

The Security Times


SPECIAL EDITION OF THE ATLANTIC TIMES FOR THE 51ST MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE

February 2015

Munich, Germany

In this issue

- Turbulent times** 2
New NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg believes that the transatlantic community remains a unique source of stability in an era of unprecedented challenges to global security.
- Increasing responsibilities** 3
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier discusses Germany's changing policy role in international affairs.
- New approaches** 4, 5
The *Charlie Hebdo* attacks demonstrate the need to rethink the fight against violent Islamism in Europe. Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, vice-president of the European Parliament, and anti-terror analyst Elmar Thevesen with two different approaches.
- Beyond Cuba** 6
In his final two years, President Obama's foreign policy options are dwindling. Events in Iran and North Korea could make or break his legacy, predicts the *New York Times'* David E. Sanger.
- World (re-)order** 8, 9
In today's networked multipolar world the West is still searching for the right strategy. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, president and CEO of International Crisis Group, on how to rebuild the global order.
- General view** 14
ISAF is a success story and Afghanistan has made extraordinary progress, argues German NATO General Hans-Lothar Domröse. He also explains the role of the new mission "Resolute Support."
- Broken peace** 17-19
The Ukraine conflict threatens 25 years of post-Cold War stability in Europe. James D. Bindenagel calls for a review of the Charter of Paris. Didier Burkhalter and Ivica Dačić discuss the OSCE's role in Eastern Ukraine. And Dmitri Trenin offers an insight into the Kremlin point of view.
- Win win** 20
The EU's dependence on Russian gas might grow. Not a problem, believes Friedbert Pflüger: Gas could broker peace – Europe needs an affordable and reliable supply and Russia a stable demand.
- Legacy costs** 22
As NATO withdraws from Afghanistan, the continuing terrorism emanating from that country and Pakistan has become a national security threat to someone else: China is inheriting Obama's nightmare, believes Ahmed Rashid.
- Boko rising** 28
Since last year, attacks by the jihadist organization Boko Haram have reached new dimensions. The Nigerian state needs to act. But military action alone cannot defeat the Islamist group, writes Annette Weber – northeast Nigeria needs a share of the South's wealth.
- Cyber Security** 33-39
The Cyber Security Special examines in a variety of articles the state of international cyber affairs, from the double-edged role state actors play in the Great Cybergame to the responsibilities of every Internet-using citizen to protect data and communications.



Years of living dangerously

Geopolitical shocks threaten to knock the international order off balance | By Theo Sommer

Last year marked the centenary of the outbreak of World War I – the seminal catastrophe of the 20th century. The message everyone agreed upon at the time seemed as convincing as it was simple: Don't ever sleepwalk to the edge of the abyss again; don't let conflicts of interest and clashing foreign policy ambitions get out of control; give diplomacy, give reason and give peace a chance. The long and the short of it: step back from the brink.

The message was heard but not heeded. 2014 was a year of shocks, disruption and geopolitical fracturing. As Michael Ignatieff, the Canadian liberal teaching at Harvard, aptly put it: "The tectonic plates of world order are being pushed apart by the volcanic pressure of violence and hatred."

Geopolitics has returned with a vengeance in the relations between nations, as both Russia and China morphed from status quo powers to revisionist states staking out new territorial claims in their neighborhood; spheres of interest and influence are once again concepts dominating international politics. Strident nationalism began to rear its ugly head in many parts of the world, triggering a dangerous arms race, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region and, in its populist version, jeopardizing even the cohesion of the European Union's historic integration project.

But states are no longer the only game-changing actors on the world stage. Non-state actors upended the existing order in 2014. Abu Bakr-al

Baghdadi's Islamic State (alternatively called IS, ISIS, ISI, ISIL or Da'ish) brought large swaths of Syria and Iraq under its control; Abubakar Shekau's Boko Haram rocked Nigeria, Africa's most populous state, and its immediate neighbors. Older jihadist groupings like al-Qaeda and its various franchised offshoots created chaos in Yemen, Sudan, Somalia and the Islamic Maghreb.

State revisionism, sectarian carnage and ethnic violence were the hallmarks of 2014. They will, alas, dominate the headlines in 2015, too.

The first shock last year was Putin's annexation of Crimea in March. This was a brazen violation of the fundamental post-Cold War principle, anchored in numerous international accords, that European borders must not be changed unilaterally, and certainly not by the threat or use of force. Relations soured further when the Kremlin started sending weapons, armored vehicles and thousands of soldiers ("volunteers") to support the pro-Moscow insurgents in the east Ukrainian Donbas area. The downing of the Malaysian airliner MH-17 by Russian-armed separatists stiffened Western backbones even more. The United States and the European Union imposed escalating economic sanctions on Russia; NATO suspended cooperation with it. No longer was Putin seen as a partner.

Berlin has since made innumerable efforts to broker a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Ukraine, all to no avail.

The Minsk ceasefire agreement of Sept. 5 was ignored, circumvented or broken outright by both the Russian-backed rebels and the Kiev government. After a short winter lull, the conflict flared up again in mid-January. Meanwhile a real war is going on in Ukraine; 5,000 people have been killed since last spring. A week before the Munich Security Conference convened it was still unclear whether diplomacy could find a way out of the crisis.

raped or forced into marriage, captured hostages gruesomely beheaded in front of video cameras. Fanatical IS warriors, many of them converts from Europe and America, pose a grave threat to Western countries. And tearing apart Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State is in the process of obliterating the borders drawn up by British and French diplomats at the end of World War I. The old order of the region is fracturing, and it may take decades of turmoil before a new order takes shape.

Boko Haram was the third shock unsettling the civilized world. Actually it had started taking over large chunks of northern Nigeria as long as five years ago, but it gained more widespread attention only last April when its jihadists abducted 276 schoolgirls from the town of Chibok and turned them into sex slaves. Originally, Boko Haram had focused on opposing western education, but then it concentrated on establishing an Islamic state. Abubakar Shekau's dream is an IS type of caliphate across Northern Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger. By now he controls a territory roughly the size of Belgium. In relentless campaigns of violence Boko Haram has devastated scores of towns and villages, leaving 13,000 dead and driving more than one million people from their homes; about 200,000 of them fled to neighboring countries.

Nigeria's political system is built on pervasive corruption. The military seem

continued on page 2

Theo Sommer is the executive editor of *The Security Times* and *The Atlantic Times* and former editor of the German weekly *Die Zeit*.



ARCHIVE

Ukraine is a bequest of the past year to 2015. The same goes for the second shock that rattled the West in 2014: the sudden rise of the Islamic State in Mesopotamia. By now, the self-anointed "Caliphate" has consolidated its hold over a territory as large as the US state of Nebraska. It controls oil fields, conducts illicit though profitable trade across the Turkish border, fields a well-equipped army of around 30,000 fighters and runs a professional cyber PR operation. Sharia law is the writ of the land. Ethnic and religious minorities – Kurds, Shiites, Yazidis – are ruthlessly persecuted, women put down,

What future threat to international peace and security are we missing right now?

As members of the global security community, we are always keen to check whether we are overlooking key indicators or misunderstanding developments on the horizon. After 2014, a catastrophic year in international security policy, we need to reflect on our shortcomings.

After all, since we came together in Munich a year ago, crucial challenges and threats to international peace and security have emerged, and they did so without many experts or decision-makers appreciating their gravity initially. Most of all, of course, the war in Ukraine and the rise of the "Islamic State" are sending shockwaves through the international and regional security systems.

Last year, in Munich, the turmoil in Ukraine was considered a seri-

ous crisis – but of limited global significance. Today, the war in Eastern Ukraine clearly is a threat to European security, to fundamental pan-European principles, and to the global order as a whole. If a breakdown of such dimensions is possible in Europe, where we have the highest density of norms, agreements and institutions, other regions are not likely to be more resilient to serious and deadly conflict.

We believed that the combination of institutions such as the European

A call to ideas

By Wolfgang Ischinger

Wolfgang Ischinger, Germany's former ambassador to the US and the UK, is the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference since 2008.



Union, NATO, the OSCE, numerous partnership agreements with Russia as well as norms established in Helsinki, Paris, and elsewhere would ensure peace and stability. But they did not – at least not in that part of Europe that did not make it into the EU and NATO. That should make us think twice about the quality of governance, stability, and security structures in other parts of the world.

It is obvious that we are facing serious cracks in the international

order and flaws in existing collective security structures.

The 2015 Munich Security Conference offers both a chance to analyze these flaws and an opportunity to debate the way forward. Once again this year, I am humbled and honored by how many decision-makers and other important members of the strategic community are joining us in the Bavarian capital. Surely, they can and will come up with new ideas that can lead the way forward.

In addition to the *Security Times*, a reliably excellent companion to the Munich Security Conference, I hope that you will also take time to look at the new *Munich Security Report*, which aims at providing food for thought for the key topics of our conference.

I am looking forward to the debates in Munich, and I wish you a thought-provoking read and a productive weekend. ■

UPPER MERIDIAN
PAID
SPRINGFIELD, VA
PERMIT NO. 18195

The Atlantic Times
2000 M Street NW, Suite 335
Washington, DC, 20036

continued from page 1

Years of living dangerously

both incapable and unwilling to conduct any sustained operation against the jihadists, while the political class, focusing on the February elections, keeps studiously looking the other way. So does the international community. The UN Security Council has not been convened to deal with the crisis; the African Union, already overwhelmed by a host of other emergencies, does not particularly care about it; other emerging powers aren't paying attention either. The destabilization of Africa's most promising state is proceeding apace.

Ukraine, the Islamic State and Boko Haram are not the only problems that 2014 bequeathed to 2015. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, although no longer the central issue in the Levant, keeps on festering; another war appears more likely than any diplomatic solution, two-state or otherwise. Except in Tunisia, the Arab Spring has ended in the reestablishment of the regimes it sought to topple. Western intervention reduced Libya to anarchy. A nuclear deal with Iran is a very vague prospect, given the fierce opposition of both American and Iranian hardliners. Afghanistan's future after ISAF, parlous at best, will have a significant impact on the fractious relationship between India and Pakistan.

Dangerous fault lines spell trouble also in the Asian-Pacific region. In the South China Sea as in the East China Sea, Beijing has been pressing its territorial claims – to the waters, atolls and reefs between Vietnam and the Philippines inside its “nine-dash line” and to the Japanese-administered Senkaku islands (Diaoyutai in Chinese) – somewhat less aggressively in recent months, but they have not been rescinded; they remain a political tinderbox. The island dispute between Japan and China can still produce perilous shockwaves. And the jury is still out when it comes to the question of whether the United States and China will be able to manage their rivalry in the Pacific peacefully. Their choice is between confrontation or cooperation, tension or détente, alienation or co-evolution.

Rising geostrategic competition and intensifying nationalism were two egregious trends identified by this year's World Economic Forum in Davos. Insurgencies, secessionism will keep battering what's left of the international order. Terrorism is escalating, conflict is on the rise. Yet there is no one who could set things right. The United Nations, stymied by the animosities between the five veto powers, have all but dropped out of the picture. In the United States, minimalism and retrenchment are the order of the day; gridlock prevents bold new departures. A series of ill-fated interventions has strengthened the animus against military engagements far afield and bolstered the reluctance to put “boots on the ground.” Europe, in turn, is weakened by its financial crisis, a fraying political consensus and the growing unpopularity of its leaders.

In this situation, the world can hardly expect any great leaps forward in 2015. It will have to settle for piecemeal engineering to prevent the worst. ■

Standing strong in turbulent times

NATO responds to new threats and challenges
By Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg



Inaugural visit to Berlin: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on Jan. 14.

These are turbulent times for Euro-Atlantic security. We face many challenges, from many directions. To the South, we see extremism advancing in Syria and Iraq, turmoil spreading across North Africa and the Middle East, and returning foreign fighters posing a threat to us here at home.

To the East, Russia has become an unpredictable, revisionist power. It is tearing up the international rule book, using military force to annex Crimea, destabilizing Eastern Ukraine, and intimidating its neighbors. In addition,

we face other challenges, like missile proliferation, cyberterrorism and energy cut-offs. Far from emerging threats, they are now part and parcel of our security environment.

In this unpredictable world, the transatlantic community remains a unique source of stability – so it is vital that we keep it strong. At our NATO summit in Wales last September, we charted a clear course to meet the challenges we face. We are now turning decisions into action.

We are implementing the Readiness Action Plan agreed at the

summit, to make our forces more agile, and able to deploy quickly whenever and wherever they are needed, in the most significant boost to our collective defense in the last 25 years. We are also enhancing NATO's military presence in Eastern Europe.

Over the past year, we deployed more planes in the air, more ships at sea, and more troops on the ground – and we will continue to rotate forces through the eastern part of our alliance for as long as necessary. We are also increasing the frequency of our exercises.

The Readiness Action Plan also involves the creation of a spearhead force to enable us to respond even quicker to emerging threats, as well as setting up a command and control presence in several eastern allied nations. All the measures we are taking are defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments.

To respond to the sort of hybrid warfare we have seen in Ukraine, we also agreed to improve information sharing, develop exercises that address hybrid threats, and strengthen coordination between

NATO and other organizations. The implementation of the Readiness Action Plan is a key priority as we prepare for the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw.

At the same time, we are making countries in our neighborhood more resilient, by helping them to strengthen their defense capabilities, reform their security and defense sectors, and achieve greater interoperability with our own forces.

Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have all held democratic elections. They have chosen Europe and everything it represents. We need to help them to realize their aspirations. This is not only a moral obligation, but a concrete security interest. By making these countries more stable and better able to resist outside pressure, we will make our own nations more secure.

We are also reaching out to the South. We are helping countries like Jordan to improve their security forces, and considering a request from Iraq to help build their defense capacity.

For over twenty years, with strong leadership by Germany, we have also worked hard to build a partnership between NATO and Russia. We have worked together on issues ranging from counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism to submarine rescue and civil emergency planning. This was also to Russia's benefit.

But Russia's actions in Ukraine have violated international law, thus breaking the trust at the core of our cooperation. So NATO could not continue with business as usual. Last April, NATO foreign ministers suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia, while keeping political channels of communication open.

I see no contradiction between a strong NATO and dialogue with Russia. On the contrary, we can only effectively engage with Russia from a position of strength. This policy of defense and dialogue took Germany and NATO safely through the Cold War. Today, as we face the biggest security crisis since then, this remains the right way forward.

So we must keep NATO strong, both militarily and politically. Over the past 20 years, we have deployed NATO forces from the Balkans to Afghanistan, and from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. We took on this more active role against a backdrop of shrinking defense budgets. We asked our forces to do more with less. But this cannot continue indefinitely.

At our Wales summit, we pledged to stop the cuts and to move towards the goal of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense as our economies grow. We also agreed to get better value for what we spend, and to arrive at a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities across our alliance.

This cannot be achieved overnight. But neither is it “mission impossible.” And despite the economic crisis, some allies, especially in Eastern Europe, are starting to stop the cuts and set out a pathway to increase defense spending. These are important steps – and every step counts.


We live in turbulent times. But I firmly believe that we can emerge stronger. If Europe and North America continue to stand strong together. If we defend our values. And value our defense. ■

NATO: Facts and figures

(from the Munich Security Report 2015)

Defense spending changes in Europe (2010–2014)


Percent, constant prices and exchange rate



While significant cuts have also occurred in Western Europe, with aggregate real outlays down by 8.4% over four years, Western Europe remains Europe's highest spending sub-region, accounting for almost half of regional outlays (46.0%).


Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Is NATO still essential?



Source: The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)

What should NATO be engaged in?



Source: The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)

The Security Times

Publisher: Detlef W. Prinz
Executive Editor: Theo Sommer
Editors: Peter H. Koepf, Kevin Lynch,
Lutz Lichtenberger

Senior Art Director: Paul M. Kern
Layout: Manuel Schwartz, Mike Zastrow

Times Media GmbH
Tempelhofer Ufer 23-24
10963 Berlin, Germany

www.times-media.de
info@times-media.de

Phone +49 30 2150-5400
Fax +49 30 2150-5447

ISSN 2191-6462

Press deadline: January 30, 2015



Talking policy : German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and US Secretary of State John Kerry at a summit of foreign ministers in Brussels in April 2014.

PICTURE ALLIANCE/DPA/EPA/VIRGINIA MAYO/POOL

German foreign policy in a changing world

The Ukraine crisis is the first serious test of Berlin's new role

By German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier

When I returned to the Federal Foreign Office in December 2013, I initiated an open discussion process on Germany's role in the world, on the scope and limits of our responsibility and on the aims and instruments of our foreign policy. I did not know at the time how urgent the question of our country's international responsibility would become.

Since then one crisis has followed another in quick succession: in Ukraine the conflict with separatists in the East and the added tensions sparked by the involvement of Russia; in the Middle East, the civil war in Syria, the fight against ISIS in Iraq and the violent confrontations between Israel and Hamas. In Mali and in the Central African Republic, too, we are faced with serious crises, not to mention the outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa. We need to prepare ourselves for the state of crisis becoming the norm.

The pace at which our world is changing is likely to accelerate even further. And globalization unleashes its own antithetical forces: instability, isolationism, violent religious or ethnic fundamentalism and an increasing number of failed states. In an age of crisis and conflict one could be tempted to say: now is the time to act, not to talk.

Yet I still think that debate is necessary, because I believe that there are deeper causes behind this array of crises. If we do not investigate them, we pass up the chance to develop the ability to act and react better in the future. I have gained the impression that not only has the world yet to find a new order, Germany too has yet to fully find its feet in this new, changed world.

So where does German foreign policy come up short and what needs to be changed? One year ago, I put those two questions to experts from Germany and abroad at the beginning of a project called 'Review 2014 – A Fresh Look at German Foreign Policy.' The responses are very interesting and as extensive as they are contradictory. Alongside a great deal of recognition for the achievements

of German foreign policy, they reflect even higher expectations of our country in the future.

Some of the experts called on Germany to "assume the role of model Europeans" in order to "revitalize the EU," or "as the recognized leader of Europe,

“Germany does not shun international responsibility.”

to change the course of world history." Others said Germany should act as an "intercultural mediator" as well as a "bridge" between the rich North and the "rising South." It should make "Russia more European" and "America more multilateral."

A series of experts also took up my invitation to voice candid criticism. "Germany tends to react to crises rather than decisively embracing and shaping its role in the world", wrote one. Another stated that strategic thinking is "not very developed" in Berlin. Some say we practice "ruthless realpolitik," whilst others call us "naive and idealistic".

It is clear that these external views (which can be read at www.review2014.de) differ greatly according to the author's viewpoint. But there is a common denominator: people have very high expectations of Germany.

conducted in the spring of last year by the Körber Foundation, which surveyed Germans' opinions on foreign policy. Thirty-seven percent of participants were in favor of Germany taking on more responsibility and intervening more in international crises

and conflicts. However, 60 percent were against this. I often encounter this skepticism when talking to the public. It emerges time and again in public debates, above all when it comes to military intervention or supplying weapons.

Does that mean that Germans shun international responsibility? I do not think so. If you look and listen carefully, then you notice that in the surveys, and the many debates which have been conducted over recent months, our citizens also seem to have very high expectations. They want Germany to engage, but not really militarily. They want us to convince them that we have effective instruments to recognize crises early and to prevent, manage and solve them. They want to see us use diplomacy to mediate wherever possible. They want us to provide humanitarian assistance to people in need. And they, too, argue amongst themselves over the right foreign policy approach. There are very different perspectives and priorities, but only between different parties, not also between different generations.

When I began my second term in office as German foreign minister, I put the following theory on the table: Germany is too big and economically too strong to merely comment on foreign policy from the sidelines. We must dare to shoulder greater responsibility internationally, we must engage earlier, more decisively and more substantively. "More responsibility" is neither a call for military adventures nor does it imply a renunciation of the long-standing fundamental principles of our foreign policy.

In discussions on our country's role I repeatedly hear the argument that the phrase "more responsibility" in reality simply veils the pursuit of policies that serve our interests. It is true that defining our interests is part of the answer to the question of when, where and how we should take on more responsibility.

However, the second question I believe we need to ask is: Where can we as Germans actu-

ally make a difference? What we need are the courage and willingness to get involved, in addition the provision of the right instruments to make things happen. Foreign policy can achieve something even in conflicts that seem deadlocked – through sound judgement, patience, integrity and the unfaltering willingness to negotiate and to strive to see

and prosperity of our country, as well as peace in the world, directly depend.

Responsibility is always about concrete action. From the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, the German government has taken on responsibility and, together with European partners, has been firmly committed to mediation and de-escalation.

the world from the perspective of the other.

As foreign minister, I am tasked with putting the phrase "more responsibility" into practice. Yet it is also a challenge for academic and civil society debate in this country: Are we doing the right thing? Are we doing it in the right way?

We cannot simply expound a new foreign policy approach – that is something we need to explore together, something that will never be static or final. The challenge will always lie in finding the right answer, in each individual situation, to the question of what are our country's interests and our chances of influencing the outcome of events.

In the short term, that applies to how we deal with urgent crises. But in the long term it also applies to the question of where and how we can best help to develop and maintain structures for our international order, upon which the security

“Germans want to see us use diplomacy to mediate wherever possible.”

order, upon which the security

order, upon which the security

Back in February of last year, the foreign ministers of Germany, Poland and France went to Kiev to mediate in order to prevent a bloody civil war. At Germany's initiative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) took on a leading role in monitoring and disengaging military groups. Moreover, Germany repeatedly provided impetus for the contact group in which the separatists and the Ukrainian Government hold discussions.

Yet our message to Russia was also clear: Anyone who arbitrarily changes borders in violation of international law should expect a clear and united response from Europe. Applying political pressure on the one hand, including the European Union's decision to impose sanctions and the decisions taken at the NATO summit in Wales, whilst maintaining dialogue and open communication channels on the other are both part and parcel of a responsible policy.

Let it be noted that it is not our aim to run Russia into the ground economically. What we want in the future is for Russia to enjoy economic strength and to work with us in a spirit of partnership to help shape the process of globalization and a peaceful future for our continent.

In terms of European security our policy must be to overcome paralysis and confrontation not by yielding, but by seeking a path forward. We want to resume discussions step by step – between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, between NATO and Russia and in the OSCE, too, in which Germany will take on a particular responsibility for Europe's collective security with its 2016 Chairmanship.

We need to re-activate and redevelop the infrastructure for a policy of small steps, we must create channels, forums and mechanisms to gradually restore lost trust and seek political solutions. When providing impetus for de-escalation we always remain aware that we are not alone.

Germany fulfills its responsibility for security on two levels: by developing ideas and initiatives whilst persistently advocating consensus and a united stance within the EU and NATO. That remains our challenge in 2015. ■



Radical rethink

We need new approaches in our response to terrorism | By Elmar Thevesen

The knife that took Theo van Gogh's life also held a slip of paper fixed to his chest: a personal message from Mohammed Bouyeri, the killer. It was the desperate attempt of a terrorist to explain himself and his crime, a cold-blooded attack on an individual and on freedom of expression. "There shall be no forgiveness for the unjust. Only the sword should be raised against them. No discussion, no demonstration, no parades, no petitions. Only death shall distinguish truth from lies," he wrote.

On Nov. 2, 2004, Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was cut down, because in his short film "Submission" he projected quotes from the Quran onto the back of a naked, abused Muslim woman. He wanted to provoke a controversy over the oppression of women in Islam. The terrible irony of the deed was that the killer Bouyeri had earlier been active in a youth center and a local magazine for the integration of young people. That was before, out of frustration and rage over his fruitless search for work, he became an Islamist.

His victim, Theo van Gogh, had himself worked in a youth center, shot a film about the dead-end lives of Moroccan youth gangs and suggested – to no avail – concepts for better integration procedures to the authorities. That was before he made his tasteless film to provoke a reaction. Two men who actually wanted the same thing encountered each other as killer and victim.

Michel Houellebecq's latest novel "Submission," which satirizes Islam, was published in France on the very day that jihadist terrorists slaughtered the *Charlie Hebdo* cartoonists and journalists. Again, it was an attack on freedom of speech. And again, the killers were Islamists trying to justify their contempt for others as part of a lofty struggle against injustice. In interviews with French media they portrayed their deeds as retribution – for the Prophet, the victims of the Assad regime in Syria and the Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Theo van Gogh's killer and the Paris gunmen considered themselves victims of a society in which they had failed to move forward. They were losers who

compensated their low self-esteem by living out violent fantasies and justifying their crimes with a book they had hardly read, let alone understood.

The parallels are no coincidence. Practically all completed, prevented and failed terrorist attacks since September 11, 2001 – in Madrid, London, Stockholm, Toulouse, Brussels, Frankfurt, Heathrow, Berlin, Bonn, Cologne and elsewhere – share these traits. The soaring numbers of potential assailants and rising frequency of attacks point out our own failures. More than 13 years after 9/11, we are still fighting the symptoms of Islamist terrorism instead of removing the fertile ground on which it arises.

It is a twofold failure, if we believe MIS. In April 2004, a confidential study by the British intelligence service identified two chief reasons for the growing radicalization of young Muslims in Western Europe. Firstly, "Muslims are experiencing high levels of disadvantage in terms of employment, qualifications and deprivation... They have a significant concern about discrimination" the report said. Especially third generation members of migrant families are increasingly frustrated at being socially and economically disadvantaged, experiencing poor educational opportunities and living conditions.

Added to that, according to the study, is mass disillusionment based on "a perception of 'double standards' British foreign policy, where democracy is preached but oppression of the 'Ummah' (the one nation of believers) is practised or tolerated, e.g. in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya." These are the same



Islamist terror in Europe: Aftermath of the 2004 Madrid train bombings (top left); wreckage of a bus targeted in the 2005 London bombings (top right) and the Charlie Hebdo attackers, Paris.

two chief motivations that breed extremist ideology in the housing projects of Madrid, Brussels and London, the banlieues of Paris and the urban turf of Berlin-Wedding, Duisburg-Marxloh and Frankfurt-Dietzenbach.

The authors of the study had no intention of finding excuses for Islamist-motivated crimes. They wanted cogent explanations so as to find more effective approaches in the fight against terrorism. But their analysis fell on the deaf ears of politicians. These wanted tougher laws, cameras in mosques, new surveillance tools, instead of launching programs for frustrated young people with no prospects. That's hardly surprising, as the latter would both be harder to set up and encounter widespread resistance in an increasingly anti-Islamic society.

Without a doubt, state pressure with the help of the police and intelligence services is indispensable, but depending exclusively on it could even worsen the problem, so that in the end we can keep attacks at bay only through shootouts in our cities and targeted killings in warzones.

That is why we need a radical rethink of our terrorism response, which should be aimed at the two chief reasons for radicalization. The first task is the easier

one. We cannot allow Salafists to be the best social workers in our countries: They offer young people the appearance of respect, orientation, and a feeling of self-esteem and belonging.

We can do that much better. A coalition forged from these kids' environments – parents, family, friends, schools, religious congregations, clubs, associations and companies, with the full support of the social, youth, employment

and law enforcement authorities – must dig away at extremism's fertile soil by creating opportunities.

The French government has just approved the first steps. Germany and other states should follow. They must also stand up courageously against the lie of the alleged Islamization of Europe: The Muslim share of the population will remain under 10 percent over the long term. At the same time, they must make clear world, so that recruiters of terrorism would fail to find fertile ground.

What, in positive terms, do we want to achieve? That is a far more important question than asking what we want to prevent. And at present, politicians, scholars and strategic thinkers have few answers. They know that the world needs a new economic and security architecture. But what would it look like?



Elmar Thevesen is deputy editor-in-chief and Head of News at the German public television channel ZDF. He has authored several books on international terrorism.

