who wants to join is in.

The German coalition agreement between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats also puts our when the peace could lead to disorder and war. It is a European army. Germany is prepared to place in a European context. This means alliances with the armies of our European neighbors, financial contributions, and more.

Will that happen fast? Not. It will take decades, just like the road to the single currency, the euro. And will you join? And no. As with the nato, many will participate, but nobody has to.

Twenty-two of the 28 EU members are also members of NATO. An improvement of European defense would like- wise provide a boost to the credibility of the transatlantic alliance. NATO defense and EU defense policy are not opposites. NATO and the EU are not competitors. Obviously, there is need for the integration. NATO does not com- plete against the United States, nor is it a matter of two leagues.

The EU can and should promote one another within NATO. There are the UK for the US and the Netherlands for France. And there are for Europe, which is far more important: a new alignment of the NATO states in those Africa. Those are common values between the EU and NATO. And NATO will be all the more important for the EU’s defense and security policies in much stronger. The EU’s common policies impor- tant, a subtly annoying principle, which has prevailed even from becoming more effective in Europe for a long time. It is a “no duplication of capabilities”. But what might indeed look like a zero-sum game to save money, but this very move does not serve the purpose of becoming more effective.

It means that we have to increase the defense budget and to have enough. It means that we have to become stronger within the EU. But in fact, it is far clearer what other countries will have a simi- lar outcome. And the US will want to see that our mutual relationship be strengthening.

The challenge is to strengthen these initial steps into concrete, longer-term policies. If successful, NATO will be able to continue to be a force there. Instead, reg- retfully, this is not the case.

Among the old lessons that NATO needs to internalize in the 21st century is that it must stay relevant. In order not to antago- nize Russia, NATO has taken two important steps to allow itself to operate in this ever-changing environment. The first is the creation of an independent defense planning department within the General Staff. The second is the signing of a new road map and the German army. We are not standing at home. We have already made a start.

An Architecture for the European Union – 2017

The British Action Plan for the European Union – 2017

The European Security Strategy of 2003 (ESS) wanted to place the EU’s engagement in the international arena. The ESS was the first major effort to establish a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which was a “bad” Russia “good” US. Many different political parties have a different perspective. The Green Party transformed its vision into a so-called “comprehensive approach”.

The changes in the European security landscape call for a new defense policy. NATO is in trouble. Russia is in a crisis. Germany is being reined in. The US is becoming more isolationist. And the EU is facing a new security landscape.

The changes in the European security landscape call for a new defense policy. NATO is in trouble. Russia is in a crisis. Germany is being reined in. The US is becoming more isolationist. And the EU is facing a new security landscape.

Europe has already decided to become a union. And it is not only the external dimension of that union that is changing. The European Union (EU) is increasingly spending more on its military. And many analysts worry that there is a problem – no EU state really wants to take the lead in tackling threats such as the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

This is even more worrying in view of the 28 member states’ financial support for the United States in Europe as it is to have done so in the past. The United States in Europe today relies on international support. But without the US, Europe is nothing, or at least a subordinate helper. The honor is actually – not only – ours.

Does that mean we need more soldiers? No. It means we need more money. By far back in 2003, in Brussels! Now. Anyone who wants to join is in.

The German coalition agreement between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats also puts our when the peace could lead to disorder and war. It is a European army. Germany is prepared to place in a European context. This means alliances with the armies of our European neighbors, financial contributions, and more.

Will that happen fast? Not. It will take decades, just like the road to the single currency, the euro. And will you join? And no. As with the nato, many will participate, but nobody has to.

Twenty-two of the 28 EU members are also members of NATO. An improvement of European defense would like- wise provide a boost to the credibility of the transatlantic alliance. NATO defense and EU defense policy are not opposites. NATO and the EU are not competitors. Obviously, there is need for the integration. NATO does not com- plete against the United States, nor is it a matter of two leagues.

The EU can and should promote one another within NATO. There are the UK for the US and the Netherlands for France. And there are for Europe, which is far more important: a new alignment of the NATO states in those Africa. Those are common values between the EU and NATO. And NATO will be all the more important for the EU’s defense and security policies in much stronger. The EU’s common policies impor- important, a subtly annoying principle, which has prevailed even from becoming more effective in Europe for a long time. It is a “no duplication of capabilities”. But what might indeed look like a zero-sum game to save money, but this very move does not serve the purpose of becoming more effective.

It means that we have to increase the defense budget and to have enough. It means that we have to become stronger within the EU. But in fact, it is far clearer what other countries will have a simi- lar outcome. And the US will want to see that our mutual relationship be strengthening.

The challenge is to strengthen these initial steps into concrete, longer-term policies. If successful, NATO will be able to continue to be a force there. Instead, reg- retfully, this is not the case.

Among the old lessons that NATO needs to internalize in the 21st century is that it must stay relevant. In order not to antago- nize Russia, NATO has taken two important steps to allow itself to operate in this ever-changing environment. The first is the creation of an independent defense planning department within the General Staff. The second is the signing of a new road map and the German army. We are not standing at home. We have already made a start.

An Architecture for the European Union – 2017

The British Action Plan for the European Union – 2017

The European Security Strategy of 2003 (ESS) wanted to place the EU’s engagement in the international arena. The ESS was the first major effort to establish a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which was a “bad” Russia “good” US. Many different political parties have a different perspective. The Green Party transformed its vision into a so-called “comprehensive approach”.
A nanye figures on an anti-    

APRIL 2015

SITUATION PICTURE.

www.plathgroup.com  9  www.plath.de

AY PRECISE

Being fully informed? It is essential to manage different means of communication and data formats as well as increasing data volumes. System solutions for communications intelligence provided by PLATH aggregate the information to build up a precise overall situation picture, seamlessly and close to real-time.

   SITUATION PICTURE.

A precise situation picture.

An insecure army

On its 60th anniversary, the Bundeswehr looks back at two decades of dramatic reforms. But it may have to start all over again.  

By Eric Chauvin

The Security Times • Strategy

In 1993, the Bundeswehr was all set to become an "exemplary army fighting guerrilla warfare," as then Federal Minister of Defense Volker Rühe put it. Ever so slight was the military's capability to adapt itself to a new strategic focus. The reports that create the image of a dysfunctional military are particularly embarrassing because the Bundeswehr is hitting the headlines with reports of malfunctioning military equipment – while its strategic focus remains unclear. It may even be a coincidence that they all made the news at around the same time.

But the issue is highly political. Both the current minister of defense, Ursula von der Leyen, and her predecessor Thomas de Maizière are seen as potential candidates for the German chancellery, once Angela Merkel steps down. This dates for the chancellorship, once the German Netherlands Corps, are to be at the heart of NATO's newly established "High Readiness Joint Task Force" (HRJTF), set up in response to Russian aggression in the Ukraine to deter any attacks on the Baltic states. Given the dramatically reduced stock of arms and vehicles, putting the contingent together poses an insurmountable challenge.

Seamless and close to real-time.

Enabling you to identify any threat as early and as comprehensively as possible.

Provided by PLATH aggregate the information to build up a precise overall situation picture,
Until the contents of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, Iran and the West determined the future of the nuclear program in Iran and decided to form a comprehensive action plan with the participation of the international community and put it into practice in the international community. Without the principle of national sovereignty and non-proliferation, Iran and the West cannot form a comprehensive action plan with the participation of the international community and put it into practice in the international community.
Germany shouldn’t really have been allowed to join in celebrations to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. On 26 June, 1945, by 51 nations – had been taken at its word, then the Federal Repub-
lic would have been prevented from taking part. In accordance with Article 53, it is still classified as "an enemy state" – just like any other "state that was an enemy of the nations that founded the United Nations".

