

# The Security Times

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NATO soldiers on patrol in Afghanistan – how much longer?

## Old and new challenges

By Wolfgang Ischinger

Once again, more than 70 government delegations meet in Munich this year, including important international foreign and security policy decision makers, chief executive officers, and media representatives from all over the world.

Over more than four decades, the Munich Security Conference has grown into the most significant independent worldwide forum for decision makers in the field of international security policy. Its atmosphere of familiarity and the extraordinary range of participants are the hallmark of Munich.

The MSC's focus is not only on "traditional" topics such as the future of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, including the relationship between NATO and Russia, nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, or security challenges in the Greater Middle East and Afghanistan. The motto of this year's conference – "International Security Policy Facing New Challenges: From the Financial Crisis to Cyber War" – alludes to the tectonic changes in global and regional power and in the nature of threats and risks that the world faces.

The crisis has significant effects on global security and stability, and especially on the ability of the Western community of nations to project stability to areas outside the Euro-Atlantic region. New responses are required, both to the challenges resulting from the crisis and to cyber attacks that redefine the very concept of security.

This year, the Munich Security Conference is fortunate to welcome an extraordinary group of speakers



Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger is Chairman of the Munich Security Conference.

and panelists, including the Secretary General of the United Nations, the President of the European Council, the Secretary General of NATO, the President of the World Bank, and a large number of heads of state, heads of government, secretaries and ministers as well as high representatives of international organizations.

This year, we will be able to offer a special welcome to the representatives of the Quartet on the Middle East, who for the first time convene within the framework of the Munich Security Conference. We trust that the Munich meeting will accelerate efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

I look forward to a frank and open exchange of views in Munich – with due respect to the opinions offered by others. That is what we need more than ever as we face the security challenges of an increasingly interdependent world.

## In this issue

### Future alliance 2, 10, 11

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen outlines the new strategic concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit. Hilmar Linnenkamp argues that EU security cooperation means more, not less sovereignty. Volker Rühle, Klaus Naumann and Ulrich Weisser make the case for pooling European defense capabilities.

### New model army 3

Germany's armed forces are embarking on fundamental change. Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg puts reform of the Bundeswehr in the global strategic context.

### Afghan dilemma 8, 9

Barack Obama never wanted to be a war president. William R. Smyser sums up the difficulties of fighting an inherited conflict that is more than just a military challenge. And former German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier defends the primacy of politics over military planning.

### Zero nukes? 12, 13

Ambassador Richard Burt says Global Zero is a long way off but remains a realistic and constructive objective. Christoph Bertram explains why Europe is unlikely to achieve Regional Zero anytime soon. And Oliver Thränert on why the US and Russia are modernizing their nuclear arsenals?

# A grand continent seeking a grand strategy

Europe's role in 21st century international security policy | By Josef Joffe

Will Europe be a strategic player in the 21st century? This wondrous continent which invented everything from the Renaissance to the fax machine? Which once conquered the farthest corners of the earth? Today, the EU boasts the world's largest economy – it exceeds America's and dwarfs China's and India's. Never mind the hype that attends the "rise of the rest." The EU is also the world's largest trading power, and its interests span the entire globe.

First the good news. It comes from Britain and France, for centuries the two greatest powers in Europe, and it is a heartening story of history transcended.

Since the Norman Conquest, England/Britain and France have fought two dozen wars against each other and spent about a total of two centuries doing so. But last November, Prime Minister David Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozy concluded a 50-year alliance, beginning in 2015, that will make Wellington and Napoleon, not to speak of de Gaulle, turn in their graves.

The two countries will build nuclear weapons together, and they will raise a common intervention force. "Perfidious Albion" will even share the pride of its fleet, an aircraft carrier, with the "Frogs." This "arch-enemy," longer and bloodier than the Franco-German version, is over. So three cheers for Europe.

Now the not-so-good news. This historic move reflects weakness, not strength. These two greats who shaped Europe's and even the world's destiny until they were muscled aside first by Prussia-Germany, then by the US and the Soviet Union, are finally yielding to the most implacable foe of all: money, or more accurately, the lack of it. They are downsizing à deux, and this will not increase Europe's punch in the world.

Nor does the picture become any brighter when we add Germany. Germany (East and West), which once fielded almost 700,000 soldiers is coming down from currently 250,000 to 185,000, perhaps even to 163,000. Eighty million Germans will now field as many troops as the 16 million of the former East Germany. And why? The Bundeswehr will have to save €600 million (\$824 million) this year, €1 billion next year, more than €2 billion in 2012 and more than €4 billion in 2014.

It is all about "restructuring," of course – about finally transforming the Bundeswehr from a deterrence force into an intervention army. The new smaller army is supposed to be more "useable" – that is, more professional, agile and mobile. Right now, it is seriously overstretched

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## European Defense

with about 7,000 troops abroad. The reform will add 2,000, maybe 4,000 troops to Germany's force projection capabilities. Compare that to the 700,000-strong force the US deployed in the First Iraq War.