PRIVATE

The New Jihadism: A Global Snapshot

A look at the scale and geographical distribution of deaths caused by jihadist groups, networks, and individuals in November 2014. Incidents were recorded as 'jihadist' when they were claimed by, or could be attributed to, groups that meet the following definition: "A modern revolutionary political ideology mandating the use of violence to defend or promote a particular, very narrow vision of Sunni Islamic understandings." This definition excludes Shia militant groups such as Hezbollah that justify fighting in the name of jihad but are located outside the Sunni tradition.

Deaths / Attacks by Victim Status & Country

	Civilian	Military	Police	Official	Jihadist	Unknown	Total	Attacks
Iraq	815	562	33	13	292	55	1770	233
Nigeria	681	28	3	15	59	0	786	27
Afghanistan	124	285	95	21	248	9	782	152
Syria	151	372	0	2	166	2	693	110
Yemen	138	235	0	0	37	0	410	37
Somalia	30	145	1	22	18	0	216	37
Pakistan	70	35	13	11	76	7	212	35
Philippines	12	14	0	0	24	0	50	9
Kenya	48	0	2	0	0	0	50	4
Libya	3	36	0	0	0	0	39	12
Cameroon	3	2	0	0	10	0	15	3
India	5	3	0	0	5	0	13	2
Egypt	0	5	0	0	0	0	5	2
Niger	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Total	2080	1723	147	84	935	73	5042	664

Source: ICSR

Deaths / Attacks by Group

Group	Deaths	Attacks
Islamic State	2206	306
Boko Haram	801	30
Taliban	720	150
AQAP	410	36
Al Shabab	266	41
Jabhat al Nusra	257	34
Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan	146	32
Jamaat ul-Ahrar	60	1
Haqqani Network	59	1
Abu Sayyaf	41	5
Ansar al-Shariah Libya	39	12
Lashkar-e-Toiba	18	3
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	9	4
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis	5	2
Jundullah	4	1
MUJAO	1	1

Jihad has arrived in Europe. For more than ten years, after the devastating attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London one year later, the European public has regarded the security situation through a foggy lens, with abstract, difficult-to-pinpoint sources of danger. In isolated cases, suspects were arrested and possible attacks prevented.

This simmering threat took on more definite contours only with the Paris attacks that began on Jan. 7. Tragically, we became witnesses to the first wide-ranging assaults motivated by militant Islamism since the beginning of the civil war in Syria – and they will not remain the only bid to attack our liberal Western system of values. Let's not forget that the target was not just France but the entire European community of values. Therefore, the EU must also find common answers to the threats of fundamentalism and extremism.

It is hardly surprising that some immediately attempted to make political hay of this tragedy. Germany's right-wing populists announced less than four hours after the attacks that they saw themselves justified in their Islamophobia. The day after the shootings, Marine Le Pen, leader of France's far-right Front National, called for a national referendum to re-instate the death penalty. In France as in Germany, debates over new surveillance tools have gained urgency.

Yet it is clear that only a dispassionate analysis of the situation and a reasoned approach can bring success. The problem is hardly a lack of intelligence or security services in Europe, or inadequate lists of suspicious persons. Instead, the core of the problem is the lack of coordination in Europe's anti-terrorism efforts.

As stridently as law enforcement officials call for new instruments, tougher laws and more manpower, they practically fall silent when asked to show how far data sharing, concrete collaboration and joint investigations have progressed. For this reason it would be wrong to succumb to the Pavlovian reflex and engage in even more data hoarding. The Paris attacks would not have been prevented by this kind of data dragnet. The Kouachi brothers' names were included both on the US terrorism watch database (TIDE) and international no-fly lists – and had been for years.

No one could dispute that the terror has gained a European dimension. Weapons used in the Paris attacks were procured in Brussels, the cell in Verviers was steered from Greece, and incendiary Islamic preachers maintain contacts stretching from Germany, France and Belgium to Spain, the UK and other countries.

On the one side, more and more sources seek information on completely innocent citizens, while on the other authorities repeatedly neglect to include significant investigation results on individuals who represent a clear and present danger.

Toothless tigers

The Paris attacks vividly demonstrate the need for more cooperation between Europe's intelligence services

By Alexander Graf Lambsdorff



A city in mourning: a sea of flowers outside the Charlie Hebdo building in Paris.

As a reaction to the Paris attacks, a structural reform of European intelligence services is more needed than ever. IntCen, the EU Intelligence Analysis Center, has yet to progress beyond the status of a toothless tiger. Information gathering is limited to publicly available sources, diplomats' reports, contributions by member states on specific requests



Alexander Graf Lambsdorff is vice-president of the European Parliament and a member of Germany's Free Democratic Party (FDP).

SABINE SCHRÜNDER

as well as satellite data from the EU satellite center.

Germany's Federal Intelligence Service, the BND, for example, provides only the absolute necessities: information for "official use," which is the lowest level of secrecy. One doesn't need to be a genius to recognize that no effective joint terrorism lookout can be conducted this way.

Yet there is no reason why the analysis of raw intelligence data

and insights could not take place mutually – not least so that investigators can be kept at the same information level across borders. Joint analysis would allow us to recognize patterns and connections that would not be recognized in a purely national evaluation.

The European treaties would not need rewriting and of course every intelligence service would still protect its sources, especially when it's a matter of human intelligence. But member states must commit to sharing sensitive data.

Legal frameworks would have to be drawn up at the national level for the authorities and duties of the respective ser-

vice and its democratic supervision. That's because IntCen already operates as a unit of the European External Action Service as an interface for various national intelligence services. Yet it is itself not based on a legal foundation or a clear mandate from the member states. It also lacks accountability toward national legislatures and the European Parliament.

To enhance terrorism prevention, the competencies of Eurojust

and Europol must be expanded. That way, suspected terrorists could be better monitored across the EU. Instead of having to put together a patchwork quilt, investigators could have a more complete picture at their disposal. Suspicious activities would be noticed sooner.

By integrating capacities, staffing shortages in individual member states could also be compensated temporarily. The two brothers in Paris had been under observation for years. But in the spring of 2014 the monitoring was discontinued because the two had not been conspicuous and too few investigators were available for the task.

The bottom line is that more closely meshed operations have become indispensable in the fight against international terrorism. Protecting the population from terrorist threats goes hand in hand with the need to defend the privacy of law-abiding citizens. The principle of law-based rule and the liberties we enjoy through our constitution cannot be sacrificed on the altar of boundless obsession with security. All our actions should be guided by the same principle: as much action for security as necessary, and as few restrictions on civil rights as possible. ■

Islamist terrorist attacks against Western targets

SEPT. 11, 2001: NEW YORK/WASHINGTON/PENNSYLVANIA

Three passenger jets hijacked and flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. A fourth hijacked plane crashes into a field in Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 dead.

APRIL 11, 2002: DJERBA

Bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba. 21 dead, including 14 German tourists. Al-Qaeda claims responsibility.

OCTOBER 12, 2002: BALI

Bombs explode in two nightclubs in Bali. 202 dead, including six Germans and more than 80 Australians. 303 injured. The bombers were members of the Jemaah Islamiyah movement, which aims to make Indonesia an Islamic state based on sharia law.

NOVEMBER 28, 2002: MOMBASA

Three suicide bombers detonate a car bomb outside an Israeli-owned tourist hotel in Mombasa (Kenya). 13 dead, 80 injured. A group calling itself the Army of Palestine claims responsibility for the attack.

MAY 16, 2003: CASABLANCA

A series of suicide attacks against Jewish institutions and a Spanish restaurant in Casablanca. 33 killed (plus 12 attackers). Claimed by Salafiya Jihadia.

NOVEMBER 15/20, 2003: ISTANBUL

Attacks on two synagogues, the British Consulate and a branch of a British bank. More than 60 dead, hundreds injured. Groups affiliated with al-Qaeda claim responsibility.

MARCH 11, 2004: MADRID

A series of bombings on four commuter trains in Madrid: nearly 191 killed, more than 1800 injured. The bombers are believed to have modeled themselves on al-Qaeda.

SEPTEMBER 9, 2004: JAKARTA

A car bomb explodes outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. 9 dead, 173 injured. The bombers are believed to be from Jemaah Islamiyah, which is linked with Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda.

JULY 7, 2005: LONDON

Bomb attacks on three underground lines and a bus in London. 52 killed (plus four suicide bombers), at least 150 injured. All four attackers are so-called "homegrown terrorists." A group calling itself "the secret organization of al-Qaeda in Europe" claims the attacks as revenge for British military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq.

OCTOBER 2005: BALI

Several bombings in Kuta and Jimbaran. 20 dead (and 3 attackers). The attackers were Jemaah Islamiyah members.

JULY 31, 2006: COLOGNE

Two suitcase bombs deposited in regional trains by the so-called "Sauerland Group" fail to explode. But Germany, too, now faces the reality of its own homegrown terrorists.

AUGUST 10, 2006: LONDON

British police prevent attacks on transatlantic flights. The international rules governing liquids in carry-on baggage are subsequently tightened. Two years later, five suspected terrorists admit to having planned the bomb attacks.

DECEMBER 11, 2007: ALGIERS

A bomb explodes on a school bus outside the high court and in a tanker truck in front of the offices of the UN refugee aid agency UNHCR. 22 dead (including 17 UN employees) 177 injured. Al-Qaeda claims responsibility.

NOVEMBER 26, 2008: MUMBAI

Islamist terrorists armed with machine guns and grenades storm the Taj Mahal Hotel, the main rail station, a tourist café and a religious center. Shooting continues for three days. 166 dead.

DECEMBER 11, 2010: STOCKHOLM

Two bombs explode in the city center, one probably prematurely while still being carried by the bomber. Two injured. The lone bomber was an Iraqi-born Swedish citizen with a background of radical Islamism.

JULY 18, 2012: BURGAS

Attack on Israeli tourists at Burgas airport (Bulgaria). 5 Israelis killed, along with their bus driver and the bomber, 32 injured. Bulgarian authorities blame Hezbollah.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2011: BENGHAZI

Militants attack the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya. Four American citizens killed, including Ambassador Chris Stevens. In June 2014 US special forces arrest Ahmed Abu Chattala as the "key figure," founder and leader of the Islamist terrorist group Ansar al Sharia.

APRIL 15, 2013: BOSTON

Two bombs concealed in backpacks explode near the finish line of the Boston marathon. The bombs were made from pressure cookers filled with gunpowder, nails and ball bearings. 3 dead, 264 injured.


JUNE 20, 2013: MOGADISHU

Suicide bombing on a United Nations building. 18 dead and 18 injured. The radical Islamist militia Al Shabaab claims responsibility.

This list does not include the many Islamist attacks in the Philippines, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Somalia, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Algeria, on churches in Nigeria and Kenya or on Egyptian and Jordanian tourist hotels.

Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq

Number of foreign fighters per origin country, as of December 2014



Seven years ago, running as an improbable long-shot for president, Barack Obama grew accustomed to hearing the charge that he was “naïve” for promising to engage some of America’s fiercest adversaries, from the Castros of Cuba to the mullahs of Iran.

Now, in the last quarter of his presidency, the question is whether engagement – some successful, some not – will end up defining his foreign policy legacy. Over the past six years he has scored two surprising victories, with Cuba and Myanmar, reversing decades of enmity. The next two years will be focused on the two states that are far more hostile to Western interest, far better armed, and far more strategically important: Iran and North Korea.

The betting in Washington is that the magic that worked so well on the burned out generals in Rangoon and the young Cubans eager to make it 90 miles to America’s shores will fail when it comes to changing the mindset of Kim Jong Un and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Both Iran and North Korea still define their legitimacy by casting the United States as their avowed enemy. For both countries, in different ways, defiance of the United States is part of the national narrative and national identity. Yet in Iran President Obama has been striving to make a breakthrough that even he assesses is a “less than 50/50 chance,” and in North Korea, though he will not admit it, to help speed a collapse of the regime.

In both cases, expectations are low. Though a few of the president’s aides think that the outlines of an Iran deal are still possible, they doubt the relationship will look dramatically different by noon on Jan. 20, 2017, when President Obama leaves office. In the case of North Korea, one senior aide said, “change would require divine intervention.”

To understand why, it’s important to start with what made the change with Cuba and Myanmar possible: Neither country has been strategically vital to American interests for decades.

Only Americans over the age of 60 can even remember the days when Miami seemed in danger of being eviscerated by missiles just 90 miles away in Cuba, or when the Pentagon measured how many minutes it would take a nuclear weapon launched near Havana to hit New York City. The obstacles to changing the relationship were largely inside the United State. They disappeared as a once-powerful generation of angry Cuban exiles, who blocked any normalization of relations, began to fade away. By the time Obama came to office, it was no longer accepted wisdom that a politician who advocated an opening to Cuba would be obliterated in presidential primaries in Florida and New Jersey, where large numbers of Cuban-Americans live. In fact, the politics flipped: More young Cuban-Americans wanted to lift the travel and investment bans.

That changing balance worked to President Obama’s advantage. He knew young Cubans who yearned for an end to the Cold War freeze that doomed a country so geographically close, yet so difficult to reach. The causes of the Castros’ Cold War rifts with Washington seemed as yellowed as an old Che Guevara poster.

“This is a regime that has been molting,” said Julia E. Sweig, the director of Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. The telling moment came more than a year ago, when Raul Castro’s government allowed Cubans to travel freely – an event analogous to the confusing moment in 1989 when it



Beyond Cuba

In his final two years, President Obama’s foreign policy options are dwindling. Events in Iran and North Korea could make or break his legacy

By David E. Sanger

seemed as if East Germans would no longer be under the strictest of restrictions.

“They have made a calculation that rather than try to control the movements of their own people, that Cubans can be part of the global economy and come back and have homes and businesses inside and outside of Cuba,” Sweig said. That change was critical to President Obama’s thinking. He himself referred to America’s six-decade-long embargo of Cuba as a policy that “was long past its expiration date. When what you’re doing doesn’t work for 50 years, it’s time to try something new.”

That shift marked an emotional moment – but perhaps the most notable fact was that the political opposition seemed so lame. The ideologues who had fought so many presidents over Cuba were fading from the scene, like Fidel Castro himself. The same could be said for the opposition to normalizing relations with Myanmar: Once the generals who ran the country loosened the political system, released Aung San Suu Kii and renounced their suspected nuclear trade with North Korea, all opposition in the United States faded away.

The result is that Cuba is the newest American experiment with

integration. American officials talking about Cuba today sound a lot like those who talked about engaging China in a web of Western values in the 1990’s. That experiment was only partially successful in the case of China. But Cuba is a tiny place, and once its economy opens up, the guesswork is that it will begin to look like Miami. It will take longer in Yangon, the former Rangoon.

So what does this say about prospects for a settlement with Iran? Not much. To reach an accord between Washington and Tehran requires not one deal, but three: One between the negotiators, one between Iran’s president and its military leaders and mullahs, and a final one between President Obama and Congress. Few doubt that the negotiating teams, led by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman, would be able to close their differences. But both are operating under huge constraints at home.

Zarif, urban and westernized, is considered far too American in Tehran, and is always walking a

fine line with the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the ayatollahs. When he started down the road of negotiation in the summer of 2013, he told confidantes he had only six months to close a deal before those “who oppose dealing with the United States” would begin to chip away at his efforts. And in fact, the chipping has begun. When Ayatollah Khamenei declared last summer that Iran would ultimately build an industrial-scale uranium enrichment capability – perhaps not for years, but eventually – it circumscribed Zarif’s ability to negotiate. With

Iran, “than a reaction to domestic political pressures not to ‘retreat’ in any aspect of its program.”

President Obama faces a parallel problem. Many in Congress want to scuttle the negotiations. The best way, they have determined, is to threaten new sanctions against Iran, ostensibly to kick in the day the negotiations end. But the practical effect is far greater; the sanctions resolutions wending through Congress may give the Iranians reason to avoid striking a deal. (The agreement the two nations are operating under prohibits new sanctions while negotiations drag on.)

President Obama has explicitly warned Congress about torpedoing his diplomatic effort, but that complaint may prove in vain. European foreign ministers have similar concerns. “Introducing new hurdles at this critical stage of the negotiations, including through additional nuclear-related sanctions legislation on Iran, would jeopardize our efforts at a critical juncture,” four European foreign ministers, amongst them Frank-Walter Steinmeier from Germany and Laurent Fabius from France, wrote in the *Washington Post* early this year. “While many Iranians know how much they stand to gain by over-

coming isolation and engaging with the world, there are also those in Tehran who oppose any nuclear deal. We should not give them new arguments.” The negotiation is meant to test whether the forces of modernization can overcome those who see Iran’s national identity defined by its opposition to the Great Satan USA. That experiment is still underway, but for now, the conservatives appear to be winning.

This collision of forces will not be resolved during Obama’s presidency. At most he would have the power to suspend some sanctions as part of a broader deal; only Congress could permanently lift them. The Iranians would have no guarantee the sanctions would ever go away. And without that guarantee, it is likely the Iranian Republican Guard Corps and the clerics will continue to rule the day.

There is no equivalent negotiation underway with North Korea, the most isolated of dictator states. For all his enthusiasm about engagement, President Obama has never seen an opening for engagement with the North; its decision to test a nuclear weapon in the first months of his presidency “turned us all into North Korea hawks,” one of his former senior aides said. Obama’s approach of “strategic patience” – essentially waiting for isolation to change the minds of the North Koreans – has failed to change the country’s behavior. If anything, it has become more provocative.

More recently the North has found a way to deliver a message to Washington that is far more realistic than threatening to use strategic arms. It spent years developing cyber weapons that are cheap, accurate and easy to deploy – perfect for a state like North Korea. The cyber attack that hit Sony Pictures Entertainment, ostensibly in retaliation for a crude comedy about a CIA plot to kill Kim Jong-un, was the first state-ordered, large scale destructive attack in the United States. Undoubtedly it will not be the last.

The president’s response, again, was not to try to engage the North Korean leadership, for whom he has made his antipathy clear. Instead, it was to create a cost for the cyber attack, and establish some sense of deterrence. He announced new sanctions on the country, a step of dubious value: Every American president since Harry Truman has sanctioned North Korea and dreamed of its demise. All have been disappointed.

Kim Jong Un is not likely to give up cyber weapons soon. They suit their purposes: It is easy to deny their use, and the severity of the attacks can be moderated. In short, they are perfect for a broken – and broke – nation, offering a way for the North Korean leadership to strike without fearing an overwhelming response.

To Obama, North Korea is the antithesis of Cuba. Its people cannot travel. Its leadership cannot see the advantages of integration with the West; instead, they view it as the beginning of the end of the regime. To the president, as one aide said, “the best solution would be for the North to go away.”

White House officials know that is a wish, not a policy. But President Obama is acutely aware that over the next two years, foreign policy is the only territory he will control largely by himself. Beyond Cuba and Myanmar he has the running room to attempt one or two more breakthroughs. The pivot to Asia offers an opportunity to shift America’s emphasis, but not to redefine his presidency. A breakthrough with Iran, or a breakdown in North Korea, could remake the last quarter of his term in office. ■

David E. Sanger is the national security correspondent for the New York Times.



PRIVATE



Wildcards galore in the Middle East

Policymakers can't plan for all scenarios but they can ask: What if? | By Volker Perthes



Scholars and policy advisors would do well to refrain from predictions about the course of the Middle East. In an uncertain environment, the soundest tool to prepare for the future is often to simply study the trends that we already see and, at the same time, be ready to deal with wildcards. Trends, of course, tend to shift, or to be broken. But they constitute strong currents that mould the flow of events as well as the perceptions of actors.

The current mega-trend in the Middle East seems to be the dissolution of a regional order with no one around to put it together again: External powers are unlikely to design a new Sykes Picot and regional powers seem unable as yet to gather for a Vienna Congress of sorts to establish their own regional security system.

In a number of respects, the political landscape between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf has ceased to be the Middle East that we used to know. This certainly applies to state-society relations, but also to the geopolitical level. Here are five trends that seem particularly relevant:

- International players are staying on the sidelines. In contrast both to the more aggressive American approach under George W. Bush and the European Union's post-2011 transformation agenda, external actors have largely given up on projecting ideas and order into the region. International actors will still defend vital interests in the region. But in the main, their approach is about containing risks and threats inside the region, enabling local partners, and, if possible, resolving problems that could entail the risk of being drawn into regional conflicts.

The modus operandi of the coalition against the so-called Islamic State (IS) gives expression to this trend by limiting international military action to airstrikes and leaving the fighting on the ground to local forces. For Europe and the US, this may go along with a renewed prioritization of stability over political transformation and human rights, which ironically brings

them closer to the approaches of Russia or China.

- As the balances shift, no sustainable alliances are emerging. Some of the power shifts are clearly more than ephemeral. Thus, for the first time in the contemporary Middle East, neither Iraq nor Syria are among the active players on the regional scene. Rather, the two countries – Syria even more so than Iraq – have become the space where all political, geopolitical and sectarian or identitarian conflicts converge. Egypt is largely occupied with itself, and unlikely to resume a regional leadership position for



some time to come. Saudi Arabia and Iran have emerged as the main regional antagonists, rather than becoming the leading protagonists of a regional concert of powers. In fact, neither the bloody conflict in Syria nor the region-wide sectarian polarisation will calm down



Volker Perthes is the director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), in Berlin.

or come to an end without some understanding between Riyadh and Tehran.

The majority of the regional states are now battling the so-called Islamic State. But they find themselves in a brittle coalition of inconvenience, rather than an alliance.

The idea that a grave common threat, such as the emergence of the IS, would help regional actors to overcome their rivalries is obviously unfounded. Consider only the relationship between Riyadh and Tehran, Cairo and Ankara, or even Riyadh and Doha. In today's Middle East, the enemy of my enemy may still remain – my enemy.

- Civil wars are no longer contained. The Middle East has for a long time been able to cope with – and even tolerate – its various civil wars because they were more or less contained within the borders of the respective states. Consider the long civil wars in Lebanon, in Algeria, in Sudan, in Iraqi Kurdistan, in Yemen. This is no longer the case. The wars in Syria and Iraq have migrated across borders; and borders – particularly between Iraq and Syria, but also between Syria and Lebanon – are losing their relevance.

- The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is losing relevance for the region, but not for Israelis and Palestinians. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians remains virulent – remember the 50-days war between Israel and Hamas in the summer of 2014 –, and it is unlikely to be settled in the near future. New violence is more likely than an agreement on a two-state solution.

However, in contrast to most of the past six decades, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer the main mobilizing issue in most parts of the region. This may add to a false sense of calm on the Israeli side. Israel's deterrence has strengthened, and its economy is strong. But given the reluctance of the current Israeli government to give up control, Israel may miss the opportunity of another



US mediation effort and sleepwalk into a perilous one-state reality.

- New quasi-sovereign entities are emerging. The weakness of states in the Middle East lies not so much in the frailty of state and security apparatuses or in the lack of resources as in the lack of inclusiveness. In Syria and Iraq, the failure of two would-be strong states has led to the emergence of new territorially based quasi-sovereign entities. Similar developments may occur in other countries.

It is relatively easy for the regional or the international community to deal with an entity like the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq which is already treated as a de-facto state actor by a number of governments, or even with the Kurdish cantons in Northern Syria. These entities aspire to be included into the system. The so-called Islamic State constitutes a totally different and much more dangerous phenomenon.

The IS is not simply another terrorist group. In order to deal with and ultimately defeat it, we need to understand it as

what it is, namely a jihadist state-building project. It is a totalitarian, expansionist, and hegemonic project for a state that tries to recreate a number of features of the defunct security states in Syria and Iraq, but rejects the state system as such and will certainly not apply for membership in international institutions.

The bombing campaign of the US-led coalition may succeed in inhibiting its further expansion. But the IS is likely to remain a military, political,

and ideological threat to regional states and societies as long as no credible, inclusive governments are established in Baghdad and Damascus; as long as no appealing counter-narrative emerges from Saudi Arabia whose Wahhabist school of Islam remains the source of ideological inspiration for the IS; and as long as tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to feed sectarian polarization in the region.

The number of wildcards in any regional situation, or, more precisely, of game-changing events and developments that never come totally out of the blue, is in principle unlimited. Consider, just to mention a few, a successful conclusion of the nuclear talks with Iran, the sudden collapse of the government in Damascus and the takeover of the Syrian capital by the IS, or an uprising by local supporters of the IS in Saudi Arabia, perhaps in connection with a succession crisis in the royal family. Policymakers cannot plan for all more or less plausible scenarios. But they would be well advised to more often ask the "What if?" question – both with regard to outcomes they want to achieve, and to more malign scenarios which too frequently are dismissed as unrealistic just because we don't want them to materialize. ■



MUNICH HAS COUNTLESS SIGHTS TO OFFER



THE HOTEL BAYERISCHER HOF INCLUDED

Since 1841, the privately managed, award-winning Hotel Bayerischer Hof is valued internationally for its elegant atmosphere and the amiable, highly personal service. Here, the highest levels of luxury come as standards with its stylish 280 rooms and 65 suites set in the heart of Munich, within walking distance of the renowned museums, Kunsthallen, art galleries and of the Opera, as well as of the finest shopping areas. The hotel offers a choice of five restaurants (Gourmet, Mediterranean, Polynesian, Bavarian and Spa Cuisine), among them the restaurants Atelier (1 Michelin star) and Garden, re-styled by Axel Verwoordt, the famous interior designer. Guests have a choice of 40 function rooms with a capacity of 10 up to 2,500 persons, six bars, the Night Club with live Jazz and the luxury cinema astor@Cinema Lounge, also designed by Axel Verwoordt. French architect Andrée Putman designed the Blue Spa, the wellness area on three floors, with a panoramic rooftop terrace. The latest addition is the Roofgarden, designed by French design studio Jouin Manku. Welcome to the best that Munich lifestyle has to offer.

Promenadeplatz 2-6
D-80333 München

Fon +49 89.21 20 - 0
Fax +49 89.21 20 - 906

www.bayerischerhof.de
info@bayerischerhof.de

LEADING HOTELS

LEADING SPAS

Preferred HOTELS & RESORTS

BAYERISCHER HOF



Three long-term trends are redefining conflict and security: the redistribution of power, the world's increasing physical and informational connectivity, and the resulting decline of the state as the centerpiece of the international system. The first moves us away from the post-Cold War world. The last two have more radical implications: they challenge the role of states and intergovernmental organizations as the building blocks of global order.

All three will shape the conflicts of 2015, and all three present immediate challenges to Western powers. International co-operation has never been as important, but today's conflicts demand an engagement that is both more modest and more imaginative than in the past. This is not an easy combination.

The redistribution of power has been abundantly documented, but its implications are not yet clear. The United States is less overwhelmingly dominant, except in its military capacity, but it is also less willing to use the force it has. In most crises, in any event, the utility of its force is doubtful. Europe moves frustratingly slowly and has failed to become a strategic actor (though one should not discount its raw potential to become one).

Both, too, have been undermined by the travails and inequities of their economic systems – no longer seen as unparalleled role models; and by the legal and moral excesses of their post-9/11 posture. The West has failed, to date, to effectively counter the perception that its international stance is motivated solely by a desire to maintain its political, economic and military supremacy.

Meanwhile, Russia, China, India and Japan are increasingly assertive in their immediate regions. And a set of middle powers plays an ever more influential, even dominant, role in their own neighborhoods, sometimes for better but often for worse, as ensuing local rivalries make conflict resolution that much more difficult. Perhaps most grave, in a growing expanse of territories, mostly across parts of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, the writ of the state is weak, sometimes even non-existent.

It has become fashionable to talk about the “return of geopolitics.” But more significant is that this redistribution – or, perhaps better, diffusion – of power makes geopolitics, as traditionally understood,


obsolete. Today's world with its multiple players, some with global reach but weak commitments, some with only regional clout, but strong interests, does not function like the world once dominated by Europe, or that of the Cold War, or even that of the immediate post-Cold War period, in which – many thought – only a handful of powers really mattered. States can work together on some issues while contesting others, allowing for a much more flexible, but also less predictable world. The co-operation between Russia and Western countries on the Iran nuclear issue, even as they compete in Ukraine and Syria, is a case in point.

