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Security in an era of global change

By Wolfgang Ischinger

The Munich Security Conference has for several years now emerged globally as a unique forum for decision-makers in the field of foreign and security policy. I am delighted to welcome more than 70 government delegations from all over the world, heads of state and government, foreign and defense ministers, ambassadors, military officials, academic experts, as well as CEOs and society representatives to this year’s conference.

Ten years after 9/11, a decade of large-scale military operations is coming to an end. Increasingly, non-military factors will shape the global security debate. As the Eurozone’s crisis and the economic crisis continue, the question is – and the answer is – how we will navigate this slow global economic growth and create jobs for millions, especially for the young generation.

Some experts are already concerned about a “demilitarization of Europe.” Three European prime ministers – George Papandreou, Silvio Berlusconi, José Zapatero – have recently discussed how to reduce defense expenses. NATO members had better start pooling and sharing in NATO and European states are neither able nor especially willing to assume new responsibilities – or less alone. It will remain preeminent, but it will no longer be predominant. It will remain preeminent, but it will no longer be predominant. It will remain preeminent, but it will no longer be predominant.

The conferences motto this year is “Securing peace in an era of multiple crises.” The dynamic developments in the Asia-Pacific region, the economic crisis, the tension in the Middle East, the situation in the Balkans, the European debt crisis, and the future of the euro are all urgent topics.

The 48th Munich Security Conference will unveil its proposals for a security architecture fit for the 21st century.

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most dangerous threats are the most dangerous threats. Above the Strait of Malacca. Above the Horn of Africa. And around Somalia, armed clashes threaten vital trade routes. The Arab-Israeli conflict is farther from the radar than the Korean peninsula. The Arab-Israeli conflict is farther from the radar than the Korean peninsula. The Arab-Israeli conflict is farther from the radar than the Korean peninsula. The Arab-Israeli conflict is farther from the radar than the Korean peninsula. The Arab-Israeli conflict is farther from the radar than the Korean peninsula. The Arab-Israeli conflict is farther from the radar than the Korean peninsula. The Arab-Israeli conflict is farther from the radar than the Korean peninsula. The Arab-Israeli conflict is farther from the radar than the Korean peninsula. The Arab-Israeli conflict is farther from the radar than the Korean peninsula. The Arab-Israeli conflict is farther from the radar than the Korean peninsula. 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the beginning of 2012, the financial and economic situation is facing many challenges. The financial crisis, the public debt crisis and the development of the economy are determining the political agenda in capitals on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite the discussion on the "Europe and beyond," we will not be guided by a repertoire by the global security situation. The division of Europe is the main characteristic of the Arab world, which is incomprehensible, especially the liberal-minded progress on the way to becoming a nuclear power and the increasing challenge of Iran. The two pillars of the complex and dynamic security environment are deterrence and disarmament. Ensuring security in a responsible way today requires a balance between security for our own country and the security of our partners. Security can be a country’s primary responsibility. The current financial and public debt crises have shown us more clearly than ever before that there can be no economic prosperity without security and conversely, no security without economic prosperity. Healthy state finances are a fundamental prerequisite for stability and security. At the same time, economic and social prosperity are dependent on protection from aggression, stabilization and reconstruction, not at least, against terrorism. The effective use of these tools, national and European, is not only particularly dependent on regional, transnational and global cooperation, but to a large extent also on the discipline and solidarity in national politics and economic matters. For this reason, Germany plays a leading role in tackling the European sovereign debt crisis. 20 Years after the end of the Cold War, Germany is an equal partner in the UN, NATO and the EU. It is in our own interest and in the interest of our partners that we stand side by side, in a joint response: climate change, demographic change, energy, the fight against crime, terrorism and other forms of international crime are challenges in cyberspace are examples of the challenges that will keep us busy in the years to come. In parallel, we are working to strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance. Today, Europe and Africa are perceived as potential partners for one another, and in the future, Africa will play an increasing role. The US and Europe actively seek to deepen and consolidate the partnerships with the US and Europe, and South America, and with China and South America, and with China. As our actions remain a robust, comprehensive, multilateral, and a strategic cooperation, the partnerships with third parties are of utmost importance. Berlin and Washington share the same goal of ensuring security for the world and ourselves. The US and Europe remain an essential country in the world, and this contributes substantially to it. As the largest export nation, Germany is an equal partner in the international arena. The US and Europe are reliable partners in the world and an active country in the world. The US and Europe are reliable partners in the world and a free and united Europe and the United States of America remain a matter of (re-)establishing the Weimar Triangle, which aims at strengthening the European Union and the international agenda in capitals on both sides of the Atlantic.

Europe should view the American shift of strategic focus toward Asia as an opportunity.

Let us not forget that transatlantic trade will remain one of the most significant economic milestones on a global level in the foreseeable future. Future issues require a joint response: climate change, energy, the fight against crime, terrorism and other forms of international crime are challenges that will keep us busy in the years to come. In parallel, we are working to strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance.