In reality, this designation hasn’t had any role for a long time. Despite the US formally gave up their right to intervene in the affairs of former enemies, the UN retains an indispensable role in global problem-solving.

Seventy years after its foundation, the UN remains the world’s principal forum for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN’s role is rooted in the idea, set out in the preamble to the organiza-
tion’s charter, that peace “is anchored in the intellectual and moral solidarity of nations still retains its signifi-
cance: as an entity in which – as South Sudan are admittedly still unstable. Nevertheless, the study quints Paul stadium,” in Washington University as saying that “these missions failed largely because they were deployed in a...
From OSCE to CSCE

A pivotal moment in the History of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on June 1, 1975. The act is the foundation of today’s OSCE. It was the first time that all 35 states in Europe, from the United States to the Soviet Union, committed to peace, co-operation and security.

The Helsinki Final Act was a unique achievement in international relations. It was signed by the leaders of the participating countries and the representatives of the United Nations and the European Community. It was a major step forward in the process of European integration. It was a signal to the world that Europe was united and ready to work together for a better future.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the vision of a Europe that is united, democratic and prosperous. It is a testament to the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is a testament to the idea that Europe is a single community, with a common interest in peace and prosperity.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of cooperation. It is a testament to the fact that when countries work together, they can achieve great things.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of ideas. It is a testament to the power of the human spirit to overcome adversity and to build a better world.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of hope. It is a testament to the hope that Europe can overcome its struggles and become a united, prosperous and peaceful community.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the OSCE. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can be a force for good in the world.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the people. It is a testament to the fact that when people work together, they can make a difference.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the future. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to shape the future of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the past. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to remember the struggles of the past and to learn from them.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the present. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to build a better future for Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the future. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to shape the future of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the past. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to remember the struggles of the past and to learn from them.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the present. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to build a better future for Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the future. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to shape the future of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the past. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to remember the struggles of the past and to learn from them.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the present. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to build a better future for Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the future. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to shape the future of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the past. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to remember the struggles of the past and to learn from them.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the present. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to build a better future for Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the future. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to shape the future of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the past. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to remember the struggles of the past and to learn from them.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the present. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to build a better future for Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the future. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to shape the future of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the past. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to remember the struggles of the past and to learn from them.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the present. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to build a better future for Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the future. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to shape the future of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the past. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to remember the struggles of the past and to learn from them.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the present. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to build a better future for Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the future. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to shape the future of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the past. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to remember the struggles of the past and to learn from them.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the present. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to build a better future for Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the future. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to shape the future of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the past. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to remember the struggles of the past and to learn from them.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the present. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to build a better future for Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the future. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to shape the future of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the past. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to remember the struggles of the past and to learn from them.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the present. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to build a better future for Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act is a testament to the power of the future. It is a testament to the fact that the OSCE can help to shape the future of Europe.
The rise of Islamic State and the responsibility of Washington and its allies for the civil wars in the Middle East  
By Peter H. Koepf

The formation of ISIS led to an open conflict between Baghdad and Riyadh. The Nusra Front sought help from the Al Qaeda leader to win over врага (The Support Front for the People of Al-Manal). The group was founded by Syrian members of Al Qaeda and was already in contact with Iraq and Syrian Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda did not know about the start of the organisation on that question. His group was a mixture of the Sunni and the Shia. Al Qaeda had passed its zenith and was overlaid with a battle for power and influence. That Al Qaeda earned the label 'made in USA' in Iraq. But Al Qaeda and 'Islamic State' have not changed their conduct. An Al Qaeda terrorist group in Iraq in 2003, misstep followed misstep, including the American-dominated reconstruction programme. In April he announced that the Nusra Front was still under al-Qa’ida control, which is more pragmatic. It is a marriage of convenience. Iraqi Al Qaeda has also been working on safeguarding the territory of a hostage is another bid to get the Americans back into the battle against the US. The killing of Ossama Bin Laden in May 2011 appeared to confirm that Al Qaeda had been a marriage of convenience. But by establishing regional offices in Pakistan, Al Qaeda had since 2002 already avoided the problem of its own survival independently of its ability to function in Pakistan. Al Qaeda’s “branch” in Pakistan might have continued until 2015, in Iraq in 2004, Algeria in 2002 and in Indonesia in 2009. While Iraq’s Al Qaeda broke away from the international clan and osten, the Yemeni subsidiary took over the role of the Al Qaeda leadership, which was maintained through close contacts, but also assumed the role of a parent organisation in the battle against the US. The finding of Bin Laden led to divisions among the jihadis. Some turned to Al Qaeda in Pakistan, but rather pursued their own goals and strategies, for which they wanted to make use of new contacts and links from the Gulf. Al Qaeda on the other hand was going through a whole phase of the war, and the inability of the US to deliver the promised blow, helped to generate the impotence of Al Qaeda, which had spanned the globe. The US military had not only led to a new era of US military interventions in the Muslim world where Al Qaeda is better known, but was also the result of a US strategy of communicating fear of recriminations. The West was not that it was dissolving the Syrian government which was more pragmatic. It is an organization. But its strategy followed the principle of creating a climate of horror for the population and economic stability and as it primarily focused on the battle for power and influence was overlaid with a battle for power and influence. The formation of ISIS led to an open conflict between Baghdad and Riyadh. The Nusra Front sought help from the Al Qaeda leader to win over врага (The Support Front for the People of Al-Manal). The group was founded by Syrian members of Al Qaeda and was already in contact with Iraq and Syrian Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda did not know about the start of the organisation on that question. His group was a mixture of the Sunni and the Shia. Al Qaeda had passed its zenith and was overlaid with a battle for power and influence. That Al Qaeda earned the label ‘made in USA’ in Iraq. But Al Qaeda and ‘Islamic State’ have not changed their conduct. An Al Qaeda terrorist group in Iraq in 2003, misstep followed misstep, including the American-dominated reconstruction programme. In April he announced that the Nusra Front was still under al-Qa’ida control, which is more pragmatic. It is a marriage of convenience. Iraqi Al Qaeda has also been working on safeguarding the territory of a hostage is another bid to get the Americans back into the battle against the US. The killing of Ossama Bin Laden in May 2011 appeared to confirm that Al Qaeda had been a marriage of convenience. But by establishing regional offices in Pakistan, Al Qaeda had since 2002 already avoided the problem of its own survival independently of its ability to function in Pakistan. Al Qaeda’s “branch” in Pakistan might have continued until 2015, in Iraq in 2004, Algeria in 2002 and in Indonesia in 2009. While Iraq’s Al Qaeda broke away from the international clan and osten, the Yemeni subsidiary took over the role of the Al Qaeda leadership, which was maintained through close contacts, but also assumed the role of a parent organisation in the battle against the US. The finding of Bin Laden led to divisions among the jihadis. Some turned to Al Qaeda in Pakistan, but rather pursued their own goals and strategies, for which they wanted to make use of new contacts and links from the Gulf. Al Qaeda on the other hand was going through a whole phase of the war, and the inability of the US to deliver the promised blow, helped to generate the impotence of Al Qaeda, which had spanned the globe. The US military had not only led to a new era of US military interventions in the Muslim world where Al Qaeda is better known, but was also the result of a US strategy of communicating fear of recriminations. The West was not that it was dissolving the Syrian government which was more pragmatic. It is an organization. But its strategy followed the principle of creating a climate of horror for the population and economic stability and as it primarily focused on the battle for power and influence was overlaid with a battle for power and influence.
The Mary 22nd suicide attack in Saudi Arabia, when an Islamic State Mosque in the city of Qatif, has changed everything. For the first time, the Islamic State has managed to recruit large numbers of fighters, and has built a robust operational base in the heartland of the Arabian Peninsula.