The second trend is the world's increased connectivity. The emergence of terrorism as a global concern is a stark illustration. Terrorism is nothing new; it is a centuries-old tactical response to an asymmetric distribution of power. What is new is the global impact of some terrorist acts. This reflects the physical connectivity of the 21st century, as exemplified in the profound transformation of civil aviation since 9/11, or the growing threat of cyber warfare in digital economies.

It also reflects unprecedented information connectivity: an impact-multiplier that creates recognition, whether for a fast-food chain, a running shoe or Jihadism. And just as global commercial franchises buy local businesses to establish a presence, the Jihadist franchises exploit and boost local conflicts, whether in the Sahel, northern Kenya, or Syria. Often pressure is bottom-up: local groups seek the franchise because it offers easy access to money, weapons and recruits.

Connectivity is also a recruitment tool. The global impact of terrorist actions attracts lost souls seduced by the publicity given to their acts. Extreme violence becomes both tactic and strategy, an end unto itself. It is packaged as Jihadism not because Islam has much to do with it, but because Islam provides a convenient marker, a readily recognizable totem around which to gather in resistance to real or perceived injustice.

Also, as yet there is no good counter-narrative in the Sunni world to win over the alienated: liberal democracy has lost its appeal; the often remote secular or religious autocrats offer little to most young men; and moderate political Islam has also come unstuck – most dramatically in Egypt. The relatively high proportion of




converts among French Jihadists (more than 20 percent) is also revealing.

In such a connected world, retrenchment is not possible. No border force, no “homeland” security can safeguard islands of peace and stability in an ocean of turmoil as isolationists would have it. The flow of people can never be fully controlled, nor can the flow of ideas, at least not in a free society. Outside threats will have their echo in homegrown terrorism. There is

no choice but to engage. The question is: How?

Sharing intelligence, coordinating efforts to weaken international terrorist connections is necessary, but cannot replace local and regional conflict resolution, and cannot take place oblivious to how others might view those actions. Empathy, clarity and consistency of exposition, and adherence to minimum norms are much needed.

Neglecting that and focusing exclusively on military operations can help terrorist groups increase their influence by aggravating the conditions that gave rise to them in the first place. Assessing the strategic impact of targeted military actions is vital: they may achieve tactical results at the expense of strategic success. In Syria and Iraq, airstrikes and support to Kurdish and Shia fighters may have degraded the Islamic State's capacities,



You serve the world's market

Your top priority is t
With our global network
Safely, reliably, and rig
processes, we have ta



In today's networked multipolar world the West still seeks the right strategy | By Jean-Marie Guéhenno

IMAGO STOCK/REDFERRE

Many are chronically weak, at war, collapsed or facing cycles of low-intensity violence. Even those that appear reasonably strong are often, to varying degrees, rather brittle.

In these regions, international actors and national reformers alike can aspire to forge inclusive, accountable and resilient states, but they face a familiar question: "What is good enough?" Can leaders in those states that appear reasonably strong be nudged into doing enough to make collapse less likely? – at a minimum widening their support base and patronage networks or, more optimistically, improving governance. And can those states that have collapsed regain a share of power and resources to keep enough people happy to create at least some short-term stability, and hope over time for improvements in governance? Such ends appear modest. But in practice they will be hard won.

As many states weaken, the relative power of non-state actors – both legitimate like corporations and illegitimate like criminal networks – keeps growing. Implications are wide-ranging. The distinction between domestic and international affairs is blurred because domestic fragility, whether in industrialized Ukraine or the developing Democratic Republic of Congo or South Sudan, creates opportunities for foreign meddling. The distinction between crime and politics is also fading: profits from trafficking not only corrupt officials and hollow out institutions, but also support terrorists, mafias and insurgencies from the Sahel to Eastern Europe and Latin America.

In such a fluid and amorphous context, wars are more intractable. Political programs no longer structure conflicts; the risk of political fragmentation increases, as political, criminal and personal agendas mix together. The longer a war lasts, the more armed groups proliferate, as observed in Somalia, South Sudan or Syria. Ending armed conflict becomes ever harder, not only because of the number of actors who need to be included in a peace process, but also because political goals are elusive and protagonists on all sides share an interest in prolonging the fighting. It keeps the

state weak, and they have adapted to a war economy that enhances their own power and ability to loot resources. Sadly most of the deadly conflicts of 2014 look set to continue.

No overarching concept can capture the diversity and complexity of conflict in 2015. Disenfranchisement and local grievances can have an increasingly global impact. They are transforming the geopolitical landscape, which in turn changes the nature of local conflicts. The connections between local grievances and the global strategic theater also make the world of 2015 a more dangerous and less predictable place: strategic surprise is the new normal, as neglected local conflicts may suddenly acquire a global dimension.

Russia, China and emerging middle powers will continue to build up their militaries, but new threats resulting from the weakness of many states are likely to be even more pressing.

This is no reason for Western powers to abandon efforts for cooperative management of international security – in fact they are more vital now than ever. But those efforts must be more humble: proportionate to the limited international consensus on interventions and to the international community's limited capacity to effectively stabilize countries in crisis. They must also be more imaginative: first and foremost looking outside traditional centers of power, but also working creatively outside traditional alliances and seeking support for efforts to end conflicts even in what may seem unlikely quarters.

After a decade and a half of interventionism, whether US-led or UN-led, and increasing disagreement on what constitutes legitimate engagement, the temptation exists for the West to adopt a minimalist approach to foreign relations. That would be as wrong as the previous maximalist posture. 2015 could bring in a new equilibrium, if a focus on the political foundations of stabilization leads to a limited but broad consensus on peace and security: less military interventionism, more politics, smarter diplomacy, more collective action, and more modest ambitions. ■


Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary General of the UN 2000 to 2008, is president and CEO of International Crisis Group and author of "The Fog of Peace," due for publication in April from Brookings.



ICC



Delivering solutions.



kets. So do we.

What your cargo reaches its destination – not how it gets there.

work, we perfectly combine rail, road, ocean, and air freight to ensure that your goods make it anywhere in the world. Right on schedule. And we do it quickly, efficiently, and affordably. From simple transport services to complex logistics tailor-made solutions to fulfill your needs. Let us serve you: www.dbschenker.com.



RT (formerly Russia Today) anchor during a live program: "RT is slick, pacy and convincing. It does not focus on promoting Russia. Instead it follows a broad anti-Western agenda."

PICTURE ALLIANCE/DPA/EVGENY BIVATOV

We are not ready for hybrid war

The West faces a joined-up threat from Russia but is yet to formulate a joined-up response | By Edward Lucas

Western security thinking is based on compartments. Military threats require a military response. Criminals are a matter for the police, and spies for the spycatchers. Diplomats deal with diplomacy and someone from the IT department – probably – worries about the security of your office computer. As for propaganda attacks? That sort of thing doesn't happen any more. We have a free press and a free media market. What could possibly go wrong?

This way of thinking grew up in what now looks like an era of innocence which followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. It was mistaken then, and is dangerously out-of-date now. The West is facing a kind of hybrid war which we barely recognize, and have little ability to withstand. The main, but not only, protagonist is Vladimir Putin's Russia, which sees our weaknesses far more clearly than we do ourselves, and is ruthless in exploiting them. The weaknesses that Russia exploits are largely general ones. They have been previously exploited to some extent by Saudi Arabia, and also by China.

The clearest example of hybrid war came in Ukraine last year. Even before Russian troops marched into the regional parliament building in the peninsula's capital, Simferopol, on March 18, 2014, the Kremlin had made sure of victory. It had penetrated every part of the Ukrainian state apparatus through bribery, intimidation and cyberespionage. It is no exaggeration to say that the Kremlin was better informed about Ukraine's plans and capabilities to resist attack than the leadership in Kiev was.

Russia's economic pressure on Ukraine – a combination of energy sanctions, trade blockades and financial manipulation – meant that the country was all but bankrupt even before the war started. Decision-making was not

just crippled, but confused. Russian propaganda had created the impression in Crimea and among many other Ukrainians that fascists had seized power and that 'Russian-speakers' (a purposely vague category of people) faced persecution.

Outsiders – both policymakers and public opinion – were distracted too. Russia managed to portray the events in Ukraine not as the invasion and occupation of another country's territory, but part of a justified response to a cynical power grab by the EU and NATO. Even now, many in the West do not realize the extent of Russia's ambitions and capabilities. The Kremlin aims to divide and distract the West, erode transatlantic solidarity and re-establish a kind of hegemony over neighboring countries, constraining their security choices and ensuring that they can pose no threat to the regime's grip on Russia. All over southeastern and central Europe, Russian influence has been growing, meaning that neither NATO nor the EU can now function properly – as the new Greek government's stance on Russia illustrates all too well.

The first and biggest weakness is the belief that, as the Romans said, pecunia non olet (money doesn't smell). Since 1989 we have come to believe that making money is a praiseworthy, or at least morally neutral, activity so long as you do not actually break the law. Considerations of national security matter even less than complaints by activists for green and human rights causes. If you get them cross, you may hurt your sales or your share price. But if you do a lot of business with a foreign power that hates your country, its political and economic system and wants to harm it – that's just business. For that reason we have blithely bought oil from Arab countries which export extremism and fund terrorists, and have let trade boom with China, which wishes to overturn the East Asian

security order, occupies Tibet and is engaged in the biggest military modernization the world has ever seen.

Letting business rip with hostile countries does not just pay for them to attack us. It also creates vulnerabilities on our side. It makes politicians timorous.

“ Even now, many in the West do not realize the extent of Russia's ambitions and capabilities. ”

Almost no European leader wants to meet the Dalai Lama. American policymakers flinch rather than speak out openly about Saudi-financed terrorism. For years Britain refused to have a public inquiry into the murder of the fugitive Russian security policeman Alexander Litvinenko, because it feared the consequences of exposing the Russian state's role in his murder. Think of the impact on the City of London if all that Russian money stopped flowing.

Russia and other adversaries exploit the fifth columns that trade and investment dependence create. The energy lobby in Germany was for years a dependable advocate of Russian interests; in Austria it still is. Russia's gas pipelines export corruption even before they are built. Fear of jeopardizing the future of BAE Systems, which has lucrative and controversial contracts in the Middle East, has contorted the British criminal justice system.

Money from our adversaries flows into public life more directly. We have seen Russia blatantly buy influence in European parties, ranging from Estonia to France. Current policymakers can be put on the payroll secretly. Retired politicians and officials take lucrative positions

on advisory boards. Discussing this robustly in public is tricky: they can sue for libel in plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions such as England.

Saudi money constrains the academic study of sensitive topics to do with Islam (such as contradictions in early versions of the

Quran). Follow that path and funding dries up. Better to stick to something safe and lucrative such as architecture or calligraphy. Think tanks are particularly vulnerable. They lack the endowments and taxpayer support of universities. A recent *Washington Post* investigation into think tanks in the American capital revealed a shocking dependence on foreign government funding. Big Western newspapers can be paid to print lucrative, lavish advertorial supplements; the unspoken quid pro quo is to go easy on investigative journalism and polemics directed towards the sponsor.

This leads on to another big element of hybrid war: information. We assume, wrongly, that truth is mightier than the sword, in all cases and everywhere. Actually it is not. Well-financed lies can be halfway around the world before the truth has its boots on. The case of RT – the multilingual broadcaster formerly known as Russia Today – is particularly instructive. RT is slick, pacy and convincing. It does not focus on promoting Russia. Instead it follows a broad anti-

Western agenda. The unspoken (and sometimes overt) theme of its coverage is that the West is decadent, hypocritical, bullying and over-stretched. Democracy is a sham and human rights are a weapon used selectively for cynical geopolitical reasons. People are being lied to, and are right to be angry.

This approach – broadly shared by other stations such as Iran's Press TV, China's CCTV and some Latin American stations -- is far more effective than the leaden propaganda of Radio Moscow and other stations during the Cold War. It is also certainly more effective than the feeble efforts the West makes to get its message across inside Russia, China or Venezuela. Western security experts used to laugh at RT a few years ago. They are not laughing now. The station has more than one billion downloads on YouTube. NATO and some hawkish Western governments are scrambling to resurrect their information-warfare capabilities which fell into complete disuse during the Cold War. It is all too little, probably too late.

The fundamental problem for the West is that we face a joined-up threat in hybrid war, and we

are unable to provide a joined-up response. Russia in particular – to my mind the most pressing threat to Europe, because it is nearer and more focused – can combine intelligence, propaganda, organized crime, cyberattacks of all kinds, diplomacy, military means (regular and irregular), economic pressure, energy sanctions, exploitation of ethnic and

regional grievances, and corruption of public life.

Dealing with that would require close coordination between government agencies of all kinds (in itself quite unusual) and also with business, media and non-profit outfits. It is hard to see that happening. Imagine a room in which spy-catchers, psychological warfare experts, foreign diplomats, police, prosecutors, financial regulators, energy companies, banks, big business, media editors and politicians are all sitting round the same table: it would strike many people as sinister. Yet unless we are willing to cooperate in this way, we will lose.

Yet during the Cold War, we did. Doing business with the Eastern bloc countries, for example, was closely scrutinized, and subject to clear political constraints. Exports of high-technology products went ahead only on a case-by-case basis. The Soviet proposal to build a gas pipeline to West Germany attracted great concern in the United States in the Reagan years. Journalists were aware of the Soviet penchant for desinformatsiya (disinformation); if they were conned by it, government officials had no hesitation in pointing out their mistake. Taking money from a Soviet-bloc source was a risky business: it would mean a ruined career, and probably a prison sentence, if it came to light.

We are no longer in an existential struggle with a totalitarian ideology. We do not want to resurrect the high walls that once divided the world. It is good that trade and investment flow across national borders and we should cherish our free speech and tolerance for different opinions. But we should also remember that we are in fierce competition with determined adversaries, who want to undermine the safety and freedom we take for granted. At the very least we should try to end the climate of impunity that surrounds those who aid and abet with their efforts. ■

Edward Lucas is a senior vice-president at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a thinktank in Washington DC; he is also a senior editor at the Economist, and author of several books, including "The New Cold War" (Bloomsbury).

PRIVATE





Asia's pivot to Asia

In a geostrategic mikado, the region's states are actively realigning their external relationships | By Daniel Twining

Much has been made of the intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, with Beijing working to edge America out of its Asian neighborhood even as Washington doubles down on its regional partnerships and presence. Less attention has been paid to regional dynamics underneath the umbrella of a US-China relationship that mixes nascent rivalry with cautious engagement. In fact, Asia is undergoing a wider set of geopolitical realignments that could reset conventional expectations about the region's strategic future.

Russia is tilting towards China and away from the West, as demonstrated by several recent energy-supply deals worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and ensuing US and European sanctions have led President Putin to pivot eastwards in hopes of building an anti-Western alliance with Beijing. Chinese and Russian armed forces are stepping up joint exercises. Both countries' leaders are ideologically united in ruthless defense of one-party rule at home and against Western leadership in international institutions.

Yet Putin holds a weak hand in this high-stakes game of geostrategic poker: a rising China's power threatens to overwhelm that of a declining Russia, with Beijing increasingly holding the trump card in commercial negotiations

and in joint clubs like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Nonetheless, Putin's own strategic choices have dashed hopes in Japan and elsewhere that Russia might be a partner in constraining China's regional ascendancy.

Meanwhile, Japan is actively shaping a regional future that depends less exclusively on its US alliance and more on strategic and economic partnerships with like-minded nations in South and Southeast Asia. With a close eye on improving its position within the Asian balance of power, Japan is investing heavily in a nascent alliance with India that could unite the gateway powers of the Pacific and Indian oceans. Tokyo is also intensifying military, diplomatic, and economic cooperation with pivotal Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar.

History issues have driven a wedge between South Korea and Japan in yet another consequential strategic realignment. In part to shore up their political standing at home, both President Xi Jinping and President Park Geun-hye have made common cause against the government of Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe over Japan's record in the Pacific War, fueling tension in relations between America's two most important Asian allies.

Although the relationship between Tokyo and Seoul urgently requires repair, frictions have also grown between North Korea and its Chinese patron – weakening the long-standing axis between Beijing and Pyongyang. The execution by Kim Jong-un of his uncle and deputy Jang Sung-taek, considered China's leading ally within Pyongyang's corridors of power, put the point on a deeper cooling in relations (note to future challengers to the Kim dynasty: his praetorian guard also reportedly executed Jang's entire extended family). China's President Xi met with South Korean President Park before meeting North Korea's Kim, a first for a Chinese leader in peninsular diplomacy. The North's engagement with Japan over the return of abductees has led to warmer ties between Pyongyang and Tokyo, causing concern in Seoul.

India has traditionally enjoyed a close defense and diplomatic relationship with Moscow. Yet in another strategic shift, Indian officials today look with growing concern at President Vladimir Putin's embrace of President Xi, and accelerated Russian provision of energy supplies and sensitive military technologies to

Afghanistan leaves a vacuum of power in the region.

Strikingly, India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi is also more openly enhancing defense and economic cooperation with Israel. This is remarkable given that India has one of the world's largest Muslim populations, has traditionally supported the Arab line on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and has a close civilizational relationship with Iran, which has vowed to bring about Israel's destruction. Modi recently met with his Israeli counterpart for the first such encounter in a decade; India's foreign minister is a long-time friend of Israel, and Home Minister Rajnath Singh made his first overseas trip there. According to Bloomberg, India has purchased more Israeli arms in the past six months alone than in the previous three years. The countries are jointly developing a long-range missile and sharing best practices on counter-terrorism.

Finally, Myanmar is engaged in its own pivot of sorts, opening itself up to close economic, diplomatic, and potentially even military ties with India, Japan, and the United States. This comes after

many years in which the country's closest ally and biggest investor was China. The future of the reform process in Myanmar is uncertain; most of the early gains from rolling back political dictatorship and economic autarky have been harvested, but many hard choices remain to be made on the path to genuine democracy and an economy operating under the rule of law. Nonetheless, Myanmar is another pivotal state that is actively realigning its external relationships in the midst of Asia's ongoing strategic flux.

Where these transformations will end remains to be seen. Asia is not coalescing into rigid, Cold War-style blocs centered on the United States and China. Rather, regional states operating underneath the strategic competition between Washington and Beijing are creating new realities – not only to hedge against Sino-American conflict, but also to guard against the “new model of great power relations” that President Xi has so often called for, and which would relegate every other nation to an inferior status. The United States must resist the gravitational pull of this “G-2” dynamic and support its Asian friends in shaping a regional strategic environment that sustains peace and prosperity. ■

Daniel Twining is Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.



GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE US

India's Chinese rival. The new Sino-Russian entente is putting pressure on the old Russia-India alliance, which in recent years has centered mainly on Russian arms sales to India's fast-modernizing military. Reflecting these new currents, President Putin wants to ramp up weapon sales to India's arch-enemy Pakistan – a country China is also cultivating as the Western drawdown from

1 place

where everyone should be safe.


Serving over 83 million customers in more than 70 countries.

At Allianz we value an open dialogue and thus believe in strong transatlantic relationships. As one of the leading insurers worldwide, we know that honest conversation and trust are the key to security across the globe.

allianz.com

With you from A-Z

Allianz



Don't fear refugees, help them

They are fleeing from conflict, not seeking it. To treat them as a threat is inhumane | By António Guterres

At the start of a new year already stained with bloodshed, fear of terrorism and instability is again dominating the public agenda. Anxiety and economic discontent are fueling extremism on all sides. Growing numbers of people are being driven into the hands of populists and xenophobes, and – in some extreme cases – are turning to violence.

These trends deeply affect refugees and other forcibly displaced people. On the run from trauma at home, they now find themselves confronting hostility in their places of exile, cast as scapegoats for any number of problems, from terrorism to economic hardship and perceived threats to their host

communities' way of life. They are being mischaracterized as illegal migrants, common criminals or worse.

Amidst this rising panic, we need to remember that the primary threat is not from refugees, but to them. By definition, those who are granted asylum are survivors of terrible persecution and violence, and many will have encountered grueling dangers as they fled for safety – travelling across war zones on perilous byways, forced to use smuggling rings to cross closed borders, and exposed to predatory attacks by bandits and pirates.

Last year, nearly 220,000 people fled in unsafe boats across the Mediterranean – more than three



António Guterres
is UN High Commissioner
for Refugees.

UNHCR/J.-M. FERRE

times the previous record during the Libyan civil war of 2011. Increases have also been seen in the Gulf of Aden, Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, with 360,000 people worldwide estimated to have taken to the seas.

Globally, more than 4,300 persons were reported dead or miss-

ing at sea last year as a result of these movements, and the real number is probably considerably higher. Countless others were abused and beaten by smugglers, or kidnapped and forced to work in trafficking networks. And now, many are struggling to overcome a rising hostility in the countries where they thought they had found refuge.

This is not to deny there are security challenges for host societies, when faced with large influxes resulting from violence and instability abroad. There is always a risk, and my organization is very

alert to it. But for the most part, refugees are fleeing from conflict, not seeking a new one. To treat them as a threat rather than people in need is inhumane, ineffective, and counterproductive. One cannot deter people fleeing for their lives without escalating the dangers even more.

Amidst today's climate of fear, we must stay focused on where the biggest threats lie: to individual refugees and their families. If we want to stop those threats multiplying, metastasizing and spreading, we need to sow the seeds of a return in peace to their homelands. We do that by providing protection and support, and by helping people not only to survive, but to thrive.

Over 51 million people are forcibly displaced around the world today, more than at any other time since World War II. Multiplying conflicts, human rights violations, and statelessness as well as climate change, population growth, jobless urbanization and food and water insecurity have uprooted entire communities against their will.

This is more than an uncomfortable statistic; it is a rising challenge that has already surpassed the capacity of the humanitarian system to respond, and shows every sign of getting larger.

Yet our response to this challenge has been mixed at best, and at worst woefully inadequate. Humanitarian appeals are going

BMW
Security Vehicles

www.bmw-
security-vehicles.com

JOINED FORCES FOR SECURITY.


BMW – OFFICIAL MOBILITY PARTNER OF
THE MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE.

What qualifies BMW to be the mobility partner of the Munich Security Conference? A shared objective: maximum security. The BMW Group has more than 35 years of experience when it comes to security vehicles, and offers three different protection classes. Every security vehicle is custom-built, and every stage of the process is carried out with a craftsman's attention to detail. The result is a vehicle that meets the highest standards of ballistic protection, while also fulfilling the most individual of requirements. The BMW Group also offers special sales programmes for all diplomats, governments and international corporations. For more information please refer to: www.bmw-security-vehicles.com

Neighborhood Watch

16.7 million people fled their home country in 2014 due to war or violence. 86 percent found refuge in a neighboring country, according to UNHCR

○ Syrian Refugees



massively underfunded, both for basic needs and for protection measures such as education.

At their borders, some governments are trying to lock up shop, investing instead in deterrence, carrying out pushbacks, and automatically detaining asylum seekers, including children. Italy's noble Mare Nostrum operation, which rescued over 160,000 people at sea, is now phasing out – and the EU has no plans to replace it, beyond the border surveillance of its new Triton operation launched in November. Many people could die as a result.

Focusing on border control will not solve the problem. While governments have a duty to manage immigration, their policies must be designed to ensure human lives do not end up becoming collateral damage.

The way we tackle population movements will fundamentally shape this century, with repercussions for generations. To manage them, we must make migration an option, rather than a desperate need. We must focus far more on the root causes of displacement, through conflict prevention and linking development policies and human mobility.

And we must support countries of first asylum and transit states. For the most part, people would rather stay closer to home, but they are increasingly finding their neighboring countries over-

stretched and devoid of opportunities. Small surprise that they are going further afield.

Poor countries currently accommodate nearly 90 percent of the world's refugees, and are groaning under the burden. As a result, some are turning to desperate measures to keep refugees out, not through a lack of generosity, but because they can no longer manage the crisis alone. Yet their appeals for assistance are not being met. This is not sustainable.

Just as importantly, we must do more to give refugees hope for the future, the possibility to rebuild their lives and contribute to society. In a world with more than 50 million displaced, many of whom will live years away from home, tents are not sufficient. People need the chance to learn, to find work and become invested in society – or else become excluded and dependent on aid, exposed to exploitation, abuse and radicalization.

A growing and misguided focus on the threat from refugees, rather than to refugees, has enormous and damaging repercussions. It delays the return to peace and prosperity for their countries, which would allow them to go back home. It feeds fear and resentment, with negative consequences for all. And it risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, creating the problem it seeks to avoid, rather than fixing the root cause.

People have been fleeing from insecurity for centuries, and today's world gives little reason to hope that this will soon change. The way countries deal with the needs of those seeking protection at their borders is an indicator of their own strength, and will play a crucial role in determining the outcome of a century that has begun so badly.

With extremely complex problems, often the best approach is to go back to first principles: protecting lives, honoring human rights, promoting tolerance and valuing diversity. In mid-January, after the vile attack on a satirical magazine in Paris, millions of people took to the streets to defend exactly those ideals. We must listen to them.

Ensuring the security and welfare of our societies is not contradictory to these principles. In fact, they are mutually reinforcing. We must not allow those who would foster hate to undermine this conviction.

The way we treat uprooted people is the front line in a battle of ideas. It will play a determining role in whether we can turn the awful tragedies of the past few years around and build a lasting peace.

If we help refugees rather than fear them, we stand a chance of breaking this cycle of violence. But we will never achieve an end to conflict if its victims continue to be mistaken for its cause. ■

Corruption kills

Combating it requires a more comprehensive strategic approach | By Edda Müller

It almost does not matter where you look: at the terrorist activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria, at drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau or Mexico, at patronage networks in Afghanistan or Iraq, at autocratic structures before the Arab Spring in Northern Africa or the Maidan in Ukraine. A common issue that links all those events is corruption. It does not need a mastermind to make the link between corruption, weak state institutions and instability. However, it too often needs persuasion to get acceptance for the message that corruption is not a minor internal issue, but a real threat to human rights and a threat to international peace and security.

Corruption has different faces. In instable environments it ranges from petty to grand corruption, from accepted custom to criminal activity. It hinders the positive impact external help seeks to achieve. Aid may even entrench corruption further and contribute to undesired outcomes. The international community has learned this the hard way in missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo or Mali.

The lessons nevertheless still have to be woven into all current and future operations. Twelve of the 15 lowest ranked countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index in 2013 were the scene of insurgencies or extremist activities. Fighting corruption thus becomes a prerequisite for sustainable military support, security, and development.

Lack of monitoring and control of spending resources and accepting corruption as a fact of mission life not only contribute to state instability, it also endangers the lives of soldiers and civilian per-

sonnel. In fact, interventions often lead to a spike of corruption in the affected country – Afghanistan and Iraq are prime examples – and an increase in support for insurgents.

Even "lighter" approaches than military intervention, such as the example of capacity building in Mali, show the need to incorporate an institution-building component with the overall principle of "do no harm" – in other words, do not add to the already prevalent issues or delegitimize the mission through misconduct.

erability. Institutional weakness, corruption, factional fault lines and lack of management procedures within the recipient armed forces increase opportunities for diverting equipment and make it difficult to improve capacity and resilience.

With the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) entering into force in December 2014, now is the time for all parties to the treaty to ensure that their arms export control systems are as robust as possible. This demands strong anti-corruption mechanisms, which can easily be introduced into arms export systems.

Given the need for international coordination, organizations such as the European Union have an important role to play. Not only should the EU encourage further ATT ratification, participate



Edda Müller
is Chair of Transparency
International Germany.

DANETZKI

What is needed is a more comprehensive strategic approach. If we really want to contribute to stable institutions – ideally, through prevention instead of intervention – then it is time to finally include anti-corruption as a cornerstone of risk analysis, planning, and mission mandates.

Furthermore, to be effective there needs to be a greater openness of civil society actors, the military and bureaucratic decision makers to work together. The private sector, of course, has a role to play as well, so that efforts are truly comprehensive.