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The US and Europe are reliable and valued, stable and predictable partners for one another, today and in the future. This is what distinguishes us. This is our common strength.

In a changing world, apart from our long-standing partnerships, new partnerships will become increasingly important. The US and Europe actively seek to deepen and consolidate the partnerships with the US and Europe, and South America, and with China. As our actions remain a robust, comprehensive, multilateral, and a strategic cooperation, the partnerships with third parties are of utmost importance. Berlin and Washington share the same goal of ensuring security for the world and ourselves. The US and Europe remain an essential country in the world, and this contributes substantially to it. As the largest export nation, Germany is an equal partner in the international arena. The US and Europe are reliable partners in the world and a free and united Europe and the United States of America remain a matter of (re-)establishing the Weimar Triangle, which aims at strengthening the European Union and the international agenda in capitals on both sides of the Atlantic.

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since the fall of Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi one year ago, it has become evident that the political transformation of the Arab world is a complex, volatile, often violent, and protracted process rather than being an exportable and replicable fr"
Iraq could become the battlefield in a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia

By Guido Steinberg

The report from Iraq reveals the worst peri-
ods of the 2003-2007 civil war that brought the country between the the Escala-
tion and the Tigers to the brink of total collapse. Almost 70 people were killed in attacks on civilians in Baghdad and Ninewa in early January, and more than 160 were wounded, many seriously. A deadly car bomb without suicide bombers killed dozens of people. As before the civil war, Sunni territories are again trying to prevent the Shiites from gaining the ministries of defense and interior. Instead, rivals from gaining the ministries. Party. Reneging on previous concessions to his new partners in a coalition of national unity.

Obviously, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki wants to take advantage of the Americans' withdrawal to neutralize his rivals. During the elections in March 2010, the Shiites came a close second to neutralize his rivals. During the elections in March 2010, the Shiites came a close second – managed to be reappointed prime minister in late 2011 after the elections. The rate of attacks in Iraq has increased since December last year. The protest movement that brought the defen
d of the 2005-2007 civil war has rec

The coalition came a close second in the elections. Al-Qaeda is a weakened force in Iraq but it still represents a danger to be taken seriously, it would be reassuring to know that the government is Baghdad was combating the terror-
ists with every means at its dis-
power. Instead, the political class remains caught up in its own struggle for power.

Iraq is a long way from that peace? Ever achieve unity and domestic reconciliation. Who knows whether it will remain a regional power, in the balance of power in Iraq could become the battleground in a proxy war between the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime.

It seems clear that Maliki's strategy is a Middle East, has yet to demonstrate that it can create democratically elected plural social and state orders, in which the differences and contradictions between the various tribes, sects and parties can be bridged satisfactorily. It is a compromise instead of confron-
tation. Iraq is a long way from that goal. The considerations of Sunnis and Shiites now only exist on paper. Right-wing militias in the South and the Syrian opposition have increased their outreach. Iran's opponents offer a welcome opportunity to weaken Bashar al-Assad and therefore also to damage Tehran. Although the Saudis seem to lack the determination to follow through on their commitments by providing major arms deliveries to the Syrian opposition, Iraq has already reacted. Maliki is helping the Assad regime because he fears that a Sunni-ruled Syria making common cause with Saudi Arabia could also support its domestic Sunni opponents. Rumors are circulating in the region about billion-dollar payments to the embattled dictator in Damascus. If Assad falls, surrender, the balance of power in Iraq could change again. Iraq could become the battlefield in a proxy war between the Syrian opposition and the Saudi camps in the Middle East.

Iraq, like the rest of the Middle East, has yet to demonstrate that it can create democratically elected social and political orders, in which the differences and contradictions between the various tribes, sects and political parties can be bridged satisfactorily. It is a compromise instead of confrontation.
Sanctions may backfire

Drastic economic actions against Iran make military confrontation more likely | By Vali Nasr

The United States and its European allies have received the most recent IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear activities with new and nagging concerns, but have ruled out military strikes for the time being. They ought to be the last option, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said in a recent speech, because there is still time for diplomatic and political solutions to persuade Iran. But that looks increasingly unlikely. The crippling sanctions that the US and its European allies are about to impose, combined with ongoing purchases of Iranian oil and encouraging other OPEC countries to skip their purchases, would historically cut Iran’s revenues. These measures go much further to undermining Iran’s economy, disclosing the clerical regime’s hold on power. That is why Iran’s rulers are stepping up economic pressure with confrontational posturing and by accelerating its nuclear program. Sanctions are no longer a clear alternative to war, they could now be a potential cause of it.

Unfazed by the machinations of international economic pressure and remained silent in the face of covert operations aimed at derailing the progress of its nuclear program, but there are plenty of indicators that this attitude has changed. The threat of waging economic warfare on the West for closing the Strait of Hormuz and “pushing oil prices to $200 a barrel” is a serious war games exercise simulating attacks on American warships, threatening to crash an American aircraft carrier, a banned assault on the British Embassy in Tehran and the downing of a US drone. Iran is not only defiant but is also escalating its own pressure on the West. Tehran has decided that it should take steps to thwart sanctions before they are imposed rather than try to remove them through negotiations.

