L eft: At the start of the 21st century, the world was a much different place. The United States was the sole superpower, and the model of cooperation for the global community was the Cold War era. But today, we are living in a time of great uncertainty and uncertainty. The world is a complex place, and it is difficult to predict what is going to happen next. One thing is clear: the world is shifting towards a multi-polar world, where several major powers are vying for influence. This shift is not just a result of the economic and political changes that have taken place in recent years, but also a reflection of the growing complexity of global issues. The issues we face today are not just about economics or politics, but also about how we interact with each other as human beings. The world is becoming more interconnected, and this interconnectedness is bringing new challenges and opportunities. The future of our world is uncertain, and it is up to us to shape it in a way that is fair and just for all.

Wealth.

But military action alone cannot defeat terrorism. Since last year, attacks by the jihadist group ISIS have risen dramatically, with the group taking control of large parts of Iraq and Syria. But military actions alone cannot defeat terrorism, and we need to take a more comprehensive approach. We need to address the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty, inequality, and lack of opportunities. The United States and other countries are working with the international community to address these root causes, and this is a positive development. The United States is committed to working with our partners to make the world a safer and more stable place.

The Minsk ceasefire agreement of Sept. 5, 2014, brought an end to the fighting in eastern Ukraine and paved the way for a diplomatic solution. The agreement was a significant achievement, and it was a source of hope for those who had been living in fear and uncertainty.

The future of our world is uncertain, and it is up to us to shape it in a way that is fair and just for all. We need to address the root causes of terrorism, and we need to work with our partners to make the world a safer and more stable place.
Years of living dangerously both acceptable and normalizing to conduct any summated operations against the neutrals, while the political class, for its part, has sought to protect its own interests, keeping a steady eye on the day of reckoning. This is the domestic constituency. The UN Security Council has not been convened to deal with the crisis, the African Union, almost exclusively a victim of other emergencies, does not particularly care about; other emerging powers aren’t paying attention either. The destabilization of Africa’s most promising areas is in progress.

Ukraine, the Islamic State and Boko Haram are not the only problems that 2014 brought to 2015. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people continues, although no longer the central issue in the Levant, keeps on surging, another war appears more likely than any diplomatic solution, U.S. or otherwise. Except in Turkey, the Arab Spring has ended in the routinization of the regime it sought to topple. Western intervention reduced Libya to anarchy. A similar deal with Iran is a very vague prospect, given the bizarre opposition of both American and Iranian hard-liners. Afghanistan’s future after 2014, still best at best, will have a significant impact on the frazzled relationship between India and Pakistan.

Dangerous fault lines spill beyond the Levant. In the South China Sea, the land South China Sea, Beijing has been promoting its territorial claims to the south, east, south and north of the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands (Brunei, to China) – areas it took from the French in recent months, but they have not been internationally recognized as part of China. The сделки between Japan and China will put pressure on the South China Sea. These are confrontations or cooperation, and moves or announcements or evolutions.

If geographic competition and international rivalries were to give way to cooperation and international cooperation, we would be much closer to the international order. Terrorist threats against Western society are on the rise. Yet there is one place where there is a complete absence of the United Nations, sponsored by the United States, more serious than China, more serious than Russia, more serious than the Islamic state. China is more serious than the Islamic state

The United States, annotated by the two wars puts all of the cards on the table. We are in a position where we have no new and no new new: a new wave of new departures. A universal prescriptive action plan, starting to turn the page on the United States. The need to start to move forward. We are now steering, decisions towards action. We are implementing the Readiness Action Plan agreed at the summit, remain our forces more focused, and able to deploy quickly whenever and wherever they are needed, is the most significant boost to our collective defense in the last 25 years. We are also enhancing NATO’s military presence in Eastern Europe.

Over the last year, we deployed more troops in the air, more ships at sea, and more troops on the ground – and we will continue to move forward to the Eastern part of our alliance for as long as is necessary.

We are also increasing the frequency of our military exercises. The Readiness Action Plan also involves the creation of a spate of fresh threats and challenges

NATO: Facts and figures (from the Munich Security report 2015)

Defense spending changes in Europe (2010-2014)

- 4.1%: Western Europe
- 4.5%: Central Europe
- 10.6%: Southeastern Europe
- -0.7%: Northern Europe

- 0.2%: Southern Europe

In the Eastern Mediterranean, the United States (US) flirted

Source: The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)

What should NATO do next?

- 0%: No change to current strategy
- 20%: Increase military spending
- 30%: Offer enhanced military support via the Partnership for Peace
- 20%: Offer additional support to the Baltic countries
- 18%: Offer more support to the countries in Southeastern Europe
German foreign policy in a changing world

The Ukraine crisis is the first serious test of Berlin’s new role

By German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier

When I returned to the Foreign Office in December 2013, I instigated an open discussion process on Germany’s role in the world, on the scope and limits of our foreign policy. I asked the question of what our country’s international responsibility would be in the future. Since then one crisis has followed another in quick succession in Ukraine, the conflict with separatists in the East and the added tensions sparked by the involvement of Russia, in the Middle East, the civil war in Syria, the fight against ISIS in Iraq and the violent confrontations between Israel and Hamas. In Malawi and in the Central African Republic, too, we are faced with serious crises, not to mention the situation of the South Sudanese in West Africa. We need to prepare ourselves for the state of crises becoming the norm.

The pace at which our world is changing is likely to accelerate even further. And globalization undermines its own antimicrobial focuses: instability, isolationism, violent religious or ethnic fundamentalism and an increasing number of failed states. In an age of crisis and conflict one could be tempted to say we’re back in the time to talk, not to talk.

Yet I still think that decline is unnecessary, because I believe there are deeper causes behind this array of crises. If we do not investigate them, we overlook the chance the world is offering to take action and react better in the future.

I keep guessing the impression that not only has the world not found a new order, Germany too has yet to find itself in the new, changed world.

In what does our German foreign policy now come up short and what needs to be changed? One year ago, I put those two questions to experts from Germany and abroad at the beginning of a project called "Horizon 2014 – A Fresh Look at German Foreign Policy". The responses were very interesting and as extensive as they are controversial. Accordingly, a grand debate on the achievements of German foreign policy, they reflect our expectations of our country in the future. Some of the experts called on Germany to “assume the role of model Europeans” in order to “rewire the EU”, or “as the leader of Europe, now the United States more European” and “America more multilateral”.

As a series of experts also took up my invitation to voice candid criticism, “Germany needs to react to crises rather than decisively outlining and shaping its role in the world”, write one. Another round that stands out is the interview with a former Federal President, Roman Herzog: “We need to develop an instrument for the use of military force, which allows Germany, but also other European states, to act more efficiently and effectively.”

Another expert who took part in that round is Matthias von Loewis von}->{nordheim:}k, former Chancellor’s chief of staff. He claims that Germany’s “character as a country that has always been involved in international crises, but has never been a major player, is incomplete.”

In clear, that these external views have a common denominator: Germany has a great reputation in the world. It is the second largest economy in the world, it is the 10th largest country, it has a high reputation in the world. For its part, Germany is happy to engage in more international crises and conflicts. However, 40 per cent of our country to engage more in international crises and conflicts. However, 40 per cent of our country to engage more in international crises and conflicts.

When I began my second term in office in February 2014, I put the following theory on the table: Germany is too big and economically too strong to move constantly on foreign policy from the sidelines. We must start to shoulder greater responsibility internationally, we must engage earlier, more decisively and more unambiguously. “More responsibility” is neither a call for unilateral action, nor does it imply a renunciation of the long-standing fundamental principles of our foreign policy. In discussions on our country’s role, I repeatedly hear the argument that the phrase “more responsibility” is misleadingly used to mean that policies that serve our interests. It is true that defining our national interest is not simple. However, our country in the future.

In discussions on our country’s role, I repeatedly hear the argument that the phrase “more responsibility” is misleadingly used to mean that policies that serve our interests.

Therefore, the world will never be static or final. The challenge will always lie in finding the right answer, in establishing new foreign policy approaches – not only in crises, but in the long term. It also applies to the question of where and how we should take on more responsibility. However, the world questions of responsibility and, together with our foreign, we will take on a particular responsibility.

In a country where economic responsibility for our country is the norm, the world changes borders in violation of any country’s initiative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe will take on a particular responsibility. Germany will take on a particular responsibility for Europe’s collective security with its 2016 Chairmanship. We need to re-establish and modernize the infrastructure for a policy of small steps, we need new, clear statements, forums and mechanisms to gradually remove the old fears and to build a way for action.

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However, the world questions of responsibility and, together with our foreign, we will take on a particular responsibility for Europe’s collective security with its 2016 Chairmanship. We need to re-establish and modernize the infrastructure for a policy of small steps, we need new, clear statements, forums and mechanisms to gradually remove the old fears and to build a way for action.
The knife that took Theo van Gogh's life was the knife of a persistent frustration – the frustration of those who had failed to move themselves victims of a society and Afghanistan.

The Western interventions in Iraq for others as part of a lofty struggle, again, the killers were Islamists and journalists. Again, it was an irony of the deed that the French government has so often pledged at the G8 summit in London to combat terrorism, but in the opposite. Terrorists in Europe. The French government has said that the West was not prepared for terrorism, that its efforts had failed. The French have said that terrorism is a side effect of globalization. The French have said that terrorism is a byproduct of Western interventions, and yet the French have never been more at risk, and the French have become more at risk because in this, the first real conflict of the Muslim share of the population, which will expand in the following years, the French will have to be the social workers in our communities. They will have to face the appearance of the population, the appearance of the population, and the appearance of the appearance of the social, youth employment... We cannot allow Salafists to live out violent fantasies and justifications of young Muslims in Western Europe. Practically all contexts are in a state of flux, because in the short film about the dead-end lives of Moroccan youth gangs, the Shoot a film about the dead-end lives of Moroccan youth gangs, the Shoot was fixed to his chest: a personal message from Mohammed.
**Toothless tigers**

*The Paris attacks vividly demonstrate the need for more cooperation between Europe’s intelligence services.*

By Alexander Graf Lambsdorff

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**Islamist terrorist attacks against Western targets**

**SEPT. 11, 2001: NEW YORK/WASHINGTON/PENNSYLVANIA**

Three passenger jets hijacked and flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Penthouse. A fourth hijacked plane crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 dead.

**APRIL 11, 2002: QUEBEC**

Bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba 21 dead, including 14 German tourists. AQI claims responsibility.

**OCT. 12, 2003: BALI**

Bombs exploded in two nightclubs in Bali. 202 dead, including six Germans. Terrorism experts and Prime Minister Abdullah Thamrin were members of the Jemaah Islamiyah movement, which aims to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state.

**NOVEMBER 20, 2003: MADISON**

Three suicide bombers detonate a car bomb outside an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa (Kenya). 13 dead. 80 injured. A former high-ranking military officer of the Israel Defence Army is dead.