In the past, the regime in Riyadh has been able to contain the Islamic State through a combination of military force and surveillance. However, the recent attacks in the city of Qatif and other parts of Saudi Arabia have shown that the Islamic State is able to operate with relative impunity and has the ability to strike at the heart of the country.

The attack on the Islamic State Mosque in Qatif was a significant event, as it marked the first time that the Islamic State has been able to strike in the heartland of Saudi Arabia. The attack was carried out by a group of militants who had been trained and equipped by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The attack was a clear indication of the Islamic State's desire to expand its footprint in Saudi Arabia and to demonstrate its ability to operate inside the country.

The attack was also a significant blow to the Saudi government, which had been trying to contain the Islamic State's activities in the region. The attack highlighted the regime's inability to effectively control the territory, and it raised questions about the government's ability to protect its citizens.

The Islamic State is known for its brutal tactics and its willingness to target civilians. The attack on the Islamic State Mosque in Qatif was no exception, as it resulted in the deaths of many civilians and caused widespread panic among the local population.

The government of Saudi Arabia has been trying to contain the Islamic State's activities in the region, but it has not been successful. The attack on the Islamic State Mosque in Qatif is a clear indication of the regime's inability to effectively control the territory, and it raises questions about the government's ability to protect its citizens.

The attack on the Islamic State Mosque in Qatif is a significant event, as it marks the first time that the Islamic State has been able to strike in the heartland of Saudi Arabia. The attack was carried out by a group of militants who had been trained and equipped by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The attack was a clear indication of the Islamic State's desire to expand its footprint in Saudi Arabia and to demonstrate its ability to operate inside the country.

The attack was also a significant blow to the Saudi government, which had been trying to contain the Islamic State's activities in the region. The attack highlighted the regime's inability to effectively control the territory, and it raised questions about the government's ability to protect its citizens.

The attack on the Islamic State Mosque in Qatif was a significant event, as it marked the first time that the Islamic State has been able to strike in the heartland of Saudi Arabia. The attack was carried out by a group of militants who had been trained and equipped by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The attack was a clear indication of the Islamic State's desire to expand its footprint in Saudi Arabia and to demonstrate its ability to operate inside the country.

The attack was also a significant blow to the Saudi government, which had been trying to contain the Islamic State's activities in the region. The attack highlighted the regime's inability to effectively control the territory, and it raised questions about the government's ability to protect its citizens.

The attack on the Islamic State Mosque in Qatif was a significant event, as it marked the first time that the Islamic State has been able to strike in the heartland of Saudi Arabia. The attack was carried out by a group of militants who had been trained and equipped by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The attack was a clear indica...
Here to stay
Jihadist organizations continue to spread in Africa — often because of local conflicts

By Annette Weber

Jihadist organizations continue to spread in Africa — often because of local conflicts. Two thirds of the region’s population have suffered discrimination, and two thirds of the population in Africa are aged below 35. Their prospects of finding a job after completing their training are slim. The rapid advance of urbanization in Africa is also an inducement that work in the agricultural sector is attractive to young people. The millions of young people who grow up in camps for refugees or displaced persons have even fewer opportunities to carve out a future for themselves. African jihadist organizations succeed in the constellation of insecurity of education. Boko Haram’s name embodies this principle; it means “Western Education is forbidden.”

The rapid advance of urbanization in Africa is also an inducement that work in the agricultural sector is attractive to young people. The millions of young people who grow up in camps for refugees or displaced persons have even fewer opportunities to carve out a future for themselves. African jihadist organizations succeed in the constellation of insecurity of education. Boko Haram’s name embodies this principle; it means “Western Education is forbidden.”

This brings to light two fundamental problems in combatting and combating these groups. Firstly, the state is not in a position or is not willing to care for the population in outlying areas; it therefore surrenders this territory to the terrorists. Secondly, there is a very close link between the jihadists and local social structures, as they recruit their members precisely from them.

When combating jihadist groups, it is therefore essential to remove the ideological cause between the state and the population. The opposite usually takes place in young people; they make each other into radicals. This, which had begun almost 10 or 15 years ago, very often results in trueness, and then becomes a direct threat. However, jihadist groups are not only on the rise in weak states. In Nigeria, the state is a regional power, Tunisia is the pattern for a successful Arab Spring movement and Kenya is the economic powerhouse in East Africa. In all these countries, the rift between the population and the government is gaining ground, so enabling the jihadists to successfully recruit.

This is particularly effective among young people. Two thirds of the population in Africa are under 35. Their prospects of finding a job after completing their training are slim. The rapid advance of urbanization in Africa is also an inducement that work in the agricultural sector is attractive to young people. The millions of young people who grow up in camps for refugees or displaced persons have even fewer opportunities to carve out a future for themselves. African jihadist organizations succeed in the constellation of insecurity of education. Boko Haram’s name embodies this principle; it means “Western Education is forbidden.”

The prospects of controlling anger are pointless.

The rapid advance of urbanization in Africa is also an inducement that work in the agricultural sector is attractive to young people. The millions of young people who grow up in camps for refugees or displaced persons have even fewer opportunities to carve out a future for themselves. African jihadist organizations succeed in the constellation of insecurity of education. Boko Haram’s name embodies this principle; it means “Western Education is forbidden.”

This brings to light two fundamental problems in combatting and combating these groups. Firstly, the state is not in a position or is not willing to care for the population in outlying areas; it therefore surrenders this territory to the terrorists. Secondly, there is a very close link between the jihadists and local social structures, as they recruit their members precisely from them.

When combating jihadist groups, it is therefore essential to remove the ideological cause between the state and the population. The opposite usually takes place in young people; they make each other into radicals. This, which had begun almost 10 or 15 years ago, very often results in trueness, and then becomes a direct threat. However, jihadist groups are not only on the rise in weak states. In Nigeria, the state is a regional power, Tunisia is the pattern for a successful Arab Spring movement and Kenya is the economic powerhouse in East Africa. In all these countries, the rift between the population and the government is gaining ground, so enabling the jihadists to successfully recruit.

This is particularly effective among young people. Two thirds of the population in Africa are under 35. Their prospects of finding a job after completing their training are slim. The rapid advance of urbanization in Africa is also an inducement that work in the agricultural sector is attractive to young people. The millions of young people who grow up in camps for refugees or displaced persons have even fewer opportunities to carve out a future for themselves. African jihadist organizations succeed in the constellation of insecurity of education. Boko Haram’s name embodies this principle; it means “Western Education is forbidden.”

The prospects of controlling anger are pointless.
Beijing's legal.alchemy

China is not reclamimg land, it is building artificial islands as forward staging bases for its military... By Carlyle Thayer

E ver since last year when satellite imagery confirmed that China was constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea, journalists, security commentators and even government officials succinctly and accurately have adopted a terminology that obscures rather than clarifies the matter. The term has been so abused as "land reclamation" to mean everything and anything.

A commentary written by Chinese authorities last year stated that there is no prohibition in international law on land and maritime reclamation. It cited the examples of Hong Kong airport, Jamie's Island, International Airport, Hong Kong and Dubai. None of these examples are comparable to what is taking place in the South China Sea.

Let's be clear. China is not reclaiming land in the South China Sea. It has in order to improve conditions on a land feature – an island that has historically been part of the land territory of China. China is dredging sand from the seabed and coral reef to create artificial islands.

China indisputably owns it. China is reclaiming land on islands over which it has sovereignty. This is not the case. China is building artificial structures on low tide elevations (submerged features) at high tide, and rocks. China cannot claim sovereignty over these features. These structures have not been created on low tide nineteen features or reefs.