It’s ratifying a report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which has drastically reduced Iran’s access to global financial markets, reduced imports leading to consumer shortages, and helped inflation and unemployment. The US has fallen to its lowest point against the dollar, and capital is flowing towards the country or an escalating war. This is what the government has been forced to gape numerous infrastructure projects, especially in the oil and gas sector. These hardships have created popular discontent but so far there are no protests in the streets. The next set of sanctions could change that. They could cut Iran’s oil revenue and undermine the stability of the ruling regime. That is why Iran is dig- ging in its heels and threatening retaliation by shutting down the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. Tehran has decided that it should take steps to thwart sanctions before they are imposed rather than try to remove them through negotiations.

Without a clear diplomatic roadmap mounting pressure on Iran will cause serious ramifications, for the health of the global economy.

For much of the past year, Iran’s leaders have dodged the bullet by Western pressure. The apparent plot to assassi- nate the Swiss Ambassador in Washington suggests that such an expon- ence has been making the case for direct confrontation with the Ahmadinejad’s gambit failed and he now wants to shred the deal. Then came the Washington plot. The US human rights report on Iran, the IAEA report, and fresh sanctions. These developments seem to have combined to settle the policy debate in Tehran in favor of confrontation.

The IAEA report left little chance for the United States and its European allies but to increase economic pressure on Iran. The US Senate unanimously passed a bill that would authorize the President to sanction Iran’s Central Bank, which would effectively isolate Iran’s ability to sell oil. The Obama administration is not too keen on taking that step now and has instead opted for a sanctions regime that would target oil industry sanctions as an act of war. Combined with stepped-up covert attacks on Iranian military and nuclear tech- nology, the latest sanctions could lead to a broader military conflict. The West thinks Iran is weak and isolated, its economy in disarray, its relations with Europe faltering, and that the

Military Build-up in the Middle East

Defense spending in $bn

Without a clear diplomatic roadmap mounting pressure on Iran will cause serious ramifications, for the health of the global economy.

"There are no easy options for dealing with Iran, but not persist- ing on a failing strategy is a good place to start. It is time Washing- ton’s done a proper review of its Iran strategy and came up with a new game plan— one that is not reliant solely on pressure but also shows the way to rehab diplomat. Without a clear diplomatic roadmap, mounting pressure on Iran will cause serious ramifications, for the health of the global economy. It will not end Iran’s nuclear program, only work to make it worse. A dangerous Iran would become a new North Korea in the heart of the Middle East. Sanctions will palliate and subdue Iran. They are not a solution to the current crises."

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Ominous developments in Iran are causing concern. The latest is the killing of an Iranian nuclear procurement director. The Israeli intelligence agency, the Mossad, has condemned the Jan. 11 killing of the director and 16 others. Iran has declared it an accident, but post-incident imagery suggested foul play. In response, Iran seeks to show it has the capability to produce nuclear weapons and to dissuade Iran from taking the final steps to a deliverable weapon. The IAEA’s November report provided evidence that some aspects of Iran’s nuclear program work continued after the 2011 date when the US and Israel concluded that the structured weaponization work was stopped. Iran’s missile program further advances in 2012, with the first test launch of the solid-fueled Sajil-2 missile for February. Tahran announced that the rocket flew 3,800 km into the Indian Ocean and also boasted that it had a sea-based tracking capability to monitor the splashdown. The missile program suffered a setback in November when a US testing center was leased by Israel to exploit the head of program and 16 others, Iran declared it an accident, but post-incident imagery suggested foul play. An attack on an missile facility would be consistent with what has been called a covert war. An incident early this year, however, crossed what many regarded as an unacceptable line. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton strongly condemned the Jan. 21 killing of Nazerian procurement director Mostafa Alirezaie Rezahrai and denied US responsibility. For a nuclear program as advanced as Iran’s, a “decloaking strategy” is unlikely to work. In addition to the normal risks, such actions could be counterproductive. Iran announced that 1,300 university students enlisted in the study to be nuclear scientists after the assassination. Iran also leased US-led sanctions against its central bank and exports as a war. In contrast to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s dismissal of US threats as a “disposable tissue,” he acknowledged that the current sanctions are having the value of the rial is plunging and Iran’s inflation rate is soaring. The sanctions are harming trade and consumers more than their proponents have imagined due to the uncertainties created consequences. However, the imposing EU oil embargoes and strikes may by other countries in response to US pressure will cut into Iran’s revenue stream. In response, Iran seeks to show that it can fight back. The threat to close the Strait of Hormuz if oil embargo is imposed should be interpreted as a warning, not as a military threat. Iran would not close all of Iran’s important routes except under circumstances of war. A pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program would be an act of folly. US unilaterality and unilateralism are not the world’s best options and it is unlikely that a terrorist attack on a terrorist network in Iran would be effective.