Between now and 2014, Britain will reduce its defense budget by 8 percent. France will cut expenditures by €4.6 billion over the next three years, starting in 2011. Adding two shrinking defense budgets cannot logically produce more power, especially when "force projection" is at stake. To intervene in far-off places requires more transport planes, tankers, helicopters and ships – plus space-based and airborne surveillance, plus battlefield intelligence, plus

standoff munitions and the platforms to carry them. Technology must make up for mass, for the first rule of 21st century democratic warfare is: no body bags. Hence as little face-to-face combat as possible. This requires more funds, not fewer. Smaller might indeed be more beautiful, but given Europe's nasty budgetary constraints, it is not at all clear that smaller will also be better.

But there is a larger issue that transcends budgets. What for? Why would democracies go to war in the absence of strategic threats? Why sacrifice blood and treasure in engagements that are remote, costly and unending (cf. Afghanistan)? Democracies like wars that are swift, cheap and decisive.

The issue runs deeper still. Does Europe – this wondrous island of peace, this shining example of community and cooperation – have a strategic vision of itself? Will it develop the appropriate "prise de conscience," as the French call it? Does it have a European "national interest" which would include force as ultima ratio?

After the Suez War, fought by Britain and France in 1956 (add the Falklands War in 1982), Europe has only deployed force when the US went first (Iraq I, Kosovo, Iraq II, Afghanistan). Indeed, Europe has not been an independent strategic actor for 50 years. Europe takes pride in being an empire by example or invitation. And look how successful this "empire" has been, expanding from six to 27 members in 50 years, without a shot being fired.

Such habits are not easily unlearned, especially when compared to centuries of deadly warfare inside and outside of Europe. And why should they be changed as long as the US takes care of global and regional security, acting as "security lender of last

resort" even for post-Cold War Europe?

Nor is the EU a "real" state. War and peace is the last decision the 27 will relinquish to a supranational body. So there is a certain logic to the downsizing Europe has decreed for itself. There is no strategic threat as far as the eye can see, and there is no eagerness to assume a strategic role apart from the United States.

Military action will be ad hoc and beholden to a "variable geometry." Some nations will act, others will hang back. Defense budgets will be closer to 1 percent than to the 3 percent mandated during the Cold War. (Compare this to America's 4 percent.) Nonetheless, the slow transformation toward intervention armies is not to be sneezed at. Europe's smaller forces will eventually be more sophisticated and useable.

And NATO will persist, serving the functions it has always had. One is to tie Europe's security to America's. The second is to serve as a "fee" that needs to be paid to the US as the security guarantor of last resort. The third is insurance against "unknown unknowns." And the fourth and new function is intervention on the margin: alone, when the risks are very low; together with the US, when it shoulders the largest burden.

All of this does not quite add up to a real national security strategy – one that has a clear conception of Europe's strategic interests and lays out the conditions for the use of force. Europe will continue to muddle through – at a much lower force level. But muddling through is what has made Europe ever since the grand failure of the European Defense Community in 1954. Europe has done very well with this un-Cartesian process. But Europe has also been very lucky in the last 60 years, moving toward ever closer union and even prevailing in the Cold War. May it be so lucky for the next 60.

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The term is probably used too often in connection with international summits, but I have no hesitation in describing the latest NATO Summit as truly historic. At Lisbon last November, the heads of state and government of the 28 allies agreed on a new Strategic Concept for the alliance – a genuine action plan for the next 10 years. And they took far-reaching decisions to turn that strategy into reality. In 2011, NATO is moving from aspiration to action.

The new Strategic Concept reconfirms the transatlantic bond between our nations to defend one another against attack. Today, the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. But it cannot be ignored – and we need to take into account emerging threats, such as terrorism,

That does not mean that, in the space of a few hours in Lisbon, NATO and Russia have overcome all their differences. On issues such as Georgia and NATO's open door policy, we continue to disagree on points of principle. However, if we manage to sustain our dialogue, and to focus not on what divides us but on what we can achieve together, then Lisbon will have marked a decisive turning point.

At Lisbon, the NATO allies decided to give a boost not just to the NATO-Russia partnership, but to make all our partnerships more modern, efficient and flexible, while also reaching out to new partners around the globe.

NATO aims to become a hub of a global network of security partners, by offering enhanced political consultations, as well as greater practical cooperation. Special focus will be given to cooperation against emerging security challenges, such as cyber defense and the protection of our vital energy infrastructures, but also issues like maritime security and counter-terrorism.

We will also increase our support to developing partners' capabilities, and to training indigenous security forces. We want to give our growing number of operational partners a structural role in shaping decisions on operations to which they contribute. And we are determined to reach out to key partners across the globe, like China and India.

Work is already underway. We have begun consulting with all our partners on how they would like to see our partnership become more effective. With their input, we will approve a new partnership policy at our Foreign Ministers' meeting in Berlin in April. It will be the start of a fundamentally new approach to the way NATO interacts with the wider world.

Our engagement in Afghanistan has taught us that today's con-

# From aspiration to action

NATO is on the path to a new strategic concept and a new partnership policy

By Anders Fogh Rasmussen



licts demand broad engagement and more than just military solutions. This highlights the importance of close cooperation not only with other nations, but also with other international institutions, such as the European Union and the United Nations, as well as with regional organizations such as the African Union. The

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determined by conditions on the ground, not driven by dates in a calendar.