**MYT. 10, 2003: CASABLANCA**

A car bomb explodes outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta. Indonesia. 14 dead. 40 members are believed to be from Jemaah Islamiyah, which is linked with Osama bin Laden’s group.

**JULY 7, 2005: LONDON**

Bomb attacks on three underground lines and a bus in London. 52 killed (plus four were declared dead); around 1,570 injured. 40 suicide bombers. The attackers were described as “home-grown terrorists.”

**OCT. 7, 2005: BALI**

Bombs went off in bars in Jimbaran. 20 dead and 38 injured.

**ATTACKS ON THE PARIS ATTACKS**

The Paris attacks vividly demonstrate the need for more cooperation between Europe’s intelligence services.

As a reaction to the Paris attacks, a structural reform of European intelligence services is more than needed than ever. In France, the Intelligence Analysis Center, has not progressed beyond the status of a toothless tiger. Information gathering is limited to politically available sources, diplomatic reports, contributions by member states on specific requests as well as satellite data from the EU’s sentinel system. Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service, the BND, for example, provides only the absolute neces-

The European Union still has to recognize that it’s a matter of human intelligence. The ‘market’ structure must change to sharing sensitive data.

Legal frameworks would have to be drawn up at the national level for the authorities and defense of the respective state’s interests. That’s because French IN�T is supposed to be a part of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a service of national intelligence services.

Yet there is no reason why the analysis of raw intelligence data from European states would have to happen in France, and not in the EU member state where the data is actually generated. The information must then be sent to an EU Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which allows a clear mandate from the member states, no rewriting and of course, joint analysis would allow us to recognize patterns and connections that would not be recognized in a purely national evaluation. The European member states would not need rewriting and of course, every intelligence service would be kept on mission, especially when it’s a matter of human intelligence. But member states must continue to sharing sensitive data. Legal frameworks would have to be drawn up at the national level for the authorities and defense of the respective state’s interests. That’s because French IN�T is supposed to be a part of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a service of national intelligence services. Yet it is not based on a legal foundation or a clear mandate from the member states. It also lacks accountability towards national legislatures and the European Parliament.

To conclude, terrorism prevention, the cooperation of European and European member states must be expanded. That way, suspected terrorists could be home monitored instead of being extradited to the EU. Instead of having to put together a patchwork of surve-

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**Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq**

Number of foreign fighters per origin country, as of December 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Foreign Fighters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>150-200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>60-100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>100-150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>200-250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>500-600</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>100-150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>50-100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>50-100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>100-150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>80-120</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>50-100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>50-70</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>50-70</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>50</td>
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**February 2015**

The Security Times • Strategy 

Lambsdorff is vice-president of the European Parliament and a member of Germany’s Free Democratic Party (FDP).
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to engage some of America’s foremost ad
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Now, in the last quarter of his pres
g, whether engagement—

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g years, he has scored two surpris-

Nations, for better or for worse,

distinctions. But for both
countries, in different ways, distin-

countries is part of the national narra-

told President Obama has been stri-

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as a "thin 50/50 chance," and in North
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It is time to try something new." In

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Chavez's goal was to change the

In the last two years, President Obama’s foreign policy options are dwindling.

By David E. Sanger

President Obama’s foreign policy options are dwindling. Events in Iran and North Korea could make or break his legacy.

In his final two years, President Obama’s foreign policy options are dwindling.

In his final two years, President Obama’s foreign policy options are dwindling.
Scholars and policy advisors would do well to rethink from predictions about the course of the Middle East under an uncertain environment, the second read to propose for the future is often to simply study the trends that we observe today, and, at the same time, be ready to deal with wildcards. Trends, of course, tend to shift, or to be broken. But they contain strong currents that would flow across the course of events as well as the perceptions of actors.

The current volatility in the Middle East seems to be the dissolution of a regional order with some autarky. Put together again: External powers are unlikely to develop a new Sino-Pakistan and regional powers want a more serious actor for the Vienna Congress of 2011 to re-establish their own regional security systems. In a number of respects, the political landscape between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf has ceased to be the Middle East that we used to know. This certainly applies to post-de facto-rulers, but also to the geopolitical level. Here are few motifs that seem particularly relevant:

- International players are acting on the sidelines. In contrast both to the more aggressive American approach under President W. Bush and the European Union’s post-2011 and aggressive American approach under George W. Bush and the European Union’s post-2011 aggressive American approach under George W. Bush and the European Union’s post-2011, the current relationships between Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf has ceased to be the Middle East that we used to know. This certainly applies to post-de facto-rulers, but also to the geopolitical level. Here are few motifs that seem particularly relevant:

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Three long-term trends are fueling conflict and security: the redistribution of power, the world’s increasing physical and informational connectivity, and the result- ing decline of the state as the centrepiece of the international system. The first move away from the post-Cold War world. The last two have more radical implications: they challenge the role of states and international organizations as the building blocks of global order.

All three will shape the conflicts of 2015, and all three present immediate challenges to Western powers. International co-operation has never been more important, but today’s conflicts demand an engagement that is both more nuanced and more imaginative than in the past. This is not an easy combination.

The redistribution of power has been abundantly documented, but its implications are not yet clear. The United States is less overwhelmingly dominant, except in military affairs, but it is also less willing to use the force it has. In most areas, in any event, the unity of its power is doubtful. Europe moves frustratingly slowly and has failed to become a strategic actor, even though one should not discount its raw potential to become one.

Both, too, have been undermined by the tech-savvy failures of their economic systems – no longer seen as superabled role models, and by the legal and moral excesses of their post-9/11 postures. The West has failed, in due to effectively counter the perception that its international stance is motivated solely by a desire to maintain its geopolitical, economic and military supremacy.

Meanwhile, Russia, China, India and Japan are increasingly assertive in their international relations. A set of middle powers plays a role even more influential, even dominant, in their own neighborhoods, sometimes for better but often for worse, as emerging local actors make conflict resolution that much more difficult. Perhaps most given, in a growing empire of territories, mostly across parts of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, the map of the state is weak, sometimes even nonexistent.

It has become fashionable to talk about the “rise of geopolitics.” But one implication is that this redistribution – or, perhaps better, differentiation of power, takes geopolitics, as traditionally understood, obsolete. Today’s world with its multiple players, some with global reach but weak commitments, some with only regional clout, but strong interests, does not function like the world once dominated by Europe, or that of the Cold War, or even that of the immediate post-Cold War period, to which – many thought – only a handful of powers really mattered. States can work together on some issues while combating others, allowing for a much more flexible and nuanced world than has been imagined.

The second is the world’s increased connectivity. The emergence of terrorism as a global concern is a stark illustration. Terrorism is nothing new; it is a centuries-old tactical response to an asymmetric distribution of power. What is now is the global impact of some terrorist acts. This reflects the physical connectivity of the 21st century, as exemplified in the profound transformation of civil aviation since 9/11, or the growing threat of cyber warfare in digital societies.

It also reflects unexpected information connectivity: an impact multiplier that can trigger recognition, whether for a fast-food chain, a running shoe or Jihadism. And just as global commercial brands buy local businesses to establish a presence, the Jihadist franchises exploit and boost local conflicts, whether in the Sahel, northern Kenya, or Syria. Often pressure in one region may push its local groups to work the franchise because it offers easy access to money, weapons and recruits.

Connectivity is also a recruitment tool. The global impact of terrorist actions attracts lost souls seduced by the publicism given to their acts. Extremist violence becomes both tactic and strategy, an end around itself. It is packed with Jihadism, not just because Islam has ready to work with it, but because Islam provides a constant market, a readily recognizable terrorist brand which is able to raise respect for its perceived injuries.

Also, it is not in its good counter- narrative in the future world to win over the alienated. Islamic democracy has lost much appeal, the often remote secular or multi- religious state, or the local nondenominational Muslim state, and moderate political Islam has less common sense, more popular in the Middle East, more popular in Egypt. The relatively high proportion of converts among French Jihadists (more than 20 percent) is also concerning.

In such a connected world, terrorism is not possible. No border, for example, “homeland” security can safeguard against. The more countries that are terrorist, the more useful as a resource. The more countries engage in terrorism, the more useful as a resource.

Neglecting that and failing exclusively on military operations can help terrorist groups increase their influence by aggravating the conditions that give rise to them in the first place. Assessing the strategic impact of targeted military actions in retail they may achieve tactical results at the expense of strategic success. In Syria and Iraq, extremists and support to Kurdish and Shia fighters may have degraded the Islamic State’s capacities.
Many are chronically weak, at war, collapsed or facing cycles of low-intensity violence. Even those that appear reasonably strong are often, to varying degrees, rather brittle. In these regions, international actors and national reformers alike aspire to forge inclusive, accountable and resilient states, but few have a familiar question: “What is going on?” Can leaders in these states that appear reasonably strong be nudged along strongly enough to make change happen fast – at a minimum delivering their support base and extensive networks or, more optimistically, improving governance? And can those states that have collapsed regain a share of power and resources to keep enough people happy to create at least some short-term stability, and hope over time for improvements in governance? Such states are rare, but in practice they will be hard won.

As many states weaken, the relative power of non-state actors – both legitimate, like corporations and illegitimate like criminal networks – keeps growing. Implications are wide-ranging. The distinction between domestic and international affairs is blurred because domestic fragility, whether in industrialized Europe or the developing Democratic Republic of Congo or South Sudan, opens opportunities for foreign meddling. The distinction between crime and politics is also blurring apart from trafficking in narcotics, but also support territories, militias and networks from the sub-Saharan Middle East, to Eastern Europe and Latin America.

In such a fluid and amorphous context, wars are more intractable. Political processes no longer structure conflict, the risk of political fragmentation increases, as political centralization and civil warropolitical institutions merge together. The longer a war lasts, the more international coalitions, as observed in Somalia, Sudan South or Syria. Ending armed conflict becomes ever harder, not only because of the number of actors who need to be included in a peace process, but also because political goals are elusive and pragmatists on all sides can be disincentives in prolonging the fighting. It keeps the state weak, and they have adapted to a war economy that enhances their own power and ability to host resources. Sadly most of the deadly conflicts of 2014 look set to continue.

This constraining concept can capture the democracy and complexity of conflict in 2015. Disentanglement and local grievances can have an increasingly global impact. They are transforming the geopolitical landscape, which in turns changes the nature of local conflicts. The connections between local grievances and the global strategic theatre also make the world of 2015 a more dangerous and less predictable place strategic surprise is now normal, as neglected local conflicts may suddenly acquire a global dimension.

Russia, China and emerging middle powers will continue to build up their militaries, but new threats emerging from the weakness of many states are likely to be even more pressing.

For Western powers to maintain efforts for cooperative management of international security – in fact they are more real now than ever. But those efforts must be more humble proportionate to the limited international consensus on interventions and to the international community’s limited capacity to effectively stabilize countries in crisis. They must also be more imaginative: first and foremost looking outside traditional arenas of power, but also working creatively outside traditional alliances and seeking support for efforts to end conflicts even in what may seem unlikely quarters.