Iran is feeling will induce it to try to acquire a nuclear weapon or block the Hormuz Strait. Israel’s red line is more ambiguous. The Israeli leadership may not know what would cause them to take unilateral military action. The Iranians cannot know either, which could cause them to be either cautious or risky. Miscalculations of another sort could also lead to war. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta recently made Ireland’s red line public, developing, a nuclear weapon or blocking the Hormuz Strait. Israel’s red line is more ambiguous. The Israeli leadership may not know what would cause them to take unilateral military action. The Iranians cannot know either, which could cause them to be either cautious or risky.

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Consider the consequences

A pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program would be an act of folly | By Mark Fitzpatrick
The EU needs a joint Defense Review initiative by Mark Leonard

A t last year’s Munich Security Conference, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and US Defense Secretary Robert Gates both declared that NATO and the EU need to join forces with purely national intent. Instead, each minister has integration get a chance. The main reason why even the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates in his valedictory speech to the US Congress in February 2012 echoed a few months later by his European counterpart, General Anders Fogh Rasmussen took to the stage to lecture European governments into spending more on defense. In their November paper on ‘How to Stop the Demilitarization of Europe,’ what was still clear was that the overall capability output of Europe’s defense establishments is probably sufficient but not of the right type. In sum, there needs to be a major realignment of European defense policies and priorities. Thus the overall pattern of defense spending in Europe seems no longer sustainable. To drive the strategy into practice.

Minister to the fore

Only their dictates can force the Europeans to streamline defense efforts | By Christoph Bertram

Finance Ministers to the fore!

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Finance Ministers to the fore!
The Obama Doctrine

China and the United States compete for supremacy in the Pacific

By W. R. Smyser

Obama is cutting the defense budget, downgrading Europe and refocusing on the Asia-Pacific.

Military Build-up in Europe

Defense expenditures in $m

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
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China’s military power “must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions.” The Chinese naval buildup, especially plans for more submarines and an aircraft carrier, is definitely amazing US analysts. The Americans also presumably now know China is expanding its global presence through investments in Latin America—no longer America’s backyard—as well as in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Those investments, if not perhaps directly strategic, certainly Chinese influence and give Beijing a significant voice on many issues on which Washington had become accustomed to having the last word. Although China may be a rival instead of an enemy, Washington wants to avoid misunderstandings and unintended clashes.

Secretory of State Hillary Clin- ton had already signaled heightened US interest in Asia with an article on “America’s Pacific Cen- ter” in the November 2010 issue of Foreign Policy. There she specifically of “defending freedoms of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, and ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players.” She wrote that America would try to “strengthen the strategic security dialogues” with Beijing, perhaps within a regional framework. She also called for more regional cooperation between America’s separate treaty allies in the region. Neither President Obama’s document nor Secre- tary Clinton’s article suggest any backing off at all from potential US strategic withdrawal from Europe.

Beijing has not so far reacted to Obama’s “new” doctrine, through Chinese guarded media reports have worried America about “flaring in maniacs” like “a bull in a China shop.” As they have also suggested that a “counter-US arms” could lead to regional liability and a “good for Chinese economic develop-

The US Navy can and does serve a variety of purposes. Its most obvious is a deterrent to potential aggression in the Western Pacific, but it is also used to project power ashore in times of crisis. From Vietnam to Iraq, China has expanded its navy, allowing it to project power around the globe.

Military Build-up in Europe

China and the United States compete for supremacy in the Pacific

By W. R. Smyser

Obama is cutting the defense budget, downgrading Europe and refocusing on the Asia-Pacific.

Military Build-up in Europe

Defense expenditures in $m

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Debating the rise of China has become one of the most controversial issues of our time. The prevailing skepticism of many Western assessments opposes the argument that China’s rise is, after all, a normal and legitimate process, whether we like its effects or not.

The rise and fall of nations is an integral characteristic of perpetual change in international relations. The 20th century witnessed the rise of the US as well as the USSR, and their final downfall in 1991. It imprisoned Germany’s historical disasters and its astonishing economic and political resurrection after 1949, as well as the continuous decline of two former global powers. Britain, when the loss of former glory was endured with a stiff upper lip, and France, without the French elite seemingly even noticing.

China has steadily increased spending on its armed forces: an honor guard of the People’s Liberation Army. China’s return to a position of global power following the long decades of war and ideological polarization after 1949 and 1976. But China’s sustained economic progress after the catastrophes of the Maoist period between 1949 and 1976. But China’s sustained economic progress after the catastrophes of the Maoist period between 1949 and 1976, and its growing assertiveness after the break of the two superpowers in 1991. It experienced two economic and presumably also military points of Chinese elites is the early 15th century.

While Western elites usually refer to more or less recent events in their political posturing, the reference point of Chinese elites is the early 15th century. At that time, China was the leading technological, cultural, economic and presumably also military power in the world. It had been in decline ever since until the trend was stopped by Deng Xiaoping’s reform policies in the late 1970s. Fu Ying’s message is clear: Lessons learned by China in the past could help to solve the problems of the West today. Thus, the challenge that lies in China’s rise and the way the country presents itself to the world. China was the leading technological, cultural, and presumably also military power in the world. It had been in decline ever since until the trend was stopped by Deng Xiaoping’s reform policies in the late 1970s.

