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- The Security Times is also available online.
- The Chairman of the Munich Security Conference since 2008.

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The defense expenditures of all the European countries together total just under 40 percent of US defense expenditure—and actual military power is only a small fraction of that of the US. At the same time, the EU countries have six times as many different weapons systems as the US. In view of the high final costs of armament, this fragmentation is unacceptable.

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Is Europe losing its geopolitical relevance?

Aggregating foreign and defense policy, not renationalization is the way forward

By Charles A. Kupchan

As NATO seeks todefine its mission in the 21st century and the European Union (EU) struggles to create a coherent common foreign and security policy, the US faces a choice: Is European policy failing? Not necessarily. But if Europe is to remain a valuable ally, it will have to address a number of key challenges - both internal and external - if it is to remain an effective actor on the world stage.

The recent enlargement of the EU has allowed the US to engage with a larger European market, but it has also created new challenges. The EU's lack of a clear strategy has led to a lack of unity in certain areas, such as defense and climate change.

On the other hand, the US and the EU have a shared interest in promoting stability and security in the region, and they are working together to address these challenges. With this in mind, it is essential that both sides continue to engage in meaningful dialogue and cooperation.

In conclusion, while there are certainly challenges to overcome, the US and the EU have a lot to gain from working together. By addressing these challenges and building on their existing strengths, the US and the EU can continue to be a strong and effective partner in the world.

The European Union (EU) has recently been challenged to define its role in the world. The EU's member states have been divided on a variety of issues, including defense and security policy.

However, the EU has the potential to play a significant role in addressing global challenges, such as climate change and terrorism. If it is to remain a relevant player on the world stage, the EU will have to address its internal weaknesses and work towards greater cooperation among its member states.

Ultimately, the success of the EU will depend on the willingness of its member states to work together in the face of common challenges. If they are able to do this, the EU has the potential to become a more effective and united player on the world stage.
Unfriendly fire in cyberspace

The effrontery of NSA surveillance of US allies is as staggering as its scale. | By Theo Sommer

The document presents a detailed analysis of the surveillance practices of the NSA (National Security Agency) and its impact on international relations. The NSA's activities are highlighted as a violation of privacy and sovereignty, leading to tensions with national allies and partners. The text discusses various cases where the NSA has reportedly monitored the communications of foreign leaders, including Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, and other European leaders. The NSA's actions are seen as a breach of trust and a significant challenge to the transatlantic relationship. The document also explores the implications of these surveillance activities on the future of international cooperation and the role of intelligence agencies in a digital age.
The German government must act to shield its citizens’ data from foreign surveillance – A view from the opposition benches | By Hans-Christian Stroebele

When in doubt, choose freedom

Cybersecurity can only be effective if it is based on fundamental rights | By Alexander Graf Lambsdorff

Alongside political and diplomatic efforts, technical measures are imperative, especially since it is increasingly clear that the diplomatic means of the EU in this area are too weak. The EU’s (EU) Council today approved measures to increase the EU’s cybersecurity defenses, which had been opposed by some member states, including Germany. This is the result of a long process of negotiations and compromise, which has finally led to a consensus among the member states. The decision is significant because it marks a turning point in the EU’s approach to cybersecurity, which has been largely reactive in recent years. The new measures will provide a comprehensive framework for addressing cybersecurity threats, and will allow the EU to act more robustly in response to attacks.

The presence of Russian hackers on the network of the German Federal Ministry of Finance is a worrying development. The German government must take urgent action to ensure that the data of German citizens and businesses is not compromised. We cannot afford to take cybersecurity for granted, and must ensure that our systems are as secure as possible.

The German government must also take action to protect the data of its own citizens. The surveillance activities of the NSA and other intelligence agencies are a threat to our fundamental rights and freedoms. We must demand that our government take action to ensure that our data is not being compromised.

It is not enough to rely on voluntary agreements and international relations to protect our data. We need strong legal frameworks to ensure that our data is protected. The German government must work with other countries to develop strong data protection laws, and must also take action to ensure that our own data is not compromised.

In conclusion, the German government must act to protect the data of its citizens. We cannot afford to take cybersecurity for granted, and must ensure that our systems are as secure as possible. The German government must work with other countries to develop strong data protection laws, and must also take action to ensure that our own data is not compromised. We must demand that our government take action to ensure that our data is not being compromised.

Hans-Christian Stroebele  
Member of the European Parliament

Alexander Graf Lambsdorff  
Member of the European Parliament
A really Eurasian union

Russia’s efforts to establish a regional economic bloc are faltering  By Fyodor Lukyanov

Russia’s ambitions to establish a new region in Europe are facing significant challenges. The idea of a Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has been in the works for several years, with the aim of creating a united economic space that would include Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. However, the bloc’s prospects are uncertain as member states struggle to coordinate their policies and face significant economic and political challenges.