After a decade and a half of inter- ventionism, whether UN-led or UN-led, and increasing disappointment on what constitutes legitimate engagement, the temptation exists for the West to adopt a minimalist approach to foreign relations. That would be as wrong as the previous maximalistic posture. 2015 can establish it a new equilibrium, if a focus on the politi- cal foundations of military endeavors is linked to limited but broad consensus on peace and security – less military intervention, more politics, smarter diplomacy, more collective action, and more modern ambitions.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under Secretary-General of the UN 2000 to 2008, is president and CEO of International Crisis Group. The views expressed here are his own.

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Even now, many in the West do not realize the extent of Russia’s ambitions and capabilities.

Almost no European leader wants to meet the Dala Lama. American policymakers blame China rather than speak our eloquent about China’s human rights problems. For years Britain refused to have a public inquiry into the murder of Litvinenko. All these show the extent of Russia’s ambition and capabilities.

The Kremlin aims to divide and distract the West, sowing discord and division in many countries. The Qing dynasty never had such a sophisticated thinking about its neighbors. Nor did China and Russia. The Kremlin never had a policy that is more moral neutral, activity that is more effective than the feeble Cold War.

The Kremlin is aiming to divide the West again. The Chinese and Russian influence is being divided, and the West is being divided. The Kremlin is trying to divide and distract the West, sowing discord and division in many countries. The Qing dynasty never had such a sophisticated thinking about its neighbors. Nor did China and Russia. The Kremlin never had a policy that is more moral neutral, activity that is more effective than the feeble Cold War.

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Asia's pivot to Asia

In a geostrategic mikado, the region's states are actively realigning their external relationships | By Daniel Twining

Asia has long been made up of the intertwining strategic, commercial, and political relationships between the United States and China, with Beijing working to edge America out of its Asian neighborhood even as Washington doubles down on its regional partnerships and presence. Less attention has been paid to regional dynamics underlying the umbrella of US-China relationship that moves in tandem with a continuous engagement. In fact, Asia is undergoing a wider set of geo-political realignments that could present conventional expectations about the region's strategic future.

Russia is tilting towards China and away from the West, as demonstrated by several recent energy supply deals worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Russia's territories of Ukraine and strong US and European sanctions have led President Putin to pivot eastward in hopes of building on an anti-Western alliance with Beijing. China and Russian annual focus is upon stepping up joint exercises. Both countries' leaders are ideologically united in ruthless defense of one-party rule at home, and against Western leadership in defense of one-party rule at home, both President Xi Jinping of China and President Vladimir Putin’s of Russia’s. This is a key to security across the globe.

China’s regional ascendancy. This is remarkable given that China has one of the world’s largest Muslim populations, has traditionally supported the Arab line on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and has a close relationship with Iran as shown in a decade's worth of energy supplies and sensitivities. China’s presence in the region is not coalescing into rigid, Cold War-style blocs centered on the US, but rather is evolving into a “G-2” dynamic and support its international institutions.

The United States is no longer viewed as the unipolar superpower with the “right” to make decisions on the African continent. The US is not coalescing into rigid, Cold War-style blocs centered on the US, but rather is embracing the “G-2” dynamic and support its international institutions.

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At the start of a new year already stained with bloodshed, fear of terrorism and instability is again dominating the public agenda. Anxiety and economic discontent are fueling extremism on all sides. Growing numbers of people are being drawn into the hands of populists and xenophobes, and – in some extreme cases – are turning to violence. These trends deeply affect refugees and other forcibly displaced people. On the run from trauma at home, they now find themselves confronting hostility in their places of exile, cast as scapegoats for any number of problems, from terrorism to economic hardship and perceived threats to their host communities’ way of life. They are being mistrusted, criminalized, and恨不得 to violence.

As the year goes on, we need to remember that the primary threat is not from refugees, but to them. In all likelihood, those who are granted asylum are survivors of terrible persecution and violence, and many will have encountered grueling dangers as they fled for safety – travelling across war zones on perilous byways, forced to use smuggling rings to cross closed borders, and exposed to predatory attacks by bandits and pirates.

Last year, nearly 220,000 people fled unsafe boats across the Mediterranean – more than three times the previous record during the Libyan civil war of 2011. Incidents have also been seen in the Gulf of Aden, Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, with 360,000 people worldwide estimated to have taken to the seas. Globally, more than 4,300 people were reported dead or missing at sea last year as a result of these movements, and the real number is probably considerably higher. Granting others who are abused, beaten or snatched the same treatment would be another outrage.

This is not to deny there are security challenges for host societies, when faced with large influxes resulting from violence and instability abroad. There is always a risk, and my organization is very alert to it. But for the most part, refugees are fleeing from conflict, not seeking one. To treat them as a threat rather than people in need is inhumane, ineffective, and counterproductive. One cannot deter people fleeing for their lives without escalating the dangers even more.

Amidst today’s climate of fear, we must stay focused on where the biggest threats lie: to individual refugees and their families. If we want to stop these threats multiplying, mounting and spreading, we need to sow the seeds of a return in peace to their homelands. We do that by providing protection and support, and by helping people not only to survive, but to thrive.

Over 51 million people are forcibly displaced around the world today, more than at any other time since World War II. Multiplying conflicts, human rights violations, and restrictions as well as climate change, population growth, jobless urbanization and food and water insecurity have uprooted entire communities on a scale that is unprecedented.

This is more than an uncomfortable statistic; it is a rising challenge that has already surpassed the capacity of the humanitarian system to respond, and shows every sign of getting larger.

Yet our response to this challenge has been mixed at best, and at worst woefully inadequate. Humanitarian appeals are going

Don’t fear refugees, help them

They are fleeing from conflict, not seeking it. To treat them as a threat is inhumane | By António Guterres

António Guterres is UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
numerously undermined, both for basic needs and for promotion measures such as education.

At their borders, some govern-
ments are trying to lock up those
invading them instead of deter-
cing, carrying out pushbacks, and
demonstrating dehumanizing atti-
dudes, including children. Is-
ley’s Noble New Art Opera-
tion, which involved over 100,000
people at a, is now planning rep-
placify the EU has plans to rep-
lace it, beyond the border sur-
rounding it. In 2015. Many
people could see a result.

Focusing on border control will
not solve the problem. While gov-
ernments have a duty to manage
migration, their policies must be
designed to ensure human lives
do not end up becoming collateral
risks – or else become excluded
from our societies and become
valid for social, economic and
demographic reasons.

The way we tackle population
movements will fundamentally shape
disorder, as we see in the war in
Syria.

People have been fleeing from
insecurity for centuries, and
today’s world gives little reason
to hope that this will soon change.
The way countries deal with the
necessities of those seeking protection
at their borders is an indicator of
their own strength, and will play
a crucial role in determining the
outcome of a century that has
begun so badly.

With extremest problems,
often the best approach is to
head to the root of the problem:
providing basic services, promot-
ing tolerance and respect, and
striving to build societies that
will live years away from home,
more secure for all. People need
to be able to live their lives, to
find work and build an identity in
society – or else be excluded
and dependent on aid, exposed
to exploitation, abuse and ex-
clusion.

A growing and interdependent
world requires the threat from
countries, rather than to horrofies, has one terminological
and management challenges. It
defies the nature of peace and prosperity
that are crucial, would allow them to go back to
their roots.

We help refugees rather than
face them, we need to act a chance of
facing the root of violence.
But we will never achieve an end
in conflict to conflict or long-term
for its cause.
NATO's new mission in Afghanistan – and new challenges in Europe

By Hans-Lothar Domrose

With the successful completion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission at the end of 2014, NATO entered a new chapter in its enduring relationship with the Afghan government. Our new mission, “Resolute Support,” brings together around 12,000 military personnel from across the globe. Significantly, the 28 NATO Allies are joined by 16 partner nations – a clear signal that ability to central Asia remains an important issue to geographically separated but economically connected nations around the world. The story of NATO’s enduring and successful partnership with Afghanistan has many chapters, each of which was fully supported by a number of objectives. The first chapter commenced back in December 2010, with NATO’s establishment as a Kabul-centre mission tasked to help rebuild the new government. From the outset it was clear that ISAF would develop into more than a NATO-only mission; partner nations were invited to join by 14 partner nations – a more than a NATO-only mission, transiting ISAF’s mandate to the ANSF.

The ISAF story became clear that the mission would be more efficient if it had greater reach beyond Kabul. It was therefore expanded to the North in 2004, the West in 2005 and the South in 2006. And in its peak, in 2010, ISAF comprised operational commands, headquarters, level and training headquarters, 11 regional commands, 45,000 personnel and 120,000 personnel under its command and control. For some a decade, a total of 11 NATO and partner nations contributed to the mission in partnership with our Afghan partners – an unprecedented achievement.

It is clear that ISAF's mission was successful, but as NATO's mission in Afghanistan entered its final chapter, the ANSF leadership need to ensure that the Alliance continues to support and coordinate the efforts across the Alliance. The ISAF mission was successful, and the ANSF continues to help the Afghan security forces equipped and trained to be able to deliver the strategic gains to maintain its future in a sustainable way. Resolute Support is not a combat mission. Significantly, smaller than ISAF, Resolute Support will draw on and assist Afghan security forces in a clear and supportive role – but not victoriously. It will concentrate its efforts on internal and international law-based training, increasing capability in municipalities and the higher levels of army and police command. Resolute Support aims to sustain key essential functions: Budgeting, Oversight, Civilian Governance of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Force Generation, Survivability, Structure and Policy Planning, Resource and Executive, Intelligence and Strategic Communication (STRIACOM). It will be centred across Afghanistan using a hub-and-spoke approach, Kabul, the central hub, will supervise spokes located in Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Jalalabad, from where missions-specific efforts will be performed and coordinated.

With this new mission, we will continue to help the Afghan security forces become self-sustaining, so that the ANSF continues to improve the skills it needs to make the Afghan state safe and secure and to build a positive and effective relationship with Pakistan. The transition from ISAF to Resolute Support (RS) is NATO’s first chapter in the “Transformer Decade,” from now until 2024. NATO remains committed, as evidenced, as confirmed during the 2014 Warsaw Summit and London Conference, we will continue our support to our Afghan partners to continue to ensure a safer, increasingly prosperous, and stable Afghanistan, understand by security forces equipped and trained to be able to deliver the strategic gains to maintain its future in a sustainable way.
German industry is becoming increasingly aware of the influence geopolitics on the security of our business enterprises. There are good reasons for our government to engage more closely with global developments. And for business to be more closely integrated into a reliable and cohesive foreign and security policy.

As an industrial nation, Germany has to secure the extent to which it is embedded in an international value creation chain. The nation’s competitiveness and its prosperity are based on economic participation in the existing open world order, which is characterized by trade in goods that is as free as possible alongside unrestricted access to procurement and sales markets.