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Instead of being alarmed, we should focus on co-evolution of trust and the creation of a partnership deserving of the name. Such a perspective on China’s rise emphasizes, first of all, that fear is unnecessary. Those who complain about China’s growing assertiveness should not forget that our hopes for a huge new market, our investments, our technology and our willingness to open up that market fundamentally contributed to making China strong. Now, the masterpieces of rapid turnings into a huge middle-class consumer and ally. Western capitals is partially dependent on the support of a reasonably Constructive system to make a full return to health.

Secondly, as a consequence of China’s rise and the new BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) constellation, the world has been rapidly turning into a free multipolar power in the world. We should be concerned that neither the US, nor Europe – or Brazil, Russia, India and China – nor Japan, nor Korea, nor Germany, nor France, not sound too bad to Western, and probably also to Eastern, ears. The definition of responsibility will always be a Chinese double-edged sword. China will be, and to some extent already is, a responsible stakeholder – but its definition of responsibility will always be a Chinese one, seeking Beijing’s interests first and then almost automatically confronting Western approaches toward global issues.

Chinese elites are past masters at feeding their Western counterparts with nice sounding concepts of harmony and hope for “win-win” situations. We

![Picture of an honor guard of the People’s Liberation Army.](image)

**By Eberhard Sandschneider**

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![DB Schenker](image)

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China’s growing assertiveness
Instead of being alarmed, the West should focus on co-evolution
By Eberhard Sandschneider

China’s growing assertiveness in its foreign policy, as it is only able to take precautions to manage its domestic development. In the past, China has accepted the American military presence in its neighborhood because it had no choice. Beijing’s modernization of armed forces, space and cyber military capacities clearly indicates a willingness to gradually increase the risk of vulnerability for American forces in the Western Pacific. After several provocative and even aggressive moves, especially in the South China Sea, Beijing has again returned to a more cooperative approach towards the US and Southeast Asian neighbors. But gradually China will become an ever more assertive power. Its influence will be decisively felt in all of Asia’s vast open and certainly on the Korean peninsula, toward Europe, as well as on the South China Sea, but also in Central Asia and increasingly also in other strategically sensitive parts of the world.

In order to avoid potential conflict, Western approaches should accordance on the major principle of co-evolution, which might help to successfully manage policies towards a rising China. Based on historical experiences, they could be described as: cooperation instead of confrontation; compromising instead of containing; negotiating instead of enforcing rules; building trust instead of preaching values; and accepting China as a partner among equals instead of promoting feelings of Western superiority.

What remains is the simple hope that these principles of co-evolution might work in the years and decades ahead. Skepticism remains as to whether it will be possible for Europe and the US in the early 21st century to avoid the mistakes made by declining powers in the past.

The key to success does not lie in policies of confrontation and containment, nor in the much-debated necessity of integrating China into our Western-dominated world, but by allowing principles of co-evolution to prevail in the complex management of readjustment to a multipolar world. The real challenge for Western powers is not primarily managing the rise of China and others, but managing the risks of fragile multipolarity.

China’s growing assertiveness

Shanghai’s skyline is the symbol of a booming economy. China is gradually transforming its economic power into political and also military might.

Eberhard Sandschneider is Otto Wolff-Director of the Research Institute and Head of the China/Asia-Pacific Program of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

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While China and the US vie for hegemony, an arms race is underway in the region | By Ulrich Weisser

A strategic tug of war has begun in the Western Pacific. This question of regional hegemony, and therefore also the question of who will dominate the 21st century, will be decided between China and the US. The world’s two largest economies square off against each other with unabashed rivalry.

But other nations in the region are also involved in the geopolitical tussle. Their ties with Washington again.

Connecting the World.

New Business Offshore Wind Farm Denmark

Military Build-up in the Asia-Pacific Region

Defence spending in $bn

Battle of the Pacific

Strategic tug of war has begun in the Western Pacific. This question of regional hegemony, and therefore also the question of who will dominate the 21st century, will be decided between China and the US. The world’s two largest economies square off against each other with unabashed rivalry. But other nations in the region are also involved in the geopolitical tussle.

India's biggest security headache is that it cannot interpret China's intentions and does not know how far Beijing's expansionary strategy will reach. The ambitious, strategically driven naval construction program makes the Indian government uneasy. The overlapping political, economic and strategic interests of India and China in the Indian Ocean are defined by competition, but increasingly also by strategic maritime rivalry.

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The Chinese defense build-up is also the main reason why Japan, Australia, Vietnam and Singapore are participating in an arms race that is unlike anything which has not been seen since the Cold War. The Chinese hegemon is driving its Asian neighbors closer together, but they are only wisely setting off on a common path. They seek protection from America while driving its Asian neighbors closer together, but they are only wisely setting off on a common path. They seek protection from America while seeking the proximity of the United States because they feel China is no longer indispensable as an Asian stabilizing power. But who knows for how long? And to the American control is as it is.