Compliance and due diligence are especially important when defense capacity building involves arms transfers aimed at increasing the receiving armed forces' capacity and enhancing interop-

erability. In information sharing and help build capacity elsewhere, it also needs to tighten the EU Common Position on arms export controls and harmonize the various national systems to ensure that anti-corruption considerations are introduced and applied effectively.

While working on the issue of corruption and state fragility in 2014, Transparency Germany was able to benefit from a range of national and international actors that agreed with the need to increase our national and multilateral capacities in anti-corruption. The Munich Security Conference is one example and we hope this year's cooperation event on "Tackling state fragility and failure: the corruption dimension" will help to promote more widespread debate on these issues. ■



Quarzwerte – more than just mining

- Sustainable long term vision
- Reliable supplier to key industries
- Innovative products – traditional values
- Motivated and responsible workforce
- Strongly committed to biodiversity



Quarzwerte

A FAMILY ENTERPRISE SINCE 1884

www.quarzwerte.com



Command Sergeant Major Delbert D. Byers saluting during the presentation of the Resolute Support Colors at the Change of Mission Ceremony in Kabul, Afghanistan, Dec. 28, 2014. NATO-led coalition forces held a flag-changing ceremony in Kabul amidst tight security to mark the end of their 13-year-old active combat.

PICTURE ALLIANCE/DPA/EPA/CPL JANINE FABRE

After ISAF: Resolute support

NATO's new mission in Afghanistan – and new challenges in Europe | By Hans-Lothar Domröse

With the successful completion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission at the end of 2014, NATO entered a new chapter in its enduring relationship with the Afghanistan government. Our new mission, “Resolute Support,” brings together around 12,000 military personnel from across the globe. Significantly, the 28 NATO Allies are joined by 14 partner nations – a clear signal that stability in central Asia remains an important issue to geographically separated but economically connected nations around the world.

The story of NATO's enduring and successful partnership with Afghanistan has many chapters, each of which was fully supportive of the mission's aims and objectives. The first chapter commenced back in December 2001, with ISAF's establishment as a Kabul-centric mission tasked to help stabilize the new government. From the outset it was clear that ISAF would develop into more than a NATO-only mission; partner nations were invited and welcomed into a coalition of nations willing and able to help build peace and security in Afghanistan.


It soon became clear that the mission would be more effective if it had greater reach beyond Kabul. It was therefore expanded to the North in 2004, the West in 2005 and the South in 2006. At its peak, in 2010, ISAF comprised operational-level and training headquarters, six regional commands and 142,000 personnel under its command and control. For over a decade, a total of 51 NATO and partner nations contributed to the mission in partnership with our Afghan hosts – an unprecedented achievement.

One of the key requirements for the Afghan government was the establishment of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) able to provide security for its citizens. Keeping to a well-orchestrated plan, the lead for security activities was slowly

transitioned, over a period of many months, from coalition forces to the ANSF.

As ANSF numbers, capabilities and operational success increased, their confidence noticeably grew and a positive momentum was established. The ANSF – grew to a total of more than 350,000 comprising the 175,800-strong Afghan National Army (ANA), an

agency was a huge challenge but, with the assistance of NATO and partner forces, extraordinary progress has been made and the ANSF has matured into what it is today – a competent force of brave and determined professionals who increasingly demonstrate they are capable of providing a relatively safe and secure environment for the Afghan people.



increase of more than 78,000 since October 2009, and the 153,000-strong Afghan National Police (ANP), an increase of 58,000 personnel. As they assumed the lead for operations the ISAF troops were gradually drawn down.

A capable and well-motivated force, the ANSF and their supervising Ministries planned, coordinated and executed security arrangements for notable events throughout 2014 such as: the Presidential election (more than seven million people turned out to register their vote), the Loya Jirga (2,000 participants from all 34 provinces), the Ghazni Islamic Festival (6,000 participants), First Vice President Fahim Khan's funeral, the opening of parliament, and the Mazar-i Sharif Nawroz festivities (10,000 participants). Their efforts culminated with the Milestone 13 Ceremony, the final handover of security responsibility to Afghan authorities.

Building a capable ANSF at the same time as fighting an insur-

At a time when 88 percent of Afghans expressed confidence in the ANA and 72 percent in the ANP – an incredible testament to their achievement – NATO was in the throes of its final transformation from ISAF to Resolute Support: Regional Commands became Train-Assist-Advise Commands, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and the majority of its bases closed, and new headquarters structures and facilities were being finalized.

Thirteen years of progress have started to rebuild Afghanistan after decades of war and strife. Afghanistan has achieved the fastest economic growth in South Asia in the combined areas of health, education and living standards; whilst maternal mortality is decreasing, overall life expectancy is rising. Afghanistan now has more than 34,000 km of roads and ‘Highway 1,’ which is planned to ring the country, is now 90 percent built. Twelve international airlines serve most of Afghanistan's major cities,

compared with just two flying to Kabul in 2000. In addition 30 percent of the population now benefit from grid-based electricity – cities such as Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Pul-e-Khomri, now have a permanent 24-hour power supply.

In 2002 Afghanistan had less than one million students enrolled in its schools; today over 7 million children attend school, and of these 37 percent are girls. About 85 percent of the population live in districts that now have providers to deliver basic health services. Infant and under-five mortality has declined and life expectancy at birth has risen to 64.

Afghans are embracing new media and technology. Cell service coverage has expanded by 80 percent since 2000; 60 percent of Afghans have mobile phones; 52 percent have a television set; and 65 percent have access to internet connections. The media is flourishing: there are now more than 175 FM radio stations, 75 television channels, news agencies and hundreds of publications, including at least seven daily newspapers.

And we should not forget Afghanistan's foreign relations. President Ghani has taken significant strides toward improving relationships with regional neighbors in an effort to help Afghanistan move forward on a more stable platform of physical and economic security. In particular, President Ghani has placed renewed focus on building a positive and effective relationship with Pakistan.

The transition from ISAF to Resolute Support (RS) is NATO's first chapter in the “Transformation Decade,” from now until 2024. NATO remains committed, as reaffirmed during the 2014 Wales Summit and London Conference, to working with our Afghan partners to continue to ensure a safer, increasingly prosperous, and stable Afghanistan, underpinned by security forces

equipped and trained to be able to allow the sovereign government to determine its own future in a sustainable way.

Resolute Support is not a combat mission. Significantly smaller than ISAF, RS will train, advise and assist Afghan security forces in a clear and supporting role – but not substitute them. It will concentrate its efforts on national and institutional-level training, increasing capability in ministries and the higher levels of army and police command. RS concentrate its work on eight essential functions: Budgeting; Oversight; Civilian Governance of the ASI/ANSF; Force Generation; Sustainment; Strategy and Policy Planning, Resourcing, and Execution; Intelligence; and Strategic Communication (STRATCOM). RS will be conducted across Afghanistan using a hub-and-spoke approach. Kabul, as the central hub, will serve mission spokes located in Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Jalalabad, from where mission-specific efforts will be performed and coordinated.

With this new mission, we will continue to help the Afghan security forces become self-generating, so that the ANSF continue to improve the skills it needs to make the country safe, and keep it safe.

Hans-Lothar Domröse is a German General and since December 2012 Commander of Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum, The Netherlands.



NATO

We are not closing the book on our partnership with Afghanistan; we are opening a new and different chapter.

Whilst Afghanistan remains of paramount importance to the Alliance, first and foremost, NATO is committed to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members. This means that activities undertaken in central Asia are part of a broader comprehensive

package of Alliance activities that collectively implement NATO's Strategic Concept. At the Operational level the working tempo is high as a raft of challenges are tackled head-on.

For example, all Headquarters of the NATO Command Structure are on a path to achieve full operational capability (FOC) within the new working framework (implemented in December 2012) by the end of 2015. The exercise Trident Juncture 15, taking place in multiple locations across the Alliance including Italy, Portugal and Spain in autumn 2015, will serve as the joint certification venue for our FOC and the NATO Response Force (NRF) 16. Also, in concert with our sister JFC (Naples) we are committed to the NRF and sustained implementation of assurance measures following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and continued military activities along Ukraine's eastern border.

In balancing these tasks we need to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the breadth of security challenges it might face. We will significantly enhance the responsiveness of our NRF by developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond appropriately to potential threats quickly. As part of this, we will establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). This will be a new Allied joint force that will be able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO's territory. This force should consist of a land component with appropriate air, maritime and special operations forces.

We will also ensure that Allied forces maintain the readiness and coherence needed to conduct NATO's full range of missions, including deterring aggression against NATO Allies and demonstrating preparedness to defend NATO territory. This is another challenging chapter, but NATO is ready to meet it with confidence. ■

German industry is becoming increasingly aware of the influence of geopolitics on the security of our business enterprises. There are good reasons for our government to engage more closely with global developments. And for business to be more closely integrated into a reliable and coherent foreign and security policy.

As an industrial nation, Germany has few equals in the extent to which it is embedded in international value creation chains. The nation's competitiveness and its prosperity are based on economic participation in the existing open world order, which is characterized by trade in goods that is as free as possible alongside unrestricted access to procurement and sales markets.

Around one quarter of jobs in Germany – more than nine million – depend on foreign trade and the trend is upwards. Exports make up around 50 percent of Germany's gross domestic product (GDP). Latest figures put the stock of German foreign investment at over €1.2 trillion, with nearly half of this sum accounted for by investment in countries outside the EU.

It is hardly surprising, then, that in his opening speech to the 50th Munich Security Conference one year ago, German President Joachim Gauck defined "the protection of the existing open world order as a core interest of the foreign and security policy" of Germany as an exporting nation. German industry endorses that analysis.

Security – both national and international – is of prime importance for the German business community, and German industry must play an active role in defining and preserving it. In the long term, trade and business activity can only thrive in a secure environment. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is the most recent evidence of that, illustrating as it does the extent to which the secure



Companies are asking the state to provide a secure business environment.

Trade needs a secure environment

German security policy must take into account the needs of the business sector | By Ulrich Grillo

supply of raw materials, German foreign investment and the stability of foreign markets are subject to political vicissitudes.

German industry is exposed to growing and increasingly complex risks as a result of globalization and technological progress. The interconnectedness of modern economies means that events taking place very far away can quickly have a direct impact on German companies.

Foreign intelligence services, competitors, organized crime and extremists seek to gain illegal competitive advantages and sources of revenue by means of economic espionage, sabotage and other criminal acts. Such attacks also impact on the transport carriers and the infrastructures of global trade and logistics – the arteries of our international value chain.

The annual damage suffered by German industry, which is both export-intensive and knowledge-intensive, is put at around €80 billion. About one company in three has so far already been the victim of such attacks.

In many countries, economic espionage and industrial sabotage are part of the intelligence services' remit. The borderlines between such activities and competitive espionage by business rivals are often blurred. The perpetrators make use of the whole arsenal of techniques: they are very successful in combining IT attacks with non-digital assault methods, for example by human or electronic espionage. The extent of this vulnerability

will inevitably increase with the steadily advancing digitization of our industrial processes.

Apart from physical menaces such as terrorism or crime, inadequacies of the rule of law and

a lack of stability in important markets constitute a threat for German enterprises. If contracts are not complied with at the commercial level, they cannot always be enforced by legal pro-

cess within a reasonable amount of time at reasonable costs. If investment projects come to grief through bureaucratic obstacles or arbitrary political interference, or if business relations are dictated by corruption, then this can be a matter of commercial life and death, particularly for medium-sized companies.

Such scenarios can rapidly assume major economic dimensions, if internal political conflicts or international disputes drastically destabilize the state concerned. Moreover, abrupt power changes or system changes can suddenly nullify existing investment protection – or lead to a market totally disappearing.

Security of supply in raw materials is a risk-laden issue for Germany and Europe. Their industries are highly dependent on the import of energy and mineral supplies. Germany meets just 30 percent of its total energy requirements from its own domestic resources. Recently, the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine has brought home to us very dramatically the extent of Europe's vulnerability.

The situation is even more drastic when it comes to strategic minerals, such as rare earths, where the dependency on imports often reaches 100 percent. The challenge for security policy consists in securing long term access to particularly critical raw materials from a small number of producer countries and also in preventing the use of raw materials exports as a political and strategic weapon against third countries.

In the view of German industry, the following points are key to framing a national foreign and security policy to meet future challenges:

- An effective defense against espionage, sabotage, crime and terror cannot be supplied by security authorities or business enterprises on their own. It requires concerted operational action by all state and private agents within the framework of a national indus-

trial protection strategy. In international law the task must be to remove the legal basis for illegal state activities and to create the preconditions for averting and combating dangers more efficiently by adapting international regulations. The latter is especially true for protecting global trade and logistics chains more effectively.

- A consistent pan-European security policy must be devised to safeguard Europe's supply of raw materials and energy. In particular, this means that the energy single market must be completed with high-performance infrastructure networks. Europe's energy sources, supplier countries and transport routes must also be further diversified. This and the long-term securing of access to critical raw materials require a geostrategic approach designed for the long term – a criterion that also applies to German foreign policy.

- Last but not least, it is necessary to preserve key technological capabilities of the security, defense and IT industries in Europe with the aim of maintaining sovereign competence and und capacity to take action with regard to technology and to security policy.

In his speech to the 50th Munich Security Conference last year, President Gauck called for a change in German foreign and security policy. He argued that Germany should be more committed to shaping a joint foreign and security policy, acting in conjunction with its alliance partners; a policy that takes account of the interests of all and is fit for facing future challenges.

It is not the task of business enterprises to define Germany's security policy. That is for the politicians to decide. Yet any such definition can only be arrived at on the basis of central values and founded on achieving a balance of national interests. It is therefore essential to voice these social and yet also economic interests. That is the task of the business community and its contribution to security policy. ■

Ulrich Grillo is president of the Federation of German Industries (BDI).



CHRISTIAN KRUPPA



AMAXX®

Receptacle combinations for Energy, Industrial Ethernet and Automation.

Plugs for the world. 用于全世界的接插装置

CN China
MENNEKES Industrial Electric Co., Ltd.
Building B, No. 58 Quihuai Road
Jiangning Development Zone
211100 Nanjing, PR China
Tel. + 86 (0) 25 / 88 03 52 22
Fax + 86 (0) 25 / 88 03 53 33
info@MENNEKES.cn
www.MENNEKES.cn

SGP Singapur
MENNEKES Electric Singapore Pte. Ltd.
No. 3 International Business Park
03-28 Nordic European Centre
609927 Singapore
Tel. + 65 / 65 67 59 78
Fax + 65 / 65 63 24 71
info@MENNEKES.com.sg
www.MENNEKES.com

IND Indien
MENNEKES Electric India Ptv Ltd.
No. 2 D, Dhanakotti Raja Street
Gandhi Nagar Ekkatuthangal
600 032 Chennai, India
Tel. + 91 (0) 44 222 535 - 61
Fax + 91 (0) 44 222 535 - 65
info@MENNEKES.in
www.MENNEKES.in

Headquarters
MENNEKES
Elektrotechnik GmbH & Co. KG
Industrial plugs and sockets
Aloys-Mennekes-Straße 1
D-57399 Kirchhundem
Germany

 **MENNEKES®**
Plugs for the world

www.MENNEKES.de

FUTURE FOR ALL.

INNOVATIONS FOR ALL.



e-mobility from Volkswagen. The e-up! and the e-Golf.

With the e-up! and the e-Golf, we are already bringing tomorrow's mobility onto the road today. 100% electric and emission-free, and as well adapted for everyday use as one expects from a Volkswagen. Major changes do not always have to feel like major changes.

Think Blue.



Das Auto.

Power consumption e-up! in kWh/100 km: 11.7 combined, CO₂ emissions in g/km: 0.
Power consumption e-Golf in kWh/100 km: 12.7 combined, CO₂ emissions in g/km: 0.
Picture shows optional extras at an additional cost.

Security Challenges



The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is playing a significant role as a mediator in the Ukrainian conflict: armored OSCE monitoring mission vehicles in Kiev, Nov. 13, 2014.

PICTURE ALLIANCE/AAVLADIMIR SHITANKO

An anchor of cooperative security

Forty years after its foundation, the OSCE proves its relevance in the Ukraine conflict | By Didier Burkhalter and Ivica Dačić

The Ukraine crisis has diminished security for all of us.

In the first place, it is a tragedy for the Ukrainian people. The armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine has taken a heavy toll on civilians. The recent upsurge of violence and indiscriminate shelling has brought further misery to countless men, women and children. The recurring violations of international humanitarian law are unacceptable and must stop.

European security has sharply deteriorated too. The numerous violations of the Helsinki Principles, including of territorial integrity, have thrown into question many assumptions about the post-Cold War European order. As trust between Russia and the West has collapsed, we are all heading for an uncertain future. Rather than progressing towards a Europe whole and free, there is political polarization and a dangerous increase in military activity and belligerent rhetoric.

In the context of these troubling developments, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has demonstrated its usefulness as a bridge between the Euro-Atlantic and the Eurasian region. The OSCE has promoted inclusive dialogue to advance the search for a political solution to the Ukraine crisis. This includes chairmanship diplomacy, regular, extensive and often heated debates among the 57 participating states in Vienna as well as the indispensable facilitating role of the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office (CiO), Swiss Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, as a member of the Trilateral Contact Group that seeks to advance implementation of the Minsk arrangements.

The OSCE has also shown its relevance as a normative intermediary, reminding states of their commitments. Furthermore, it has become the main operational responder to the Ukraine crisis.

The OSCE has made full use of its broad array of instruments to deal with this conflict. For the first time in more than a decade, participating states have agreed to deploy new field missions – the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) and a small observer mission at two Russian checkpoints. These missions provide invaluable objective information about developments on the ground and have proven their ability to quickly react to the many incidents and challenges. Other important OSCE contributions include the Project Office in Ukraine, the election observation by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) as well as the activities of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Parliamentary Assembly.

The revived international recognition of the OSCE's role as a provider of cooperative security is positive. What is needed most now is political will to enable the OSCE to do two things: help the actors in the Ukraine crisis reverse the logic of escalation for good, and address the broader crisis of European security. We need to redouble our efforts to preserve an inclusive approach

to security and resolve our differences through dialogue. It is our responsibility as political leaders to make sure that Europe will not be divided again.

Regarding the Ukraine crisis, we should work collectively towards a full and genuine commitment by everyone involved to a sustainable ceasefire and a swift implementation of the Minsk arrangements in their entirety. It is worth recalling that these arrangements resulted in a



Ivica Dačić is Foreign Minister of Serbia and currently holds the rotating chair (CiO) of the OSCE.

WIKIPEDIA/DRAGAN ZEBELJIAN



Swiss Foreign Minister Didier Burkhalter held the CiO position in 2014.

EUROPA FORUM LUZERN

noticeable reduction in military activity for several months. They also brought about the release of over 2,500 detainees. The efforts by the Trilateral Contact Group to establish a lasting peace process on the basis of the Minsk arrangements deserve our continuing full support. The only possible solution to this crisis is a political one.

Unwavering political and material support for the Special Monitoring Mission by all OSCE participating states is also

required. These civilian monitors are doing a tremendous job and they work in a very precarious environment. We need to provide the SMM with both the necessary security equipment and qualified staff with relevant experience in sometimes very specific areas such as crater analysis. The SMM also needs faster access to critical assets. Enhancing its tracking capacity through new technology instruments is important, especially since the SMM monitors

still cannot monitor some occupied areas for security reasons and a lack of cooperation.

In addition to helping de-escalate the Ukraine crisis, we firmly believe that the OSCE has an important role to play in finding ways to reconsolidate European security as a common project. There is a worrying tendency in the narratives on the crisis of European security and its causes to become increasingly one-sided, exclusionary, and stereotyped. What we need is genu-

ine dialogue instead of parallel monologues. We owe it to our citizens and future generations to make every possible effort to find ways collectively of rebuilding security with rather than against each other.

This is why we, together with our OSCE Troika partner Germany, have set up the Panel of Eminent Persons to prepare the basis for a constructive security dialogue across the Euro-Atlantic and the Eurasian regions.

The Panel is mandated to reflect on how to rebuild trust among the OSCE participating States and ensure more effective adherence to the Helsinki Principles, examine perceived threats in the OSCE area and potential common solutions, and explore possibilities for reinvigorating cooperative security.

The Panel consists of 15 distinguished individuals from across the OSCE area. We are grateful to all of them, and in particular to Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger who has agreed to act as chair. Following its first meeting on the margins of the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 8, 2015, the Panel will produce two reports in the course of this year: an interim report, in particular on lessons learned for the OSCE from its engagement relating to Ukraine, and a final

report on the broader issues of European security. Both reports will contain recommendations on action points for policymakers. While the Panel can come up with ideas, it is for the OSCE participating states to find a way out of the crisis.

Four decades ago, on Aug. 1, 1975, European leaders gathered in Helsinki to sign the Final Act. Although divided on many issues, they succeeded in identifying common foundations of European security and committed to a new notion of cooperative and comprehensive security. While it took more than two years and over 2,400 meetings to establish consensus on the Final Act, the result was truly astonishing and has since transformed our continent.

Today, our continent is far less divided than in the 1970s, but the common foundations of our security are eroding. War and insecurity have returned to Europe. We should do everything possible to reverse this negative development. The vision and determination of the founding fathers of the OSCE should inspire our efforts to reconsolidate European security as a common project.

It is our firm belief that strengthening the OSCE as an anchor of cooperative security in Europe would be an important contribution to re-enhancing security for all of us. For years, there have been discussions on reforming the OSCE and strengthening its capacity to act, be it the field of mediation support or regarding other aspects of the conflict cycle. Now is the time for us to act. This year's 'Helsinki+40' commemoration marks an opportunity for political leaders to provide strategic guidance as to where the OSCE should be heading. It is a valuable opportunity, and one we should definitely seize. ■

The article reflects developments until Jan. 29, 2015.

Minsk Agreement 2014

The agreement was drawn up by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, which consisted of representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE. It was signed on Sept. 5, 2014.

1. Immediate ceasefire to be agreed by all sides.
2. Ensure monitoring and verification of the ceasefire regime by OSCE.
3. Decentralize power, including through adoption of a Ukrainian law "On a temporary regime of local autonomy in some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk" (Law on Special Status).
4. Ensure permanent monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE with the establishment of security zones in the border areas of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
5. Immediate release of hostages and illegally detained persons.
6. Adoption of a law preventing prosecution and punishment in connection with events that took place in areas of Donetsk and Luhansk.
7. Continue an inclusive national dialogue.
8. Take measure to improve the humanitarian situation in the Donbass.
9. Ensure organization of early local elections in accordance with the Ukrainian law "On a temporary regime of local autonomy in some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk" (Law on Special Status)
10. Withdraw illegal armed groups, military equipment, as well as fighters and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory.
11. Adopt a program for the economic revival and reconstruction of the Donbass region.
12. Provide personal safety guarantees for the participants of the consultations.

This year promises to be the most difficult for Russia since the beginning of the new century. A combination of three forces is hitting the country very hard: structural economic problems; Western sanctions; and the plunge in the oil price. As a result, Russia's GDP is likely to contract by 5 to 7 percent, inflation may rise to 15 to 20 percent, unemployment climb to 7 percent, and the capital flight reach \$130 billion on top of \$150 billion in 2014. Since last summer, the ruble has already lost nearly half its value against the major currencies.

Yet Russia looks generally calm, if increasingly concerned about what the near future might bring. If presidential elections were held now, polls indicate President Vladimir Putin would win with 71 percent of the vote, compared with 63 percent in 2012. Opposition to the system that Putin has constructed remains weak and lacking broad support. Government ministers are working round the clock as crisis managers. Some are even hoping to use the dire situation to launch a new round of reforms, which are essentially impossible when the oil price is high. Neither the ministers nor Putin, however, have any doubt that the challenge they are facing is more serious than anything they have seen since 2000.

There is no illusion either as to the seriousness of the rupture between Russia and the West. A consensus of sorts exists within the Russian establishment that the sanctions the United States has imposed on Russia for its actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine will stay for many years, possibly decades. The European Union is believed to be too weak to begin easing its own sanctions unilaterally. Much as the Kremlin regrets the deterioration of relations with Europe, particularly with Germany, which it did not regard as an opponent (unlike the United States), Moscow will not simply abandon Donetsk and Lugansk to

The Kremlin perspective

Russia wants to consolidate its new strategic perimeter without being drawn into a full-scale war | By Dmitri Trenin



Dmitri Trenin is Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

CARNEGIE.RU

Kiev, and will not even think of handing back Crimea.

The Russian formula for a peace settlement in Ukraine sounds simple: Crimea is ours, while Eastern Ukraine is Ukrainian – on certain conditions. The con-

ditions make this formula more complex. They include direct negotiations between Kiev, on the one hand, and Donetsk and Lugansk on the other, on a special status for the region within Ukraine's "common political space". This special

status would include a degree of financial autonomy for Donbas; wide cultural autonomy, i.e. the use of the Russian language and of its own history textbooks; and security autonomy, with the police and security forces

reporting to the regional authority rather than Kiev.

These conditions remain unacceptable to Kiev, which treats the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk people's republics as terrorist organizations run by "bandits," and insists on full re-integration of the territories within Ukraine's unitary state. Kiev clearly fears giving Moscow a foot in the door through Donbas. A compromise between the two positions looks extremely remote, the more so as Moscow does not see itself as a party to the inter-Ukrainian conflict, and Kiev is only prepared to discuss technical issues, not political ones, with

Golden future? Vladimir Putin enters a Kremlin meeting room in December last year. Putin wants to open the doors to a new era of Russian power – but could end up isolating Moscow from Europe.

Donetsk and Lugansk. However, the more the situation stalls, with the only real contact between Kiev and the rebels being exchanges of fire along the frontline, the more it looks like Donbas is turning into another Transnistria.

Through its actions in Ukraine, Russia did break out of the post-Cold War order in Europe. It demonstrated a willingness to protect and defend its national

interests the way the Kremlin defines them. Yet Moscow's challenge to the US-dominated, NATO-centric Euro-Atlantic security order does not mean that Russia will now seek to restore the Soviet Union, or the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Rather, Russia will consolidate its new strategic perimeter, which now includes Crimea, as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And it will continue to provide support to Donbas, while avoiding being drawn into a full-scale war in Ukraine. As for the idea of a Novorossiia (New Russia) from Kharkiv to Odessa, it has been shelved indefinitely, if not forever.

Relations between Russia and Europe will never be the same after 2014, but Russia and Europe cannot afford not to have a relationship. At the core of that relationship lies security. The Normandy format – France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine – has not been able yet to produce a settlement to the Ukraine crisis, but it is the most appropriate mechanism for hammering out a formula for an eventual compromise. Holding open the lines of communication between Berlin and Moscow, Paris and Moscow is a key prerequisite for this, but the Europeans also need to work hard with Kiev to move it toward a more realistic stance toward Donbas. Preventing the conflict in Eastern Ukraine from escalating to a European war is the most important task that responsible statesmen are facing this year.

If they succeed, Europe and Russia can move on to the next target: repairing European security writ large. Using the 40th anniversary this year of the Helsinki Final Act, members of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) need to start a serious conversation about the continent's current security agenda, and set the stage for a new European security summit, possibly during the period of the German OSCE presidency in 2016. ■

Mega Project

Auckland Waterview Connection: New Zealand's largest-ever road project counts on the **reliability and expertise** of market leader Herrenknecht. Our 14m+ diameter TBMs have completed more than 51km of road tunnels worldwide.

14.4 m

Intermediate breakthrough for 'Alice', whose large diameter makes it **one of the biggest TBMs** in the world.

Efficient

EPB Shield S-764 with an electrical drive and independent culvert gantry for laying the tunnel floor, from the start making continuous headway – up to **126m a week**.