Averaged over a quarter of jobs in Germany – more than nine million – depend on foreign trade and the trend is upwards. Exports make up around 40 percent of Germany’s gross domestic product (GDP). Lower figures put the stock of German foreign investment at more than €4.2 trillion, with nearly half of this sum accounted for by investment in countries outside the EU.

It is hardly surprising, then, that in the opening speech to the 50th Munich Security Conference one year ago President Joachim Gauck defined “the protection of the existing open world order as a core interest of the German security policy”. As an exporting nation, German industry understands the arguments.

Security – both national and international – is of prime importance for the German business community, and German industry must play an active role in defining and preserving it. In the long term, trade and business activities can only thrive in a secure environment. And the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is the most recent evidence of that, illustrating as it does the extent to which the secure supply of raw materials, German foreign investment and the worldwide foreign markets are subject to political machinations.

German industry is exposed to growing and increasingly intense risks as a result of globalization and technological prog-

The interconnectedness of modern economies means that economic players play very far away can quickly have a direct impact on German companies.

Foreign intelligence services, competitors, organized crime and criminals seek to gain illegal competitive advantages and sources of revenue by means of economic espionage, sabotage and other criminal acts. Such attacks also impact on the transport networks and the infrastructures of global trade and logistics – the arteries of our international value chains.

The annual damage suffered by German industry, which is both exposed to unknown and knowledge-intensive, is put at around €30 billion. About one company in three has suffered an attack there is the extent to which the secure trade in raw materials, German foreign investment and the worldwide foreign markets are subject to political machinations.

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German security policy must take into account the needs of the business sector | By Ulrich Grillo

The Munich Security Conference is a meeting place for policymakers, security analysts, business representatives and students of strategic affairs, and it is a unique platform for the exchange of views on the current security situation and the future security architecture of Europe and the world.

The Security Times • Strategy

Trade needs a secure environment

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e-mobility from Volkswagen.
The e-up! and the e-Golf.

With the e-up! and the e-Golf, we are already bringing tomorrow’s mobility onto the road today. 100 % electric and emission-free, and as well adapted for everyday use as one expects from a Volkswagen. Major changes do not always have to feel like major changes.

Think Blue.

Power consumption e-up! in kWh/100 km: 11.7 combined, CO₂ emissions in g/km: 0.
Power consumption e-Golf in kWh/100 km: 12.7 combined, CO₂ emissions in g/km: 0.
Picture shows optional extras at an additional cost.
The OSCE has made full use of its broad array of instruments to deal with this conflict. For the first time in more than a decade, participating states have agreed to deploy new field missions – the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) and a small observer mission at two Russian checkpoints. These missions provide invaluable objective information about developments on the ground and have given the parties their ability to quickly react to the many nuances and challenges. Other important OSCE contributions include the Project Office Ukraine, the election observation by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) as well as the secretariat of the Representative on Freedom of the Media. The Open Government Partnership and the OSCE Development Assistance Unit have also brought about the release of over 2,000 detained persons. The efforts by the Trilateral Contact Group to establish a lasting peace process on the basis of the Minsk arrangements deserves our continued full support. There is a worrying tendency in the narratives on the crisis to one-sided, exclusionary, and stereotypical representations of the participants of the consultations. This includes, for example, the unbalanced and exaggerated portrayal of the pro-Russian separatists.

Minsk Agreement 2014

1. Immediately release of hostages and illegally detained persons.
2. Adoption of a law proving protection and punishment in connection with events that took place in areas of Donetsk and Luhansk.
3. Continue an inclusive national dialogue.
4. Ensure permanent monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification of the OSCE with the establish-ment of security zones in the broader areas of Ukraine and the Russian Federation
5. Immediate release of hostages and illeg-ally detained persons.
6. Adoption of a law proving protection and punishment in connection with events that took place in areas of Donetsk and Luhansk.
7. Continue an inclusive national dialogue.
8. Take measures to improve the humanitar-ian situation in the Donbas.
9. Ensure organization of early local elec-tions in accordance with the Ukrainian law “On a temporary regime of local self-government in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk” (Law on Special Status).
10. Withdraw illegal armed groups, military equipment, as well as fighters and mater-iel from Ukraine territory.
11. Adopt a program for the economic reintegration of the Donbas region.
12. Provide personal safety guarantees for the participants of the consultations.

The OSCE has already shown its relevance in the Ukraine conflict: the SMM monitoring mission vehicles in Kiev, Nov. 13, 2014. By Didier Burkhalter and Ivica Dačić

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is playing a significant role as a mediator in the Ukrainian conflict: the OSCE Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.
The Kremlin perspective

Russia wants to consolidate its new strategic perimeter without being drawn into a full-scale war | By Dmitri Trenin

This year promises to be the most difficult for Russia since the beginning of the new century. A combination of three forces is hitting the country very hard: structural economic problems, Western sanctions, and the collapse in the oil price. As a result, Russia’s GDP in the first quarter was 5.7 to 7 percent, inflation may rise to 15 to 20 percent, unemployment could climb to 7 percent, and the capital flight by foreigners ended up at more than $110 billion in 2014. In fact, last summer, the ruble has already lost nearly half its value against the major currencies.

Yet Russia’s response has been calm, if increasingly concerned about what the near future might bring. If presidential elections were held now, polls indicate President Vladimir Putin would win with 73 percent of the vote, compared with 63 percent in 2012. Opposition to the Kremlin remains weak and lack broad support. Government ministers are working round the clock as crisis managers. None are even trying to use the demographic situation to launch a new round of reforms, which are essentially impossible when the oil price is high. Neither the minister nor Putin, however, have any doubt that the challenge they are facing is more serious than anything they have seen since 2008.

There is no illusion either as to the meaning of the rupture between Russia and the West. A consensus of sorts exists within the Russian establishment that the sanctions imposed on Russia for its actions as Crimea and Energa Uranium. Russia will stay for many years, possibly decades. The European Union is believed to be too weak to begin even new sanctions. Meanwhile, the Kremlin regime itself is beginning to accept that full-scale war with Europe, particularly with Germany, which is determined to be an opponent (unlike the United States), Moscow will not simply abandon Donetsk and Lugansk to

Kiev, and will not even think of handing back Crimea. The Russian formula for a peace settlement in Ukraine sounds simple: Crimea is ours, while Eastern Ukraine is Ukrainian – on certain conditions. The center management points here to the way they see their role in the region region itself. Moscow has turned to a full-scale war in the region to avoid a full-scale war in Europe.

Prevention of the conflict is important that responsible statesmen are facing this year. They include direct and indirect terrorist organizations. These conditions remain unacceptable to Kiev, which treats at least several times, and Moscow, as Moscow has never allowed a pro-Russian country to be drawn into a full-scale war with Europe.

If they succeed, Europe and parts of Europe can move on to the next target: requiring European security with large forces. Using the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe need to start a serious conversation about the continent’s current security agenda, and set the stage for the new security summit, possibly during the period of the German-OSCE presidency in 2015.
Russia and the West have competing narratives to explain Putin’s actions.

Western scholars, analysts and politicians unanimously both to explain Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Eastern Europe in different terms. Europe and the US have framed their response to Russia’s actions and accusations along the lines of a clear choice between two systematic, self-determination and stability in Eastern Europe.

The EU, the US and Russia are called to define this increasingly dangerous confrontation.

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the concept of energy security was born 300 years ago. At that time, the British Navy con-
verted their ships from coal to oil, a move to be fame and more economic than the German fleet.
Faced with criticism from the opposition that Britain would thereby become dependent on for-
eign exports of oil, the First Admiral of the Navy, Winston Churchill, replied: "...no one country, on
no one say, in no one field must we be dependent. Safety and certainty [...]." It is a variety and
variety alone."

After the two Ukrainian-Rus-
sian gas conflicts in 2004 and 2009 and even more so in today's
confrontation between the West and Moscow, energy security has been catapulted to the top of
Europe's agenda. The EU strongly determined to diversify away from Russian gas. But all
available options are too little and too complex to name, and some may well come too late. They will
not be sufficient to replace Russian gas as a major gas supplier for Europe. Energy security and
security are naturally six options for the EU to diversify its gas imports:

1. European domestic ma-

2. Israeli gas from the Israeli Levi-

3. Gas from Iraq. Kirkuk gas reserves have also been

4. Gas from Iran's Kiyukta gas field. The Kiyukta

5. Gas from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas.

6. Gas from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas. Gas is not just a commodity. Pipeline gas, especially comes as a service with long lasting and stabilizing implications. The...
The forgotten conflict

The obduracy of the warring countries Armenia and Azerbaijan has defeated every attempt to stop the bloodstream in Nagorno-Karabakh | By Richard Kiessler

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the most complicated territorial dispute in the post-Soviet region. For more than two decades it has contributed to destabilization in the region and blocked the South Caucasus as a transit corridor. Because all attempts to negotiate a peaceful solution or even to reduce the losses in the war have failed, the situation in the South Caucasus has become a frozen conflict. That’s although violence claims thousands of victims on an almost daily basis along the ceasefire line since Nagorno-Karabakh and seven additional regions, or “islands”, in Armenia were occupied by Azerbaijan. The war has been going on for more than 10 decades along the “line of contact” in 2016 the highest total there since 1994.

The conflict in South-Caucasus has complicated efforts at resolving other territorial conflicts within the former Soviet Union. They seem to all follow the same pattern: at some point they are “frozen,” yet continue to smoulder – as is threatening to happen even in the disputed Donbas region. Russia generally attempts to maintain a hand in such matters of influence in that way. Not unlike the conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia/South Ossetia) and Moldova (Transnistria), the dispute surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh has become a long-lasting territorial and political issue.

The issues in this essentially ethnic dispute are, first of all, the two conflicting sides: the Armenians, who believe they were the war over the enclave but have no perspective because of their dispersed economic situation, and the Azeris, whose riches in oil and gas offer an outstanding economic outlook, but who have lost a third of their territory and must cope with a huge refugee problem.

The legal situation is clear: Four UN Security Council resolutions, and Azerbaijan’s claim to the unrecognized “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic,” and call for the withdrawal of the Armenian occupation forces. Resolution of other bodies includ- ing the European Parliament and Germany’s Bundestag demanded the re-establishment of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. During a visit to Baku on Jan. 23, EU Representative Chrysostomos Angelides reaffirmed the call for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and offered Germany’s assistance in finding one.

The conflict over the “mountainous black garden” (as its name translates) has deep roots, even though various ethnicities and religions coexisted peacefully in the region for hundreds of years. In the rugged area of Nagorno-Karabakh, today a majority Muslim state, Christianity survived through the centuries. Up to 1856, the Chris- tian community was allowed to keep its religion and had its own schools. Then the Russian Empire annulled the Armenian autonomy. The region belonged to one of the main Khanates of the Azeri Empire and, after the Russian annexation, to the territory.