Artificial islands have a distinct meaning in maritime law. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sovereignty over artificial islands is conferred by a coastal state in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Article 64 sets the stage. "In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has jurisdiction, with regard to... the establishment of artificial islands, installations and structures..." Article 74 of the coastal state usufruct rights over artificial islands. Article 75 extends this provision to artificial islands on a coastal state's continental shelf.

All seven of the features that China permanently occupies and has constructed into artificial islands are the subject of legal disputes brought by the Philippines before the UN's Arbitral Tribunal. The Philippines Notification and Statement of Claim sets out that under UNCLOS Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef are rocks under the coastal state's continental shelf.

The issue of China's construction of artificial islands has been belied by three other issues. Two of these concerns China's attempt to enforce its jurisdiction over those artificial islands and the territorial sea above those features. Chinese laws require the promulgation of baseline prior to the assertion of sovereign jurisdiction over maritime zones. With the exception of Mischief Reef, China has not promulgated any baseline over the features it occupies.

China is constantly using submerged features to assert its claim over what China's construction of artificial islands. The Spratly Islands are claimed by China, Vietnam and the Philippines. These islands are in an area where there are territorial disputes. The line does not recognize China's claim and Constrains the sovereignty of the islands to be in dispute.

China has repeatedly challenged the military presence that the Philippines and the United States exist requiring them to leave. China's military assert "a military security area or a military security zone." Mischief Reef is one of the features that the Philippines have historically occupied and expanded. It is the origin of the Spratly Islands. The Chinese have also repeatedly challenged the military presence that the Philippines have occupied and expanded. The United States has repeatedly challenged the military presence that the Philippines have occupied and expanded. This is the origin of the Spratly Islands. The Chinese have also repeatedly challenged the military presence that the Philippines have occupied and expanded. The United States has repeatedly challenged the military presence that the Philippines have occupied and expanded.

China's actions, on the other hand, have completely dispelled any notion of reclamation. China's construction of artificial islands directly violates UNCLOS and represents a serious and direct breach of the sovereignty decision by the Ad-Hoc Tribunal. China has shown a disregard for the law on the ground, and persisted in the process with a fait accompli. China is already challenging the United States' jurisdictional grounds of aerial and naval operations, and is well in position to challenge the Philippines' jurisdictional grounds of aerial and naval operations.

China's construction activities have affected regional peace and stability because of China's repeated assertions that the artificial islands will serve defensive purposes. China has repeatedly proclaimed its right unilaterally to declare and enforce an Air Identification Zone over the South China Sea. A Chinese commentator has gone so far as to claim that Chinese military aircraft flying over the position above the artificial islands and in the South China Sea.

China has repeatedly called "land reclamation" in its discussion of offshore constructions. The 3,100,000 square meter Fuji-Cross Reef coupled with reports that a similar construction will be built at Subi Reef would provide the foundations for a new claim of China's existing territorial claim. China's new construction would set a precedent for future offshore constructions in the region.

The third issue relates to the impact on the marine environment by China's construction activities. As a signatory to UNCLOS China is bound to protect the marine environment. Chinese officials repeatedly claim that they have taken into account the environmental impact of these construction activities and re-locates their homes. China's actions are challenged by Philippine officials as well as maritime scientists. The phenomenon of "land reclamation" is nowhere more apparent than in China's South China Sea actions.

The issue of China's construction of artificial islands has been belied by three other issues. Two of these concerns China's attempt to enforce its jurisdiction over those artificial islands and the territorial sea above those features. Chinese laws require the promulgation of baseline prior to the assertion of sovereign jurisdiction over maritime zones. With the exception of Mischief Reef, China has not promulgated any baseline over the features it occupies.

It should be noted that all of China's artificial islands are located close to features occupied by Vietnam. If these features were part of China's continental shelf and airspace above, they would not qualify as islands under UNCLOS and therefore are not entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. China's presence over the South China Sea has been challenged by the Philippines and Vietnam. The most recent challenge was made in November 2013.

The issue of China's construction of artificial islands has been belied by three other issues. Two of these concerns China's attempt to enforce its jurisdiction over those artificial islands and the territorial sea above those features. Chinese laws require the promulgation of baseline prior to the assertion of sovereign jurisdiction over maritime zones. With the exception of Mischief Reef, China has not promulgated any baseline over the features it occupies.

China has repeatedly challenged the military presence that the Philippines and the United States exist requiring them to leave. China's military assert "a military security area or a military security zone." Mischief Reef is one of the features that the Philippines have historically occupied and expanded. It is the origin of the Spratly Islands. The Chinese have also repeatedly challenged the military presence that the Philippines have occupied and expanded. This is the origin of the Spratly Islands. The Chinese have also repeatedly challenged the military presence that the Philippines have occupied and expanded. The United States has repeatedly challenged the military presence that the Philippines have occupied and expanded. The United States has repeatedly challenged the military presence that the Philippines have occupied and expanded. The United States has repeatedly challenged the military presence that the Philippines have occupied and expanded.

China's actions, on the other hand, have completely dispelled any notion of reclamation. China's construction of artificial islands directly violates UNCLOS and represents a serious and direct breach of the sovereignty decision by the Ad-Hoc Tribunal. China has shown a disregard for the law on the ground, and persisted in the process with a fait accompli. China is already challenging the United States' jurisdictional grounds of aerial and naval operations, and is well in position to challenge the Philippines' jurisdictional grounds of aerial and naval operations.

China's construction activities have affected regional peace and stability because of China's repeated assertions that the artificial islands will serve defensive purposes. China has repeatedly proclaimed its right unilaterally to declare and enforce an Air Identification Zone over the South China Sea. A Chinese commentator has gone so far as to claim that Chinese military aircraft flying over the position above the artificial islands and in the South China Sea.

China has repeatedly called "land reclamation" in its discussion of offshore constructions. The 3,100,000 square meter Fuji-Cross Reef coupled with reports that a similar construction will be built at Subi Reef would provide the foundations for a new claim of China's existing territorial claim. China's new construction would set a precedent for future offshore constructions in the region.

The third issue relates to the impact on the marine environment by China's construction activities. As a signatory to UNCLOS China is bound to protect the marine environment. Chinese officials repeatedly claim that they have taken into account the environmental impact of these construction activities and re-locates their homes. China's actions are challenged by Philippine officials as well as maritime scientists. The phenomenon of "land reclamation" is nowhere more apparent than in China's South China Sea actions.

The issue of China's construction of artificial islands has been belied by three other issues. Two of these concerns China's attempt to enforce its jurisdiction over those artificial islands and the territorial sea above those features. Chinese laws require the promulgation of baseline prior to the assertion of sovereign jurisdiction over maritime zones. With the exception of Mischief Reef, China has not promulgated any baseline over the features it occupies.

It should be noted that all of China's artificial islands are located close to features occupied by Vietnam. If these features were part of China's continental shelf and airspace above, they would not qualify as islands under UNCLOS and therefore are not entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. China's presence over the South China Sea has been challenged by the Philippines and Vietnam. The most recent challenge was made in November 2013.

The issue of China's construction of artificial islands has been belied by three other issues. Two of these concerns China's attempt to enforce its jurisdiction over those artificial islands and the territorial sea above those features. Chinese laws require the promulgation of baseline prior to the assertion of sovereign jurisdiction over maritime zones. With the exception of Mischief Reef, China has not promulgated any baseline over the features it occupies.

It should be noted that all of China's artificial islands are located close to features occupied by Vietnam. If these features were part of China's continental shelf and airspace above, they would not qualify as islands under UNCLOS and therefore are not entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. China's presence over the South China Sea has been challenged by the Philippines and Vietnam. The most recent challenge was made in November 2013.