Client:
New Zealand Transport Agency

Contractors:
Fletcher Construction Ltd.
McConnell Dowell Constructors Ltd.
Obayashi Corporation

Pioneering Underground Technologies

› www.herrenknecht.com/alicetbm



Fears of war in Europe

It will take political will and courage on all sides to restore peace | By James D. Bindenagel

When I arrived in Germany last fall at Bonn University, I expected to find Europe as I had left it when I stepped down as acting US Ambassador: whole and free and at peace, confident in the principles of sovereignty, self-determination and democracy. The reality was different though.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine pose a fundamental challenge to the agreed principles and norms set down in the Charter of Paris, which have kept Europe stable for the past 25 years. Was I now to witness the end of the peaceful era in Europe that I had seen begun in the Peaceful Revolution while a US diplomat in East Germany?

The fulfillment of the Charter of Paris vision of a new Europe, crafted at the unification of Germany, is clearly evident, despite some intractable issues. The European Union is democratic and prosperous; with the US it has contained the Balkan Wars and has managed the euro crisis. Germany, surrounded by friends and reconciled with Poland, has marked a new partnership in the EU and NATO. President Joachim Gauck in his speech to the Munich Security Conference in February 2014 challenged Germany to accept more international responsibility marking a new role for the country, and the challenge was being met.

Even troublesome issues such as austerity-encouraged right-wing party populism, demonstrations by a group calling itself "Patriotic Europeans Against Islamization of the West" (Pegida), Putin's propaganda plays on fears of war, and horrors of Islamic State terrorism have been managed well by government and society, solidarity not often seen in the EU. Yet cracks have appeared.

US-German and transatlantic relations are important to the European order. Germany has become the natural leader of Europe and increasingly both politically and economically America's indispensable ally, yet in my classroom and in public debates, I am confronted with a loss of trust in the US that risks seriously damaging the close US-German relations and the transatlantic partnership.

The litany of disappointments over the past several years – the 2003 Iraq War, Guantánamo prisoners and torture, NSA affair and Snowden leaks, corporate influence in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – have changed the image of the US. The American political process of democratically addressing and correcting these detours from shared values and constitutional protections has begun, notably with Senator Diane Feinstein's report on torture. Nevertheless, turning the American commitment to Europe remains strong.

Russia's President Vladimir Putin's open challenge to the Charter of Paris vision of a new Europe and his worldview – and indeed that of many members of Russia's elite – is premised on a perceived need to restore Russia to its former position of influence and greatness in its "near abroad" and – by extension – in the world. It is this policy of

aggressive nationalism and hegemonic aspirations and rejection of democracy, rule of law, sovereignty and self-determination that has reminded the US and Europe that transatlantic security is indivisible.

Russia and the West have competing narratives to explain Putin's actions. Putin and those seeking to "understand" Putin in his new strategic doctrine asserts the West is responsible for Putin's action in Ukraine. Putin argues the West's actions are aimed at violent change of the Russian

“Russia and the West have competing narratives to explain Putin's actions.”

constitutional order, destabilization of the political and social environment, disorganization of the functioning of governmental bodies, crucial civilian and military facilities and informational infrastructure of Russia.

Putin sees NATO's expansion and military buildup as NATO taking upon itself "global functions realized with violation of international law" including a NATO military buildup and American Prompt Global Strike concept. He has claimed Russia's intervention in Ukraine is a humanitarian act to protect ethnic Russians, undermining the established rule of law. Further, the narrative continues that the present order was imposed by the West, while Russia's constructive proposals for a more egalitarian institutional order, including those of a Eurasian Union and a pan-European security system have largely fallen on deaf ears.



James D. Bindenagel, a former US ambassador, is the Henry Kissinger Professor for International Security and Governance at Bonn University.

ANDREAS ARCHUT/UNI BONN

Western scholars, analysts and politicians are scrambling to explain Putin's invasion of Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Eastern Ukraine in different terms. Europe and the US have framed their response to Russia's actions and accusations along the lines of a clear choice between nationalism and the principle of 'Might makes Right' on the one hand and democracy, respect for sovereignty and the rule of law on the other. The Russian humanitarian intervention argument for intervening in Ukraine makes a mockery of the UN Principle of the Responsibility to Protect.

“The EU, the US and Russia are called to defuse this increasingly dangerous confrontation.”

Setting aside a military intervention, the US and Europe have no choice but to impose sanctions and to strengthen the NATO Treaty's Article V defense clause - to protect the principles of peace, not to threaten Russia. Successive rounds of sanctions have progressively increased the pressure on Putin as the Russian economy now seems headed towards a prolonged and severe recession. The Kremlin still seems undeterred to resolve the Ukraine

crisis and have sanctions lifted. Russian cooperation is needed to defuse conflicts with ISIS and Iran where people are dying.

The EU, the US and Russia are therefore called to defuse this increasingly dangerous confrontation. Maintaining open communication is crucial. Twenty-five years after its signature, it may be the right time to call for a Charter of Paris 'review conference' to avoid new confrontations over the role of NATO, Russia's action in Ukraine and economic sanctions.

Any stance accommodating the military invasion, annexation and destabilization in Ukraine would put the Charter of Paris principles on peace, security, self-determination and stability in Europe at risk. Therefore, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, which includes Russia and the US, is an inclusive framework that provides an apt forum to bring all European powers together, can create an open process of reassessment of successes, complaints and problems. The interested parties could devise a workable – and mutually accepted – approach to implementing the principles enshrined in the Paris Charter while reflecting the realities of the 21st century.

This approach would renew the legitimacy of the fundamental principles presently at stake and strengthen commitments to preserve and protect them. At the same time, it would provide a forum to discuss concrete ways in which to further develop the European security architecture – including, but not limited to, Russia's ideas of a Eurasian Union with the European Union and a European security system in concert with NATO.

It could be implemented in two consecutive steps: a review conference with OSCE member states, including the US and Russia, to be held in a European capital on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Charter of Paris in 2015 and to be followed by high-level consultations. A high-level, comprehensive dialogue on a strategy for the 21st century conducted under the German chairmanship of the OSCE in 2016 could begin with an initiative Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger plans for the upcoming Munich Security Conference.

The Charter of Paris review conference itself should be an open dialog to discuss options for adapting the European security architecture to the realities of the 21st century and making it more resilient and result in a political mandate affirming the adapted validity and relevance of the principles adopted in 1990. The outcome of this two-step process will be a strategy paper with the explicit ambition to guide European security cooperation more broadly over the course of the next decade.

Peace in Europe is broken. All parties, including Russia and the United States, need the political will and courage to preserve and adapt the principles on which our freedom, peace, and security depend. The 1990 Charter of Paris for a new Europe is the place to begin. ■

Innovative solutions for the highest IT security requirements.

Attacks on computers and networks are on the rise. Cyber crime and data theft have dramatic consequences ranging from enormous economic damage to loss of image and customers.

Years of work can be destroyed in minutes.

Rohde & Schwarz supports government, society and business with IT solutions and encryption technology made in Germany.

Ensure your security at:
www.rohde-schwarz.com



R&S SITLine ETH encryptor

R&S SITGate L500 next-generation firewall

 **ROHDE & SCHWARZ**



Mutual interests:
Gas wells of Gazprom
on the Kovykta gas field.

PICTURE ALLIANCE/DPARIA NOVOSTI/IGOR AGEYENKO

Peace through gas

Europe needs an affordable and reliable flow of gas,
Russia a stable demand | By Friedbert Pflüger

The concept of energy security was born 100 years ago. At that time, the British Navy converted their ships from coal to oil, aiming to be faster and more economic than the German fleet. Faced with criticism from the opposition that Britain would thereby become dependent on foreign oil exports, the First Admiral of the Navy, Winston Churchill, replied: "...no one country, on no one route, and on no one field must we be dependent. Safety and certainty [...] lie in variety and variety alone."

After the two Ukrainian-Russian gas conflicts in 2006 and 2009 and even more so in today's confrontation between the West and Moscow, energy security has been catapulted to the top of Europe's agenda. The EU seems strongly determined to diversify away from Siberian gas. But all available options are too little and would come too late. They will not be sufficient to replace Russia as a major gas supplier for Europe in the foreseeable future.

There are basically six options for the EU to diversify its gas supplies:

- European domestic measures. Over the last years, the EU has been expanding storage-facilities, building interconnectors, improving its reverse flow capabilities and increasing efficiency to enhance its capacity to survive in times of crisis. It has discovered considerable shale gas reserves. But public rejection of their exploitation, or even

exploration remains strong. In a best-case scenario, those reserves could one day compensate for the decreasing conventional production. They will not decisively diminish the EU's dependence from gas-imports.

- US Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). The shale revolution in the US has increased the country's gas production by a third. In 2009, the US surpassed Russia to become the world's top natural gas producer. However, the recent price decrease threatens to derail the advancement of US shale production. The costs of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing are high and many businesses will slip deep into the red. Add in the transportation costs from America to Europe and Russia will always be able to compete with US LNG. Moreover, due to much higher gas prices offered in Asia, supplies of US shale gas will not aim for the Old World.

- Azeri gas via TAP. The first realistic diversification option is gas from Azerbaijan, which is supposed to reach Europe via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) by 2019. TAP was chosen by the Shah Deniz Consortium in Baku as it seemed more economical than its competitor, the

Nabucco-Pipeline. TAP will ship gas – via Turkey, Greece, Albania – to Italy and other EU-states. This is a step in the right direction, but not more: Initially, TAP can only transport 10 billion cubic meters of gas a year, less than 2 percent of the EU's annual consumption.

- Eastern Mediterranean Gas.

Substantial gas finds have been made in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Israel and Cyprus. A solution that will make the most sense for all parties involved is to build a pipeline from the Israeli Leviathan field, via Cyprus (where it would take up additional gas) to Turkey and from there to the EU. While this pipeline has the potential to be a peace-builder, it seems more likely that the geopolitical conflicts in the region will complicate its realization.

- Gas from Iraqi Kurdistan. Significant gas resources have also been found in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has concrete plans to export large quantities of its gas to Turkey and beyond by

2017. But Erbil has made it clear that it wants to meet domestic needs first. Here, too, the overall geopolitical situation, given the assault of ISIS-terrorists, seems all but stable.

- Iranian gas on the horizon. Iran holds the world's largest natural gas reserves. The announced new law to re-attract

political risks make it unlikely that the vital role of Russia as a major supplier of gas for Europe can be diminished within the next two decades. On the contrary: the EU's dependence on Russian gas might in fact even grow. Europe's overall gas consumption will not increase due to higher efficiency and the rise of renewable energy. However, about 40 percent more gas imports will be needed by 2035 – due to the fast decline of most indigenous European gas fields. Consequently, Russia will remain a major part of the European energy equation.

The Russian decision to terminate South Stream does not threaten this flow. It was a pure business decision. The pipeline was oversized and financially not sustainable from the beginning. New and costly Gazprom upstream projects, the expensive construction of the huge Power of Siberia pipeline to China and the LNG Terminal in Vladivostok naturally led to the demise of South Stream – even before the present economic crisis in Russia. Much more alarming in the current situation is Gazprom's termination of its deal with German chemical giant, BASF. Gazprom had been willing to grant shares

of Siberian up-stream projects in exchange for the purchase of BASF's subsidiary Wingas. These companies have been at the core of the German-Russian energy partnership from the very beginning. The sudden end of this deal hints at the damage that geopolitical developments have caused recently. Did the trust, which had been built over five decades, vanish in just five months? How long will it take to rebuild it?

The "Gas for Pipes" deal between Germany and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s was of great importance to maintain peace in Europe. Despite the Cold War, the arms race and all the ideological confrontation, Moscow and Bonn managed to establish a reliable energy partnership – with the support of Germany's western allies. It worked because it was not a one-sided dependence. Just as Germany needed an affordable and reliable flow of gas, Russia needed a stable demand. Over decades, this interdependence has proved to be a stabilizing factor in foreign policy.

Gas is not just a commodity. Pipeline gas, especially comes as a service with long lasting and stabilizing implications – the huge investments in exploration, production, transport and distribution need many years to become beneficial for supplier and consumer. Therefore: Let us define our mutual interests – and weigh them against the misperceptions, mistakes and misconduct of recent days. ■

Friedbert Pflüger is Director of the European Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS), King's College London. He was a member of the German Bundestag for two decades and is a former State Secretary in the German Defense Ministry.



PRIVATE

foreign investment in this sector could spark an energy revival. Iran has the potential to become a game-changer in the world of energy. Iranian gas could quite easily find its way to Europe. But as long as there is no nuclear deal and sanctions are not lifted, Iran cannot make a difference for Europe.

It is important to follow up on these potential options for diversification. But domestic strains, technical limitations and geopo-

ENERGY SECURITY SUMMIT 2015

6/7 May, Berlin

Foto: Pshahligator | Shutterstock



The Frankfurter Allgemeine Forum and the Munich Security Conference (MSC) will be co-organizing the 3rd annual »Energy Security Summit 2015« under the patronage of Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Federal Minister for Economics and Energy Sigmar Gabriel.

International decision-makers from the worlds of politics, business and science will convene for the Energy Security Summit 2015 in Berlin on 6/7 May, chaired by Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (MSC) and publisher Berthold Kohler (FA.Z.). The summit will once again promote interdisciplinary discourse for international exchange concerning the global changes in the energy markets, a sustainable security of energy supply and the geopolitical implications of a potential next »great game«.

In addition to the summit, Frankfurter Allgemeine Forum and MSC provide exclusive side events at well-known international conferences for high-ranking decision-makers to discuss important issues regarding Energy Security, each time considering a specific regional or topical edge.

More information and registration: www.faz-forum.com/ess2015 and www.securityconference.de/energy

Frankfurter Allgemeine Forum

INSELN DER AUFMERKSAMKEIT

Munich Security Conference **MSC**
Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz

UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF



Federal Foreign Office



Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy

ACADEMIC PARTNER



CORPORATE PARTNER

SIEMENS

MEDIA PARTNER



The German Times

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the most complicated territorial dispute in the post-Soviet region. For more than two decades it has contributed to destabilization in the region and blocked the South Caucasus as a transit corridor. Because all attempts to negotiate a peace treaty or enforce a ceasefire in the area have failed, the status quo in the South Caucasus has become a forgotten conflict. That's although violence claims fresh victims on an almost daily basis along the ceasefire line since Nagorno-Karabakh and seven additional rayony, or departments, in Azerbaijan were occupied by Armenia. The more than 50 deaths along the "line of conflict" in 2014 were the highest total there since 1994.

The conflict in Ukraine has complicated efforts at resolving other territorial conflicts within the former Soviet Union. They seem to all follow the same pattern: at some point they are "frozen," yet continue to smolder – as is threatening to happen even in the disputed Donbas region. Russia generally attempts to maintain a hand in lost areas of influence this way. Not unlike the conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia/South Ossetia) and Moldova (Transnistria), the dispute surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh aims to change currently recognized borders – making it more akin to the dispute over occupied Crimea.

The losers in this essentially ethnic dispute are, first of all, the two conflicting sides: the Armenians, who militarily won the war over the enclave but have no perspectives because of their dismal economic situation, and the Azeris, whose riches in oil and gas offer an outstanding economic outlook, but who have lost a fifth of their territory and must cope with a huge refugee problem.

The legal situation is clear. Four UN resolutions uphold Azerbaijan's claim to the unrecognized

The forgotten conflict

The obduracy of the warring countries Armenia and Azerbaijan has defeated every attempt to stop the bloodshed in Nagorno-Karabakh | By Richard Kiessler



"Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" and call for the withdrawal of the Armenian occupation forces. Resolutions of other bodies including the European Parliament and Germany's Bundestag demand the re-establishment of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. During a visit to Berlin on Jan. 21 by Azeri President Ilham Aliyev, Chancellor Angela Merkel reaffirmed her call for a "peaceful resolution" of the

conflict and offered Germany's assistance in finding one.

The conflict over the "mountainous black garden" (as its name translates) has deep roots, even though various ethnicities and religions coexisted peacefully in the region for hundreds of years. In the rugged west of Azerbaijan, today a majority Muslim state, Christianity survived through the centuries. Up to 1836, the Chris-

tian community was allowed to keep its religion and had its own leader. Then the Russian Empire annulled the Armenians autonomy. The region belonged to one of the many khanates of Azerbaijan. Armenia had neither an ethnic nor a political claim to the territory.

The Armenians settled primarily in northeastern Turkey, from where they were expelled

in the World War I. After the 1915 genocide, Russian Armenia became their new homeland.

The ethnic aspect of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be traced back to demographic changes. Until the Russian annexation the territory was inhabited primarily by Muslims. But more and more Armenians left Turkey in the 19th century, by 1917 they constituted 93 percent of the population. During the Soviet era, however, demographic trends in Nagorno-Karabakh favored the Azeri population. But in 1920, the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee handed Nagorno-Karabakh as well as the territories Nakhchivan and Zangezur to the Armenian Soviet Republic. One year later, again under substantial political pressure, the Soviets' "Caucasus Bureau" gave Nagorno-Karabakh back to Azerbaijan. That's how it remained until the Communist empire started to dissolve.

After 15 new national states had declared their independence on the territory of the eroding USSR, several smoldering territorial conflicts broke out into open warfare, including the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The war of Armenian separatists backed by the Republic of Armenia and isolated Russian units against the young Republic of Azerbaijan between 1992 and 1994 was won by Armenia. The costs were substantial. More than 30,000 Azeris displaced by ethnic cleansing. Another 250,000 were expelled from Armenia.

Ever since the ceasefire the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has tried unsuccessfully to mediate a negotiated peace. The negotiating format, known as the Minsk Process with the co-chairs France, Russia and the US and permanent

members Belarus, Germany, Finland, Italy, Sweden and Turkey as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan and, on a rotating basis, the OSCE troika, has yet to overcome the intransigence of the warring states.

Armenia rejects the principles supported by all other states in the Minsk Group, of both republics' territorial integrity, legal status for Nagorno-Karabakh based on self-determination and self-administration, and guaranteed security for the enclave. Repeated bilateral talks between presidents Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Armenia's Robert Kocharyan and his successor Serzh – both of whom were born in Nagorno-Karabakh – have failed to break the deadlock.

Russia's closest (and poorest) ally Armenia demands self-determination for the people of Nagorno-Karabakh – a thoroughly self-serving demand, given the region's now almost exclusively-Armenian population.

Richard Kiessler was diplomatic correspondent for Der Spiegel (1978-93), chief editor of the Neue Rhein/Neue Ruhr Zeitung (1994-2008) and foreign policy correspondent for the WAZ Media Group in Europe (2008-2010).



PRIVATE

Azerbaijan is demanding an end to the Armenian occupation, the reinstatement of its sovereignty, return of refugees and autonomy for the enclave. Sanctions have been put in place to raise the pressure on Armenia.

A real settlement for Nagorno-Karabakh, on its own hardly a viable entity, has a chance only if external powers, first and foremost Russia and the US, set aside their strategic rivalry in the South Caucasus, give priority to the interests of Armenia and Azerbaijan and open the path to compromise. For the foreseeable future, however, the status quo with all its inherent risks is likely to smolder on.



Cyberspace Needs Norms

Cyber conflict and cyberwar are not just theoretical but actual possibilities that need to be considered and addressed. Information and communications technology creates benefits for states and their citizens alike, but technologies can and are being exploited by a variety of government actors with differing motivations and means. For nearly two decades, the cybersecurity community has warned of the increasing number and sophistication of cyber attacks. But now, cyberspace is being operationalized by some nation states as a domain for conflict, dramatically escalating the threat. In this shared and tightly integrated domain, any escalation of hostilities could result in unintended and even catastrophic consequences.

Reducing this risk requires an inclusive global dialogue on the development of norms that advance cybersecurity.

Microsoft proposes six norms to limit conflict in cyberspace.

Read more at <http://aka.ms/cybernorns>





Pakistani activists participate in a rally for the victims of the Peshawar school massacre, in southwest Pakistan's Quetta on Dec. 21, 2014. At least 141 people, mostly children, were killed by Taliban terrorists who attacked the army-run school in Pakistan's northwestern provincial capital of Peshawar on Dec. 16.

IMAGOXINHUA

China inherits Obama's nightmare

As NATO withdraws from Afghanistan, the continuing terrorism emanating from there and Pakistan has become a security threat to China | By Ahmed Rashid

Two weeks before Barack Obama took his first oath of office as president of the United States in January 2009, he said that the country giving him the most sleepless nights was Pakistan. Although nobody has asked Obama recently – and in between lie the collapse of Syria and Iraq, the rise of the Islamic State, Ebola, tensions with Russia, Boko Haram and terrorism in Europe, – he would probably still say that Pakistan continues to give him sleepless nights.

The multiple crises in Pakistan today – terrorism, the ineffective government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, a belligerent but ineffective opposition, a dire economy, chronic shortages of gas and electricity, capital flight, mass migration and the military take over of the effective reigns of foreign policy and some civilian institutions – all point to the continuing breakdown of the Pakistani state.

Next door in neighboring Afghanistan where Pakistan's military has been deeply involved in backing the Taliban for the past 30 years, the situation is equally dire. There is a huge question mark over whether newly elected President Ashraf Ghani can pull his country out of the quagmire that the Americans and NATO have left behind after they withdrew the bulk of their troops last year. The Taliban is on the offensive and the barely trained Afghan army is only just holding its ground. There is no productive, revenue-yielding economic activity, there is capital flight, no jobs and a huge increase in opium production.

However as the Munich summit convenes there could be the beginnings of a slight thaw in the long winter of insurgency, terrorism and state failure that has gripped Afghanistan and Pakistan since the early 1990s.

In Pakistan the army has taken charge although it has, for the moment, not overthrown the government. The no-nonsense,

anti-intellectual, soldier's soldier army chief General Raheel Sharif (no relation to the prime minister) has gone on the offensive against the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

He has promised to clean up all terrorist groups, regain lost territory and put an end to the good Taliban, bad Taliban syndrome that was the hallmark of the military's favoritism policy for years. (The good Taliban were those who killed US and Afghan troops rather than Pakistani soldiers.) After the devastating attack on an army school in Peshawar in December that left nearly 150 children and teachers dead, the army demanded that the Nawaz Sharif who only a few months ago was advocating dialogue with the Taliban, clamp down hard. The death penalty has been reinstated and over 500 convicted terrorists could be hanged in the months ahead.

On Jan. 7 after much cajoling and pressure from the military, parliament passed two bills amending the Constitution and the Army Act to try civilian terrorist suspects in military courts. Past martial law regimes have used military courts to punish and intimidate politicians, which is why many members of parliament were extremely reluctant to obey the army's marching orders. For starters military courts will try some 3,400 suspected terrorists. The criminal justice system had broken down years earlier and there was no attempt by the judiciary to reform the ancient and next to useless state prosecution service or modernize the police investigation process. The judges were easily intimidated by the terrorists.

As a result the army has, according to *Dawn* newspaper, been secretly holding some 6,000 alleged terrorists in prison

camp in the mountains, fearful that if they were presented to the courts the judges would let them off due to a lack of evidence. Moreover the government has been more concerned about the threat it faces from the non-cooperation campaign by opposition leader Imran Khan

“ The Taliban is on the offensive and the barely trained Afghan army is only just holding its ground. ”

than the threat from terrorism or judicial failure.

The army has also taken over foreign policy, in particular dealings with the US, Afghanistan and India. Tensions with India are high, but the army appears to distrust any civilian leader to make peace with New Delhi. On Afghanistan the army is finally becoming more positive, demanding that once Ghani gets his house in order, the army will offer the possibility of direct talks between Kabul and the Afghan Taliban leaders who are all residing in Pakistan.

What is abundantly clear is that the army is very much here to stay. The hard won battle for a semblance of democracy that has seen for the first time one elected government succeed another could be in jeopardy. Yet the army faces trouble ahead. Even though it is operating just under the radar, we can expect that civil-military relations will worsen, the Islamic parties will not play ball on any major counter terrorism policy, tensions will persist on control of foreign policy and the army itself could become part of the problem. The answer is for the civilians to deliver on state building, but

that is unlikely given the lack of leadership amongst them.

Then there is the question of whether the army will go after not just the Pakistani Taliban in the northwest but the tens of thousands of militants in Punjab and Karachi that the army itself had trained and armed to fight India in Kashmir. Will the army help regulate some 8,000 madrassas or religious schools in the country, many of which recruit for terrorist groups? Will the awful curriculum of state schools and even the army's own training programs that teach hatred against non-Muslims also be changed?

Essentially, General Sharif's message is: all in good time. But he needs to move fast on several sensitive fronts. Just take a look at foreign policy. Pakistan is involved in shooting wars with three of its neighbors at present – India, Iran and Afghanistan – and it is hugely mistrusted by all regional countries for its past use of jihadists to pursue foreign policy aims, while giving shelter to jihadists from neighboring countries like the Afghan Taliban, the Iranian Jundullah group and Indian Kashmiris.

Pakistan is also enormously mistrusted by the West, especially the US. The West remains deeply concerned about the long-term safety of Pakistan's over one hundred nuclear weapons and whether the extremism that has penetrated the military will be dealt with ruthlessly enough. Significantly most of those dozen or so terrorists who have already been hanged were ex-armed forces personnel found guilty of taking part in terrorist attacks. It is too early to

say whether General Sharif can take on what amounts to a total restructuring of the state, but at least he has had the courage to talk about extremism and the need to end it.

Equally dangerous for the entire region is the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, which recently led to President Ghani suggesting that US forces stay on beyond 2016 when all US troops are scheduled to leave. He was met with a flat 'no' from the White House. The US declared formal combat to be over on Dec. 31, 2014.

However according to US officials the country will remain an area of active hostilities for the time being as 10,600 US troops aided by another 2,000 Nato troops and some 45,000 contractors will continue training the Afghan army, launch special forces operations against terrorists and use drones to fire missiles at targets in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Most Afghans do not believe US promises that it will continue funding and support for Afghanistan's economy and army. The West has pledged \$4 billion a year for budget support and salaries

Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are increasingly looking at China to come to the rescue. Ambassador Sun Yuxi, China's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan told me in November that, "we are ready to do more, we want to play a bigger role (in Afghanistan)." He went on: "We would welcome the Taliban in any neutral venue such as in China. We will make negotiations happen but the process must be Afghan owned and Afghan led." In December a Taliban delegation visited China for talks with Beijing at the same time as President Ghani was there.

The West hopes that China could broker a peaceful end to the civil war not least because it can put real pressure on its close ally Pakistan. China's interests in the region are multiple – the desire to tap into the mineral resources of Afghanistan, to help Pakistan build an economic corridor from the Gulf port of Gwadar to the Chinese border but above all to deal with terrorism.

For years small numbers of Chinese Muslims or Uighurs from Xinjiang have studied and trained at madrassas in Pakistan and then honed battle skills fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Now they are returning home either as members of the banned East Turkestan Islamic Movement or as militants linked to al-Qaeda. The continuing terrorism emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan has become a national security threat to China so there is much more at stake now for China to help a peace process.

Ultimately foreign powers can do little to stabilize volatile domestic crises which both Pakistan and Afghanistan are presently going through. The idea that nations have to be built from the bottom up, one step at a time and with honest and purposeful leaders has yet to penetrate the region. No amount of foreign pressure or money can save a nation from internal collapse if it is not willing to save itself. ■

Ahmed Rashid is the author of the bestselling book "Taliban" and a foreign policy expert on Pakistan and Afghanistan.



PRIVATE

and another \$4 billion a year for the Afghan military until 2017. There are serious doubts if the money will be delivered given the renewed recession in Europe and the new military commitments in the Middle East to deal with the Islamic State. Pakistani and Afghan officials are convinced that the US is quickly walking away from the region despite US statements to the contrary.


On Oct. 2, 2014, a powerful improvised explosive device (IED) went off accidentally at a secret bomb-making factory of a group known as Al Jihad in rural West Bengal. Investigators identified the device as the handiwork of Bengali, an Indian terrorist leader affiliated with al-Qaeda and Bangladesh. Perennially at the forefront of homegrown and Pakistan-induced terrorism, India is suddenly surrounded by a spurt of terrorist threats from al-Qaeda; the Islamic State, also known as IS, ISIS or ISIL; and the Haqqani network, used interchangeably as Taliban – all groups that had historically avoided the Indian theater.