The Armenians settled primarily in northeastern Turkey, from where they expelled in the World War I. After the 1915 genocide, Russian Armenians became their new homeland. The ethnic aspect of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be traced back to demographic changes. Until the Russian annexation the territory was inhabited primarily by Muslims. But more and more Armenians left Turkey in the 19th century, by 1937 they constituted 93 percent of the local population. During the Soviet era, how- ever, demographic trends in Nagorno- Karabakh favored the Azeri population. But in 1989, the Azer- ians’ Revolutionary Committee in Nagorno-Karabakh as well as in the territories Nakhichevan and Zangezur to the Armenian Soviet Republic. One was later again under substantial political pressure, the Soviet “Caucasus Bureau” gave Nagorno-Karabakh back to Azerbaijan. That’s how it remained until the Communities remained to be decided. After 15 new national states has declared their inde- pendence on the ter- ritory of the ex-Soviet Union, several small territory dis- putes over Nagorno-Karabakh broke out over open warfare, including the disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The war of Armenian separatists backed by the Republic of Armenia and the continuing Russian forces for the WAZ Media Group

Microsoft proposes six norms to limit conflict in cyberspace.

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Cyberspace Needs Norms

Cyber conflict and cyberwar are not just theoretical but actual possibilities that need to be considered and addressed. Information and communications technology creates benefits for states and their citizens alike, but technologies can and are being exploited by a variety of government actors with differing motivations and means. For nearly two decades, the cyberspace community has warned of the increasing number and sophistication of cyber attacks. But now, cyberspace is being operationalized by nation states as a domain for cyber conflict, dramatically escalating the threat. In this shared and tightly integrated domain, any escalation of hostilities could result in unintended and even catastrophic consequences.

Reducing this risk requires an inclusive global dialogue on the development of norms that advance cybersecurity.

Microsoft proposes six norms to limit conflict in cyberspace.

Nagorno-Karabakh Republic,

2015-02-06T15:29:20Z

The forgotten conflict

The security times • Challenges

Azerbaijan is demanding an end to the Armenian occupation, the recognition of the enclave, as well as the recognition of the Azeri population. Russia’s closest (and poorest) ally Armenia demands self-deter- mination for the people of Nagor- no-Karabakh – a thoroughly self-serving demand, given the region’s now almost exclusively Armenian population.

http://aka.ms/cybernorms

Read more at

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In the months before Barack Obama took his first oath of office as president of the United States in January 2009, he said that the country was going through the most sleepless nights it was Pakistan. Although nobody has asked Obama recently – mainly because in the collapse of Libya and Iraq, the rise of the Islamic States, Ebola, tension with Russia, Boko Haram and terrorism in Europe, – he would probably still say that Pakistan continues to give him sleepless nights.

The Rules in Pakistan today, terrorism, the inepticent government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, a belligerent but ineffective opposition, a discredited economy, chronic shortages of gas and electricity, capital flight, don $30 million to $40 million a day, and the civil service or modernize the police force was nonexistent. Even though it is operating just under the radar, we can expect that civil servants will not be able to put on a major count- terterrorism policy, tensions will remain on control of foreign power and the army itself could become part of the problem. It is the answer to the army’s next move, according to a major newspaper, are the security forces.

The Talibain is on the offensive and the barely trained Afghan army is only just holding its ground.

The army also has the capability to defeat the Afghan Taliban, but only if it is given enough support. It has not received enough support and it has been displaced by the Taliban. The army is very much here in Pakistan, even Pakistan.

Most Afghans do not believe that the country will remain an ally Pakistan. China’s interests in the Gulf port of Gwadar to the Pakistan-India in Kashmir. Note that the allocation to counter the US$ 4 billion a year budget support to salaries and supplies. Chinese and Pakistanis are increasingly looking at China to come to the rescue. Ambassador Sun Tour, China’s special rep- resentative for Afghanistan and Pakistan told me in November that, “we are ready to do more, we want to play a bigger role (in Afghanistan).” He went on, “We would welcome the Taliban in any neutral role such as in China. We will make negotiations happen but the peace must be Afghan-owned and Afghan-led.”

In December a Taliban delegation visited China for talks with the Chinese at the same time as Prime Minister Sharif was there. The question is how the Pakistan-led Afghan_owned government. The Afghan Taliban in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan is a big problem. Pakistan and Iran are increasingly looking at China to come to the rescue.

As NATO withdraws from Afghanistan, the continuing terrorism emanating from there and Pakistan has become a security threat to China. | Ahmed Rashid
war tactics in Kashmir. India was after its victory in Afghanistan and Intelligence (ISI) was triumphant. In 1989, Pakistan’s Inter-Services threat is history repeating itself. Security Guards, warned, is the State, as J.N. Choudhury, director. tourists against India. The Islamic some in Pakistan would direct military to any of the overseas groups, the – all groups that had historically avoid the Indian theater.

Three specific but complex trends dominate the rise in threats from terrorism. First, the terror theatres South Asia countries are increasingly linked. If approved in one place, they break out in another, rogue militant groups from the frontlines in Kashmir to those in Afghanistan to India. In 1987, 87,000 NATO troops fighting insurgents are withdrawing. The United States is leaving behind 16,000 miners as the 16th Afghan Biennial Security Agreement. While NATO troops withdraw, after a 15-year war, al-Qaeda, Taliban and Paki- stani terrorists are planning unprecedented victories. A string of failed nuclear attempts in Afghanistan signals that the balance is tilting in favor of instability.

As the NATO troops withdraw, some Pakistan would discontent- ment against India. The Islamic, as in N. Chehchara, director general of India’s elite National Security Guard, warned, is the flavor and most lethal front, encouraging “real-true multiple attacks” on India.

India’s contemporary terrorism threat is history repeating itself. In 1980, Pakistan’s militant intelligence (ISI) was terrorist group. It was easier to replace the same guerrilla war tactic. In Kashmir, India was caught unprepared, and Kashmiri Muslims are still reeling from the loss of men.

The second trend is the influx of Wahabists preaching in India since 2015. They have seduced 7,000 regimental madrassas in India, preparing these outfits as potential paramilitary ground to participate in the litany of al-Qaeda and Taliban. It is a classified dossier, India’s spy agencies reported that 21,000 Wahabists belong to 20 countries who have already responded to IS chief that Indian Muslims terrorists have already responded to IS chief. Some 25 Indian Muslim youths have so far been choreographed by IS chief to join international terrorist groups.

A third trend is the influx of radicals. After the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, some militant groups left Kashmir to join Afghan jihad. Since 2001, some focus in the Pakistani Army tried to shift the focus of terrorist groups from the Afghan region to India and won even linked to the com- munist-ruled Mumbai attacks of 2008. NATO’s withdrawal and Afghanistan renders a generation of Al-Qaeda militants jobs, and greater lights will turn their atten- tion to India.

Pakistan’s and India’s two-pronged policy. One is to work on social sites by removing Muslim ghettoization, checking Wahhabi indoctrination, and adopting a two-pronged policy. One is to work on social sites by removing Muslim ghettoization, checking Wahhabi indoctrination, and ensuring fair and fast judicial scrutiny. The other is to work on social sites by removing Muslim ghettoization, checking Wahhabi indoctrination, and ensuring fair and fast judicial scrutiny. The other is to work on social sites by removing Muslim ghettoization, checking Wahhabi indoctrination, and ensuring fair and fast judicial scrutiny. The other is to work on social sites by removing Muslim ghettoization, checking Wahhabi indoctrination, and ensuring fair and fast judicial scrutiny. The other is to work on social sites by removing Muslim ghettoization, checking Wahhabi indoctrination, and ensuring fair and fast judicial scrutiny. The other is to work on social sites by removing Muslim ghettoization, checking Wahhabi indoctrination, and ensuring fair and fast judicial scrutiny. The other is to work on social sites by removing Muslim ghettoization, checking Wahhabi indoctrination, and ensuring fair and fast judicial scrutiny. The other is to work on social sites by removing Muslim ghettoization, checking Wahhabi indoctrination, and ensuring fair and fast judicial scrutiny. The other is to work on social sites by removing Muslim gh
Neither war nor peace

Between Israel and the Palestinians: armed gridlock forever? | By Martin van Creveld

The net outcome is likely to be nothing short of a truce. First, since the border areas between Israel and the Strip has hardly seen much friction. It would be much better for all parties if Hamas provided available guarantees to stop military "incursions," which have become routine, against Israel once and for all. And, in any case, the "state" of the Strip would be lifted and Gaza allowed to develop as it can and should.

For that to happen, Hamas would have to recognize Israel, which Israel would agree to recognize with Hamas. At the absence of such recognitions and such negotiations, additional skirmishes like those that took place last spring in the summer of 2014 cannot be excluded. They may, in fact, be inevitable. It remains true that Hamas is basically in a position to start a major war, let alone defeat Israel.

To that end, to the Palestinians on the West Bank. Depending on whom one believes, they number anywhere between a million and a half and two and a half million. Unlike the Palestinians in the neighboring state of the Gaza Strip, these people live in territory that, in one way or another, is occupied by Israel. This occupation is one that even the most moderate among us are determined to overthrow in one or another way.

The more to be done, as one goes on, more and more of their land is being taken away by Jewish settler outposts where the changing governments in Jerusalem seem to be either unable or unwilling to rein in. In the expected failure of their uprisings (al-Najah, in Aramaic, means "dealing off, scouring", the Palestinian term stands in contrast against the Arab struggle against the occupation and security services. Yet it is not one, as is so often been claimed, that the West Bank is essential for Israel's defense. First, as the example of Gaza before 2005 shows, the occupation will not stop various kinds of municipal controls from the Bank from reaching Israeli territory. Let alone those emanating from some other territory. Second, both geographi- cal and the military balance puts the area in question really as the core of the Israeli Army. Should there be a withdrawal, the latter will always be able to reoccupy in a moment's notice. As many of its own citizens have been suffering for years, demo- graphically, social and political develop- ments are a much more serious problem.

Newly elected Prime Minister Be'ezo (Misha Derux) seems to have taken in the American telescopes to justify his own position in a major war, let alone defeat Israel.

The not-so-secretary, however, issues a warning: Notwithstanding the illusions of steady-state idealism and some realism and Israel, new peace agreements with both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, following a complex Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, is going to need the Palestin- ans hope of some day doing away with armed conflict and reacquiring their lost land. As one Palestinian diplo- mat put it to me: "Why should we give up our rights?" They will either win the war or lose some support of some 200 million Arabs who have never been heard, which is now, since less under Israeli rule. Not to mention 75 million Europeans whose government, which does not expect any favorably towards Israel, may soon obtain nuclear weapons.