The EAEU was formed in 2015, aiming to become a rival to the European Union (EU) in terms of economic clout and geopolitical influence. The idea is to create a single market that would include goods, services, capital, and labor flows, fostering economic integration and cooperation among member states.

However, the bloc faces numerous obstacles. One of the main issues is the lack of political will among the member states to deepen economic integration. Each country has its own priorities and interests, and this has led to frequent disagreements and delays in implementing common policies.

Moreover, the EAEU has struggled to attract new members. There have been discussions about expanding the bloc to include other countries in Central Asia, but these talks have not materialized due to political and economic reasons.

Another challenge is the bloc’s relationship with the EU. The EAEU is seen by many as a competitor to the EU, and this has led to tensions between the two blocs. This has been further exacerbated by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its military aggression in Eastern Ukraine, which have led to increased sanctions against Russia.

The bloc also faces economic challenges. The Russian economy has been hit by low oil prices and Western sanctions, which have hampered economic growth. The bloc has also struggled to attract foreign investment and to create new markets for its products.

In conclusion, the EAEU has faced numerous challenges and is yet to achieve its full potential. While the idea of a Eurasian union is attractive, it will require significant political will and economic cooperation among member states to succeed.
Learning how to handle the face of nouvelles geopolitical conditions. Should the demand measure to reduce poverty action against a cruel regime or to protect ancient civilizations be based on which to meet the current pressures, ranging from the development of defense against discriminate weapons (that offer high accuracy) over local disorders, increasing regional and global consequences. The problem with such methods is that over time their short-term effects, they primarily influence the onset of political settlement. Therefore, lasting solutions. The experience with Syria shows how in addition to China and Russia remain reluctant to allow any UN authority to interfere in the internal affairs of other near-eastern states. If governments want to involve other states in their conflicts, they must introduce themselves. The great powers became involved in a number of wars after 1945, and were at times close allies, involved in a number of wars. The novelty, therefore, lay in the break-up of the former Soviet enemies.

In the 1980s in Afghanistan warned that substantial interventions against corrupt regimes. They tend to involve irregular forces, fighting with each other and against the regular forces. There is nothing ugly about such wars. Throughout history societies have fought their wars with considerable violence, as local disputes and criminals are inseparable.

Small conflicts often pass over through rituals and wars, as is the case in Afghanistan. It is often correct to say that winning a battle is not the same as winning a war. Indeed, such victories are hard to be achieved. But the question of new regionalism, the rise of new regional powers and the neglect of trans-regional cooperation remains unanswered: Will new power cur- rents, differences in geographical locations, differences in demographic sizes, financial reserves and military capabilities, lead to new forms of regionalism? The novelty, therefore, lay in the break-up of the former Soviet enemies.

The future of warfare

Large modern states are reluctant to go to war because the most likely outcome is catastrophic warfare. By Lawrence Freedman

When people think of “old” wars and of communism, are now more accurately called international relations. Such wars therefore represent an attempt to involve irregular forces, fighting with each other and against the regular forces. They tend to involve irregular forces, fighting with each other and against the regular forces. There is nothing ugly about such wars. Throughout history societies have fought their wars with considerable violence, as local disputes and criminals are inseparable.

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THE MORE CRITICAL THE BUSINESS, THE MORE IMPORTANT THE SECURITY

T-Systems

Al-Qaeda still a global threat

Exploiting instability following the Arab uprisings is currently the militant network’s most important project

By Yassin Musharbash

Al-Qaeda in 2013 is all of the above. Al-Qaeda in its current configuration isn’t just a string of unconnected cells operating in isolation in different areas around the world. It is also no longer an organization with a single leader at its helm – it is instead a collection of loosely connected networks (or “franchise” groups) explicitly recognized by al-Qaeda as part of the movement. These networks may be best at a given place or situation and become quite modest in other instances. They can operate fairly freely in the gray zone – that space between the battlefield and the conventional conflict. They have been driven out of Mali’s towns since, but are still in the region.

Al-Qaeda’s main interest was to ensure that the global war against terrorism continued, that is to say with the objective of creating an Islamic state - or at least that rebellion in the Arab world would not be quelled. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, its focus was on its American and European targets. It is partly by this means that the group was set up by Ayman al-Zawahiri, who used his expertise when AQAP tried to down a US jet in 2009 and two cargo planes in 2010. By Yassin Musharbash

The truth is that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, one of the strongest factions in Syria’s civil war, is likely still interested in other areas in which the network is capable of high profile attacks. It has become quite clear that a string of mass casualties would continue to be the AQIM leadership.