Three specific but complex trends explain the abrupt rise in threats from terrorists.

First, the terrorist threats in South Asian countries are inextricably linked. If suppressed in one place, they break out in another; rogue jihadists wander from the frontlines in Kashmir to those in Afghanistan or Iraq. In Afghanistan, 87,000 NATO troops fighting insurgents are withdrawing. The United States is leaving behind 10,000 trainers as per the US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement. While NATO troops withdraw, after a 13-year war, al-Qaeda, Taliban and Pakistani associates are proclaiming victories. A rising number of bold assaults in Afghanistan signals that the balance is tilting in favor of militants.

As the NATO troops withdraw, some in Pakistan would direct militants against India. The Islamic State, as J.N. Choudhury, director general of India's elite National Security Guards, warned, is the latest and most lethal entrant, encouraging "multi-city multiple attacks" on India.

India's contemporary terrorist threat is history repeating itself. In 1989, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was triumphant after its victory in Afghanistan and eager to replicate the same guerrilla war tactics in Kashmir. India was caught unprepared, and Kashmir



India is still mourning 160 people killed by Pakistani gunmen in Mumbai on Nov. 26, 2008.

Al-Qaeda's new focus

NATO's drawdown in Afghanistan and the rise of IS leave India vulnerable to terrorism | By Saroj Kumar Rath

plunged into militancy. After the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, some militant groups left Kashmir to join Afghan jihad.

Since 2001, some forces in the Pakistan Army tried to shift the focus of terrorist groups from the Af-Pak region to India and were even linked to the commando-styled Mumbai attacks of 2008. NATO's withdrawal from Afghanistan renders a generation of Af-Pak jihadists jobless, and many fighters will turn their attention to India.

This process has already started. The Haqqani Network, which the Pakistan Army consistently declines to attack, is collaborating with the terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and al-Qaeda to hit Indian interests in Kabul and Kashmir. The al-Qaeda chief in Pakistan, Farman Sinwari, is a Landi Kotal resident and old Kashmir hand. He is an added ace for the combined militant forces in Kashmir. Since his appointment in 2012, militancy has escalated in Kashmir.

If local Kashmiris lend support to any of the overseas groups, the terrorist threat to India would

increase manifold. With the rise of IS, there have been sporadic protest marches in urban Kashmir, where, as reported by the Srinagar-based 15 Corps Commander, Kashmiris have hit the streets, wielding the black IS banner.

Besides al-Qaeda, Haqqani and IS, India confronts threats from Pakistani militants. A by-product of the US presence in Afghanistan was significantly reduced terrorism in India. Once this protection is removed, India will again be exposed to terrorists from Pakistan and their sympathizers. In December 2012, former Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan chief Hakimullah Mehsud demanded the Pakistan army stop engaging against Afghan insurgents and refocus on the war of revenge against India. Such demands will automatically be fulfilled once NATO troops vacate Afghanistan. Therefore, the threat to India from motley groups of militants now operating in Af-Pak region is real and looming.

A second trend is the influx of Wahhabi preachers in India since 2013. They have radicalized the 7,000 registered madrassas in India, preparing these institutions as potential recruitment grounds for the likes of al-Qaeda, IS and Taliban. In a classified dossier, India's Intelligence Bureau reported that 25,000 Wahhabi scholars from 20 countries visited eight Indian states – Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan,

ologies in India, have been facilitating the influx of hardened foreign terrorist groups.

India's 176 million Muslims represent about 15 percent of India's population. Most adhere to the moderate Berlevi form of Islam, but in recent times it's estimated that as many as 20 percent have been lured to Wahhabi ideology. India is susceptible to the extremist snare.

The third trend is inter-organizational competition in between al-Qaeda and IS to stretch their area of influence and enlist the support of disgruntled Indian Muslims who have so far been choreographed by Pakistan. So far, Indian Muslims have resisted the temptation to join extremist groups like al-Qaeda. None of the 9/11 conspirators or other al-Qaeda-sponsored attackers were traced to India.

Similarly, no attack on India has directly been linked to al-Qaeda. In 2006, Osama bin Laden spoke about India and Kashmir for the first time, referring to a "Zionist-Hindu war against Muslims." However, since 2001 many Indian youths have been enticed to jihad in the trenches of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan and in Afghanistan where they were introduced to al-Qaeda and Taliban dogma. Before such relationships could fully develop, bin Laden was captured and killed.

Soon afterward, IS – carved out of al-Qaeda by disgruntled and impatient jihadists – started recruiting Indian Muslims. Painstakingly, al-Qaeda refocused attention on India, opening a branch in the name of Qaedat al-Jihad in September 2014.

Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed that it took two years of hard work, precisely after the appointment of Shinwari as al-Qaeda chief in Pakistan, to establish Qaedat al-Jihad. India's National Investigation Agency disrupted al-Jihad's activities in rural West Bengal in October 2014, and classified documents indicate that Indian Mujahedeen terrorists

discussed ties with al-Qaeda and Taliban to attack India. Revelation about the mujahedeen intention to obtain a nuclear bomb from Pakistan to attack the Indian city of Surat, a city in Gujarat, sent shock waves throughout India.

Some 25 Indian Muslim youths have already responded to IS chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's call in Syria, and hundreds of others are on their way – any of whom could bring IS ideology back into India.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a strategic novice, has left vital national security issues unattended. The Modi government successfully silenced Pakistan's October border misadventure by stretching the firing line towards civilian installations inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, with the explicit intention of building internal civilian pressure against the Pakistan army. However, when Pakistan clandestinely sends numerous militants, India is defensive at best.

Post-2015, Afghanistan will be the launching pad of international terrorism, a place where extremists will find safe haven. Using Afghanistan as springboard, the militants could restart jihad and chaos in India.

The Modi government must adopt a two-pronged policy. One is to pre-empt and counter terrorists by profiling existing and potential militants, creating a dedicated national anti-terror workforce, integrating inputs from academics in policymaking and ensuring fair and fast judicial scrutiny. The other is to work on social sites by checking Wahhabi indoctrination, removing Muslim ghettoization, modernizing madrasa education, and supporting small-scale entrepreneurship initiated by semi-skilled illiterate Muslims along with other Indian citizens.

Reprinted with permission from YaleGlobal Online (www.yaleglobal.yale.edu), a publication of the MacMillan Center, Yale University. 2015 © The Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale.

Saroj Kumar Rath is Assistant Professor of History, Sri Aurobindo College (Eve), University of Delhi, India.



YALE GLOBAL

Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Bihar, Maharashtra and Jharkhand. They addressed 1.2 million people, preaching conservative, hard-line Islamic doctrine and implementation of Sharia law in its strictest form. Terrorist organizations like the Indian Mujahedeen, notorious for plying militant ide-

WE MAKE SECURITY WORK


Bilfinger Maueil developed and implemented the visualization systems for more than 60 control rooms at the venues for the 2014 Football World Cup in Brazil. The bundling of the various activities in a single control room optimizes staff assignment procedures and promotes direct cooperation among all decision makers. Short decision-making processes make it possible to react immediately to any incidents that occur. www.maueil.bilfinger.com

BILFINGER ENGINEERING AND SERVICES


WORLD DANGER SPOTS

Map methodology

The color-coded rating of each country and territory represents the level of the risk or threat. The scores are retrospective and based upon data collected by Terrorism Tracker and WorldAware as well as judgments by a panel of experts.

KEY TO SYMBOLS	
Country risk level	
	Negligible
	Low
	Medium
	High
	Severe
	Line of Control
Symbols illustrating significant perils	
	Terrorism and Sabotage
	Strikes, Riots, Civil Commotion and Malicious Damage
	Insurrection, Revolution, Rebellion, Mutiny, Coup d'Etat, Civil War and War

Source: AON/Risk Advisory Group



Neither war nor peace

Between Israel and the Palestinians: armed gridlock forever? | By Martin van Creveld

Just over a century has passed since the first Zionist settlers arrived in what, following Biblical precedent, they called the Land of Israel. In all that period hardly a single Arab anywhere in the Middle East has been ready to accept Israel as a fait accompli – in other words, to acquiesce to a permanent Jewish state in their midst.

Shlomo Avineri, one-time director-general of the Israel ministry of foreign affairs, redoubtable political scientist, and a former teacher of mine has offered a useful perspective on the Arab stance. The way he sees it, the Arabs of the Middle East can be divided into two groups: those who are not ruled

by the State of Israel, and those who are.

Appearances notwithstanding, Israel has always got along fairly well with the former group. To be sure, there have been some wars. However, without exception they ended in Israeli victories. Some were small, others very great. That alone explains why fully 41 years have passed since any Arab State, or combination of states, has last tried to launch another major war aimed at putting an end to the Zionist enterprise.

Of the Arab states that used to fight Israel two, Syria and Iraq, are at risk of collapsing. With the US, several NATO countries, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Iran, and various Iraqi Shiite militias all fight-

ing IS, it does not appear as if the latter will succeed in realizing its objective: to set up a caliphate, and march on Jerusalem. One state, Egypt, is busy trying to solve its internal problems in close cooperation with Israel. And one, Jordan, has long become an Israeli protectorate. Following the so-called Second Lebanon War of 2006 even Hezbollah seems to have learnt its lesson. Skirmishes are always possible, especially with Hezbollah. However, they are far from presenting a serious danger to Israel, at least not in the foreseeable future.

Back in 2005, Israel's late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon courageously decided to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. He thereby reduced the number of Arabs who are ruled

by the State of Israel by about a million and a half. True, since then the border area between Israel and the Strip has hardly seen much peace. It would be much better for all parties if Hamas provided credible guarantees to stop military "resistance," also known as terrorism, against Israel once for all. And if, in return, the Israeli "siege" of the Strip would be lifted and Gaza allowed to develop as it can and should.

For that to happen Hamas would have to recognize Israel, while Israel would have to agree to negotiate with Hamas. In the absence of such recognition and such negotiations, additional skirmishes like those that took place in the summer of 2014 cannot be excluded. They may, in fact, be inevitable. Yet it remains true that Hamas is scarcely in a position to start a major war, let alone defeat Israel.

To turn, now, to the Palestinians on the West Bank. Depending on whom one believes, they number anywhere between a million and a half and two and a half million. Unlike their brethren in the neighboring states and the Gaza Strip, these people live in territory that, in one way or another, is occupied by Israel. This occupation is one that even the most moderate among them are determined to throw off by one means or another. The more so because, as time goes on, more and more of their land is being taken away by Jewish settlers whom the changing governments in Jerusalem seem to be either unable or unwilling to rein in.

As the repeated failure of their uprisings (intifadas, in Arabic, means "a shaking-off") shows, militarily the Palestinians stand no chance against Israel's army and security services. Yet it is not true, as has so often been claimed, that the West Bank is essential for Israel's defense. First, as the example of Gaza before 2005 shows, the occupation will

not stop various kinds of missiles coming from inside the Bank from reaching Israeli territory. Let alone those coming from outside such territory. Second, both geographic, social and political developments are a much more serious

threat to Israel than the military one. Not to put too fine a point on it, the occupation of the West Bank is turning Israel into a monster. One that, lacking moral justification, is bound to end by collapsing under its own weight just as many other historical regimes have. Especially if, as seems to be happening in recent years, Israel's own million and a half Arab citizens become radicalized and join in the struggle. And especially if, as seems to be happening in recent months, Jewish extremists start fighting both Arabs and Jewish moderates, leading to a war of all against all.

The difficulty is that, unlike Germany, Israel has a system of undiluted proportional elections. It puts too much power into the hands of a bewildering array of ever-changing small parties. So far those parties have succeeded in blocking any attempt to come to grips with the problem. One prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, paid with his life for trying to do so. Another, Ariel Sharon came under such vehement attack from his own people that he suffered a stroke from which he is never recovered. Nor are there any signs that things are about to change.

Precisely because a major war does not appear to be on the cards, the one way towards a possible solution is to help Israel along by bringing pressure to bear from outside. A precedent exists in the form of the Camp David Accords. In late 1978 it looked as if the negotiations with Egypt, which had been going on for about a year, were about to suffer a catastrophic breakdown. At that point Israel's then minister of defense, retired general and war hero Moshe Dayan, suggested bringing in the

Americans. As President Jimmy Carter entered the fray, his presence forced Prime Minister Menachem Begin to accept a complete withdrawal from the Sinai. Next, Begin used the American pressure to justify his decision to his fellow Israeli right-wingers.

The rest is history. It is, however, necessary to issue a warning. Notwithstanding the illusions of starry-eyed idealists inside and outside Israel, not even a peace agreement with both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, followed by a complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, is going to end the Palestinians' hope of one day doing away with Israel and recovering their lost land. As one Palestinian diplomat put it to me: "Why should we give up our rights?" They will enjoy the more or less active support of some 200 million Arabs who never have lived, and do not now live, under Israeli rule. Not to mention 77 million Iranians whose government, which does not exactly look favorably on Israel, may soon obtain nuclear weapons.

Thus the *conditio sine qua non* for any kind of withdrawal and any kind of peace is an Israel sufficiently strong to defend itself against all comers. "An Iron Wall," as right-wing Zionist leader Ze'ev Jabotinsky called it as far back as 1923. Or else, chaos in the Middle East is certain to spread even more than it already has. ■


Martin van Creveld is a military historian who holds degrees from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the London School of Economics. In 1971 he joined the faculty of the Hebrew University where he is now professor emeritus.



PRIVATE



No hope for a common future? A Palestinian protester throws stones at Israeli soldiers during a protest against the expansion of Jewish settlements in the Kufr Qadoom village near Nablus, on Jan. 9, 2015.



Stalemate in Yemen

President Hadi's resignation was the only chance to preserve democratic gains – but risks fragmenting the country | By Mareike Transfeld

On Jan. 22, 2015, the UN-supported Yemeni President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi and his technocratic government resigned suddenly amid Houthi pressure to make changes to the draft constitution published days earlier. The Shiite Houthis, an armed movement from northern Yemen, rejected a central aspect of the draft: the division of the country into six federal regions. The government's forced resignation demonstrates not only the powerlessness of the political leadership in the capital, it also marks the breakdown of the transitional process as outlined by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative.

With the most recent escalation of violence on Jan. 19, 2015, the Houthis pushed President Hadi into a dead end. Had the president given in to the pressure and changed the constitution, all the gains of the transitional period would have been lost. Remaining in office while not giving in to the pressure would have led to more violence. Resignation was Hadi's only option to keep the last flicker of legitimacy he had by preventing the Houthis from violently imposing their demands.

That the Houthis were in a position to exert this kind of pressure on the government was on the one hand due to the weaknesses inherent to the GCC initiative. After having been excluded from the negotiations of the GCC initiative and the unity government formed in December 2011, the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was the first instance the Houthis had to contribute to the transition. While there was a general agreement by the end of the conference in January 2014 that the future state should be federal, a final consensus failed regarding the number of federal regions the country should be divided into. Since then the Houthis have violently expanded their territorial control in northern Yemen and established themselves as de facto rulers in Yemen's capital.

But their rise to power was also the consequence of the Houthi's uncompromising attitude in the face of the state's weakness. Time and again, the Houthis engaged in negotiations with the government and agreed to deals brokered by the UN. Paying lip service only to those agreements, the movement repeatedly showed that it was not willing to compromise or agree to a power sharing arrangement.

After Houthi fighters violently took over control of Sanaa, the government and Houthi representatives signed the National Peace and Partnership agreement on Sept.

21, 2014. The agreement was supposed to put an end to the Houthi's violent campaign, but in reality it gave the Houthis a legitimate cover for their unilateral drive to control the state.



Mareike Transfeld is a research fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. She specializes in Yemeni politics.

The Houthis are now in a position where they must show their true face. They can either work within the framework of the

political institutions and adhere to the agreements reached in the transitional period, which would also entail coming to terms with the federal structure of the future Yemeni state. Or the Houthis can unilaterally grab power by forming a presidential council. But they would then be held accountable by the public and risk losing the legitimacy they have in the population.

Since the Houthi's rise to power, opposition against the movement came particularly from central and southern Yemen. In contrast to the Houthis, who adhere to the Zaydi tradition of Shia Islam, in these regions the majority of the population follows the Shafi'i school of Sunni Islam. The fragmented Hira

movement and tribes exist next to an ever-stronger al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which gains strength due to the Houthi's incursion. The lines between the tribes and AQAP become increasingly blurry, as both are violently engaging the Houthis and are trying to put an end to the group's military expansion in the south.

The fear that the Houthi's grab of power will make the establishment of federal regions in the south impossible led to a wave of Hira leaders declaring independence in the wake of Hadi's resignation. This could be the beginning not just of division, but of a fragmentation of Yemen. Given the Houthi's aggression and their unwilling-


ness to agree to a federal solution, a radicalization of Hira becomes ever more likely. Only through a genuine inclusion of the Hira and other southern leaders in the political process in Sanaa, can the radicalization of Hira the fragmentation of the south and the risk posed by AQAP be effectively countered.

Although it is a major power broker in Yemen's transition, the international community has little influence on these developments. This became particularly clear after the UN Security Council issued sanctions against former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and two Houthi leaders for obstructing the implementation of the GCC initiative. The sanctions had no positive impact on the political situation in Sanaa, with both Saleh and the Houthis continuing to influence the transitional process negatively.

The little influence the international community has is restricted to its ability to legitimize actors through recognition. The international community should not accept any unilateral steps taken by the Houthis, and should insist on an inclusive process and the validity of political agreements. Only political unity in Sanaa will enable the Yemeni state to effectively tackle political reforms and the security situation.

International military interventions will only be counterproductive in this volatile environment, as it is impossible for foreign forces to remain neutral in this complex network of actors and interests. There is a risk of disenfranchising supporters of the UN-supported transitional roadmap. Moderate Shafi'i who see themselves stuck between Houthis and AQAP find it hard to perceive the international community, but particularly the US, as a genuine partner in the transition.

For that reason, AQAP benefits immediately from foreign military intervention, particularly the US drone campaign. AQAP not only uses the high number of civilian casualties, but also American casuality to mobilize support and recruit fighters.



It would not have needed the recent stir around the hacking of Sony Pictures to remind the world that things are far from quiet on the Korean peninsula. Ever since the Korean War, Korea has been one of the world's main security flashpoints. The role of the villain in this game, and in a growing number of Hollywood movies and computer games, is assigned to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its leaders.

The West in general terms, and in a more narrow sense the US, Japan, and South Korea, approach North Korea as a rogue state. Pyongyang's actions are routinely interpreted as provocations and are met with the harshest response, including UN resolutions and economic sanctions. The North is upset about what it perceives as an inadmissible infringement on its national sovereignty. America, South Korea and Japan are portrayed as North Korea's sworn enemies, intent on toppling the current regime and imposing their own political and economic systems.

This process has been going on for decades. It is regrettable and risky, but has in a way become business as usual. Each year, huge joint military exercises are undertaken by the US and South Korea, and North Korea protests loudly. Every few years since 2006, North Korea tests a nuclear device or a ballistic missile, and the West reacts with condemnation and more sanctions. Occasionally, we see variations, such as the recent US focus on human rights or North Korea's threats to turn Seoul into a sea of fire or to launch a nuclear attack on Guam.

However, beyond this questionable normality, there are a few noticeable aspects that have broader implications far beyond the Korean peninsula.

The most obvious point is the nuclear issue. It is shocking to see that an underdeveloped country like North Korea has been able to develop such weapons. If they can do it – and get away with it – who will be next? Among the candidates on an alarmingly long list are two of the world's most developed economies, South Korea and Japan. Given the recent nationalist trend in East Asian foreign policy, a nuclear North Korea could serve as the perfect excuse for these two countries to follow suit. The result would be a

the Middle East. The West finds it hard enough to deal with a conventionally armed al-Qaeda or ISIS; add nuclear weapons to this asymmetrical warfare, and the prospects become frightening.

The US reaction to the Sony hack

movie. It is hard to understand why this necessitated a personal reaction from

Kim Jong-un's rogue state

America could actually
be more than happy
with North Korea as it is
By Rüdiger Frank

ALMUDI/NET
TOM SCHNEIDER

global chain reaction that would shake the world's security architecture to its grounds.

Apprehensions of nuclear proliferation are nourished by the fact that North Korea has a long record of arms deals with countries in the Third World, including

strikes one as somewhat out of proportion.

After all, regardless of whether North Korea was actually involved, what has actually happened? A private corporation has become the victim of a hacking attack. A few movies and emails were leaked, further cyberattacks were announced in case of non-compliance with the demand to withdraw a rather silly

none less than the president of the United States.

Obviously, the fact that a country with which the US is still technically at war is working on the development of nuclear weapons weighs heavily in this context. But the most important reason for the disproportionate attention directed towards North Korea is its geostrategic location. Cold War 2.0 is approaching fast in Asia, and the main adversaries will be China and the United States.

North Korea serves as a welcome excuse for China's rivals to be active in its backyard. Pointing at the North Korean threat, the US maintains the presence of troops and significant hardware on the Korean peninsula, more than 60 years after the end of the Korean War. Pointing at North Korea, Tokyo has buried its decades-old Yoshida doctrine, according to which defense of the Japanese islands is taken care of by the United States, and embarked on a path toward

what it calls normalization, adding independent and offensive military capabilities to its exercise of national sovereignty.

Almost everybody wins. The US can maintain its presence in the region, Japan can justify its remilitarization. North Korea enjoys top international attention and is able to convert this political capital into economic gains. The big loser in this game is Beijing.

A remarkably underreported possibility is that one of the main goals of Pyongyang's nuclear program is to hedge against too much Chinese influence. For obvious reasons, North Korea would never admit that openly; the American threat is used as a welcome proxy. But a look at the facts reveals that the biggest challenge for North Korean sovereignty is indeed China. It is an immediate neighbor, overwhelmingly strong in every aspect, a huge ideological challenge, and has for decades shown a direct interest in North Korean affairs.

All factional fights in Pyongyang that we know of involved a pro-Chinese faction. Not least, most dangerous outside information that reaches North Korea does so through China.

The irony is that one of the most remarkable successes of US foreign policy in the region has been to make everybody believe that North Korea is a Chinese client state, and that Beijing is responsible for its behavior –

either by directly supporting it, or by not doing enough to stop it. Yet China's actual influence over North Korea is very limited, not least by its own strategic interests.

Chinese frustration over North Korea is as old as their bilateral relationship. Only in recent years selected Chinese officials have begun to be openly critical of Pyongyang. But this is a shift in PR, not in actual policy, since Beijing's interests have remained the same. Meanwhile, China's main regional adversary, Russia, is rapidly improving its relations with Pyongyang. This adds strategic weight to North Korea and makes Beijing's position even more complicated.

In light of all this, it seems that Washington could be more than happy with North Korea as it is. Not everyone seems to subscribe to such an analysis, however. In a *Washington Post* op-ed of Dec. 23, 2014 about the Sony Pictures hack, Richard N. Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote: "Only one approach is commensurate with the challenge: ending North Korea's existence as an independent entity and reunifying the Korean Peninsula."



Rüdiger Frank is Professor of East Asian Economy and Society at the University of Vienna. He spent one semester as a language student at Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang in 1991 and has been studying North Korea since. In September 2014, he published a new book on North Korea.

PRIVATE

Let's keep our fingers crossed that Obama is considerate enough not to provoke China this way, unless he is ready to accept that a unified Korea will come under Beijing's dominance, with the US pulling back to Japan, where few people are looking forward to being on the frontline of an intensifying confrontation between two global giants. ■

**A PRECISE
SITUATION PICTURE.**

www.plathgroup.com

Being fully informed? It is essential to manage different means of communication and data formats as well as increasing data volumes. System solutions for communications intelligence provided by PLATH aggregate the information to build up a precise overall situation picture, enabling you to identify any threat as early and as comprehensively as possible. Seamless and close to real-time.

www.plathgroup.com · www.plath.de

PLATH

The talks resumed in mid-January. Tehran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has met twice with US Secretary of State John Kerry for negotiations on Iran's nuclear program and visited his counterparts Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Berlin and Laurent Fabius in Paris.

In the following days, top diplomats from Washington, Moscow, Beijing, London, Paris and Berlin (P5+1) met with the Iranian deputy foreign minister in Geneva. Time is short. A political framework deal has to be agreed by early March; a final document is to be drafted by July 1, 2015.

Negotiations have already been extended twice. There is a deep divide between the demands for Iran to drastically cut back its nuclear enrichment facilities and Iran's counter-demand for the lifting of sanctions against it. Therefore it seems unlikely that the new round of talks will bring about any agreement on the Iranian nuclear program. But the attempt has to be made.

For failure could mean the start of a nuclear arms race in the Mideast. The remarkable show of diplomatic unity by the five nations with a Security Council veto and Germany – in which the Western countries cooperate constructively with Russia and China – would crumble. And any chance for joint action with Iran against the terrorism of the "Islamic State" in Syria and Iraq disappear.

Those are the overarching security policy concerns which are at stake. In essence, the negotiations still center on the question of how to stop Iran from building nuclear weapons – without taking away the country's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes?

That is where it gets difficult. How much uranium can Iran be allowed to enrich? How many centrifuges can it be allowed to have? How long will it remain subject to checks on its nuclear facilities? How quickly and on what kind

Wanted: Heroic flexibility

Mistrust dominates talks on Iran's nuclear program. Hardliners in Washington and in Tehran are seeking to block any compromise | By Matthias Nass



Time is short to agree a political framework deal: US Secretary of State John Kerry, left, waits with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif before a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, Jan. 14, 2015.

of a timetable should sanctions be lifted in return?

Prospects for agreement are grim. Both in Washington and in Tehran – the political environment has grown harsher. Since the midterm



Matthias Nass is international correspondent for the German weekly Die Zeit.

accept Iran having any centrifuges at all and are aiming to step up the pressure on Iran using even more sanctions.

Senator Bob Corker, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has announced legislation on the matter will be ready "late January, early February." Obama fears that piling on more sanctions will torpedo the talks with Iran and has already threatened to veto any such bill.

But those against any compromise with Tehran are not all in the opposition – some of them are in Obama's own party. Among them is Hillary Clinton, who is

poised to announce her bid to be the next Democratic presidential candidate. In contrast to Obama, she believes any agreement must include the dismantling of all Iran's roughly 19,000 centrifuges.

That corresponds to the demand by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. "It is better not to have an agreement with Iran than to have an agreement that will jeopardize Israel, the Middle East, and humanity," was his comment on the failure of the latest round of talks in Vienna in November 2014. Netanyahu says zero centrifuges is the only acceptable solution. He therefore sees no reason to simply extend the period for a breakout – the time Iran would need to build a bomb with the fissile material it

already has. This period is currently estimated to be two months. The talks aim to stretch that to at least a year – and the controls are to be refined to the point when the attempt to reach a breakout could be recognized in time.

That still leaves the threat of a sneakout – the undiscovered construction of a bomb with fissile material from hidden Iranian nuclear facilities. Israel is convinced that Iran is more than capable of wriggling out of its contractual obligations.

That means that any agreement will have to be absolutely watertight as far as controls go. Yet comprehensive surveillance is hardly compatible with Iran's national pride; Iranians insist on

their rights under the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, it is a matter of trust. And that is lacking on both sides.

What Western opponents of any compromise must bear in mind is that even the Iranian President Hassan Ruhani has to deal with hardliners at home, amongst the clerics and among the top brass of the Revolutionary Guard. Above all, he must overcome the skepticism of the supreme spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei has, however, backed the president, at least verbally, saying that "heroic flexibility" was sometimes required in talks with the enemy.

Some in Tehran are saying that Ruhani will have to achieve an easing of the sanctions soon – or jeopardize his entire reform program – and that otherwise he will soon lose the backing of the moderate forces currently supporting him.