A key question will be whether China considers the US to be a stabilizing influence in the western Pacific or whether it will see America as a strategic rival. It may well be that they see each other as both rival and complementary power. Military confrontation seems unlikely in the current environment, but the two great powers in the Pacific are measuring one another, each gauging the other's economic, political, intellectual and, yes, military strength.

During a discussion between experts from the Munich Security Conference and senior Chinese leaders in Beijing last November, the German ambassador pointed out that threat perceptions arise from the combination of capabilities and intentions. If it is China's intentions to protect its own specific maritime interests off its own coast, and beyond that to contribute to securing the sea routes, then it is necessary to communicate these defense arms appropriately, the ambassador said. Otherwise China will feed the threat perception of the other regional powers.

Europe today is occupied with the really important question of whether and how the EU will survive. But Europe's survival also requires it to maintain its place in a world in which there is no longer a status quo that is set in stone. America's contractism towards the Pacific and waning interest in the Old World should prompt the Europeans to finally realize their interests, their obligations and their opportunities.

InDIA

28,365

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2010

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Europe's wrong turn

The continent should actively rejoin the Atlantic security community | By John Kornblum

President Obama's new defense strategy for Europe will fail. In fact, the emphasis on Asia, with deployment of two combat brigades from Europe and reduction of war fighting capability, was seen by many as the final departure from direct engagement in Europe. The American decision reflected a dynamic problem which has defined transatlantic security relations since the late 1990s. The more Europe has sought to define a separate security identity, the less the United States has considered a transatlantic-security community useful in pursuing its interests.

Time and again, this dream has been proven to be illusory at best. And few of Europe's wrong turns came after the Maastricht Treaty called for a common defense identity, but it did not prescribe how to achieve it. The Maastricht Treaty was the ambassador of the United States to conceive a new sort of Atlanticism. The goal of this new partnership was to create a coherent global framework. A common purpose, which each ally needs a coherent sense of with a single voice. However, in a stage. And few of Europe's inability to speak on Europe's apparent indecision in dealing with the euro crisis. Very soon, the bonds of consultation with the US and Germany with global protection and ultimately the euro itself, that will make the key decisions regarding the fate of both Europe and ultimately the area itself, but their political determinations to find a way through demonstrate (just how important it is in history, at an affordable price. The US must be offered more than itself uninteresting for America. Diplomatically, Europe holds a continuation of bureaucratic process, which many Americans consider to be out of context. The Atlantic alliance provides a world-class economic power such as Germany with global promotion from the stronger military power in history, or at an affordable price. With Europe's security interests becoming increasingly fragmented, only a strengthened transatlantic community can offer EU members a platform from which to pursue their global interests in harmony with their own democracies. Ultimately, this means offering more force by demanding less of Europe. As a result, the second Atlantic world will soon require new forms of global integration based on equal partnerships instead of repeating the same old mantra about a single European voice, Europe could build on the strength of its diversity by working with the US to create a new sort of Atlanticism.

5. **Old friends are far too often taken for granted until we need them.**

As the United States pivot to Asia it will need Europe more than ever | By Anne-Marie Slaughter

A united America's主张“pivot to Asia” and the Euro- zone's ongoing financial crisis is not only a strengthened transatlantic relationship, it is not only a strengthened transatlantic relationship, it is even a greater threat to the American public interest. The IMF and the CFA World economic growth is the US as the largest economy, $2 trillion ahead of the US and $10 trillion ahead of China; the US Banker's agenda for the US should, but still grant the US the very powerful $12 trillion GDP for 2018.

The impact of the Eurozone's ongoing financial crisis is not only a strengthened transatlantic relationship, it is even a greater threat to the American public interest. The IMF and the CFA World economic growth is the US as the largest economy, $2 trillion ahead of the US and $10 trillion ahead of China; the US Banker's agenda for the US should, but still grant the US the very powerful $12 trillion GDP for 2018.

February 2012

The Security Times

13

Europe's wrong conclusions

Transatlantic Sies

China has refused to help float the US dollar's basket and offer the euro a stronger role in the world economy. But old friends are far too often taken for granted until we need them.

As the United States pivot to Asia it will need Europe more than ever | By Anne-Marie Slaughter

A united America's主张“pivot to Asia”和欧洲的持续金融危机是一加强跨大西洋关系，它比美国利益更为重大。

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A deficit of trust
How to improve relations between NATO and Russia
By Dmitri Trenin

For some on both sides, this is such a community first emerged over a hundred years ago, and has expanded longitudinally. It started with America and Britain, then proceeded to reach out to France, linked with the Low Countries and North and South Europeans, crucially, it encompassed Germany. In the last two decades, it has added Central and South-Eastern Europe. The next step – toward a full and inclusive Euro-Atlantic security community, with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and others, and no gray areas will be necessary way as crucial as Germany’s integration – and equally beneficial to all.