However, our commitment to Afghanistan will continue beyond 2014. In Lisbon, President Karzai and I signed an enduring partnership agreement between NATO and Afghanistan. We are now moving ahead to turn it into reality. We are considering continued training, professional military education, selected courses at NATO's educational institutions and other activities from NATO's extensive partnership toolkit. I expect the Foreign Ministers to agree on concrete ideas when they meet in Berlin in April.

Finally, the Lisbon Summit mandated a process of continual reform in NATO. The

financial crisis of the past few years

has cast a harsh light on the way we spend our taxpayers' money. We must spend

smarter and deliver greater value for money by cutting fat and building muscle. Within NATO, there will be a strong emphasis on innovative, multinational solutions to deliver key capabilities, and on making our structures as efficient and cost-effective as possible. I hope, and expect, that the present austerity will also encourage closer cooperation with the European Union, which our new Strategic Concept describes as "a unique and essential partner for NATO."

2011 will be another busy year for the alliance. With our new Strategic Concept, we have a clear mission statement for the age of globalization. It puts a premium on our ability to find effective and efficient solutions, and to explain to our publics the need for continued active engagement in the interest of our shared security. ■

Summit signaled strong support for this comprehensive approach.

At Lisbon we also underlined our joint readiness to begin handing over to our Afghan partners in early 2011 the lead for security operations. Together with our partners in the ISAF coalition, we fully support President Karzai's ambition to see Afghan forces in the lead for security operations across Afghanistan by the end of 2014. But transition must be sustainable and irreversible. So the transition process will be



Anders Fogh Rasmussen is Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

## Transforming NATO

nuclear proliferation, and cyberattacks.

We decided to develop within NATO a capability to protect our populations and territory in Europe against missile attacks. And we invited Russia to work with us in developing that capability.

The Lisbon Summit has paved the way for a truly strategic partnership between NATO and Russia. We are already stepping up our cooperation to stabilize Afghanistan, and to fight terrorism and piracy. And we agreed to deepen our political dialogue and to explore together in which other areas of common interest we can enhance our practical cooperation.



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## NATO's tasks and principles



Excerpts from the Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adopted in Lisbon, November 19, 2010

### Active Engagement, Modern Defense

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO's evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:

- It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.

- It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.

- It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.

- It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.

- It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

- It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defense.

The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO's essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

### Core Tasks and Principles

1. NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.

2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.

4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the

security of NATO's territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

- a. Collective defense. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

- b. Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

- c. Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards.

The international security environment is subject to constant change.

Since the end of the Cold War our view of the challenges to our security and the protection of our citizens has increasingly been determined by a complex interplay of forces and by mutual dependencies. For Germany, adapting to this evolving situation requires long-term strategic awareness, continuing dependability for our international partners and a reformed Bundeswehr, fit for future purpose and geared to alliance requirements.

Germany needs a Bundeswehr that is a powerful and up-to-date instrument of preventive security that matches our country's standing and strength and is even more professional, more effective and more appealing than it already is. Improving organizational efficiency and enhancing the armed forces' operational capability are the organizing principles for the fundamental reform of the Bundeswehr that we have now embarked on. "Think operational" is the leading idea.

The reform process is scheduled to take between five and seven years but the Defense Ministry will already have new structures within two years. The outcome will be a Bundeswehr with responsive forces at its disposal, capable of operating in a multinational environment, providing a broad range of capabilities – and financially viable in the long term. As the military element of German security policy, the Bundeswehr will master today's threats and risks – as well as tomorrow's.

#### The strategic environment

Our world is less stable than it used to be; security risks are less predictable but could still have potentially serious consequences. Germany, despite its favorable geo-political position, is thus in a situation of strategic uncertainty.

Globalization has become a major catalyst for political, economic and social change. It is characterized by, among other things, the rapid worldwide dissemination of knowledge, an increasing merging of markets and the decreasing significance of geographical distance. Globalization also leads to global shifts of power – between states, but also toward non-state actors – involving the potential risk of new struggles for resources. Terrorist groups and networks, often collaborating internationally with organized crime networks, pose a direct threat to Germany.

Ambitious emerging powers are jostling with established ones for geo-political influence, resources, market access and market share. The increasing scarcity of energy resources is exacerbating this development. The resulting intra-state and regional conflicts, as well as the collapse of government structures, even in countries geographically distant from Germany, have the potential to destabilize entire regions.

Disruption of transport routes, or the free flow of goods and raw materials, as well as a breakdown of critical national infrastructure, for instance through cyber attacks, could seriously jeopardize Germany's prosperity and its performance as an export nation. This would directly affect our economic stability and hence our national security.

#### The goals of German security and defense policy

Germany pursues its legitimate national interests on the basis of the values enshrined in our Basic Law, in the spirit of a "culture of responsibility" and within the framework of international law. Responsible German security and defense policy must monitor and analyze developments in geographically more distant regions and act whenever our interests are at stake. Providing security today means first and foremost keeping the effects of crises and conflicts at bay and actively contributing to their prevention and containment.