Thus, the condition is one if you can for any land of withdrawal and all kind of peace is in Israel, sufficiently strong to defend itself against the threat of a nucle- ar, "Iron Wall," the wing-wing Palestinian leader Ze'ev Jabotinsky called it as he back in 1923. At any rate, in this is the Middle East is certain to expand even more than it already has.
O n Jan. 22, 2013, the US-supported Yemeni President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi and his technocratic government resigned suddenly amid Houthi pressure to make changes to the draft constitution published days earlier. The State Department, an armed movement from northern Yemen, rejected a central aspect of the draft: the division of the country into six federal regions. The government’s forced resignation documents not only the powerlessness of the political leadership in the country, it also breaks the transformation process outlined by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initia- tives. 

With the most recent escalation of violence on Jan. 19, 2015, the Houthis pushed President Hadi into a dead end. Had the presi- dent given in to the pressure and changed the constitution, the agreements of the transitional period would have been lost. Remaining in office while not giving in to the pressure would have led to violence. Revolution was Hadi’s only option to keep the low flicker of legitimacy he had by preventing the Houthis from violently imposing their demands.

The Houthis were in a posi- tion to court the kind of pressure the government was on the one hand due to the weakness advanced to the GCC initiative. After having been excluded from the negotiations the GCC initia- tives and the anarchy government formed in December 2011, the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was the first instance the Houthis had to contribute to the transition. The final political agreement by the end of the conference in January 2014 that the future state should be federal, this final consensus failed regarding the number of federal regions the country should be divided into. Since then the Houthis have ra- pidly expanded their territorial control in northern Yemen and established themselves as de facto rulers in Yemen’s capital.

But the rise to power was also the consequence of the Houthis’ incompelling attitude in the face of the state’s weakness. Time and again, the Houthis engaged in negotiations with the govern- ment and agreed to deals brokered by the UN. Paying lip service only to those agree- ments, the movement repeatedly showed that it was not willing to compromise or agree to a power shar- ing arrangement. After Houthi light- tunately took control of Sanaa, the govern- ment and Houthi representatives signed the National Peace and Partnership agreement on Sept. 21, 2014. The agreement was supposed to put an end to the Houthis’ violent campaign, but in reality it gave the Houthis a legitimate cover for their unilat- eral drive to control the state.

The Houthis are now in a posi- tion where they realize their true facade. They can either work within the framework of the political institutions and adhere to the agreements reached in the transitional period, which would also entail coming to terms with the federal structure of the future state. Or the Houthis can unilaterally grab power by forming a presidential council. But they would then be held accountable by the public and risk losing the legitimacy they have in the population. Since the Houthi’s rise to power, opposition against the movement was particularly from central and southern Yemen. In contrast to the Houthis, who adhere to the Zaydi tradition of Shia Islam, in these regions the adherent given to the pressure and its unwilling- ing to compromise or agree to a power shar- ing arrangement. After Houthi light- tunately took control of Sanaa, the govern- ment and Houthi representatives signed the National Peace and Partnership agreement on Sept. 21, 2014. The agreement was supposed to put an end to the Houthis’ violent campaign, but in reality it gave the Houthis a legitimate cover for their unilat- eral drive to control the state.

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Stalemate in Yemen

President Hadi’s resignation was the only chance to preserve democratic gains – but risks fragmenting the country | By Mareike Transfeld

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Kim Jong-un's rogue state

America could actually be more than happy with it
By Rudiger Frank

The most obvious point is the nuclear issue. It's shocking to see that an undeveloped country like North Korea has been able to develop such weapons. If they can do it - and get away with it - who will not? Among the candidates in an ever-lengthening list are two of the world's most developed countries, South Korea and Japan. Given the most immediate threat in East Asia foreign policy, a nuclear North Korea could serve as the perfect excuse for those two countries to follow suit. The result would be a huge joint military exercises are portrayed as an inadmissible infringement on its territory. Pyongyang's actions are hence interpreted as provocations and are seen with the hardest response, including UN resolutions and economic sanctions. The West is in general terms, and in a more narrow sense the US, Japan, and South Korea, approaches North Korea as a rogue state. Pyongyang's actions are seen as a challenge to the world's security archipelago, a global chain reaction that would shake the world's security architecture. The most obvious point is the nuclear issue. It is shocking to see that an undeveloped country like North Korea has been able to develop such weapons. If they can do it - and get away with it - who will not? Among the candidates in an ever-lengthening list are two of the world's most developed countries, South Korea and Japan. Given the most immediate threat in East Asia foreign policy, a nuclear North Korea could serve as the perfect excuse for those two countries to follow suit. The result would be a huge joint military exercises are portrayed as an inadmissible infringement on its territory. Pyongyang's actions are hence interpreted as provocations and are seen with the hardest response, including UN resolutions and economic sanctions. The West is in general terms, and in a more narrow sense the US, Japan, and South Korea, approaches North Korea as a rogue state. Pyongyang's actions are seen as a challenge to the world's security archipelago, a global chain reaction that would shake the world's security architecture. The most obvious point is the nuclear issue. It is shocking to see that an undeveloped country like North Korea has been able to develop such weapons. If they can do it - and get away with it - who will not? Among the candidates in an ever-lengthening list are two of the world's most developed countries, South Korea and Japan. Given the most immediate threat in East Asia foreign policy, a nuclear North Korea could serve as the perfect excuse for those two countries to follow suit. The result would be a huge joint military exercises are portrayed as an inadmissible infringement on its territory. Pyongyang's actions are hence interpreted as provocations and are seen with the hardest response, including UN resolutions and economic sanctions. The West is in general terms, and in a more narrow sense the US, Japan, and South Korea, approaches North Korea as a rogue state. Pyongyang's actions are seen as a challenge to the world's security archipelago, a global chain reaction that would shake the world's security architecture.
The talks resumed in mid-January. Tehran's former Foreign Minister Moham- med Jawad Zarif has met twice with US Secretary of State John Kerry for negotiations on Iran's nuclear programs and visited his counterpart, Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Berlin and Laurent Fabius in Paris. In the following days, top diplomats from Washington, Moscow, Beijing, London, Paris and Berlin (P5+1) met with the Iranian foreign minister in Geneva, January 7. A political framework deal has to be signed by early March. A final document is to be drafted by July. 1, 2015.

Negotiators have already been extended twice. There is a sharp divide between the demands for Iran to drastically cut back its nuclear enrichment facilities and Iran's counter-demands for the lifting of sanctions against it. This issue will be the main stumbling block at the talks. In the following days, top diplomats and officials from Iran, the US and five European countries will meet in Geneva, January 14, 2015.

That is where it gets difficult. Mistrust dominates talks on Iran's nuclear program. Hardliners in Washington and in Tehran are seeking to block any compromise. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel is convinced that Iran's nuclear capabilities could be recognized in time. This period is currently estimated to be two months. The talks aim to stretch that to at least six months. Iran is determined to fight for a successful outcome. For Ruhani, it's all about his political legacy. For Obama, it could be a highlight of his presidency.

Iran and has already lifted in return? Prospects for agreement are grim. But those against any compromise are not in Obama's own party. Among them is Hillary Clinton, who is poised to announce her bid to be the next Democratic presidential candidate. In contrast to Obama, she believes any agreement must include the dismantling of all Iran's roughly 20,000 centrifuges. That corresponds to the demand by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. "It is better to have an agreement with Iran than to have no agreement that will jeopardize Israel, the Middle East, and humanity," was his comment on the failure of the latest round of talks in Vienna on November 24. Netanyahu's aim in negotiations is the only acceptable solution. He therefore has no reason to simply extend the period for a breakthrough – the time has now passed and we need a bomb with the finite period is already too. This period currently estimated to be two months. The talks aim to stretch that to at least six months – and the control is to be offered to the joint when the attempt to reach a breakthrough could be recognized in time. This means that any agreement must bear in mind the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, it is a matter of trust. And that is lacking on both sides.

If both in Washington and in Tehran are saying that Iran will have to achieve an ending, or that a compromise can only be reached in the course of which Iran has not seen a second round of talks with the country. Iran is saying that the US is not in agreement. "The sanctions that exist today, the like of which Iran has not seen since the 1979 revolution. It is almost as if the US is not in the mood to sit down at the negotiating table with the Iranian leadership and between the White House and the US Congress than the alignment between the negotiating partners themselves. But both presidents are determined to fight for a successful outcome. For Ruhani, it's all about the modernization of Iran. For Obama, it could be a highlight of his presidency. The US has already backed the president, at least verbally, saying that "Islamic State" in Syria and Iraq cannot be a spectacular trial of strength, the prevention of a nuclear arms race. That would be a highlight of his presidency. The US has already backed the president, at least verbally, saying that

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As for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, it is a matter of trust. And that is lacking on both sides.
Nigeria, the power of the military is in trouble. In the wake of the breakout, the Nigerian economy passed the 2011 global recession. At almost the same time, attacks by the Boko Haram insurgency took up the most serious political issue. Recently, the organization is believed to be plotting to attack and burn villages in the neighboring regions. The target of the attack was attracted by Boko Haram since the factory of the images show – roused to the ground.

Boko Haram’s declared aim is to destroy the Lagos government and promote an Islamic state. In a video message, the movement’s spokesman declared the Islamic government to deal with global and support for the “Islamic State”.

Boko Haram has been fighting in the heart of the capital, Abungu, for more than 18 years. Boko Haram is a terrorist organization that has attacked and murdered civilians in various parts of Nigeria, including the villages of Baga, Lake Chad, and Niger. Since December 2012, the insurgents have launched a series of attacks in the north, killing hundreds of people and forcing thousands to flee their homes.

One of Boko Haram’s last major attacks was on the town of Maiduguri, a major city in the north. The group attacked the town, killing at least 10 people and damaging several buildings. The attack was carried out by a small number of militants who entered the city to attack government installations.

The Boko Haram attack forced the government to intensify its military operations and to deploy more troops in the region. The government has also been working to improve the security situation in the area by strengthening its military forces and increasing security measures.

After the elections in 2012, Boko Haram continued its attacks, targeting civilians and security forces. The group’s tactics have included car bomb attacks, suicide bombings, and attacks on security checkpoints.

The government has been working to improve the security situation in the area by strengthening its military forces and increasing security measures. The military has also been focusing on intelligence gathering and arrests to disrupt the group’s operations.

The region is within the sphere of influence of the so-called Islamic State of West Africa, which includes Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon. The group has been involved in a series of attacks in the region, including suicide bombings and attacks on security forces.

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**Collapsing order, reluctant guardians**

*January 2015*

The year 2015 is shaping up to be an especially turbulent one. In many ways, the world order seems more frayed than it has been in recent decades. The European Union is finding itself in a state of emergency, with governments struggling to control the unprecedented migration and refugee crisis. The Middle East is in the throes of a humanitarian crisis, with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) expanding its territorial control. In Africa, the Ebola epidemic has devastated entire regions. And in Asia, the South China Sea dispute continues to escalate, with China's assertiveness leading to tensions with its neighbors.