Ruhani reiterated his determination for reform early this year in a speech to 1,500 business leaders and other professionals. He said their could be no sustainable development for Iran "as long as we remain in isolation." The sanctions have to go. Faced with resistance from his conservative opponents, Ruhani has even threatened to hold a referendum on his economic policies and his actions in the nuclear debate. That would be a spectacular trial of strength, the like of which Iran has not seen since the 1979 revolution.

It almost seems as if the talks are more likely to fail due to differences within the Iranian leadership and between the White House and Congress than the disagreement between the negotiating parties themselves. But both presidents are determined to fight for a successful outcome. For Ruhani, it's all about the modernization of Iran. For Obama, it could be a highlight of his political legacy.

Much is at stake. In the Mideast, it is nothing less than the prevention of a nuclear arms race. "Heroic flexibility is certainly needed – on all sides. ■"

Missile Defense / Electronic Warfare / Cyber / C4ISR / Precision Weapons / Training

MISSION: A WORLD OF INNOVATION

FOR OVER 90 YEARS, RAYTHEON HAS ENABLED COUNTLESS MISSIONS BY REMAINING COMMITTED TO A SINGLE ONE: CUSTOMER SUCCESS. FROM THE DEPTHS OF THE OCEAN TO THE FARTHEST REACHES OF SPACE, FROM REMOTE BATTLEFIELDS TO THE VIRTUAL REALMS OF CYBERSPACE, RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES ARE DEPLOYED IN MORE THAN 80 COUNTRIES TO DELIVER INNOVATION IN ALL DOMAINS.



"Blue Marble" image of Earth captured by Raytheon's Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite.

Raytheon.com

Connect with us:

Raytheon

Customer Success Is Our Mission

Beating Boko Haram

Military action alone cannot defeat the Islamist group.
Northeast Nigeria needs a share of the South's wealth | By Annette Weber


Nigeria, the powerhouse of Africa, is in trouble. In the middle of last year, the Nigerian economy passed those of South Africa and Egypt. At almost the same time, attacks by the jihadist organization Boko Haram took on previously unseen dimensions. In recent years more than 10,000 people have been killed in northern Nigeria – Christians and Muslims, most of them civilians but also soldiers, policemen and politicians. More than 1.5 million people have been displaced.

Boko Haram controls vast tracts of the three Nigerian regions bordering Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Since December 2014 the group has also been attacking barracks and villages in the neighboring regions. The town of Baga on Lake Chad was attacked by Boko Haram militias on Jan. 3, and – as satellite images show – razed to the ground.

Boko Haram's declared aim is to establish a caliphate and to punish or annihilate unbelievers. In a video message, the movement's spokesman declared its dedication to global jihad and support for the "Islamic State." Boko Haram sees itself as the ruling power in the areas it controls, in which it aims to found a theocracy. Since the violent death of Mohamad Yussuf in 2009, the movement's leader has been Abubakar Shekau. Meanwhile, it has grown by up to 10,000 members.

There are several reasons for that increase. Northern Nigerians feel neglected by the southern-based government of Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan; they complain of political corruption, and collusion between criminal networks and the regional political elites. Pledges of modernization remain unfulfilled, and young people in particular see no prospects for the future. A narcissistic culture of violence makes heroes of those who fight for the one and only truth.

It is true that a region's affluence depends first and foremost on its personal links with the capital Abuja. While the country's leaders during the military dictatorships up into the 1990s mostly came from the Muslim north, today the political power and with it access to resources lies in the hands of Christians in the south. Widespread anger and powerlessness in the northeast – and above all, mistrust of the south – boosts the jihadist mobilization, which promises to overcome the failure of both poli-



tics and traditional social models in one fell swoop.

The supposed enemy is in plain view, and in the battle to create their Islamic state the jihadists will stop at nothing. They do not even shrink from the murder or kidnapping of children – such as the nearly 300 schoolgirls from Chibok – or the use of children as suicide bombers.

So far, the political elite in the capital has failed miserably to deal with Boko Haram terrorism. The government seems to be waiting in the hope the problem will simply go away. The inability, the apparent disinterest of politicians in Abuja has made fear and panic in the northeast turn to fury. It took international campaigns such as #bringbackourgirls to get President Jonathan to call the crime by its name – months after the Chibok schoolgirls were abducted – and to recognize that the girls' parents are not enemies but victims.

One of Boko Haram's last major attacks was on the town of Baga, site of the headquarters of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), made up of troops from Nigeria, Chad and Niger. Founded in 1994, the force was meant to fight terrorism. In a video released after the attack, Abubakar Shekau and his supporters showed off a large arsenal of weapons and ammunition supposedly taken in the attack on the MNJTF barracks.

That highlights a fundamental problem. The military has not failed to protect the people in northeastern Nigeria due to a lack of weapons. The failure lies in the army's lack of interest in pursuing its mission, when the humanitarian crisis of more

than one million displaced people should be reason enough.

Chad has sent troops to Nigeria and Cameroon – an indication that awareness of the urgent need for stabilization mission has risen in the region. Currently, several thousand Chadian troops are active in Nigeria, more than 1,000 in the area of Baga and Lake Chad, 2,500 in Cameroon. Some Chadian special forces are US-trained and experienced in fighting jihadist organizations in the Sahel.

Most recently, they were deployed in northern Mali. Regional leaders do not want to make the same mistakes that led to long-lasting instability there. Half the Nigerian army has now reportedly been deployed to the northeast. However, that did not deter Boko Haram from launching an assault on Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state on Jan. 24. Meanwhile the president of Ghana has called for intervention by African Union forces.

But while a coordinated deployment of regional forces is needed in response to the direct threat and expansion of Boko Haram, this must be just one part of a wider strategy to solve the problem. Politicians in the northeast will have to be better integrated into national politics.

Also needed are economic stimulus programs and a fairer redistribution of public assets. Just as important is a religious alternative to jihadist radicalism.

Annette Weber is a senior associate at the Middle East and Africa Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).



MARC DARCHINGER

Libya on the brink

Tripoli could become the world's first capital ruled by Islamic State | By Mirco Keilberth

Libya is descending into civil war while the world looks the other way. In late January, militant Islamists from the self-styled Islamic State (IS) attacked the Corinthia, a luxury hotel in Tripoli, popular with diplomats and businessmen. At least three young men, barely 18 years old, stormed the building in the heart of the capital. As security personnel tried to help hotel staff wounded by volleys from the attackers' Kalashnikovs, a car bomb exploded outside.

In Benghazi entire streets look just like the ruined wastelands of Aleppo. In heavy house-to-house fighting, the city's local militias battle jihadists from Tunisia, Sudan and the rest of Libya.

The country has become the focus for a wider regional war – and for the IS. If the radicals – who reject Libya's statehood, a constitution and laws – triumph with bombs and violence, Tripoli could become the world's first capital city to be ruled by the IS.

Following the deaths of more than 300 police and soldiers in attacks, retired army general Khalifa Haftar is seeking to prevent a takeover by the Islamists. His "Karama" (dignity) alliance is a potpourri of clans and army units from Cyrenaica province. It is a war against a loose alliance of for-



The remains of a car bomb set off outside Tripoli's Corinthia Hotel on Jan. 28, 2015 during an attack launched by Islamic State-affiliated fighters.

eign, often teenaged extremists and the former revolutionaries of Ansar al-Sharia. Six hundred people have been killed in Benghazi alone since the start of the year. One-third of the city's population is on the run.

"Without Gaddafi, how exactly did the scenario come about which NATO said it was saving us from?" asked Taufik Mansoury, who worked as a coordinator between NATO and the rebels. "After 2012 they left us with a new dictatorship. Because the West secretly left the religious militias alone, think-

ing they would be useful idiots in the anti-Assad alliance," said Mansoury, echoing the view of many in Benghazi.

Many people have joined "Karama," not out of sympathy with Haftar and his generals who served under Gaddafi, but out of despair. The uncompromising brutality of the jihadists has turned off Libya's young people, who yearn for freedom.

"For a while Islamist militias like Ansar Sharia and Rafallah Shati were able to offer young men

with no prospects decent pay and a feeling of belonging, giving them independence and even a spiritual home," said one commander who has since left the Islamist movement. But Libyan fighters returning from Syria brought with them a new radicalization and the murder of prominent activists; now the clans of the mostly moderate Libya reject the radical Islamists.

"It was foreseeable that the extremists would take over in Benghazi, Sirte and Derna – and now Tripoli," Mansoury said.

"After the elections in 2012, diplomats, normal citizens and politicians still believed the moderate conservatives when they said they would contain the few radicals. But the jihadis said goodbye to society a long time ago."

The price of denying that the movement was self-contained and interconnected from Mali to Aleppo has been civil war. Is a renewed international military mission needed to prevent Libya's fledgling democratic process?

The attack on the Corinthia Hotel left ten people dead, at least five of them foreign nationals. The message was clear. From now on, another force has a say in what happens in Tripoli. A network which has nothing to do with the competing "Karama" and "Fajr" alliances and which will strike at anyone who agrees to a constitution or a peace treaty with Karama. It was also a message to the delegations in Geneva struggling to forge a ceasefire under the leadership of United Nations Special Representative Bernardino Leon. The message is: we can strike anywhere, any time at those who oppose us.

Things are hardly any better in Tripoli. Female students at the

Nigeria goes to the polls in a few weeks. If a new government could be formed which would truly represent the interests of all Nigerians regardless of religious and ethnic background, this could reawaken some trust in the state – even in the northeast.

A few steps have been taken in the right direction. President Johnathan has chosen a Muslim from the north as his running mate, and his challenger Muhammadu Buhari has picked a Christian from the south to be his potential vice-president.

A more comprehensive approach will have to include a more just distribution of wealth, and improved opportunities for education, work, and development. Boko Haram makes money primarily by extorting ransom payments, but it also supports itself by armed robbery, slavery and through funding from al-Qaeda. Allegedly corruption in the military and political clientele structures in Nigeria are another source of funding for the group.

Development aid needs to find viable alternatives to nourishing organized crime; security initiatives have to be created to prevent kidnappings and smuggling. Religious education and reconciliation initiatives would also contribute to making social structures stronger.

Nigeria has recently headed military initiatives by the regional organization Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) and is the foremost provider of troops to the United Nations' peace missions in Africa. It is not an option to allow Africa's most populous and economically strong nation to fail because of Boko Haram – it would be bad for Nigerians, for their African neighbors and for the international community.

The region is within the sphere of influence of jihadist groups in northern Mali, the Sahel and Libya, and it is not too far away from conflicts in Darfur and Central Africa. All this makes Boko Haram an enormous threat.

It would make sense to launch a regional or African Union mission. It could include equipment and expertise from the international community (including Germany). Yet a military victory over Boko Haram alone will not solve the problems. To get at the root of the problem, a comprehensive new approach is needed to tackle the long neglect of northern Nigeria. Inclusion at all levels – political, economical and social. This is the only way to keep the country together and to restore social order throughout. ■

Mirco Keilberth is the North Africa correspondent for several German publications and is based in Tripoli, Libya.



PRIVATE

Quality.
Quality.
Quality.

When you perform over
38 million vitally important
treatments a year,
nothing else matters.



Fresenius Polysulfone® dialysers lie at the heart of the dialysis treatment. Dialysers are highly efficient filters for removing toxic substances from the blood of dialysis patients.

The human kidney is truly a masterpiece of biology. It is at work around the clock, filtering harmful substances from our blood. But if our kidneys fail, our body is unable to cope without them. In most cases dialysis is the only answer, with the dialyser acting as an artificial kidney to take over the work of these vital organs.

As a world leader in dialysis, we apply the highest possible quality standards to our products and services, and work with the strictest controls imaginable. Anything else would be unthinkable for us. After all, hundreds of thousands of people put their lives in our hands every day. If you would like to know more: www.fmc-ag.com

First Munich Security Report published

On Jan. 26, 2015, the Munich Security Conference (MSC) published the first Munich Security Report (MSR), an annual digest on critical questions and important trends in international security policy. This year's inaugural edition is called "Collapsing Order, Reluctant Guardians?" It is available to the interested public.

In addition to providing short summaries of key issues, the report features a selection of insightful analyses, charts, and maps relating to events over the last twelve months.

Topics of this year's report include the Ukraine crisis, a survey of recent developments in jihadist extremism, new challenges such as hybrid warfare, and the global refu-



gee crisis. Special attention is given to the role of the United States, Germany's international responsibility, European defense cooperation, Nato's problems and prospects, the strategy of Russia and the Asian-Pacific powers.

A few selected highlights:

- A poll by TNS Infratest for the Munich Security Report underlines that Germans continue to view a more active German engagement in international crises skeptically. Only 34 percent (2014: 37 percent) are in favor of a stronger engagement, while 62 percent argue that Germany should continue to exercise restraint (2014: 60 percent).

- The Institute for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King's College London documents the rise in foreign fighters who are joining jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria.

- New data from „The Military Balance 2015“, prepared by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, show a further reduction in military capabilities in Europe. In Western Europe, for instance, military spending declined by 8.4 percent between 2010 and 2014.

Over the past five decades the Munich Security Conference (MSC) has become a key annual gathering for the international "strategic community." Since its foundation in 1963 as the "International Wehrkunde Conference," the MSC has been an independent forum dedicated to promoting peaceful conflict resolution and dialogue in dealing with today's and future security challenges. It has especially focused on the transatlantic partnership.

In addition to the traditional annual conference in Munich in early February, the MSC has developed smaller formats. In 2015, they will include the Energy Security Summit (May 6/7 in Berlin), the MSC Core Group Meetings in capitals around the world (June 16/17 in Vienna), and the European Defence Summit (Sept. 15/16 in Brussels). ■

A year ago, as we prepared to assemble for the 50th Munich Security Conference, a terrorist group that at the time called itself ISIS had just seized control of Fallujah and Ramadi in Iraq. These advances mostly just appeared on the radar screen of specialized analysts. Protesters had been filling the Maidan in Kiev for two months, but, to many, a peaceful, consensual inner-Ukrainian solution was very much on the table.

Only a few months later, the remarkable escalations of these two crises, along with a few other developments, have given rise to a plethora of essays announcing the advent of a new, more chaotic, and less peaceful era.

Terms such as "the great unraveling," "the era of disorder," an "era of unprecedented level of crises," or a world "coming apart at the seams" base their pessimism on eroding structures. After all, the flaws of today's international order that these analyses highlight will probably be with us for a long time.

Numerous crucial international and regional elements of order are being tested. It is now more unclear than in many years whether those in the international community that are trying to uphold order are able to do so.

War has returned to Europe, proving that even the region with the most tightly knit web of common rules, institutions, and interdependence is at risk. Instead of moving closer to the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace, the continent in 2014 has seen attempts to resurrect divisions and classical spheres of influence. What many wanted to avoid may become entrenched: different levels of security across Europe. And the breakdown in relations between Russia and the West may well undo all the progress made since the end of the Cold War.

In the Middle East, the challenges are even more fundamental and threaten the very existence of numerous states and regional orders as we know them. The war in Syria has raged for well over three years, killing hundreds of thousands and forcing millions to leave their homes. It has now also metastasized into the broader region, enabling the rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State and further contributing to the disintegration of the current system. Crises in Libya and Yemen have degenerated into civil wars, Egypt's democratic interlude is over, and the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians violently erupted again. Only Tunisia has made real progress toward a democratic future.

In the Asia-Pacific, even as major incidents were avoided, the state of play is precarious. Asia is the only region in which defense expenditures have increased each year for the past two and a half decades. The rhetoric employed by numerous actors has become much more assertive, the regional security architecture is far from solid, and the number of unresolved border disputes staggering. Moreover, the rise of an assertive power has his-

Collapsing order, reluctant guardians

torically always been an enormous challenge.

In Western Africa, the Ebola pandemic has almost shut down a number of states. And in other regions of the continent, humanitarian disasters and protracted conflicts threaten the lives of millions.

Challenges to effective global governance also abound. While

the structures for economic governance have arguably performed rather well in managing the global crisis after 2008, the same can hardly be said for security governance. Our collective ability to solve problems has decreased, and major institutions of global security structures have been weakened. This leaves the world with a

huge gulf between demand for governance and its actual provision.

Collapsing orders are arguably both a driver and an effect of an increasing reluctance on the posts of its traditional guardians. As potential leaders stop acting the way they used to, other actors make use of their opportunity to test limits. And as orders crumble

and become much harder to maintain or manage, potential leaders might consider the challenge to do so too great. Call it the vicious circle of international disorder.

To be sure, many charges leveled at the United States are exaggerated. But President Obama's focus on "nation building at home" has led to a perception that America is beating a retreat. Shrill warnings of an American empire, voiced only a decade ago, have given way to fears that Uncle Sam might disengage from the world. Both in Europe and in Asia, Washington had to make clear that defending its allies remains a core interest of the United States. But it is not certain how long the US can and will bear this extraordinary burden.

In Europe, many countries are still trying to overcome the impact of the financial and economic crisis as well as domestic blockades and rising Euroscepticism. Europe's global role will not soon be spelled out in a meaningful way. At the same time, many Europeans openly say that Russia's actions have done a lot to help them move closer together in matters of foreign policy. If there is anything positive about the crisis of European security, it is this wake-up call. It cannot be ignored.

Many observers and practitioners now consider Russia more of a spoiler than a contributor to international security and stability. Yet Moscow has played a constructive role in certain areas – notably in the negotiations between the five UN veto powers and Germany (P5+1) and Iran over Tehran's nuclear program. But against the backdrop of Russia's role in the war in Ukraine, cooperation with Moscow will remain a severe challenge.

And while the so-called rising powers have assumed crucial roles in the world economy, their contributions to safeguarding the international order have in the eyes of many been limited.

Of course, the breakdown of the old order cannot be attributed merely to changing great power relations, a shift in domestic priorities, or economic considerations. The number of relevant actors and potential spoilers has skyrocketed, also contributing to a decreased ability of countries to solve problems on their own or in coordination. This and the increasing interdependence of today's globalized societies further exacerbate broader risks, for example risks stemming from climate change or cyberattacks.


Finally, our ability to predict major crises, let alone prevent them, appears to be weakening as well. The more complex and complicated the world gets, the harder it is to get it right. Put differently, it's much easier today to overlook or misjudge the signals amid the noise.

In early 2014, hundreds of decision makers were about to travel to Munich. If many "missed" the rise of ISIS and the coming fundamental crisis in European security a year ago, the question now must be: What are we missing today? ■

Which region will be most affected by rising geopolitical competition in the next 12–18 months?

Assessment by the World Economic Forum's global knowledge network

Percent



Source: World Economic Forum

Is there a leadership crisis in the world today?

Assessment by the World Economic Forum's global knowledge network


Percent; by region of origin of respondents



Source: World Economic Forum

Diverging trends in defense spending in Asia and Europe

USD billions




Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies

What are the top 10 geopolitical risks for 2015?

Eurasia Group, January 2015

"Geopolitics is back. As 2015 begins, political conflict among the world's great powers is in play more than at any time since the end of the Cold War."



Source: Eurasia Group

Emerging powers: free riders?

This year, China's economy, if adjusted for purchasing power, has overtaken the United States' economy as the world's largest. Despite the rising economic importance of the emerging powers, some analysts continue to label them "reluctant stakeholders," noting that their contributions to global governance have not increased very much. Are they free riders, are they learning to route around long-established structures, or do they contribute more than commonly assumed?

Clearly, while Western representatives usually point out that rising global influence comes with more global responsibility, the emerging powers feel that their voices are not respected enough.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, for instance, emphasized that his country "is a participant in, builder of, and contributor to the international system" and

cited its economic development as an important contribution to the world. Recently, US President Obama underlined that "the United States welcomes the continuing rise of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and stable and that plays a responsible role in world affairs."


Through the BRICS group, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are joining forces in a coordinated fashion. So far, they have mainly focused on economic and financial matters, for instance through the creation of the New Development Bank.

In broader political and security terms, the BRICS have often been lacking a common position: If they are "unified at all, it's out of a

common perception of the strength of the West and a shared interest in limiting the West's ability to dictate the terms of international play."

How the influence of certain countries is perceived in the world


Average results from polls in 20 tracking countries



Source: BBC/GlobeScan

Catching up?


GDP Current USD billions



Source: World Bank

GDP per capita

Current USD



Source: World Bank


Asia-Pacific: a pow(d)er keg?

When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for a handshake at the margins of the APEC summit in November, there were no smiles – but a sigh of relief around the world. After all, the gesture, came along with small suggestions made toward improving bilateral crisis after many months of increasingly assertive and aggressive rhetoric from both sides.

In early February of 2014, at the Munich Security Conference, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying said that the relationship between her country and Japan was “at its worst.” A few days earlier, in Davos, Abe had likened the China-Japan relationship to the one between Britain and Germany just before the outbreak of World War I. “Even if military engagement is highly unlikely, China-Japan is still the world’s most geopolitically dangerous bilateral relationship and that will remain the case,” Eurasia Group President Ian Bremmer wrote at the time.

Today, even as relations between China and Japan have improved, the situation in the East and South China Seas, in particular, remains fragile. While the risk of armed conflict might be low, it is not negligible, and the consequences would be enormous – not only because the South China Sea is one of the world’s most important

Maritime disputes and selected naval capabilities in the South China Sea



trade routes, with almost a third of global crude oil and over half of global LNG trade passing through it.

Annual defense spending in the region has more than doubled over the past ten years, and regional security structures are rather weak and untested. Many historical grievances have yet to be dealt with, and the number of unresolved border disputes and competing territorial claims is extraordinary. They are further exacerbated by estimates that there are enormous oil and gas reserves under its seabed.

A Pew poll in spring 2014 showed that large majorities in the region are “concern[ed] that disputes between China and neighboring countries could lead to armed conflict:” 93 percent in the Philippines, 85 percent in Japan, 84 percent in Vietnam, and 83 percent in South Korea. In China, 62 percent have the same concern.

Sharing their citizens’ worries, China’s neighbors have been seeking much closer ties to the US. The US government, in turn, has stated unequivocally that it remains committed to the ‘pivot’ and to its allies’ security. “The rebalance is not a goal, not a promise, or a vision – it’s a reality,” Chuck Hagel said at the last Shangri-La Dialogue. “We take no position on competing territorial claims. But we firmly oppose any nation’s use of intimidation, coercion, or the threat of force to assert those claims.”

Munich Security Conference **MSC**
 Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz

STAY IN TOUCH WITH US:

Twitter



Follow us on Twitter
twitter.com/MunSecConf
 to contribute to the online debate, please use the hashtag #MSC2015.

Facebook



Like us on Facebook
www.facebook.com/MunSecConf

Save the Date Our Events in 2015/2016

MSC Munich Young Leaders Alumni Meeting	30 April–1 May 2015 Washington DC, United States
Energy Security Summit 2015	6–7 May 2015 Berlin, Germany
7 th MSC Core Group Meeting	16–17 June 2015 Vienna, Austria
European Defence Summit 2015	15–16 September 2015 Brussels, Belgium
Munich Strategy Forum	22–24 November 2015 Elmau, Germany
Munich Security Conference 2016	12–14 February 2016 Munich, Germany
8 th MSC Core Group Meeting	April 2016 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia



MS EUROPA | MS EUROPA 2

A CLASS OF THEIR OWN.

“No other ships today can match the high standards set by MS EUROPA and MS EUROPA 2 and their crews.”

Douglas Ward, Berlitz Cruise Guide

For the first time in the history of the Berlitz Cruise Guide, in 2014 two ships have achieved the most exclusive ranking of 5-stars-plus. Experience the elegant luxury and the freedom that takes you places in the highest award category.



Hapag-Lloyd
Cruises

www.hl-cruises.com

Cyber Security



Why we are not ready for cyberwar

Our dependence on computers is growing faster than our ability to forestall attacks | By Edward Lucas

Computers and networks are baffling and the people who do understand them are notoriously bad at explaining the things that matter. The security of what is now the central nervous system of modern life – the Internet – is baffling too. But it is of mainstream importance.

The most important thing to understand is that the Internet is inherently vulnerable, because it was not designed with security in mind. It developed as a means for research collaboration, with resilience (including the ability to withstand a nuclear attack) as prime feature. This remains the case. The Internet is amazingly capable and robust. Processing power, memory and connectivity have become astonishingly cheap. Even the poorest people in the world can aspire to have a mobile phone and use it to send and receive data.

Yet the same features that make the Internet so valuable also make it vulnerable. The first and biggest weakness is identity. A famous *New Yorker* cartoon shows a dog looking at a screen, with the caption “On the Internet, nobody knows you are a dog”. Nobody knows if you are a criminal, prankster, terrorist, hooligan or nutcase either. We lack the ability to prove who we are to other people when we interact with them, and we lack the ability to check that they are who they say they are.

This is changing slowly. Countries such as Estonia have digital ID systems (recently available to foreigners too) which allow users of the Internet to identify themselves. I have an Estonian ID and I can send a cryptographically signed email that can only have come from me, and I can send a document to another person

which only that person can read. But such schemes are still rare. Employers, retailers, governments and other institutions all rely on flimsy combinations of passwords and logins, sometimes backed up with mobile-phone messages or “dongles” (gadgets that provide a special code, or can be plugged into a computer).

Another supposed line of protection is “security certificates”. These are digital signatures for websites which should give the user the confidence to know that he is interacting safely over the Internet. They are usually signified by a small padlock on your browser. But the system of security certificates is fundamentally broken. The companies and other outfits which issue them have been breached time and again; some are close to governments with proven records of mischief-making. Most users of the Internet have no real way of telling if they are browsing safely or not.

The third problem is the sloppy way in which hardware and software are designed. Computer programs, and the chips they run on, are far too complicated for any individual to understand. New generations of products blindly include the work of previous versions (it would be far too expensive to start from scratch). But this guarantees the presence of what are called “zero-day” vulnerabilities—mistakes and flaws in hardware and software which an attacker can exploit. Simply by connecting a computer to the Internet (or even turning it on when other electronic devices are nearby or plugged in to it) can be enough for the attacker’s software to find and exploit a “zero-day”.

These tend to be used by sophisticated attackers against important targets. But most attackers are far simpler. To breach a net-

work or compromise a computer, all you need to do is get your victim to click on a link or open an attachment. That will install “malware” (malicious software) on the target’s computer, allowing the adversary access over the Internet or by some other means. Another crude but effective attack is called “distributed denial of service” – it involves simply swamp-

“ Evolution has not prepared us for the challenges which electronic communication presents. ”

ing the victim’s network with bogus requests for information, so that real data cannot get in or out.

The threat is mushrooming out of control. In recent months we have seen prurient hooligans break into the accounts of celebrities on Apple’s computer network in order to steal embarrassing pictures. An unknown attacker – probably North Korea – broke into Sony, stealing and deleting data, in purported revenge for that company’s mocking film about the dictator Kim Jong-un.

Cyberattacks are so numerous that journalists tire of writing about them. And many breaches are never made public at all.

Our system is not set up to deal with this. We worry more about our computers and networks being convenient and cheap than we do about security. Whereas a badly driven, badly maintained car is regarded as a menace, and may be subject to criminal penalties, the idea of prosecuting someone for careless use of a computer would strike most people

as shocking. But allowing your computer to be hijacked by spies, criminals or hooligans makes you part of their misdeeds, which can ruin lives, bankrupt businesses or weaken national security.

The threats to our computers and networks are ambiguous. It can be clear that an attack has happened, but it is usually much harder to attribute blame. The

Similarly, you should not be able to wander through cyberspace if you are unwittingly spreading infections which hurt other people. This kind of thinking—about public health—offers some useful parallels for the world of cyber-security.