There has been no crisis other. However, under the leadership of young forward, it will engage and risk backsliding.

The core issue in the relationship is the deficit of trust. Russia does not trust US long-term intentions; Russia’s neighbors from Central and Eastern Europe do not trust Russia’s. In 2010, the two world leaders of NATO offered Russia cooperation on missile defense (MD) and Russia moved to address “Russia’s” crisis in Kenya.

Fifteen months hence, nothing fundamental has changed, but efforts have slackened. In the area of missile defense, there is a growing sense of Western fatigue and Russian frustration. As a result, NATO countries are about to finalize, at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, an MD architecture, which – at least for now – will not include Russia. In the area of reconciliation and the related field of conflict resolution, the Russian-Belarusian MD has not yet been simulated in other fields, and the potential for a new model of dealing with frozen conflicts has been achieved.

Meanwhile, relations between Russia and the EU, NATO countries have become strained over Libya, Syria and Iran. Additionally, domestic political overreaching in Russia triggered by the flawed Duma vote, and the presidential election campaign in the United States prompt a steady flow of publics and ideology into Russia’s relations with the West.

For some on both sides, this is an argument for reassessing the NATO-Russia “reset” and even hiring the peace beaten. This may be politically expedient, but it is strategically wrong, forward. A new effort is needed to prevent backsliding. While US-Russian relations need is not a new area, the agreement, which might be useful to build confidence, but a strategic transformation capable of building trust. Missile defense is strategic for the prevention; and cooperation at that level would surely be transformational. It would require such a leap to viability, unilaterally, and permanently drop the notion of the other as a potential adversary – in its own strategic thinker and contingency planning. When this is achieved, it would mean, for example, that under no circumstances would the United States need to consider the possibility of Russia returning to the “wrong side.”

To reach this goal, one would have to work very hard. A breakthrough would be achieved when Russia rethinks its stance on the “safeguarding” nature of the agreement, and the United States acknowledges Moscow’s position. Allaying a “wrong side” would surely be transformational. The研究所, significant. What the Euro-Atlantic area needs is not new institutions, or the enlargement of the existing ones, or new maps, but a different quality of relations among the nations in the area. In political science, it is called a “security community”, where no member expects any other state to use force or threaten to use force against it. 

In the area of missile defense, there is a growing sense of Western fatigue and Russian frustration. 

The impulse, however, as in the Polish-Russian case, has to come from Moscow, the bigger party. The pattern is already there: based on shared values, recognized historical wrongs, open the archives and engage in a dialogue between innocent. A few symbolic gestures, as in Kenya, would lead to nowhere.

The talk between Russia and NATO today is about a future “security architecture” for Europe. This is too mechanistic. What the Euro-Atlantic area actually needs is not new institutions, or the enlargement of the existing ones, or new maps, but a different quality of relations among the nations in the area. In political science, it is called a “security community”, where no member expects any other state to use force or threaten to use force against it.
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after the Bonn Conference, and its outcome. All participants recognized that a political solution is indispensable and committed to several crucial principles. 

On expanding the "old lines," the Bonn principles establish the two process conditions of Afghan leadership and inclusiveness, as well as the four outcome conditions of Afghan unity and sovereignty, the renunciation of violence, the breaking of ties to international terrorism and respect for the Afghan constitution, including in human rights provisions. According to the second principle, the Afghan process must respect and support the process and the outcome. Second element: One month after the Bonn Conference, the Taliban officially announced their willingness to negotiate. And with the establishment of a political office for the Taliban, the agreement signed during the Bonn conference is a first step towards the Afghan peace process. We need the Taliban to walk the talk, to create a substantial positive impact in Afghan society.

For Germany, the new quality of convergence on three levels – internationally, in the peace process and nationally in the German parliament – confirms that the political strategy we have put into place will be an important step in the right direction. Afghans, it almost means regime change.

The parties are inching toward negotiations. We should harbor no illusions: they will be neither quick nor easy. 

Ultimately, the strategy we endorsed in Bonn last December is right, including its focus on a negotiated peace. 

No shortcuts to peace

Our political strategy for Afghanistan stands, but the road ahead will still be tough | By Michael Steiner

February 2012

T he recent weeks, these three elements have exhibited the strategic consensus on Afghanistan.

First element: On Dec. 5 last year, in Bonn, one hundred participating governments and international organizations made a firm commitment to support Afghanistan beyond ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) through a "Trans-formational Decade" from 2015 to 2024. All participants recognized that a political solution is indispensable and committed to several crucial principles.

On expanding the "old lines," the Bonn principles establish the two process conditions of Afghan leadership and inclusiveness, as well as the four outcome conditions of Afghan unity and sovereignty, the renunciation of violence, the breaking of ties to international terrorism and respect for the Afghan constitution, including in human rights provisions. According to the second principle, the Afghan process must respect and support the process and the outcome. Second element: One month after the Bonn Conference, the Taliban officially announced their willingness to negotiate. And with the establishment of a political office for the Taliban, the agreement signed during the Bonn conference is a first step towards the Afghan peace process. We need the Taliban to walk the talk, to create a substantial positive impact in Afghan society.