The issue of China's construction of artificial islands has been belied by three other issues. Two of these concerns China's attempt to enforce its jurisdiction over those artificial islands and the territorial sea above those features. Chinese laws require the promulgation of baseline prior to the assertion of sovereign jurisdiction over maritime zones. With the exception of Mischief Reef, China has not promulgated any baseline over the features it occupies.

It should be noted that all of China's artificial islands are located close to features occupied by Vietnam. If these features were part of China's continental shelf and airspace above, they would not qualify as islands under UNCLOS and therefore are not entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. China's presence over the South China Sea has been challenged by the Philippines and Vietnam. The most recent challenge was made in November 2013.
**Mischief reefs**

China’s new strategy and its behaviour in the South China Sea reveal its expansionist intentions | By Felix Lee

The first two sound harmless enough. In early May, the Chinese leadership in Beijing pressed a white paper outlining its vision for the development of its armed forces. The document speaks of “active defense” and the “expansion of the military for purposes of powerful purposes.” At first glance, the goons in the south seas still feel like they are adhering closely to the doctrine enunciated by Chinese defense reform Design Xiepop in the early 1980s: the defense of the nation’s borders and coastal waters. He recoiled on aggressive foreign policy.

But other choices of phrases make the reader sit up and take notice. Suddenly there is mention of “China’s military presence beyond national borders,” or of “a combination of offshore waters defense and open sea protection,” and that China’s leadership will give greater importance to the sea and air force branch and tourism. According to the document, these will constitute both “defense and attack” in the future. So what is this then? A de facto military policy, or an aggressive one even after all? A reality check of recent months shows it is highly likely that a mass portentous paradigm shift is taking place in Chinese foreign policy. It appears to be anything other than peaceful.

The clearest evidence of China’s new military strategy can currently be seen in the South China Sea, according to images taken by the US think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) tracked South China Sea features at the beginning of the year. The photos, taken in the area of the disputed Spratly Islands archipelago, show dozen of islands loaded with excavators tearing sand and rubble onto the reefs and sandbanks, and securing them with concrete to create new islands.

Members of the US military are convinced China is creating an archipelago in the South China Sea. Among other things, a 3,000-tonne landing ship for the military jets on this man-made land. “We all know that this is military use in the south China Sea is immense,” US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter reiterated the Chinese in late May at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. “This initiative is one of the most important security concerns for the US, and a rejection of international law.

The US military was on a “mission flight” over the South China Sea. The reporters were able to capture the moment when the US military took a team of CNN aircraft with threats via radio. This is because the Chinese military bombarded the reporters with threats via radio. This is because the Chinese military bombarded the reporters with threats via radio.

But the Americans are much better at selling their policies to the outside world. They present themselves as suitable partners in alliances with militarization in the region as a bully challenging them over their territory. While US Defense Secretary Carter spoke at the Singapore meeting that other states were also militarizing, the region, he defended these actions by saying that China had gone much further, and their militarizing claims to a much larger area than the others. Beijing is feeling increasingly forced into a corner by Washington’s policy stance.

Indeed, the US takes every opportunity to needle China. It regularly sends aircraft and naval vessels dangerously close to Chinese territory, even close to the Chinese coast, thereby demonstrating that dropdowns between China and small nations, while China comes across as an aggressor. This is because the communist nation, first and foremost.

In mid-May, one such scenario was made public: when the US military took a team of CNN reporters along on a surveillance flight over the South China Sea. The reporters were able to capture the moment when the Chinese military bombarded the aircraft with threats via radio. Such activities can lead to misunderstandings and accidents, a senior representative of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army could be heard saying.

Analysts from the independent think tank RAND’s Jane’s are still sounding the alarm bells about China. But then they warn about the potential threat, “The prospect of a naval battle between China and the US is becoming a potential threat,” they say.
The migrants, armed with a selection of weapons, were beheaded, tortured, and murdered by their captors. Some were burned alive, others were mutilated, and still others were left to die slowly in the desert. The brutality of these attacks was unprecedented in the history of armed conflict.

The UN has been criticized for its failure to take action to prevent these atrocities. The Security Council, which has a duty to maintain international peace and security, has failed to take any meaningful action to protect the African migrants. The Security Council has not imposed sanctions on the governments of Libya or other countries that have failed to take responsibility for the ongoing atrocities.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African migrants have been subjected to a range of human rights violations, including unlawful detention, torture, and forced labor. The African migrants have also been subjected to human trafficking, forced labor, and slavery.

The lack of action by the Security Council has been widely condemned by human rights organizations and the international community. The African migrants have been left to suffer in silence, with no one to protect them from the crimes being committed against them.

The Security Council must take action to protect the African migrants and end the atrocities that are being committed against them. The Security Council must impose sanctions on the governments of Libya and other countries that have failed to take responsibility for the ongoing atrocities.

The Security Council must also take action to provide humanitarian assistance to the African migrants who are living in detention centers and reception centers. The Security Council must authorize the deployment of peacekeepers and other peace enforcement missions to protect the African migrants and ensure their safety.

The Security Council must also take action to address the root causes of the conflict in Libya and the region. The Security Council must work with the African Union and other regional organizations to prevent the conflict from escalating and to bring about a lasting peace in the region.

The Security Council must also take action to prevent the recurrence of similar atrocities in the future. The Security Council must ensure that the perpetrators of these crimes are held accountable and that justice is done.

The Security Council must also take action to provide humanitarian assistance to the African migrants who are living in detention centers and reception centers. The Security Council must authorize the deployment of peacekeepers and other peace enforcement missions to protect the African migrants and ensure their safety.

The Security Council must also take action to address the root causes of the conflict in Libya and the region. The Security Council must work with the African Union and other regional organizations to prevent the conflict from escalating and to bring about a lasting peace in the region.

The Security Council must also take action to prevent the recurrence of similar atrocities in the future. The Security Council must ensure that the perpetrators of these crimes are held accountable and that justice is done.
Countering Putin's disinformation campaign

Germany's international broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW) launches a new flagship English-language news channel

By Paul Hockenos

Deutsche Welle, Germany’s state-financed radio and television broadcaster, is taking a big gamble. Its new programming strategy aims to significantly revamp and beef up multimedia English-language service can one day boost it into the league of the BBC – with a restructured and improved Deutsche Welle English-language service that can one day overtake the likes of Al Jazeera, RT and China’s CCTV simply by providing something that’s missing: a German voice in the international broadcasting market.

The latter has enabled it to expand its programming in Ukrainian and Russian.

Today broadcasts 1,500 full-time staff supported by 4,000 freelancers. It is not widely watched though just to have the broadcaster’s budget increased, whatever its size, is not a sign of success. It appeared on the scene in 2005. For years, Deutsche Welle – with much smaller budgets – has lagged far behind the big-ticket international broadcasters like BBC and CNN. Despite its 60 years of history, Deutsche Welle has won few hearts and minds. It has 700 million television watchers. But there’re not many in Germany’s global media ecosystem.

Today broadcasts 5–16, between the European Council on Foreign Relations and academia.

One of Limbourg’s main arguments in seeking new funding was that a new perspective would entail,” admits Henning Keding, former director general of the German broadcasting company.

It’s important that there be a German voice in the international news market. “We’re going to try to get there first and break some important stories,” says von Nahmen. That’s what Deutche Welle says it will do in the future.

The issue of financing is sensitive as Germany, which has a view different from the Anglo-American broadcasters,” says Carsten von Nahmen, head of news programming.

The New York Times, Newsweek, and the New York Post, for example, Deutche Welle is needed to counter Russia on some political issues.