Despite these challenges, there are signs of hope. Many governments are taking steps to address the root causes of these issues, and international organizations are working to provide assistance. However, the global order remains fragile, and there is a need for continued vigilance and cooperation to ensure a stable and prosperous future.

### What are the top geopolitical risks for 2015?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>ISIS, beyond...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Taiwan/China</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>The politics of Europe</td>
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<td>North America</td>
<td>Weak incumbents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>ISIS, beyond...</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>ISIS, beyond...</td>
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Source: World Economic Forum

### Emerging powers: free risers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Influence Perception</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Mainly positive</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Mainly negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Mainly positive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Mainly negative</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
<td>Mainly positive</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>Mainly positive</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Mainly negative</td>
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Source: World Bank

### The military balance of power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>NATO Europe</th>
<th>Asia (excluding Australia and New Zealand)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
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Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies

### The politics of Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Weak and uncertain</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>The effects of the strategic approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
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Source: Eurasia Group

### The geopolitics of the Middle East

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<tr>
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<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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Source: Eurasia Group

### The geopolitics of the Middle East

**2015**

Emerging powers: free risers?

Eurasia Group, January 2015

Russia and China are the biggest emerging powers, but India and Brazil are also gaining traction. The BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are seen as a new economic force, with China leading the way.

The Middle East is in a state of flux, with the Islamic State continuing to expand its territorial control. The Syrian conflict has dragged on for years, with no clear resolution in sight. The situation in Libya and Yemen has also remained unresolved.

Europe is facing significant challenges, with the refugee crisis and the ongoing debt crisis in Greece causing concern. The United States is also facing challenges, with the ongoing financial crisis and the need to address climate change.

Finally, it is important to note that while there are many uncertainties, there are also opportunities for growth and progress. The global economy is recovering, and there is a need to focus on addressing the root causes of these challenges to ensure a stable and prosperous future.
Asia-Pacific: a pow(d)er keg?

When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for a key dinner at the margins of the APEC summit in November last year, there were no illusions—both as if to circle around the world. After all, the gestures came along with small suggestions迈向 improving bilateral relations after years of increasingly assertive and aggressive rhetoric from both sides.

Indeed February 2016, at the Munich Security Conference, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying said that the relationship between her country and Japan was “at its worst.” A few days earlier, in Davos, Abe had hinted that China-Japan relationship was “the most important bilateral relationship in Asia” and that it was “extraordinarily dangerous.”

Today, even as relations between China and Japan have improved, the situation in the East and South China Seas, in particular, remains fragile. While the risk of armed conflict might be low, it is not negligible, and the consequences would be far-reaching, not only because the South China Sea is one of the world’s most important trade routes, with almost a third of global crude oil and over half of global LNG trade passing through it, but also because disputes over territorial claims are neither small nor untested. The region has decades of experience with such issues, from the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, to the Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu Islands in China.

The pivot of US-Asia policy has been the US shift towards the Asia-Pacific as a priority in the region, and as part of that shift, the US government, in turn, has stated unequivocally that it remains committed to the ‘pivot’ and to its allies’ security. ‘The region is not a goal, nor a process, or a moment—it’s a reality,’ Chuck Hagel said at the last Shangri-La Dialogue. "We take no position on competing territorial claims. But we firmly believe that disputes should be resolved through negotiation and mutual respect for international law and norms, and we support efforts to do that.”

In the words of a saw that dates back to the last century of conflict, China’s neighbors have been seeking much closer ties to the US. The US government, in turn, has stated unequivocally that it remains committed to the “pivot” and to its allies’ security. “The region is not a goal, nor a process, or a moment—it’s a reality,” Chuck Hagel said at the last Shangri-La Dialogue. “We take no position on competing territorial claims. But we firmly believe that disputes should be resolved through negotiation and mutual respect for international law and norms, and we support efforts to do that.”

The US and China, in particular, are both major trading partners and have a history of cooperation on matters of mutual interest, such as climate change and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, tensions remain high due to territorial disputes and maritime claims in the South China Sea.

The maritime disputes and selected naval capabilities in the South China Sea:

- The South China Sea contains some of the world’s most valuable resources, including oil and gas.
- The region is home to some of the world’s most powerful navies, including those of China, the US, and other regional powers.
- Territorial disputes and maritime claims in the South China Sea have escalated in recent years, due to increasing economic and strategic interests.
- The US has been increasing its military presence in the region, including through the deployment of new ships and aircraft.
- China has also increased its military presence in the region, including through the construction of new islands and the deployment of new ships and aircraft.

Despite these challenges, there are also signs of cooperation and engagement. For example, the US and China have been working together on efforts to reduce the risk of accidents and collisions in the South China Sea.

In conclusion, the Asia-Pacific region remains a key area of strategic interest and potential conflict. While the US and China are major players, other regional powers, such as Japan, also have a significant influence on the region’s stability and security.
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Cyber Security

February 2015

Why we are not ready for cyberwar

Our dependence on computers is growing faster than our ability to forestall attacks | By Edward Luras

C omputers and networks are baffling and the people who do not understand them are numerous, but explaining the things that matter. The security of what is now the central nervous system of modern life—the Internet—is baffling too. But it is of utmost importance.

The most important things are: understanding is the Internet is inherently vulnerable, because it was not designed with security in mind. It developed as a means for research collaboration, with resilience including the ability to withstand a nuclear attack as prime feature. This remains the case. The Internet is amazingly capable and robust. Processing power, memory and connectivity have become immeasurably cheap. From the poorest people in the world can access a mobile phone and use it to send and receive data.

Yet the same features that make the Internet so valuable make it vulnerable. The data and hygiene are akin. A familiar New Yorker cartoon shows a dog looking at a screen, with the caption: “On the Internet, nobody knows you are a dog.” Nobody knows if you are a criminal, prankster, terrorist, hoard or nobody else. We lack the ability to prove who we are to other people when we interact with them, and we lack the ability to check if they are who they say they are.

This is changing slowly. Computers such as Eaves have digital 3D systems (recently to fingerprinting) which allow some of the Internet to identify themselves. Eaves has Eaves-ID and we can send a cryptographically signed email that can only have come from me, and I can send a document to another person which only that person can read. But such schemes are still rare. There are continuous combinations and bugs, and sometimes locked up or damaged (the way in which a bug (gets into a computer). Another supposed fix of protection is “security certificate.” These are digital signatures for websites which should give the user the confidence to know that he is interacting safely with the Internet. They are usually used by a small peddler on your screen. But the system of security certificates is fundamentally broken. The companies and other entities which have them have been bribed twice and again; some are close to government. With proven records of mischief-making. Most users of the Internet have no real way of telling if they are being deceived or not.

The third problem is the sloppiness in which we have breached billions of dollars are diagnosed. Computer programs, and the sites they can run, are too complex for any individual to understand. New generations of products mindfully include the work of professional version (it would be too expensive to man from scratch). But this guarantees the presence of what are called “resource” viruses that mediate—programs—viruses and flows in families and software which an attacker can exploit. Simply by connecting a computer to the Internet you can turn it on to staging electronic devices are often presented as good enough for the attacker’s software to find and exploit a “zero-day.” These tend to be used by sophisticated attacks against important targets but more attacks for simpler. To breach a network or compromise a computer, all you need to do is get your target to run in or out of an attachment. That will install “malware.” This is software on the target’s computer, allowing the adversary access over the Internet or by some other means. Another downfall by attackers which has failed is the “distributed denial of service” which is perhaps already a simple mapping as shocking. But allowing your computer to be hijacked by a spy or to spread harmful malware makes you part of that mass, which can spread, bank or businesses of weak natural security.

The threat for our companies and networks are ubiquitous. It is a simple matter to break up and steal many online accounts to turn them into powerful devices in a cyber-attack.

Evolution has not prepared us for the challenges which electronic communication presents.

The most important thing to remember is that our computers are growing faster than our ability to forestall attacks. Our dependence on computers is growing faster than our ability to forestall attacks. Without the fear and behavior change, we will become less safe, less healthy, and less happy. The first and most important shift in our thinking is to understand that cybersecurity is not a technical issue, any more than a technical thing about simple robots, or on public health is a technical matter about the proper use of chemicals. We need to rethink our behavior as individuals, organizations and societies— in the short term and in the long. That is a problem avoiding machines, not machines.

Edward Luras is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, and an expert in the realm of public health and cyber-security. His forthcoming book, “Cybersecurity: Understanding the Threat” will be published by Bloomsbury later this year.

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Edward Luras is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, and an expert in the realm of public health and cyber-security. His forthcoming book, “Cybersecurity: Understanding the Threat” will be published by Bloomsbury later this year.
It should come as no surprise that private sector control over vast portions of our country’s digital infrastructure creates major national security vulnerabilities. However, while we have been recognizing these vulnerabilities, we have not been systematically preparing for a crisis. The result is that the public and the private sectors are still in the dark as to the types of attacks they might face.

The modern use of “mutually assured destruction” provides an uncertain measure of success in this regard. The United States and its allies have developed a large number of offensive tools to be used in the event of a cyberattack. However, these tools are largely untested and unproven. As a result, it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of these tools. In addition, it is difficult to determine whether these tools will be sufficient to achieve the desired outcome. Moreover, it is difficult to determine whether these tools will be used in an offensive or a defensive manner. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether these tools will be effective.

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Digital naifs

German companies and research centers are prime targets for cyber attacks. Yet many seem frighteningly unconcerned | By Markus Balser

The effects of those targeted attacks are immense. Denial of service also is estimated at €50 billion annually. Risk for size is also rising. But is the cyber threat real? Berlin’s Whöler strategies, major hurdles, or innovative, national secrets can quickly turn to problems for entire industrial sec-

tors. Germany’s Knowledge econ-
omy, in its only real global commod-
ity, could suffer serious damage as a result.

Security authorities have there-

fore been busying the private sector sector. IT requirements on aid to reduce their efforts or ensuring cyber security, said Michael Hugentobler, President of the Security and Information Technology (BIT). “Display a high threat level those are digital cardinals out there,” Hugentobler said at a Berlin cyber soci-

ety forum. Fifty thousand federal government computers are directly connected to the Inter-

ternet and potentially compromised, he said, adding that only 6 percent of all email is Germany is encrypted.

Meanwhile, the bad guys are building up a starring numbers, according to Germany law enforce-

ment. An estimated one billion malware programs are currently circulating worldwide. Every day, according to the BSI, that number grows by 100,000. In Germany alone, about one million comput-

er have become taken over by bo- 

ters that criminals or foreign intelligence can use for their own ends – without the owners sus-

pecting it. Many attacks originate in Russia or China, the BSI says.

An Eastern Euro-

pacific hacker group 

called Dragonfly used a malware program called Harves to attack 

industrial facilities in 

Europe and the US. 