Crisis prevention requires close cooperation of civilian and mili-

tary components under a national security strategy comprising political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military means. It should primarily be civilian in nature and be launched as far in advance of an outbreak of violence as possible. Nevertheless, it may become necessary to employ military means to prevent or end conflicts or to create conditions in which the causes of conflict can be countered by civilian means. In this respect, the Bundeswehr is a flexible instrument of German security policy, which has its place in a comprehensive approach.

#### The consequences of the reform of the Bundeswehr

In future, the Bundeswehr will have a troop strength of up to 185,000, including up to 170,000 professional soldiers. From July 1, conscription for compulsory military service will be replaced with a new voluntary military service offering young men and women an opportunity to serve in the armed forces for a period of 12 to 23 months. This will be civic commitment in the true sense of

the word, giving young Germans a chance to make an important contribution toward safeguarding the freedom and security of our country.

With the transition to a fully professional army, the Bundeswehr is both responding to the security requirements of

security and defense policy. The new Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon forms the basis for the transformation of NATO from a defense pact into a security alliance. The goal is to adjust the alliance to existing and foreseeable challenges, orienting it toward the role of actor in a globalized world without neglecting the importance of collective defense. By achieving strategic consensus on this fundamental concept, the alliance has reconciled different national positions to a common framework of action for the decade ahead.

Europe must be sufficiently united to assume responsibility for coping with the challenges to common security within and beyond its borders; it must be strong and capable of taking action on security policy matters. In future, there will be a need for greater emphasis on joint task accomplishment and role sharing between allies. Germany and Sweden have proposed that each EU member state should review which military capabilities need to be maintained at national level, and where there is potential for

even more intensive cooperation with partners. However, cooperation will reach its limits if it creates a political compulsion to act or leads to mutual political deadlock.

NATO and the EU are part of a global security network under the aegis of the United Nations. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Germany assumes additional responsibility for global peace and security for the next two years.

Germany is conscious of its multilateral role and is prepared to fulfil its international obligations. Firmly embedded in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, we pursue a comprehensive approach to security policy. Its credibility relies on both the political willingness and the military capability to maintain or restore freedom, human rights, stability and security – including by the use of armed forces if our own security so requires. This calls for continuity, reliability in terms of our actions and political foresight. The reform of the Bundeswehr reflects this approach. ■

# Revamping the Bundeswehr

The German army faces its most fundamental change in 65 years | By Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg



German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg visiting German troops near Kunduz, northern Afghanistan.

PICTURE: ALLIANCE/OPAMANN/IBL, HANSCHKE



Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg is Germany's Minister of Defense.

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#### Bundeswehr Reform

our times and at the same time breaking new ground. We will have a Bundeswehr capable of resolutely and successfully countering threats to our territory and to the alliance.

#### Germany's multilateral role – continuity and reliability

NATO continues to be the strongest anchor of German

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# The big reset

Russia and the West are working to put their relationship on a different footing

By Alexander Rahr

The break-up of the Soviet Union two decades ago opened the possibility of a period of freedom for Europe which the continent has never witnessed before. The two outstanding positive elements of the new European peace order were the inclusion of almost 30 states in the European Union and the emergence of a non-totalitarian Russia. The EU became Russia's main trading partner and Russia emerged as the EU's main energy supplier.

Unfortunately, the historical opportunities for a genuine rapprochement were missed.

Obviously, the EU and Russia had a wrong perception about each other from the very beginning of their new relationship. The EU reformed itself after the end of the Cold War into an institution of shared liberal values and expected Russia to seek to become a democracy. Russia's idea of integration with the EU was a purely practical one.

The EU was seen in Russia primarily as the source for economic modernization and not as an example of democracy. Russia looked mainly for economic cooperation with the West, never thought to become part of the modern European liberal civilization and never considered giving up any sovereignty rights to Brussels. Russia agreed to play according to mutually established rules, but rules that were co-developed with Moscow.

Geopolitically surrounded by NATO, Russia found itself in a serious dilemma. After the end of the Cold War, the two main pillars of the new European security architecture were the EU and NATO. Russia was a member of neither and had no intention of joining in the foreseeable future. Moscow viewed the enlargement of NATO as infringing upon its national security interests.

However, without being a member of NATO and the EU, Russia lacked the possibility of participating in the decision-making over Europe's future. The consequence of not being anchored in the all-European institutions was a deeply felt isolation from the future economic and security architecture of the Occident – to which Russia historically belongs.

Had Russia's embrace of the liberal political and economic system of the West prevailed in the 1990s, the United States and the EU would have sealed an open energy partnership with Russia: Western energy companies would have acquired large stakes in the privatized oil and gas market, Russia would have established itself as a reliable supplier of raw materials, and doors would have opened for a comprehensive technology transfer from the West.

With Vladimir Putin's rise to power, the Kremlin considered consolidating state power and regaining great power status more important than democracy and building a genuine market economy. Russia transformed from a weak country, financially dependent on Western institutions, to a strong, difficult and globally



US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gives Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov the reset button during a meeting on March 6, 2009, in Geneva.

acknowledged actor pursuing its own national interests. The West became concerned about Russian ambitions and started to diversify the sources of its energy imports.