Our fundamental problem is that evolution has not prepared us for the challenges which electronic communication presents. Our sense of security in the wider world outside our homes and workplaces is instinctive. We know that some neighborhoods are safer than others, that some times of day require special precautions. We may avoid conspicuous behavior in some circumstances, such as when we travel. Shopping in a bazaar on vacation in a poor country we will browse, negotiate and pay differently from the way we would behave when visiting an upmarket boutique in a rich-world city. We negotiate trust quickly, judging strangers on their appearance, behavior,

and tone of voice, and using introductions and connections to establish obligation and privileges. A heavily-built, scruffy and somewhat drunk young man on my doorstep in the small hours is a threat—until my sons remind me that they are expecting guests.

The past millennia of civilization have given us a huge range of skills to balance risk, security and

convenience. We are programmed to trust and help others – primitive man could not survive solo – while at the same time engaging in a constant series of observations and actions, mostly unconscious. Our eyes, ears and noses tell when we are safe or in danger, what to do, where and when.

Once we venture online, all that vanishes. Our senses are constrained: all we have to go on are the words and images on a screen, plus tinny sounds coming from a small loudspeaker. It is a simulacrum of the real world, but a deceptive one. We may feel confident in our familiar routines – shopping, browsing, Skypeing, emailing – but in truth we are helpless, unprepared and vulnerable to thieves, manipulators and enemies. We cannot see the people we are dealing with; we cannot judge their tone of voice, body language or facial expressions. We cannot smell them or touch them. We cannot place them in the history and geography of our lives. But we have to deal with them – and do so using technology which most of us do not understand.

As a result, our dependence on computers is growing faster than our ability to forestall attackers. Unless our thinking and behavior change, we will become less safe, less free, less healthy, and less happy. The first and most important shift in our thinking is to understand that cybersecurity is not a technical issue, any more than road safety is about engineering (it is about simple routines), or that public health is about medicine (it is mainly about hygiene). We need to rethink our behavior – as individuals, organizations and societies – in dealing with the threats we face online. That is a problem involving humans, not machines. ■

Edward Lucas is a senior vice-president at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a think tank in Washington DC; he is also a senior editor at the Economist, and author of several books, including “Cyberphobia” which will be published by Bloomsbury later this year.



PRIVATE



The assault began in silence. The attackers proceeded with absolute professionalism. Using spear phishing – emails aimed at specific individuals, in this case workers at a steel foundry – they gained access to key data centers. The rest was child’s play. Through a compromised PC the attackers penetrated deeper and deeper into the company’s intranet, until they reached the central control system for the entire steel works. The effects of this cyberattack on a German firm were an enterprise gone haywire and a damaged blast furnace.

It’s by far not just sensational operations like the cyberattack on Sony Pictures and the hacks of German government websites early in January that have German authorities on edge. Security experts are sounding the alarm amid soaring numbers of attacks even on midsized companies. Given its prominent status in business and research, Germany has become “a prime target,” warns Catrin Rieband, a senior federal law enforcement official. “Not a day goes by in which we don’t find out about new cyber attacks,” she said. More and more, Germany’s political, business and research communities are in the crosshairs of foreign intelligence services and hackers.

The effects of these targeted attacks are immense. Damages in Germany alone are estimated at €50 billion annually, Rieband said in mid-January in Berlin. Whether strategies, research results or innovations, siphoned secrets can quickly cause problems for entire industrial sectors. Germany’s knowledge-economy, its only real global commodity, could suffer serious damage as a result.

Security authorities have therefore been urging the private sector to take action fast. IT departments need to redouble their efforts at ensuring cyber security, said Michael Hange, President of the Federal Office for Security and Information Technology (BSI). “Despite a high threat level there is digital carelessness out there,” Hange said at a Berlin cyber security forum. Fifty thousand control systems of German companies are directly connected to the Internet yet inadequately protected, he said, adding that only 6 percent of all emails sent in Germany are encrypted.

Meanwhile, the bad guys are building up at a startling tempo, according to German law enforcement. An estimated one billion malware programs are currently circulating worldwide. Every day, according to the BSI, that number grows by 300,000. In Germany alone, about one million comput-

Digital naifs

German companies and research centers are prime targets for cyber attacks. Yet many seem frighteningly unconcerned | By Markus Balsler

ers have become taken over by botnets that criminals or foreign intelligence can use for their own ends – without the owners suspecting a thing. Many attacks originate in Russia or China, the BSI says.

An Eastern European hacker group called Dragonfly used a malware program called Havex to attack industrial facilities in Europe and the US and to spy on corporations. One German gas grid operator recorded “anomalies in data flow.” IT experts fear that the attackers could go further and cripple water or electric supply systems. Critical infrastructure is a

possible attack target, law enforcement officials say.

At least in the boardrooms of big corporations, attitudes are changing. Many urgent secu-

rity measures by German firms read like spy thrillers. German share index DAX corporations are building surveillance-secure conference rooms. Top executives

travel with briefcases that could easily double as James Bond props, for example to make laptops snoop-proof. Or they make calls using crypto-equipment with secret codes on their iPhones – for outsiders hardly noticeable.

In Germany the company that probably goes farthest is aerospace group Airbus, with 140,000 workers and €60 billion annual revenue. The Airbus Group (formerly EADS) spends up to €70 million every year protecting itself against attacks, according to Guus Dekkers, the group’s IT chief. A cyber center with enormous screens monitors the firm’s IT around the clock, blocks risky web sites automatically and sets off an alarm when employees check their email from outside computers. The goal is to shield sensitive information on aircraft, satellites and rockets. The corporation has already experienced too many unfortunate episodes, such as bids made public. But Dekkers admits that “many employees don’t like it. They feel over-regulated.”

But Berlin wants to ensure that more companies follow the Airbus example and set up their own firewalls. Draft IT legislation approved by the cabinet would better shield critical infrastructure in the country, including the energy, finance and transportation sectors, as well as the health-

care industry. Some sectors were already well equipped, others not, said Ole Schröder, a senior IT security official. “We don’t have much time to lose,” he said.

So how does the German economy intend to better protect itself? Ninety percent of all software is produced in the United States. And ever since the Snowden revelations, that country is largely regarded as part of the problem, not the solution. Berlin hopes to mobilize Germany’s own know-how. Ole Schröder believes German firms need to get creative instead of just being subcontractors of the global IT industry. They need to build up their own know-how, and hold onto it. Possible mergers and acquisitions of companies with essential expertise would be “accompanied critically,” Schröder said.

It is dawning on many in German industries that this initiative means the beginning of years of struggle. For Airbus IT boss Guus Dekkers, “this is a journey that has no end.”

This article was originally published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on Jan. 15, 2015.

Markus Balsler is an economics correspondent for the Süddeutsche Zeitung. He reports from Berlin about energy and environment topics.



SZ PRIVATE

Reporting on transatlantic ties since 2004

Since its launch in the US capital on Oct. 6, 2004 *The Atlantic Times* remains the only German paper in English available from New York to Hawaii.

As a media bridge between Berlin and Washington, *The Atlantic Times* is a key platform for political, economic and cultural exchange within a transatlantic partnership that is more important now than ever.

www.atlantic-times.de

The Atlantic Times
A newspaper from Germany

The ghosts they have summoned

States developed the most sophisticated malware. Now these technologies are proliferating | By Eugene Kaspersky

The world is becoming increasingly reliant on computerized networks and devices that have effectively revolutionized communication, manufacturing, finance and many other areas of our lives. Unfortunately, this IT revolution has produced grave risks as well. We see a rapidly evolving cyberthreat landscape, and so far governments, law enforcement agencies and private companies have not been able to stop the development of cybercrime.

Arguably, it's not possible to stop this process completely because the global IT sphere, the number of connected gadgets, and the volume of business done online all continue to grow – and provide new opportunities for cybercriminals.

Recent events in the cyber domain – from the Sony Pictures and JPMorgan hacks to the theft of millions of credit card holders' data from large retailers in the US plus dozens of complex cyber-espionage campaigns run by various governments all over the world – demonstrate the vulnerability of our networks and the data stored on them.

If we put aside state sponsored espionage campaigns, the development of cyberweapons by various militaries, and hacktivism, the goal of cybercrime is to obtain profit. This is the main reason why tens of thousands of people all over the world form groups that send spam, create banking Trojans, or steal personal credentials. It's a global criminal industry that causes huge damage to the

world economy – hundreds of billions of dollars according to some estimates – and it has a well-structured value chain, efficient distribution of labor, and a high level of professionalization.

There has been some noticeable progress in tackling cybercrime on national and international levels, including very significant efforts by Europol, and the launch of Interpol's cyber-arm, the Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) in Singapore. However, there are several very worrying trends in the development of cybercrime.

Eugene Kaspersky is the founder and CEO of Kaspersky Lab in Moscow, and a leading global expert in the field of information security.



PRIVATE

First is the increase in professionalism of criminal groups. It used to be widely believed that governments running security services were behind

the development of the most sophisticated, stealthy and dangerous malware designed to steal secrets and sometimes even act as cyberweapons. The problem is that these technologies have been proliferating and today we're seeing an emergence of very dangerous Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) criminal attacks.

Most cybercriminals today target ordinary users almost indiscriminately, trying to attack and infect as many computers as possible. But a new generation of 'elite' cybercriminals is now competent enough to attack banks and other financial institutions, so as to maximize their profits – and the resulting damage. From a cyber-researcher's point of view, it's very hard to tell the difference today between a criminal APT and an APT run

by a secret service, as they tend to be equally stealthy and effective.

The next trend is that traditional organized crime is turning cyber: gangs are hiring software engineers to bolster their offline activities. We know of several such cases, including the involvement of hackers in the organization of drug smuggling through the port of Antwerp, Belgium. There have also been reports of criminal groups hiring hackers to facilitate the theft of coal from a mine and grain from a silo by tweaking computerized loading equipment.

This is most disturbing, as in these cases we often see how criminal groups are hacking physical industrial equipment like Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used in the operation of critical infrastructure such as power grids or assembly lines. This capability – to attack the computerized systems that manage our physical environment – can be potentially lethal.

The third worrying trend is that cybercrime is increasingly targeting mobile devices. It's happening predominantly on the Android platform on which we already see millions of samples of malware, but other operating systems are not immune. And with the number of 'smart' connected devices expected to surge to the tens of billions as the 'Internet of Things' rolls out, more devices – from smart TVs to smart homes – can and most likely will be hacked by criminals.


The most generic recommendation applies to everyone, from ordinary computer users all the way up to large businesses and governments: Cybersecurity needs to be taken very seriously. The attack on Sony Pictures showed that even progressive, technology-oriented organizations with sufficient resources

are likely to ignore some basic rules of cybersecurity, such as storing important data separately and with different access rules, and not sending important passwords without encryption.

Technologies and procedures for building resilient and highly protected computer networks and industrial systems are already available; the problem is that so many organizations continue to indulge in bad practices, which literally invites hackers in to steal and generally cause havoc. Full protection is probably impossible, but making defenses strong enough to make a successful attack too costly, time-consuming and complicated is quite realistic.

At government and international levels it's very important to continue efforts to tackle cybercrime, including those of Interpol and Europol. Information sharing is crucial, particularly in the fight against the growing threat of cyberterrorism. It's vital to raise awareness of the threats posed by various forms of cybercrime among businesses and general users. And we are more frequently observing a shortage of IT security specialists, which makes investment in education in this area also essential for the security of tomorrow.

Our dependence on computerized systems will only grow as time goes by, which means that the security of our networks should be a key priority in keeping our world safe to permit us to enjoy all the benefits of the new computer age. ■



SIXT
rent a car



Finally: freedom and security combined.

(The BMW M6 Convertible at Sixt)

sixt.com

Cybersecurity norms are overdue

The integrity of the Internet is critical to governments and private citizens alike | By Matt Thomlinson

In 1999, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the dual-use nature of information technology noting the great societal benefits that it provides while at the same time expressing serious concern over the potential exploitation of technology for criminal and terrorist purposes. In the time since, the world has also learned that in addition to their role as protectors of cyberspace, governments also act as exploiters of cyberspace for national security and other reasons. Indeed, the United Nations now documents at least 41 countries who have publicly acknowledged some military planning for cyber activities.

particular – impacts which could result from government activity below the threshold of war.

Four years ago, then UK Foreign Secretary William Hague began a global cybersecurity norms dialogue at the Munich Security Conference. In order to make meaningful progress, I believe this discussion must take on a more concrete form regarding substance, process, and possible outcomes. The following proposed norms provide a framework for restraint and a foundation for resilience, while enabling states to make choices that appropriately balance their roles as users, protectors, and exploiters of cyberspace:

1. States should not target ICT companies to insert vulnerabilities (backdoors) or take actions that would otherwise undermine public trust in products and services. Users of ICT products have come to expect that the companies that make these products will strive to continuously improve users' security and privacy by improving the functionality and reliability of these products. When nation states insert themselves into this process by deploying their own code, it undermines product reliability, users' privacy and security,

and ultimately the public's trust.

2. States should have a clear principle-based policy for handling product and service vulnerabilities that reflects a strong mandate to report them to ven-

dors rather than to stockpile, buy, sell, or exploit them. Reporting vulnerabilities to the affected vendor is consistent with the principles of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure. These principles have been adopted by Microsoft and other software vendors across the ICT industry, and has been an effective strategy for multiple stakeholders to ensure the protection of the cyber ecosystem.

3. States should exercise restraint in developing cyberweapons and should ensure that any which are developed are limited, precise, and not reusable. When governments build cyber weapons, they should ensure that their execution is consistent with the concepts of distinction, discrimination, and distribution.

The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber warfare, published in 2013 under the aegis of NATO determined that the principle of distinction – a “cardinal principle” of the Law of Armed Conflict – applies to cyber attacks.

4. States should commit to non-proliferation activities related to cyber weapons. As states increase investments in offensive cyber capabilities, care must be taken to not proliferate weapons or techniques for weaponizing code.

Illustrative of this concern, a vulnerability exploited by a cyberweapon can readily be reused by other

actors as occurred after the discovery of Stuxnet.

5. States should limit their engagement in offensive cyberoperations to avoid creating a mass event. Regardless of technological advances, there are certain principles of customary international law and the Law of Armed Conflict that are inviolate, namely minimizing harm to civilians and the principle of proportionality. States should recognize that attacks targeting the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of ICT systems, services, and data

can have a mass effect beyond any reasonable sense of proportionality.

6. States should assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, respond to, and

recover from events in cyberspace. Although governments play an increasingly important role in cyberspace, the first line of defense against cyber attacks remains the private sector, with its globally distributed telemetry, situational awareness, and well established incident response functions. Additionally, governments should go one step further and, when asked by the private sector, commit to assist with recovery and response needs that have global and regional implications.

The development of cybersecurity norms is one of the critical tasks of our time, for governments, the private sector, and anyone relying on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the technologies that make up cyberspace. ■

Matt Thomlinson is Microsoft Vice President for Trustworthy Computing Security.



MICROSOFT

In this shared and tightly integrated domain, any escalation of hostilities could result in unintended – and even catastrophic – consequences. Unintended consequences of this scale could very easily escalate hostilities from the keyboard to kinetics, in the absence of normative limits on such behaviors. Cybersecurity norms will help define acceptable and unacceptable state behaviors, with the aim of reducing risks, fostering greater predictability, and limiting the potential for the most problematic impacts, including – and in



A good flight's sleep.

With only 19 seats, the new airberlin Business Class offers you even more privacy and more exclusive service.

airberlin.com
Your Airline.

iterato
rows () != qu
FLYING
KITTEN
matrix.rows (
quad_ma
matrix< T, Contain
>::row_proxy row_proxy; typ
column_iterator; if(quad
quadratic("mitrax::inverse<>()", quad_matrix.dimens
) : matrix< T, Container > original(quad_matrix); matr

The Great Cybergame

A new dawn in strategic Internet security | By Sandro Gaycken

In the cyberworld, 2014 was dominated by the Snowden revelations, or rather their aftermath. It was interesting to see how different nations reacted, what they considered relevant, and what they did to address the many issues the case brought up. Much of it was and is trial and error.

Snowden aside, the various other high-profile cyber-incidents in 2014 serve to underline that we have only just begun to acknowledge and tackle the problem. Many attacks exhibited new features, patterns and methods to penetrate and abuse IT and the Internet. These recent campaigns differed from earlier ones not only in regard to tactical and technical details. They differed in their fundamentals as well.

The cyberworld is used to five or six cyber superpowers fighting it out amongst each other: China, the US, Russia, Israel, and occasionally, to a lesser extent, France and Britain. These actors usually attack the same kinds of targets, with more or less the same escalatory patterns (a little media excitement, vague government statements and a not too angry diplomatic note is a common mix). But in 2014, new players emerged on the field, attacking new countries and institutions in different ways, and with varying consequences – an important strategic evolution on many levels.

The detection of new entities began as early as January 2014 with CrowdStrike's observation of a group called "Flying Kitten" (or "Saffron Rose" as they were dubbed by another security company, FireEye). This group was assumed to be Iranian, targeting aerospace and defense companies around the world as well

as Iranian dissidents. It wasn't the first Tehran-driven hacking attack. Since being attacked by Stuxnet in 2011, Iran has developed and demonstrated its skills repeatedly. In 2014 it conducted at least three campaigns.

Flying Kitten was the first. It was neither highly sophisticated nor particularly unique,

“ New players emerged on the field, attacking new countries and institutions in different ways. ”

but it was successful on many targets – a first example of lesser powers effectively infiltrating high-security targets. The second campaign was called "Newscaster," another targeted espionage attack. But most worrisome was the discovery of the third campaign, "Operation Cleaver," which collected control data about critical infrastructures and aircraft. Operation Cleaver revealed a stronger interest in sabotage rather than espionage.

In Germany, the Dragonfly group successfully infiltrated a producer of industrial control software, and infected the original mastercopy of the company's product with an attack virus called Havex – which in turn was shipped and installed with every copy and every update of the original software. We still know little about Havex, only that it had a high level of sophistication and that it was solely interested in industrial computers. Its final aim is not entirely clear, but attacks of this kind are usually not just spying cam-

paigns. Gathering control data is more often the reconnaissance stage of a sabotage attack. Germany even actually suffered one such attack in 2014: A competent saboteur hacked into a German steel mill, penetrated the office network and moved successfully on to the production network, causing significant chaos and

even some destruction. A blast furnace could not be safely shut down, badly damaging the whole facility.

These first attempts to sabotage industrial sites are worrisome, not least because they are a novum in the IT-security world. The producers, administrators and users of production-related software are familiar with Stuxnet. But few of them reformed their IT processes thoroughly and – whether it be their capacities, their methodologies or their technologies – they still have a lot of homework to do. This is disconcerting.

Other countries have also joined the great cybergame. India and Pakistan launched cyberespionage campaigns against each other, starting in 2013 and continuing throughout 2014. While the Indian attack was rumored rather than detected, the Pakistani response was discovered and described as "Operation Arachnophobia," using an attack called "Bitterbug." It had all the marks of a sophisticated military cyberespionage attempt,

foreboding a new kind of cyberconflict in South Asia.

In August 2014, "Operation Machete" was discovered in Latin America, after a local businessman suspected his laptop might have been hacked by Chinese cyberspies during a visit to China. Analysts from Kaspersky Labs who examined his computer declared the Chinese innocent for once. The hack was programmed in Spanish and focused mainly on government and military networks in Venezuela, Ecuador and Columbia, as well as some critical industries. It lacked the sophistication known by now from the more able attackers. But it seems to have been highly effective. Machete might have been inside Latin America for some four to six years, undetected and undisturbed, with 778 victimized institutions in total.

Summing up, 2014 has seen many new actors, with new methods and a diversifying set of interests in new targets. They demonstrated a clear global growth of capabilities in cyber offense, ease in acquiring at least some first abilities in this field, and a strong strategic interest in cyberespionage and sabotage. More actors will likely emerge in 2015, with an even more diverse set of targets and activities.

In the fall of 2014, the discovery of the Sony Entertainment hack shocked the IT world. Terabytes of sensitive internal communications, records of dirty tricks, as yet unscreened movies, and databases with celebrity phone numbers and similar data were stolen and in part widely publicized. North Korea's fingerprints appeared to be all over the hack

– a Korean accent, attack tools used in previous attacks from Pyongyang against South Korea, the use of some North Korean infrastructure, and the "cui bono" test: the blockade of a movie featuring an assassination plot against North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un.

The hack was stylized into an attempt to attack and censor the US from afar. President Barack Obama publicly accused North Korea. But there is growing evidence that an insider – the classic disgruntled employee – did the job and conspired with movie-piracy activists. This has not been entirely confirmed yet either, but the evidence is more solid and credible than the story about North Korea wanting to attack the US by leaking Hollywood celebrity phone numbers.

With the Sony-North Korea incident, three other important facts emerged. First, the problem of attribution is still unsolved. Digital fingerprints can always be forged. Authenticity cannot even be defined in this area. Nothing has really changed in this respect,

biased cyber-analysis combined with a little cyber-hysteria can escalate quickly into physical, kinetic conflict. Obama's accusations were unfounded and far too rash in an uncertain escalatory environment.

Third, the incident made it obvious that false flag operations are very easy and quite possible in cyberspace. This was clear in theory, but now it has been demonstrated in practice. If a disgruntled employee can provoke an exchange of blows among nation states – what will a professional secret service be able to fabricate?

The final lesson of 2014 is this: There are many new actors and many more will join the cybergame. But simply observing and analyzing them to initiate political responses is pointless. Any insights gained must provide the foundation for meaningful cybersecurity innovation, not half-cocked accusations of blame that can lead to further escalation. ■

Sandro Gaycken is Senior Researcher Cybersecurity and Cyberstrategy, European School of Management and Technology (ESMT) Berlin.



FU BERLIN

despite the hype about "Threat Intelligence" in cybersecurity. That begs the question: Was it really Iran, India, Pakistan and Latin America who were all identified as perpetrators last year?

Secondly, overzealous but underqualified or commercially

Securing digital terrain

The Sony hack is a textbook example of the fog of cyberwar. A view from India | By Samir Saran

The whole incident is a telling manifestation of the many aspects of cybersecurity: There is the allegation of a state-sponsored international incident by North Korea and the promise of a 'proportional response' by the United States of America. The Sony hack brings to mind the question of state behavior in cyberspace; the threat to business advancing public-private cooperation in combating such attacks; and the question of motive – an assault on the freedom of expression, as opposed to the more predictable motivations of theft, terrorism and war.

Other countries, including India, have observed the consequences with keen interest. This includes the disruptions in North Korea's Internet connectivity that followed immediately after the attack was successfully attributed to the authoritarian North Korean state by the US. How does this episode play out against all the narratives built to understand and respond to cyber security threats?

At the outset, there are larger questions to consider.

The first is the fundamental understanding that access to the Internet is an essential feature of security; that without connectivity, the citizen is not plugged into the system, as he cannot engage digitally with either his fellow citizenry or the state. After all, security cannot be for security's sake. It must be based on the premise that secu-

rity infrastructure is to protect its people, its nation-state, its economic interests within its territory and globally. To this end, India's ambitious 'Digital India' project, which has committed an investment of \$21 billion with the stated ambition to secure last-mile connectivity and effective e-governance for every citizen, is only a partial response to the enormous challenges facing the Indian subcontinent in its digital endeavors.

The second question relates to the fundamental tension between development and security. This holds especially true for developing countries like India. They



Samir Saran is Vice President at the Observer Research Foundation and Chairman of CYFY – The India Conference on Internet Governance and Cyber Security.


are witnessing rapid internet proliferation, a phenomenon that goes hand-in-hand with cheap devices with questionable security standards and a digitally naïve population susceptible to hackers, thieves and phishers alike. They will be susceptible to sophisticated attacks as well, as they build up their capacity. The inevitably linked trilemma of security, privacy and surveillance, in the face of complex challenges has raised many-layered problems in need of exami-

nation. Finding a balance between surveillance and privacy in order to secure citizens without infringing their rights is the order of the day. But countries are struggling to achieve this equilibrium.

Most recently, the UK – to the horror of privacy activists everywhere – has come out in favor of banning encryption to intercept communications so as to ensure security more effectively. There is also the need for accountability of state intelligence agencies. They can quite easily infringe

on citizens' personal communications in their zeal to catch the bad guys. Therefore a strong mechanism needs to be put in place to ensure they are encouraged to act responsibly.

There is also a need for governments, private sector companies and civil society, including those fighting for individuals' rights, to cooperate in creating robust cyber security frameworks. Key questions on the quality of interconnectivity and appropriate mechanisms for securing critical infrastructure have to be addressed. What are the costs of cyber security and how will they be shared? Who will define and how will we all agree to what is the optimal level of security in cyberspace? What is the role of the private sector



in this regard? Governments cannot begin to understand the range, frequency and severity of the attacks on their countries unless critical infrastructure operators and private enterprises share this information with them. In many countries confidence building measures are necessary to develop this relationship.

Thirdly, given that attacks do not only originate from criminals and terrorists, an understanding – 'norms' – of state behavior in cyberspace need to be fleshed out. This could be done by way of universal multilateral agreements (desirable but unlikely) or by consensus between like-minded states who wish to set rules of engagement (less inclusive but more efficient). Countries also

need to examine what can best be described as 'unintended consequences' of state behaviour. For example, the Stuxnet virus, which exploited a weakness in the Microsoft operating system, affected 18 percent of computers in Indonesia and 8 percent in India, causing these countries great financial loss as they had to upgrade their systems to counter the virus.

At the same time, no conversation about cyber security can be complete without addressing online terror. Online terror networks, aided by the multiplicity of communication networks over the Internet, have become a common cause of concern for individuals and states alike. This growing threat cannot be countered unless solutions that enable real-time information sharing between

countries are developed.

These questions – and more – were at the core of the debates at CyFy 2014 – the India conference on Internet Governance and Cyber Security hosted by the Observer Research Foundation. India's Deputy National Security Advisor emphasized the importance of international norm-building and central role of the UN Group of Governmental Experts. He stated that "the Indian position on these issues will continue to evolve...", adding that this group of experts "is a useful forum, but it should be made more representative." India's Minister of Communications and Information Technology echoed a similar thought at CyFy – "...this unhindered growth of networks of infected computers across the world – how do we propose to address this problem in the absence of global cyberspace norms to regulate and guide responsible behaviour in cyberspace?"

Which brings us back to the incident involving Sony, North Korea and the United States. It shines the torch on cyber security, state behavior, damages, responses and attacks on freedom of expression. Do we have a blueprint or a road map to respond to such developments? Maybe not – and therefore 2015 will be a vital year for finding common ground to keep the digital world secure. ■

Bavarian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Media, Energy and Technology

invest in bavaria

My home is my castle.

We know how to secure your data.

IT security influences all areas of application where digital solutions and business models are important. Bavaria supports this future-oriented sector with funding and the establishment of a world-class competence centre for IT security together with the Fraunhofer AISEC. This is good news for players in Bavaria, such as Kaspersky, Symantec, Giesecke & Devrient and many others.

Bavaria.
The Future.

→ www.invest-in-bavaria.com

Deutsche Bank
Corporate Banking & Securities

Our ideas help businesses take off

When the only constant is change, ideas create a way forward. At Deutsche Bank, we deliver results for our clients by embracing change and the thinking that harnesses it. Visit db.com and turn ideas into results today.

Passion to Perform



This advertisement has been approved and/or communicated by Deutsche Bank AG. Without limitation this advertisement does not constitute an offer or a recommendation to enter into any transaction neither does it constitute the offer of securities. The offer of any services and/or securities in any jurisdiction by Deutsche Bank AG or by its subsidiaries and/or affiliates will be made in accordance with appropriate local legislation and regulation. Deutsche Bank AG is authorised under German Banking Law (competent authority: BaFin – Federal Financial Supervisory Authority) and authorised and subject to limited regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority. Details about the extent of Deutsche Bank AG's authorisation and regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority are available on request. Investments are subject to investment risk, including market fluctuations, regulatory change, counterparty risk, possible delays in repayment and loss of income and principal invested. The value of investments can fall as well as rise and you might not get back the amount originally invested at any point in time. © Copyright Deutsche Bank 2015.