But Riecke thinks Deutsche Welle is up to the task. “Deutsche Welle doesn’t twist the Bundestag. It is not a tool for the German foreign ministry,” he says. “It is not a tool for the German foreign ministry,” he says.

Deutsche Welle says it will do so by providing something that’s missing: a German voice in the international broadcasting market.

In 2013, Limbourg went to Berlin with Deutsche Welle’s director general to speak to the British, who had a view different from the Anglo-American broadcasters.

Today broadcasts seven days a week. “We’re not going to be able to compete with the big international broadcasting machines,” says Carsten von Nahmen, head of news programming.

In the market. “We want to focus on the programming that we do in other languages, including German,” he says. “Al Jazeera broke into it and we lost our audience.”

But Reljic says that English-language programming “doesn’t have a chance toward Russia on some political issues.

And the West. The broadcasting venture and its current conflicts with Ukraine and Russia, it has shored up support for the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine and for President Putin’s leadership.

And it has 700 million television watchers. But there’re not many in Germany’s global media ecosystem.

If its aim is to outdo the Russian media and disingenuous journalism of RT.”

The region is particularly important since countries like Romania, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece tend to listen toward Russia on some political issues.

But others, like Dusan Reljic, head of the German Liaison for International and Security Affairs Brussels office, think it’s worth a shot. “Don’t use the added value that Deutsche Welle can provide to the international television news market,” he says.

The language evolution is in full swing. “Today broadcasts seven days a week. “We’re not going to be able to compete with the big international broadcasting machines,” says Carsten von Nahmen, head of news programming.

Small budget, big ambitions – the DW newsroom in Berlin.

Deutsche Welle says it will do so by providing something that’s missing: a German voice in the international broadcasting market.

In particular, Deutsche Welle keeps on new viewers in places like China and the Arab world. “This market has been dominated by Anglo-American media,” he says. “Al Jazeera broke into it and we lost our audience.”

The latter has enabled it to expand its programming in Ukrainian and Russian.

Today broadcasts seven days a week. “We’re not going to be able to compete with the big international broadcasting machines,” says Carsten von Nahmen, head of news programming.

In the market. “We want to focus on the programming that we do in other languages, including German,” he says. “Al Jazeera broke into it and we lost our audience.”

But Reljic says that English-language programming “doesn’t have a chance toward Russia on some political issues.

And the West. The broadcasting venture and its current conflicts with Ukraine and Russia, it has shored up support for the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine and for President Putin’s leadership.

And it has 700 million television watchers. But there’re not many in Germany’s global media ecosystem.

If its aim is to outdo the Russian media and disingenuous journalism of RT.”

The region is particularly important since countries like Romania, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece tend to listen toward Russia on some political issues.

But others, like Dusan Reljic, head of the German Liaison for International and Security Affairs Brussels office, think it’s worth a shot. “Don’t use the added value that Deutsche Welle can provide to the international television news market,” he says.

The language evolution is in full swing. “Today broadcasts seven days a week. “We’re not going to be able to compete with the big international broadcasting machines,” says Carsten von Nahmen, head of news programming.

Small budget, big ambitions – the DW newsroom in Berlin.

Deutsche Welle says it will do so by providing something that’s missing: a German voice in the international broadcasting market.

In particular, Deutsche Welle keeps on new viewers in places like China and the Arab world. “This market has been dominated by Anglo-American media,” he says. “Al Jazeera broke into it and we lost our audience.”

But Reljic says that English-language programming “doesn’t have a chance toward Russia on some political issues.

And the West. The broadcasting venture and its current conflicts with Ukraine and Russia, it has shored up support for the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine and for President Putin’s leadership.

And it has 700 million television watchers. But there’re not many in Germany’s global media ecosystem.

If its aim is to outdo the Russian media and disingenuous journalism of RT.”

The region is particularly important since countries like Romania, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece tend to listen toward Russia on some political issues.

But others, like Dusan Reljic, head of the German Liaison for International and Security Affairs Brussels office, think it’s worth a shot. “Don’t use the added value that Deutsche Welle can provide to the international television news market,” he says.

The language evolution is in full swing. “Today broadcasts seven days a week. “We’re not going to be able to compete with the big international broadcasting machines,” says Carsten von Nahmen, head of news programming.

Small budget, big ambitions – the DW newsroom in Berlin.

Deutsche Welle says it will do so by providing something that’s missing: a German voice in the international broadcasting market.

In particular, Deutsche Welle keeps on new viewers in places like China and the Arab world. “This market has been dominated by Anglo-American media,” he says. “Al Jazeera broke into it and we lost our audience.”

But Reljic says that English-language programming “doesn’t have a chance toward Russia on some political issues.

And the West. The broadcasting venture and its current conflicts with Ukraine and Russia, it has shored up support for the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine and for President Putin’s leadership.

And it has 700 million television watchers. But there’re not many in Germany’s global media ecosystem.

If its aim is to outdo the Russian media and disingenuous journalism of RT.”

The region is particularly important since countries like Romania, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece tend to listen toward Russia on some political issues.

But others, like Dusan Reljic, head of the German Liaison for International and Security Affairs Brussels office, think it’s worth a shot. “Don’t use the added value that Deutsche Welle can provide to the international television news market,” he says.

The language evolution is in full swing. “Today broadcasts seven days a week. “We’re not going to be able to compete with the big international broadcasting machines,” says Carsten von Nahmen, head of news programming.

Small budget, big ambitions – the DW newsroom in Berlin.

Deutsche Welle says it will do so by providing something that’s missing: a German voice in the international broadcasting market.

In particular, Deutsche Welle keeps on new viewers in places like China and the Arab world. “This market has been dominated by Anglo-American media,” he says. “Al Jazeera broke into it and we lost our audience.”

But Reljic says that English-language programming “doesn’t have a chance toward Russia on some political issues.

And the West. The broadcasting venture and its current conflicts with Ukraine and Russia, it has shored up support for the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine and for President Putin’s leadership.

And it has 700 million television watchers. But there’re not many in Germany’s global media ecosystem.

If its aim is to outdo the Russian media and disingenuous journalism of RT.”

The region is particularly important since countries like Romania, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece tend to listen toward Russia on some political issues.

But others, like Dusan Reljic, head of the German Liaison for International and Security Affairs Brussels office, think it’s worth a shot. “Don’t use the added value that Deutsche Welle can provide to the international television news market,” he says.

The language evolution is in full swing. “Today broadcasts seven days a week. “We’re not going to be able to compete with the big international broadcasting machines,” says Carsten von Nahmen, head of news programming.

Small budget, big ambitions – the DW newsroom in Berlin.

Deutsche Welle says it will do so by providing something that’s missing: a German voice in the international broadcasting market.

In particular, Deutsche Welle keeps on new viewers in places like China and the Arab world. “This market has been dominated by Anglo-American media,” he says. “Al Jazeera broke into it and we lost our audience.”

But Reljic says that English-language programming “doesn’t have a chance toward Russia on some political issues.

And the West. The broadcasting venture and its current conflicts with Ukraine and Russia, it has shored up support for the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine and for President Putin’s leadership.

And it has 700 million television watchers. But there’re not many in Germany’s global media ecosystem.

If its aim is to outdo the Russian media and disingenuous journalism of RT.”

The region is particularly important since countries like Romania, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece tend to listen toward Russia on some political issues.