The USA was never interested in expanding its partnership with Russia as long as the Russian economy lacked clearly defined rules. Nor did Washington seek a real alliance with Russia in the struggle against Islamic extremism. The George W. Bush administration signaled to Putin that it was basically only interested in Russia's cooperation in containing Iran's nuclear program.

The US perceived Russia as the loser of the Cold War. In 2001, Washington renounced the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and, despite assurances that it did not intend to build a full-scale national defense directed against Russia, started in 2007 to develop a limited missile defense shield in central Europe ostensibly to fend off Iranian missiles.

While no real partnership developed between the US and Russia,

there were initial hopes of a strategic partnership between Russia and the EU. But the EU was so focused on protecting its liberal value system vis-à-vis Moscow that it failed to create even a free trade zone with Russia.

Consequently, the EU concentrated its policy on accomplishing



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JUERGEN DAUM

## Russia and the West

the historic reunification of the West with most of the countries of Eastern Europe. The accession of the former Warsaw Pact states and the three Baltic republics to the EU and NATO in 2002-2004 changed the West's attitude toward Russia; it became more critical. The new member states

had, in contrast to the "old" EU nations, not reconciled with post-communist Russia, while Russia did not forgive them their drive toward the West.

Moscow was irritated when the EU, after integrating Central Eastern Europe, made attempts to focus its new foreign and defense policy on the Western states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), calling these former Soviet republics the EU's "eastern neighborhood." The EU began to assist democracy and economic reform, prevent instabilities and help resolve conflicts in its broader neighborhood, especially in regions which were seen as transit routes, raw materials bases or potential markets for the EU.

In the 1990s, Russia learned to deal with the EU as an economic power. But, when the EU started to develop its own common security policy, criticizing Russia from its Brussels headquarters and keeping the visa barrier along Russia's western borders in place,

Moscow began to fear that the EU was attempting to build a new European architecture that would exclude or weaken Russia.

The Russian-Georgian War in 2008 was the climax of a "mini Cold War" that shook Europe 20 years after the end of the original East-West confrontation. One positive aspect of the conflagration was that it forced the West and Russia to make a decision on wiping the slate clean: they could either resume targeting each other with their military arsenals, or press the reset button and forget the mutual conflicts of the past few years.

2008 was also the year in which Russia's new President, Dmitry Medvedev, suggested a new security dialogue on "cohabitation" between Russia and the West. But so far, Russia's Western partners are not prepared to sacrifice NATO in favor of a different, more explicitly pan-European organization.

On the other hand, Russia and the West understand that they

narrowly escaped the beginnings of a new Cold War in the Georgian crisis and that they need proper trust-building mechanisms to avoid further similar crises. There is no real reason to restart the Cold War; there is no ideological foundation for it. So now, Russia and the West are again debating how to improve the institutional framework for future partnership cooperation.

In 2008-2009 many of the institutions that had formed the core of relations between Russia and the West vanished. Russia quit the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT); the EU and Russia failed to renegotiate the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; the West was reluctant to revive the OSCE in its old status at the last summit in Astana (fearing that the OSCE could supplant NATO), and Russia is still not a member either of the World Trade Organization (WTO), or of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Hardly anyone remembers the Charter of Paris of 1990, which was supposed to lay the foundation for a new eternal peace between Russia and the West after the end of the Cold War. The chance for true reconciliation between Russia and the West emerged. Despite all the conflicts of the past years, that policy might become as important as the détente policy in the 1970s.

The West and Russia understood that just pressing the reset button in their relations was not enough. They realized that they had to agree on a new platform on which further cooperation could develop. That platform was supposed to be the new "cohabitation" between Russia and the rest of Europe and the US.

Various proposals focused on the idea of a new, revitalized Charter of Paris or a refurbished OSCE Security Council which would incorporate Russia in the European architecture.

In such a new framework, it is hoped, Russia and the West could agree on a common threat perception in the emerging international system of the 21st century. Diverse issues could be settled and developed into common strategies.

This proposes, though, that Russian elites understand that successful modernization of their economy demands deeper integration with Western economies. The EU can play a pivotal role in Russia's further modernization and its transformation into a country of technological innovation, a pillar of the global energy structure, as well as a major international financial center.

But first of all the Russian population must derive tangible material benefits from taking a more multilateral approach to resolving international problems as part of a new rules-based architecture. A more cooperative relationship with the West will make this possible for the Russian government.

## Cooperation between NATO and Russia



Excerpts from the Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adopted in Lisbon, November 19, 2010

NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.

The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences

on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security. We are determined to:

- enhance the political consultations and practical coop-

eration with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;

- use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.

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Relations between Russia and the West are currently in a state of rapprochement. However, there have been many ups and downs within the last two decades. The key question now is whether current efforts to bring Russia and the West closer will be more promising than previous attempts.

With some reservations the answer is yes. Two factors make the new approach different and in some respects unique.

The first is the global economic and financial crisis and its impact on Russia. The second is the crisis of European security. These developments have a different meaning for Russia and the West, but should bring them to the same conclusion – the insight that genuine and long-term partnership is much needed.