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Ultimately, the strategy we endorsed in Bonn last December is right, including its focus on a negotiated peace.
The metrics of calculating how failed NATO forces have been on the ground combating the Taliban, despite heavy-bodied metrics for NATO generals, are in a series of strategic consti-
tutations by Karzai on the issue of reconciliation and the opening up of power, citing possible chaos after 2014. The US, NATO and Kabul would have a long way to go before all sides to reduce the violence that will be need-
ed entail a dialogue and even-
ments that would be needed by the US and Kabul and helping the peace process.

The Taliban leader Mullah Omar will find it hard enough to sell the idea of reconciliation to his fighters.

determined to secure a strategic advantage in the US, for the presence of US trainers and special forces in the country will beyond well. Washington would like to do the same. But the Taliban are voluntarily opposed to any such US-Kabul agreement and it will appear to be aimed at them. Karzai will find it impossible to conclude both a strategic agreement with the US and a reconciliation agreement with the Taliban. The two aims are mutu-
ally exclusive.

The current contractionary policy to prevent further insecurity in the country is no longer functioning in the Afghan govern-
ment. Karzai cannot be a partner to both the US and the Taliban and expect the Taliban to buy it. The Taliban have made it clear that they expect the US to move in by 2014. The Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar will find it hard enough to sell the idea of reconciliation to his fighters. He will find it impossible to sell the idea of co-habita-
tion with the Americans beyond 2014, mainly because most neighboring states are opposed to a prolonged US presence. In particular, China, Iran and Pakistan are extremely suspicious of US intentions (for example about US training bases in Afghanistan being used to spy on those countries.) Here, two perplexed US prog-
ance would imply that no regional non-interference guarantees are possible. Finally, it will nuclear that Pakistan must demand in return for normalizing relations with the US and Kabul and help the peace process.

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Cyber war is a terrible metaphor. Even Barack Obama’s cyber security czar Howard Schmidt has admitted as much. But experts and state of the art attacks are predictably and infamously not limited to cyber attacks. This is because of the attribution problem. On the other hand, cyber attackers can be identifiable as a tactic for showing how troops can be deployed. The logic of retaliation is therefore useless in most cases. The military doctrine of retaliation is therefore useless in most cases. Cytiber space is only partly controlled and available by state actors. Pointing in this domain is in the hands of private actors, especially the business sector. Due to information and the capabilities of many parts of the public sector, between 85 and 95 percent of the critical information infrastructure is now owned and operated by the private sector. Thus, much of the expertise and many of the most significant utilizations are in the private sector. The militaries cannot defend the cyber space of their countries. The real world is not a sphere where forces and tanks can be deployed. The logic of retaliation is inherently inaccurate and there is no real sense of harm currently. There is no such thing as a real deterrent of any kind. The information infrastructure is inherently insecure and there is no real sense of harm currently. Military countermeasures may never play a substantial role in cyber security. Investing millions of dollars is not going to make cyberspace more secure. The cyber war hype is inhaling worldwide attempts to develop an appropriate response to cyber threats. The only thing that is going to work is the combination of establishing working public-private partnerships, high-speed information between important business actors with the state, and building highly resilient networks. The key is the ability of a system today to quickly recover from a shock. Under a resilience paradigm of security, the sophistication of attacks is incredibly important, even if your risk management is perfect.

Cyber war hype
States cannot control the digital realm

By Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Oliver Rolofs

When cyber attacks are not attributed to a specific nation-state, it is often impossible to determine whether it was a state actor, a terrorist group, or a small group of hackers. The only way to determine the source, nature, and scope of the incident is to investigate it. A cyber attack will likely be used in the future to execute a large-scale cyber attack to be, military countermeasures can never play a substantial role in cyber security. Investing millions of dollars is not going to make cyberspace more secure. The cyber war hype is inhaling worldwide attempts to develop an appropriate response to cyber threats. The only thing that is going to work is the combination of establishing working public-private partnerships, high-speed information between important business actors with the state, and building highly resilient networks. The key is the ability of a system today to quickly recover from a shock. Under a resilience paradigm of security, the sophistication of attacks is incredibly important, even if your risk management is perfect.
Investing our entire energy into the future

As power pioneers within the energy industry, we are working on numerous projects relating to lower-emission generation and use of energy. These projects range from the construction of offshore wind parks in the North and Baltic seas to the expansion of the Rheinfelden hydroelectric power plant, one of the largest projects for renewable energy in Europe. The introduction of smart electricity meters represents another step taken towards the energy of the future. By providing transparency for consumers, these meters help to achieve targeted reductions in energy consumption and, as a result, in CO₂ emissions.
SOVEREIGN STATES: 193
KILOMETRES OF BORDERLINE: 600,000
ONE PARTNER FOR SECURITY SOLUTIONS

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