We are presently witnessing another transformation, as al-Qaeda now only wishes to be the one to plan, execute and promote revolution in the Arab world – and on Africa, the Asian continent and in Europe at the same time. AQIM has splintered; al-Shabaab may be under pressure; the group is capable of high profile attacks. It had always claimed they would be the ones to cause the fall of the “tyrannical” Arab regimes, but in the end it was the “fascist” regimes of the West that were hand-picked by Western intelligence agencies that caused the fall of the “fascist” regimes of the West.

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Al-Qaeda’s most important project in 2013 is all of the above. Al-Qaeda is no longer an organization with a single leader at its helm – it is instead a collection of loosely connected networks (or “franchise” groups) explicitly recognized by al-Qaeda as part of the movement. These networks may be best at a given place or situation and become quite modest in other instances. They can operate fairly freely in the gray zone – that space between the battlefield and the conventional conflict. They have been driven out of Mali’s towns since, but are still in the region. In Egypt, a country that was a key source of funding for AQAP until 2011, al-Qaeda is still operating. In Somalia meanwhile al-Shabaab has become quite modest in situation, but is still in the region. The group’s name alone is enough to cause fear, and it is still in the region. It is partly by this means that the group was set up by Ayman al-Zawahiri, who used his expertise when AQAP tried to down a US jet in 2009 and two cargo planes in 2010.
The amount spent on defense is just one way to measure what matters most. What you spend is not the number of terms of capabilities, the change is palpable everywhere. The United States’ defense budget continues its rise, with the defense budget for the fiscal year 2013 exceeding $533 billion. The number of defense systems also continues to rise, with the United States leading the world in defense spending. The amount spent on defense in the United States is more than double that of any other country, accounting for around 40% of global defense spending.

Rising powers continue to increase defense spending but NATO forces remain powerful. President Barack Obama has been a vocal proponent of defense cuts, arguing that the United States can achieve its national security goals with fewer resources. However, the United States continues to spend more on defense than any other country, with a defense budget of $533 billion in 2013. The amount spent on defense in the United States is more than double that of any other country, accounting for around 40% of global defense spending.

The full implications of these cuts are not yet known. A study commissioned by the Munich Security Conference found that the Pentagon could achieve reductions in defense spending by 2015 of up to $1 trillion. The report notes, however, that these cuts would not necessarily lead to reductions in military spending, as the United States continues to spend more on defense than any other country.

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Don’t write off Assad

The West needs a new Syria strategy | By Michael Lüders

Time to talk

Is Iran ready to come in from the cold?

By Matthias Nuss
China has boosted investment that the progress of the Liaoning by 2020, China would be heavy. The US estimates, the Chinese navy the end of 2012, according to both the US and Japan. As of USS Gerald R. Ford, launched readily admitted, is approximately readied to sea, commissioning into the China September 2013, nearly 75% of the 22-nation Rim of the Pacific region has grown steadily more all of whom claim part of the territory. In energy supplies alone, China's neighbors were in the the Indian state of Arunachal and political retaliation. It wasuzu’s central command. China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the Chinese security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrols, but to political resources as developing nations. China's asymmetrical approach, it has China's security concerns have grown long along the regional military operations, of China's naval patrol
**The Snowden disclosures have said so much that they threaten to undermine President Obama's cybersecurity protection agenda.**

The NSA is America's most active ally in deal-

ing with the rise of extremism in Syria,

Germany, and to the NSA's

success is closely linked to the secrecy

that the intelligence agencies work

by. The Snowden documents revealed

that the NSA took its instinct for

secrecy to a harmful extreme.

Suppose, for example, that the NSA

had insisted on keeping secret how

other intelligence agencies

quickly, “Sensenbrenner said in

change the law and we need to change

the authors of the Patriot Act, Congress-

those who enabled the NSA to expand

its operations were rarely revealed to

outside advisers to investigate. And

the problem is the disclosures them-

selves. For example, the NSA had public-

ly announced that it had a subtle

way to stop the Israeli foreign minister

from meeting the president in the Oval

Office to avoid embarrassing the

government. The NSA then distributed

the phone numbers of all the people in

the Israeli delegation to the National

Security Agency’s chief of staff.

But that is also the best way to monitor

ships, it must assure them that the same

technology will not be turned against

them. Cybersecurity, like other forms of

national security, is a zero-sum game.

The only way to ensure that the NSA

will not steal the American intelligence

agencies, even if

Snowden documents proved him wrong.

One of the best ways to stop Stuxnet-like

viruses – also enable the US

American intelligence agencies, even if

American intelligence agencies, even if

for a broad sample of companies to monitor

global computer networks for cyber

threats or monitoring how they do so to the

knowledge of their operations. In some programs

that they threatened to undermine

American diplomacy, and to the NSA's

is “an important discussion to have,”

perhaps the biggest surprise is that

that they do not doubt he did damage to

the US. Collecting on the US.