It is evident that the global crisis necessitates major changes in international relations, including common and responsible management of world finances and economies. But for Russia this crisis, coming after a decade of enormous oil revenues and unprecedented economic prosperity, has highlighted the weakness of its economy: its reliance on the export of raw materials.

There is a growing understanding in Russia that without radical modernization the country will be marginalized in the modern world. Such modernization cannot be accomplished outside the most advanced high-tech international economic system, which is primarily composed of the US, the EU, Japan and South Korea. Russia's foreign policy of resetting relations with the US, the EU countries (including Poland), Norway and Ukraine reflects the recognition of these realities. The new strategy was officially launched by President Dmitry Medvedev as a concept of "Partnership for Modernization," which was endorsed by the recent Russia-EU declaration.

Certainly, there is a lot of skepticism about such initiatives. Some

# A breakthrough is possible

The EU-Russia "Partnership for Modernization" can succeed if Russia is integrated into Western economic, political and security institutions | By Nadia Arbatova



Sailing along the river Don near Rostov: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (center) flanked by EU President José Manuel Barroso (left) and European Council President Herman Van Rompuy (right) during the Russia-EU Summit in June 2010.

people in the West are against technological investments in Russia, because they fear that it might later turn into a powerful economic competitor. They do not understand that a technologically backward, raw-materials exporting and politically unstable authoritarian Russia with a huge nuclear arsenal would be a much bigger threat. And in Russia many interpret innovation narrowly in terms of high-tech mega-projects like the planned Skolkovo innovation center and the Russian Nanotechnology Corporation (Rusnano).

However, there is no doubt that Russia's economic modernization has to go hand in hand with its political, social and state modernization. This is a much more fun-

damental and important requirement than nursing a few high-tech corporations. In order to attract foreign and national investment into industries other than oil and gas, Russia would have to establish a reasonable and balanced division of state powers, key to creating an independent judiciary, as well as arbitration and law-enforcement authorities. This is the sine qua non for controlling bureaucracy and suppressing corruption, securing private property of all kinds, encouraging civil society and protecting human rights and freedoms.

Even now, in the absence of a real division of powers, the binary structure of Russia's top leadership has, over the last decade, unwit-

tingly split the 'power vertical,' opening a window of opportunity for political elites, the business and academic communities and the public at large to openly debate crucial national issues and take sides between the two poles. Despite the efforts of Medvedev and Vladimir Putin to demonstrate full unity, the very existence of the two poles made them symbols of two political avenues and has encouraged Russian modernizers.

The latter may eventually gain the upper hand – if the West initiates a policy of realistic and consistent integration of Russia into the Western economic, political and security institutions and endeavors. The precondition is, of course, that Russia erects not

just a Potemkin village facade of modernization; it must make real progress. If this were implemented it would in its turn have a strong impact on Russian foreign policy: It would make Russia a part of the modern world.

The crisis of European security is another factor changing relations between Russia and the West, although each sees it through a distinct lens. Russia is not satisfied with the existing fragmented and inefficient model of European security, Moscow's limited influence on this system and NATO's excessive role in Europe. Transatlantic relations are a matter of deep concern. Besides the European-American differences regarding their relative contribution to the operation in Afghanistan there is a divide among European nations. As one prominent EU diplomat has defined it: "The old Europe wants a new NATO, while the new Europe wants the old NATO."

On the one hand, there is a growing understanding in some European capitals that security within Europe is increasingly becoming a matter for the EU and that Russia cannot be elbowed out of this context. As long as Russia shares the continent with the EU and NATO, both of which possess huge economic, political and military potential, "without Russia" will always be interpreted in Moscow as "against Russia." To prevent this and bolster EU-Russian security cooperation, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Medvedev proposed in June 2010 to establish an EU-Russia Political and Security Committee.

At the same time, policy divisions within Europe are an obstacle to

a real breakthrough in NATO-Russia relations. They undermine NATO's collective capacity to develop efficient responses to new challenges and threats. Thus, despite high expectations prior to the NATO Lisbon summit, its concrete results were mostly about good intentions – and none too innovative ones at that. A commitment to install a joint missile defense system and a declaration that Russia is not viewed by NATO as a security threat – that's not too imaginative 20 years after the end of the Cold War.

It is high time for good intentions to be transformed into practical and far-reaching cooperation on the real common interests. These might include: deep reductions of conventional arms and tactical nuclear weapons, which would totally abolish any war-planning or training by NATO

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## Russia and the West

and Russia against each other; cooperative Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Defense technical projects, starting with the integration of early warning systems; creation of joint rapid deployment corps for peacekeeping missions; an agreement between NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization on common operations (going much further than transit) to stabilize Afghanistan.

The "reset" of Russian-American relations, the changed attitude of "new Europe" (primarily Poland), and developments in Ukraine may provide a political starting point for a real breakthrough in Russia-NATO relations – given more energetic and creative initiatives by decision-makers on both sides. ■

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# Japan, Korea, China: the troubling triangle

Security relations in Northeast Asia | By Bernt Berger and Gudrun Wacker

Northeast Asia has re-established itself as a geo-political flashpoint and as a region of uncertainties. Despite flourishing trade relations and growing economic interdependencies among China, Korea and Japan, the security situation has deteriorated over the past two years. Tensions have boiled up because the parties involved lack a common perspective in dealing with the existing security issues in the region. A common security architecture that could help to eliminate security dilemmas does not exist.