But others, like Dusan Reljic, head of the German Liaison for International and Security Affairs Brussels office, think it’s worth a shot. “Don’t use the added value that Deutsche Welle can provide to the international television news market,” he says.
Germany needs to have a robust, capable military to protect its trade and its manifold interests in the most distant seas. This was the substance of an interview with the German Emperor Wilhelm II, published by the Daily Telegraph in 1900. In 1914, German leaders then welcomed the fleet plans. The satirical newspaper Der Wahrer Jacob, however, mocked the Kaiser. The title of its cartoon: “An illustrious speech. We Germans are a people fond of war.” (...)

Global defense trends and the military balance in 2015

An assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies | By Bastian Giegerich and James Hackett

Disputed military build-up

Despite strenuous efforts and policymakers’ attempts to grapple with the challenges posed by an increasingly dangerous security environment, multiple complex security crises are testing the scope and sustainability of military capabilities. These capabilities are increasingly technologically advanced. They are also growing in destructive power, and are proliferating.

In defense spending terms, the strategic centre of gravity continues to move from the West to the Asia-Pacific, and the Military Balance 2015 continues the decline in European defense spending and the increase in Asian defense expenditure.

However, while only some 18 months ago, the consensus was almost complete that military conflict in Asia, the salient strategic reality since the end of World War II, was nearing an end, the evolving security environment is now again posing challenges to the western and regional military capabilities of the main states in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in the South China Sea, the South China Sea, and the South China Sea. The rise of the Islamic State, the threat from South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

The Military Balance 2015 takes a detailed look at the military balance in 2015, with special focus on the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

In this context, it is important to remember that the Asia-Pacific region is a region of great power rivalry, and that the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region is a reflection of the strategic and security balance in the region. The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

In this context, it is important to remember that the Asia-Pacific region is a region of great power rivalry, and that the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region is a reflection of the strategic and security balance in the region. The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

In this context, it is important to remember that the Asia-Pacific region is a region of great power rivalry, and that the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region is a reflection of the strategic and security balance in the region. The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

In this context, it is important to remember that the Asia-Pacific region is a region of great power rivalry, and that the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region is a reflection of the strategic and security balance in the region. The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

In this context, it is important to remember that the Asia-Pacific region is a region of great power rivalry, and that the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region is a reflection of the strategic and security balance in the region. The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

In this context, it is important to remember that the Asia-Pacific region is a region of great power rivalry, and that the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region is a reflection of the strategic and security balance in the region. The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

In this context, it is important to remember that the Asia-Pacific region is a region of great power rivalry, and that the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region is a reflection of the strategic and security balance in the region. The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.

In this context, it is important to remember that the Asia-Pacific region is a region of great power rivalry, and that the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region is a reflection of the strategic and security balance in the region. The Military Balance 2015 provides a comprehensive overview of the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and the South China Sea, and the South China Sea, and the threat from non-state actors, particularly in the Middle East, continue to cast a shadow over the region.
The political and military crisis in Ukraine has led to a major reassessment of threat perceptions and military strategies in much of Europe. Increased threat perceptions have led to calls in Europe for higher military spending, and, in particular, a renewed commitment by NATO and its neighbors to spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on the armed forces. SIPRI's provisional estimate for Ukraine's military expenditure in 2014 is $4.1 billion, an increase in real terms of 2 percent compared to 2013, and 75 percent compared to 2012. However, these estimates may not fully include some costs and the final figure is likely to be higher.

The September 2014 NATO summit in Wales was NATO's first major response to events in Ukraine. As well as producing a 'Readiness Action Plan' designed to improve NATO's ability to respond to the crisis, member states 'pledged' to increase their military expenditure to NATO's long-standing target level of two percent of GDP over 10 years. The long-term, multi-billion-dollar nature of the pledge represents a commitment between countries that some past bald for increases to military spending (mostly the UK and others that were more reticent (especially Canada and Germany). Unlikely tensions with Russia escalates significantly, it seems unlikely that many NATO members will meet this target. The Ukrainian crisis may well mark a break in the trend of falling military expenditure in western and central Europe. From countries that are immediately adjoining Russia, there is growing pressure to continue past increases and to ensure that decreases do not continue.

The current situation in Ukraine is likely to increase the NATO 2 percent target in 2015. Poland's military expenditure increased by 38 percent in real terms between 2013 and 2014, excluding a 12 percent increase in 2015. A further increase of 20 percent real terms is budgeted for 2015. The reasons for this are that Poland has largely avoided the economic fallout from the 2008 financial crisis, and has been willing to invest in its military, originating in NATO and its Warsaw Pact military operations and the US-built Javelin missile defense program (largely also the theoretical fears of Russia). Planned well before the start of the Ukraine crisis, events in Ukraine have prompted the Polish government to seek to accelerate aspects of a new 10-year modernization plan from 2015–22. The Polish Ministry of Defense budget for 2015 amounts to $9.7 billion, about 2.5 percent of Poland's projected GDP in 2015.

In contrast to most of western and central Europe, Poland is likely to exceed the NATO 2 percent target in 2015. Poland's military expenditure increased by 38 percent in real terms between 2001 and 2014, including a 13 percent increase in 2014. A further increase of 20 percent real terms is budgeted for 2015. The reasons for this are that Poland has largely avoided the economic fallout from the 2008 financial crisis, and has been willing to invest in its military, originating in NATO and its Warsaw Pact military operations and the US-built Javelin missile defense program (largely also the theoretical fears of Russia). Planned well before the start of the Ukraine crisis, events in Ukraine have prompted the Polish government to seek to accelerate aspects of a new 10-year modernization plan from 2015–22. The Polish Ministry of Defense budget for 2015 amounts to $9.7 billion, about 2.5 percent of Poland's projected GDP in 2015.

Despite the strong condemnations of Russia across Europe and the defensive policy responses taken by NATO, there has been little change in military spending in all three countries and some degree of convergence:

- • a 3.7 percent increase in Estonia, to $436 million;
- • a 14.9 percent increase in Latvia, to $269 million; and
- • a 29 percent increase in Lithuania, to $480 million.

The current situation in Ukraine is likely to increase the NATO 2 percent target in 2015. Poland's military expenditure increased by 38 percent in real terms between 2001 and 2014, including a 12 percent increase in 2015. A further increase of 20 percent real terms is budgeted for 2015. The reasons for this are that Poland has largely avoided the economic fallout from the 2008 financial crisis, and has been willing to invest in its military, originating in NATO and its Warsaw Pact military operations and the US-built Javelin missile defense program (largely also the theoretical fears of Russia). Planned well before the start of the Ukraine crisis, events in Ukraine have prompted the Polish government to seek to accelerate aspects of a new 10-year modernization plan from 2015–22. The Polish Ministry of Defense budget for 2015 amounts to $9.7 billion, about 2.5 percent of Poland's projected GDP in 2015.

In contrast to most of western and central Europe, Poland is likely to exceed the NATO 2 percent target in 2015. Poland's military expenditure increased by 38 percent in real terms between 2001 and 2014, including a 12 percent increase in 2014. A further increase of 20 percent real terms is budgeted for 2015. The reasons for this are that Poland has largely avoided the economic fallout from the 2008 financial crisis, and has been willing to invest in its military, originating in NATO and its Warsaw Pact military operations and the US-built Javelin missile defense program (largely also the theoretical fears of Russia). Planned well before the start of the Ukraine crisis, events in Ukraine have prompted the Polish government to seek to accelerate aspects of a new 10-year modernization plan from 2015–22. The Polish Ministry of Defense budget for 2015 amounts to $9.7 billion, about 2.5 percent of Poland's projected GDP in 2015.

Despite the strong condemnations of Russia across Europe and the defensive policy responses taken by NATO, there has been little change in military spending in all three countries and some degree of convergence:

- • a 3.7 percent increase in Estonia, to $436 million;
- • a 14.9 percent increase in Latvia, to $269 million; and
- • a 29 percent increase in Lithuania, to $480 million.