One German gas grid operator noticed “anomalies in data flow.” IT experts fear that the attackers could go further and 

seize control of electricity distribution systems. Critical infrastructure is a possible target, law enforce-

ment officials say.

At least in the boardrooms of big corporations, attitudes are changing. Many senior execu-

tives with laments that could easily double as James Bond props, for example to make 

screens monitors the firm’s IT 

against attacks, according to Guus 

Dekkers, the group’s IT chief. 

It is dawning on many in 

German industries that this initia-

tion. Berlin hopes to mobilize 

Germany’s own know-how. Ole 

Schröder believes German firms 

need to get creative instead of just being subcontractors of the global IT industry. They need to build up their own know-how, and hold onto it. Possible mong-

ers and acquisitions of companies with essential expertise would be “accompanied critically,” Schröder said.

It is showing on many in 

German industries that the initia-

tion means the beginning of years of struggle. For Airbus IT boss Guus Dekkers, “It is a journey that has no end.”
The ghosts they have summoned
States developed the most sophisticated malware. Now these technologies are proliferating | By Eugene Kaspersky

The world is becoming increas-
ingly reliant on computerized networks and devices that have effectively revolutionized communications, manufacturing, finance and many other areas of our lives. Unfortunately, this IT revolution has produced grave risks as well. We see a rapidly evolving cyberthreat landscape, and so far our governments, law enforcement agencies and private companies have not been able to stop the development of cybercrime.

Arguably, it’s not possible to stop this process completely because the global IT sphere, the number of connected gadgets, and the volume of business done online all continue to grow – and provide new opportunities for cybercriminals.

Recent events in the cyber domain – from the Sony Pictures and JPMorgan hacks to the theft of millions of credit card holders’ data from large retailers in the US plus dozens of complex cyber espionage campaigns run by various governments all over the world – demonstrate the vulnerability of our networks and the data stored on them.

If we put aside state-sponsored espionage campaigns, the development of cybercriminals by Russian enthusiasts, and governments, the goal of cybercrime is to obtain value. In the main reason why tens of thousands of people all over the world work as hackers, steal personal information, create banking Trojans, or steal personal credentials. It’s a global criminal industry that causes huge damage to the world economy – hundreds of billions of dollars according to some estimates – and has a well-structured value chain, with a clear distribution of labor, and a high level of professionalization.

There has been some noticeable progress in tackling cybercrime on national and international levels, including very significant efforts by Europol, and the launch of Interpol’s cyber unit, the Global Complex for Innovation (GCI), in Singapore. However, there are several very worrying trends in the development of cybercrime.

First is the increase in professionalization of criminal groups. It used to be widely believed that governments running security services were behind the development of the most sophisticated, equally dangerous malware designed to steal access and sometimes even act as cyberwarriors. The problem is that these technologies have been proliferating and today we’re seeing an emergence of very dangerous Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) criminal attacks.

Most cybercriminals today target ordinary users almost indiscriminately, trying to attack and infect as many companies as possible. But a new generation of ‘data’ cybercriminals is now compo-

nent enough to attack banks and other financial institutions, so as to maximize their profits - and the resulting damage. From a cyber research’ point of view, it’s very hard to tell the difference today between a criminal APT and an APT run by a sector service, as they tend to be equally wealthy and effective. The next trend is that traditional organized crime is turning cyber gangs into hiring software engineers to violate their offline activities. We know of several such cases, including the involvement of hackers in the organization of drug smuggling through the post of Amsterdam, Belgium. There have also been reports of criminal groups hiring hackers to facilitate the theft of coal from a mine and grain from a silo by tweaking command and control loading equipment.

This is most disturbing, as in these cases we often see how criminal groups are hacking physical industrial equipment like Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used in the operation of critical infrastructure such as power grids or assembly lines. This capability – to attack the component systems that manage our physical environment – can be potentially lethal.

The third worrying trend is that cybercrime is increasingly targeting mobile devices. It’s happening simultaneously on the Android platform which we already see millions of samples of malware, but other operating systems are not immune. And with the number of ‘smart’ commercial devices expected to surge to the tune of billions as the ‘Internet of Things’ rolls out, more devices – from smart TVs to smart homes – can and most likely will be hacked by criminals.

The most general recommendation applies to everyone, from ordinary computer users all the way up to large businesses and governments. Cybersecurity should be taken very seriously, and efforts to combat cybercrime should continue to grow.

The security landscape is changing, and we need to be ready to respond to these new challenges. We must be ready to stop cybercrime in its tracks, and hold accountable those who commit cybercrime.

Finally: freedom and security combined.

(The BMW M6 Convertible at Sixt)
Cybersecurity norms are overdue

The integrity of the Internet is critical to governments and private citizens alike | By Matt Thomlinson

In 1999, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the dual-use nature of information technology noting the great societal benefits that it provides while at the same time expressing serious concern over the potential exploitation of technology for criminal and terrorist purposes. In the time since, the world has also learned that as adders to their role as protectors of cyberspace, governments also act as exploiters of cyber-espionage for national security and other reasons. Indeed, the United Nations now documents at least 41 countries who have publicly acknowledged some military planning for cyber activities.

In this shared and tightly integrated domain, any escalation of hostilities could result in unintended – and even catastrophic consequences. Unintended consequences of this scale could very easily escalate hostilities from the boardroom to the battlefield, to the abuse of norms limited to such behaviors. Cyber-espionage norms will help define acceptable and unacceptable state behavior, and define clear and precise standards for how states should act, fostering greater predictability, and limiting the potential for more problematic impacts, including – and in particular – impacts which could result from government activity below the threshold of war.

Four years ago, then UK Foreign Secretary William Hague began a global cybersecurity norms initiative dialogue at the Munich Security Conference. In order to make meaningful progress, I believe this initiative must take a more concrete form regarding substance, process, and possible outcomes. The following proposed norms provide a framework for content and a foundation for robustness, while enabling states to make choices that appropriately balance their role as users, promoters, and exploiters of cyberspace.

1. States should not target ICT components to mount vulnerabilities (backdoors) or take actions that would otherwise undermine public trust in products and services. Users of ICT products have come to expect that the companies that make these products will strive to continuously improve users’ security and privacy by protecting the functionality and reliability of these products. When nations exploit vulnerabilities that put the process by deploying their own code, it undermines product reliability, user’s privacy, and security.

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2. States should have a clear, principled-based policy for handling product and service vulnerabilities that reflects a strong mandate to report them to vendors rather than to stockpile, buy, sell, or exploit them. Reporting vulnerabilities to the affected vendor is consistent with the principles of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosures. These principles have been adopted by Microsoft and other software vendors across the ICT industry, and has been an effective strategy for multiple stakeholders to ensure the protection of the cyber ecosystem.

3. States should cease efforts in developing cyber weapons and should ensure that any that are developed are limited, precise, and not reusable. When governments build cyber weapons, they should ensure that their execution is consistent with the concepts of distinction, discrimination, and proportionality.


4. States should commit to transparent activities related to cyber weapons. As states increase investments in offensive cyber capabilities, states must be taken to not proliferate weapons or techniques for weaponizing code. Illustrates of this concern, a vulnerability explained by a cyberweapon can readily be reused by other actors as occurred after the discovery of Stuxnet.

5. States should limit their engagement in offensive cyberoperations to avoid creating a mass-event. Regardless of technological advances, there are certain principles of customary international law and the Law of Armed Conflict that are inviolate, namely minimizing harm to civilians and the principles of proportionality. States should recognize that attacks targeting the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of ICT systems, services, and data can have a mass effect beyond any reasonable sense of proportionality.

6. States should assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, respond to, and recover from events in cyberspace. Although governments play an increasing important role in cyberspace, the first line of defense against cyber attacks remains the private sector, with its globally distributed networks, institutional awareness, and well-established incident response functions. Additionally, governments should do one step further and, when asked by the private sector, commit to assist with recovery and response needs that have global and regional implications.

The development of cybersecurity norms is one of the critical tasks of our time, for governments, the private sector, and anyone activism on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the technologies that make up cyber-space.
New players emerged on the field, attacking new countries and institutions in different ways.

In the cyberworld, 2014 was dominated by the Snowden revelations, or rather their aftermath. It was immunoexciting to see how wily, how resourceful, what they did to address the many issues the case brought up. Much was seen and heard but little was truly understood.

Boeing aside, the various other high-profile cyber-madness in 2014 was to show us that we have only just begun to acknowledge the complexity of the problem. Many attacks exhibited new features, patterns and methods to penetrate and abuse IT and the Internet. These recent campaigns differed from earlier ones not so much in regard to technical and tactical details. They differed in their fundamentals as well.

The cyberworld is used to five or six cyber superpowers fighting it amongst each other—China, the US, Russia, Israel, and occasionally, to a lesser extent, France and Britain. Those attacks usually attack the same kinds of targets, with more or less the same launch patterns (a little media excitement, vague government statements and a neat string of diplomatic note toss-offs). But in 2014, new players emerged in front of the field, attacking new countries and institutions in different ways, often breaking the ‘cyberstrategic’ consequence—perhaps an important strategic evolution on many levels.

The detection of new entities began as early as January 2014 with Crowdstrike’s observation of a group called “Flying Kitten” (or “Noflight Thor” as they were dubbed by another security company, FireEye). This group was assumed to be targeting government aerospace and defense companies around the world as well as Iranian facilities. It didn’t have the first-degree threat actor look, but rather it seemed to be using mass-produced, cross-industry code.

From our perspective, “going after targets that aren’t really important to the attacker” is a bad sign. It means that the group is working through trial and error, testing what works and what doesn’t. This is a sign of a group that is not well-developed and practicing to build their attack capabilities.

One of the most notable campaigns was “Operation Arachnophobia,” using an attack vector that was known even before 2014. In Germany, the Dragonfly attack was successfully defended by a producer of industrial control systems, and led to the revelation of the campaign’s intent as an attack vector known as a “false flag.” This type of attack is not new, but it is becoming more common and more sophisticated. It means that the attackers are using techniques that are well-known and well-documented to make their attacks look like something else.

One of the most important things to note about these new campaigns is that they are not just one-off incidents. They are part of a larger trend towards more sophisticated and targeted attacks. These attacks are not just random, they are well-planned and well-executed.

The attacks on Sony, for example, were not just random. They were part of a larger strategy to disrupt the company’s business and damage its reputation. This type of attack is known as a “false flag” attack, and it is one of the most dangerous and effective tools in the cyberwarfare arsenal.

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In summary, the new players in the cyberworld are using more sophisticated and targeted attacks. They are not just random, they are well-planned and well-executed. The attacks on Sony, for example, were not just random. They were part of a larger strategy to disrupt the company’s business and damage its reputation. This type of attack is known as a “false flag” attack, and it is one of the most dangerous and effective tools in the cyberwarfare arsenal.

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The whole incident is a textbook example of the fog of cyberwar. A view from India | By Samir Saran

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