Two main issues have been dominating the agenda in Northeast Asia. First, the unresolved nuclear issue and the ongoing tensions on the Korean peninsula are a burden to the whole region. Second, long-standing conflicting territorial claims have repeatedly affected the political climate among all littoral states in the region. To name but a few: Senkaku/Diaoyutai (between China and Japan); Kuril Islands/Northern Territories (between Japan and Russia); and Takeshima/Dokdo Island (between Japan and Korea).

Recent provocations by North Korea have bolstered a more uncompromising South Korean stance and mark a new level of tensions. Pyongyang's leaders have continuously displayed their disregard for multilateral efforts aimed at convincing them to give up their nuclear weapons program. After years of stalling tactics, the North has repeatedly breached interna-



Tension has been rising along the 38th parallel, the world's most dangerous strategic frontier: maneuver of the South Korean armed forces in December 2010. Disputed islands: Takeshima/Dokdo Island (below, left), Senkaku/Diaoyutai (below, right), Kuril Islands/Northern Territories.

US-Japan alliance into an equal partnership.

As a consequence of a year of negative trends and deteriorating perceptions in regional security, the US and its partners, including South Korea and Japan, have closed ranks and resuscitated their alliance. However, China's reputation as a soft power has suffered. Whereas trust in Northeast Asia has never reached a satisfactory level, China had managed to build up a positive image in Southeast Asia since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Yet broadly conceived concepts such as "Peaceful Rise" or "Harmonious Neighborhood" have never entirely convinced its neighbors. Now the lost credibility will be difficult to recover.

In security affairs, confidence building has never been a matter of public diplomacy and influencing perceptions alone. Multilateral mechanisms that enable mutual arms control and assessments of strategic intentions have in the past been essential for establishing trust. Current bilateral formats and summitry in the region, combined with growing economic interdependencies, do contribute to regional stability. However, they cannot replace reliable and credible mechanisms that are binding for all parties involved.

Even a consensus-based model such as the CSCE process in Europe has so far not been met with great enthusiasm. The nuclear issue is one of the key security challenges and has nourished mistrust in Northeast Asia. Without resolving this issue, a "first basket"



PICTURE: ALLIANCE (PAKISTAN) GUARD (H)

tional agreements reached at the Six-Party Talks. Last year evidence was provided that North Korea was building a second light-water reactor for enriching uranium on the site of its Yongbyon nuclear facility.

Concurrently North Korea has engaged in a range of provocations including the sinking of the South Korean vessel Cheonan and the shelling of Yeongpyong Island. Pyongyang's motives remain opaque. Commentators assume that blackmail for aid, displays of strength in support of the impending leadership change and forcing the other parties back to the negotiation table could have been the main reasons for the foray.

Yet Korea, China and Japan have, if anything, displayed disunity and a lack of dexterity in dealing with the issue as well as with each other. Under the government of President Lee Myung-bak, Seoul has departed from its former rapprochement strategies and reverted to putting pressure on the North. The US has taken the same line and stood by its ally in the South – partly in order to reposition itself vis-à-vis China.

International commentators have mainly blamed China for failing to assert pressure on its troublesome ally, arguing that Beijing's constant emphasis on regional stability has paved the way for a continued militarization of the North.

China initially tried to reduce the tensions, dispatching State Coun-

cilor Dai Bingguo for a round of shuttle diplomacy between Seoul and Pyongyang when the situation threatened to escalate. But Beijing's continued defense of the North Korean position and its own role in long-standing territorial disputes made it impossible to play the role of honest broker in the region.

A series of events has rekindled the territorial issues in the region. After a Chinese fishing trawler rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel in a maritime area in the East China Sea claimed by both, the two countries have been at odds once again. But those conflicts have not only been about territorial integrity and strategic repositioning of the parties involved in the region. The central issue has been the exploitation of maritime and energy resources.



PICTURE: ALLIANCE (PAKISTAN) GUARD (H)



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## Powder Keg Northeast Asia

Earlier memorandums between China and Japan declaring their intention to jointly develop and exploit the resources and "shelving" the question of sovereignty have been forgotten – or at least they were never seriously imple-

mented. China also complained about joint US-South Korean military exercises, involving a US aircraft carrier, calling the maneuvers that took place near China's territorial waters "provocative and destabilizing." Consequently, Bei-

jing perceived its own military drills over the last year as defensive reactions to developments and provocations in its immediate vicinity. Its neighbors, however, sense a new assertiveness, if not aggressiveness, on the part of China.

Uncertainties about the future role of the US have had an impact on the overall security situation in East Asia. Since President Obama took office, the role of the US in the region has been far from uncontroversial. The new administration simultaneously adopted three objectives in its Asia policy: strengthening traditional alliances with Japan and the Republic of

Korea, offering China a broad and comprehensive partnership and enhancing America's multilateral engagement in East Asia.