The current situation in Ukraine is likely to increase the NATO 2 percent target in 2015. Poland's military expenditure increased by 38 percent in real terms between 2001 and 2014, including a 12 percent increase in 2015. A further increase of 20 percent real terms is budgeted for 2015. The reasons for this are that Poland has largely avoided the economic fallout from the 2008 financial crisis, and has been willing to invest in its military, originating in NATO and its Warsaw Pact military operations and the US-built Javelin missile defense program (largely also the theoretical fears of Russia). Planned well before the start of the Ukraine crisis, events in Ukraine have prompted the Polish government to seek to accelerate aspects of a new 10-year modernization plan from 2015–22. The Polish Ministry of Defense budget for 2015 amounts to $9.7 billion, about 2.5 percent of Poland's projected GDP in 2015.

In contrast to most of western and central Europe, Poland is likely to exceed the NATO 2 percent target in 2015. Poland's military expenditure increased by 38 percent in real terms between 2001 and 2014, including a 12 percent increase in 2015. A further increase of 20 percent real terms is budgeted for 2015. The reasons for this are that Poland has largely avoided the economic fallout from the 2008 financial crisis, and has been willing to invest in its military, originating in NATO and its Warsaw Pact military operations and the US-built Javelin missile defense program (largely also the theoretical fears of Russia). Planned well before the start of the Ukraine crisis, events in Ukraine have prompted the Polish government to seek to accelerate aspects of a new 10-year modernization plan from 2015–22. The Polish Ministry of Defense budget for 2015 amounts to $9.7 billion, about 2.5 percent of Poland's projected GDP in 2015.
The financial markets are now very sensitive about the contraction of coal use, too. The Norwegian State Fund has decided to no longer invest in companies that are involved in the coal business. Oil and gas conglomerates are supporting a global coal levy to protect the climate in the extract in the con- temporary debate. It is conceivable that climate change will increasingly demand the development of energy markets. The main focus is on the use of fossil energy sources. They believe to be necessary for the covering of the growing number of power stations and much of the economic services. This can be achieved by higher emissions, which are expected to be higher due to the effects on the energy mix and they would trigger greater demands for oil and gas. The strategy will also be conducted in reducing the amount of carbon dioxide generated during the energy mix and they would trigger greater demands for oil and gas.

**Climate protection starts with renouncing fossil fuels** – and using energy more effectively | By Stephan Kohler

The continuing digitalization of our society creates an essential feature of the German federal crimefighting authority. Along with many cooperating authorities, businesses, and levels of trust between the authorities and businesses, the awareness of responsibility and the German energy market. Germany and Europe plan to reduce their CO2 emissions by 40 percent and 20 percent respectively. The financial markets are now very sensitive about the contraction of coal use, too. The Norwegian State Fund has decided to no longer invest in companies that are involved in the coal business. Oil and gas conglomerates are supporting a global coal levy to protect the climate in the extract in the con- temporary debate. It is conceivable that climate change will increasingly demand the development of energy markets. The main focus is on the use of fossil energy sources. They believe to be necessary for the covering of the growing number of power stations and much of the economic services. This can be achieved by higher emissions, which are expected to be higher due to the effects on the energy mix and they would trigger greater demands for oil and gas. The strategy will also be conducted in reducing the amount of carbon dioxide generated during the energy mix and they would trigger greater demands for oil and gas.

**Climate protection starts with renouncing fossil fuels** – and using energy more effectively | By Stephan Kohler

Future climate protection policy is dependent on this. There is a need to finally define a clear development path for global CO2 emissions. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has demanded the following in its World Energy Outlook: CO2 emissions amounting to approximately 30 gigatons (Gt) in 2010 should be reduced to 22 Gt by the year 2050. This would require a major reduction in the use of fossil energy sources. Coal would have to be replaced, as it generates the highest CO2 emissions when being converted into energy. However, coal is almost always cheaper than oil and natural gas, so it will be available around the world and it will be as new basis to 2030 in terms of CO2 emissions. This also helps to reduce H2S emissions. The CO2 emission targets can be achieved through a global CO2 levy, with higher energy prices that lead to greater demand. The CO2 levy will not be successful in attracting and using energy more effectively. This is equally true for the climate protection measures. We need to form interdis- ciplinary teams to prevent cybercrime. This is also important for the German federal crimefighting authority. Along with many cooperating authorities, businesses, and levels of trust between the authorities and businesses, the awareness of responsibility and the German energy market. Germany and Europe plan to reduce their CO2 emissions by 40 percent and 20 percent respectively. The financial markets are now very sensitive about the contraction of coal use, too. The Norwegian State Fund has decided to no longer invest in companies that are involved in the coal business. Oil and gas conglomerates are supporting a global coal levy to protect the climate in the extract in the con- temporary debate. It is conceivable that climate change will increasingly demand the development of energy markets. The main focus is on the use of fossil energy sources. They believe to be necessary for the covering of the growing number of power stations and much of the economic services. This can be achieved by higher emissions, which are expected to be higher due to the effects on the energy mix and they would trigger greater demands for oil and gas. The strategy will also be conducted in reducing the amount of carbon dioxide generated during the energy mix and they would trigger greater demands for oil and gas.
Siber strike is the name of the military maneuver con-
ducted by several NATO partners in military cooperation on their northeastern flank. Although the name may sound old-
fashioned, the exercise includes elements of the war of the future. Some of the soldiers active in Siber strike will be fighting off attacks in the virtual world – prac-
tising cyberattacks.

The Baltic States are the ideal place to train for cyber war. Estonia, the smallest and northeasternmost Baltic State, with hardly more than 1.3 million inhabitants – it has implemented new cybersecurity comprehensively in administr-
ation and government communication. And Estonia was the first country to become a target of a cyberattack – in 2007, when the websites of many authorities, ministries, and banking houses were blocked and unusable for nearly a day.

It is likely the attack came from Russia – but this cannot be proven. Estonian politicians and military commanders are wary even today of pointing the finger at Moscow. But there is no doubt due to its response to the attack, the Estonian capital Tallinn was chosen as NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in May 2008. Today, 40 cybersecurity experts from ministries and police are on the staff of the think tank, which aims to shed light on the opportunities and dangers the Internet holds for NATO.

The Atlantic Alliance has more than 20 such centers of excellence. Pioneering Underground Technologies

Vegas Tunnel Constructors
Salini Impregilo S.p.A.

www.herrenknecht.com/lakemead

The Security Times • Challenges

Defending the Internet
NATO prepares for cyberwar with new centers in the Baltic States
By Johannes Leithäuser

The Baltic States are the ideal place to train for cyber war. Estonia, the smallest and northeasternmost Baltic State, with hardly more than 1.3 million inhabitants – it has implemented new cybersecurity comprehensively in administration and government communication. And Estonia was the first country to become a target of a cyberattack – in 2007, when the websites of many authorities, ministries, and banking houses were blocked and unusable for nearly a day.

It is likely the attack came from Russia – but this cannot be proven. Estonian politicians and military commanders are wary even today of pointing the finger at Moscow. But there is no doubt due to its response to the attack, the Estonian capital Tallinn was chosen as NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in May 2008. Today, 40 cybersecurity experts from ministries and police are on the staff of the think tank, which aims to shed light on the opportunities and dangers the Internet holds for NATO.

The Atlantic Alliance has more than 20 such centers of excellence. Pioneering Underground Technologies
"THE EU STANDS FOR PEACE. I WANT THAT FOR ALL EUROPEANS"

Manuel Markovic
Shop Assistant