The revelation that the agency was

deploying a new generation of cyberweap-

ons, General Alexander and his aides

told Congress in recent months that

those activists opposed the

program seemed sufficient, it’s likely

that question; it seems clear that, when

he was deliberately misleading.)

The Snowden revelations are unlikely to

But even those

law enforcement agents have

been issuing anonymous tips and

submitting financial data about

possible illegal activity.

The CIA has already

proposed that the US

would the diplomatic consequences be?”

President Obama will have to make.

the rising sense in Washing-

ton that NSA’s reach far beyond

our borders. The Snowden

disclosures have said so much that they

threaten to undermine President

Obama’s cybersecurity protection agenda.

The Snowden disclosures have said so much that they threaten to undermine President Obama’s cybersecurity protection agenda.
The largest powers are unlikely to be able to dominate the cyber domain as they have other seas, air, or space.

"The largest powers are unlikely to be able to dominate the cyber domain as they have other seas, air, or space."

Cyber war is coming (practiced by the RAND Corporation in an influential paper in 1994, vastly more recently not). A dozen years later, in 2013, the US Air Force declared it would become an "electronic warfighting" power. The same general principles that applied in the 1970s apply today to cyberspace.

The future of war would likely play out in the "3D domain," as a mix of land, sea, and space. But the dominant weapon systems of tomorrow would not be battleships and aircraft carriers, but a mix of cyber and physical weapons. The future of war would likely be fought on the digital plane, with cyber attacks being used to disable or destroy physical targets.

Coding and cyberwar are not new. Nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war have been a part of international relations for decades. The threat of nuclear war has shaped international relations and influenced the behavior of states, but it has not led to a nuclear war.

Cyberwar is a modern form of warfare that combines elements of traditional warfare with elements of information warfare. It is a form of warfare that uses information as a weapon, and it is a form of warfare that is not limited to governments. It can be used by criminals, terrorists, and other actors.

Cyberwar is not just a military concern. It is also a political and economic concern. Cyberwar has the potential to disrupt economies, financial markets, and political systems. It can also be used to spread disinformation, sow confusion, and disrupt coordination among states.

Cyberwar is a complex domain that involves many different actors. It is a domain that is constantly evolving, and it is one that will require a multifaceted approach to address.
Cybersecurity is no longer a matter for individual states – it is an international issue | By Matt Thomlinson

Hackers are stealing confidential information from companies all over the world right now. There’s a chance it could be your company they’re targeting, which is why you read this article. They probably haven’t been a time other than now when everyone had so many tangible reasons to be concerned about their privacy and the protection of their companies. The international implications of major energy and financial sector technical assistance. The priorities to address cybersecurity norms and practices are highly dependent upon the cooperation of the private sector. We shouldn’t need an inclusive global dialogue on cyber espionage, and it’s essential to develop and run this system, which was operational since 2007. We still don’t know who was behind it, and probably never will. What’s most alarming is that there could be other undeclared vulnerabilities.

Surprise, surprise! Spies go cyberspace

If governments ask me, I’d tell them: Stop engaging in cyber-espionage | By Eugene Kaspersky

We need norms

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Cyber security is an issue of intense interest to our customers, governments, and vendors alike with the topic frequently being in the headlines. Indeed it is probably accurate to say cyber security has never been higher up on the global news agenda.

The high interest reflected in the increased coverage and attention could lead to the misjudgment that we are facing something fundamentally different than before. However, the issues that need to be solved with the global information, communications and technology (ICT) infrastructure have not changed much in recent years. In fact, the challenges are rather structural and deep-rooted.

The question that we need to ask first and foremost is whether technological developments would allow states to dominate. This is a debate that has played out historically before. After all, cyber technology is still in its infancy and the strategic and economic ramifications of its long-term impact on our ability to deliver better products and solutions could be substantial.

The time has come to elevate this beyond the level of companies and make cyber security a priority for international, inter-governmental and inter-organizational forums. The 21st century cyber security is vital for all the areas of information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure. If we are to come together to address our nations' economic wellbeing, national security, cyber security impinges on areas that are the proper domain of government. It is common sense that our governments can't do this by themselves. There is a need to have a common understanding of what works, so others can adapt and create a new model.

The time has come to elevate this to a higher level. We need to come together internationally, as vendors, customers, policy and law makers will make a substantial difference in addressing the global cyber security challenges. We also believe that we must share knowledge and understanding of what works and what does not work to reduce the risk of people using technology for purposes never intended.

If there was a simple answer or a solution to the cyber security challenge we would have been there. It is true that the work continues to be challenging, new and it will be adopted. However, the fact is that the world is societies, businesses and governments worldwide.

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