But trends in the region were initially not in Washington's favor. When Japan's newly elected Democratic Party government called into question the US Marine Corps base in Futenma on the island of Okinawa, the US showed no intention to compromise. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who during his election campaign promised to renegotiate the Futenma agreement with the US, eventually lost his post. His declared aim had been to improve Japan's profile in East Asia and transform the

solution similar to the CSCE process (including confidence building measures, common principles, norms and rules of behavior) remains unlikely.

For the time being, a regional security architecture building on diplomatic initiatives is out of reach. The prospects for the Six-Party Talks to develop into a viable security organization after the nuclear issue has been resolved have become dim. The Six-Party Talks themselves have stalled since 2008. In view of the progress in North Korea's nuclear armament it remains uncertain whether the US and South Korea are willing to continue the format. Additionally, with their bilateral conflicts unresolved the trilateral summit format between China, Japan and South Korea, which had developed out of the ASEAN+3 meetings, can hardly be expected to put hard security issues on its agenda. Yet dialogue is more important than ever in preventing the situation from deteriorating any further.

With presidential elections in the US as well as South Korea and a Party Congress cum leadership change in China all due to take place in 2012, the conflicts and different positions in the region will be reflected and filtered through the prism of the respective campaigns and tailored to domestic audiences. That does not bode well for fresh and creative ideas, sorely needed to achieve a turn for the better. ■

# India and China: pitfalls on the path ahead

Asia's giants oscillate between rivalry and rapprochement | By Jonathan Holslag

When Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called on China two years ago, his visit took place in a pleasant spirit of pride. While the United States headed for some stormy economic weather, China and India were seemingly set to become the twin engines of a new Asian Golden Century.

When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao recently left India after a three-day visit, the mood was much less upbeat. Both sides had to digest another failed round of border negotiations, proliferating trade disputes and tensions over Kashmir. While that has been the normal state of things between China and India for two decades, their leaders should understand that muddling through like this undermines the prospects for lasting peace.

Obviously, Chinese and Indian leaders have to bear a heavy historical burden. The border conflict, with two strategically located swaths of land at stake in the western and eastern part of the boundary, is to a large degree the inheritance of imperial wrangling between the British Empire and the rulers of the late Qing Dynasty. China's quasi-alliance with India's arch-enemy Pakistan has deep roots in the Cold War. The same goes for Beijing's nervousness about India's linkages with the Tibetan government in exile. Much of these disputes from the past are kept alive by a new quest for international status and regional influence.

Preoccupied with their domestic development and longing for

some sort of stability, Beijing and Delhi have tried to work their way around these tensions. Last month, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao urged acceptance of the fact that "there is both competition and collaboration in the dynamic equilibrium" of the relationship.

Chinese and Indian leaders tend to believe that it is better to let sensitive issues lie than to awake the sleeping dogs of nationalism. They also appear to assume that great power rivalry will become obsolete as trade and P2P exchanges expand. Yet the past cannot be separated from the future, because the past will continue to sow discord and there are plenty of pitfalls on the road to the future.

Even the most impressive architecture of dialogues, business exchanges and discussions between opinion leaders will not offset mutual distrust if relations continue to be plagued by small but symbolically sensitive provocations. Take the recent visit of the Dalai Lama to the monastery of Tawang in disputed territory or sensational but overblown reports of Chinese troops controlling parts of Pakistani Kashmir.



A provocation for China: The Dalai Lama during his visit to the Tawang Monastery in Tawang city, Arunachal Pradesh, northeast India, November 2009. China has never recognized the 1914 McMahon Line and claims 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory – nearly all of Arunachal Pradesh, which the Chinese call South Tibet.

Should such incidents matter? Not really. Do they matter? Yes, a lot. They cloud public perceptions and reduce the space for cooperation.

A sort of status quo will prove to be impossible if the balance of power between the two countries continues to alter to China's advantage. As China

develops faster, Tibet becomes more densely populated, better connected to the rest of the country and more closely watched by the government. Consequently, its role as strategic buffer diminishes, which in turn makes India more concerned about securing the border.

Likewise, India has been alarmed by China's growing economic influence in neighboring countries and the decision to dispatch the Chinese navy to the Indian Ocean to guard its merchant fleet. Shifts in the balance of power inevitably aggravate threat perceptions and revive past strategic fears.

Economic interests have been an important driver of pragmatism in Sino-Indian relations, but this cannot be taken for granted. Should India manage to trigger its industrialization, it will become a formidable competitor for China in an international market that suffers from overcapacity and uncertain demand. Both countries will have to use a lot of political lobbying to gain access to both export markets and raw materials.

If India fails to build a stronger economy, demographic pressure and social unrest will become the

ideal substrate for a negative kind of nationalism that could turn against ethnic minority groups as well as against old rivals like Pakistan and China. Even in China, slower growth would make it much more difficult for its leaders to respond calmly if another incident erupts.

There are many more challenges that lie well beyond the scope of the current superficial form of engagement. The water reserves of the Himalaya are clearly one of them. Glaciers are melting rapidly and both sides



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
## India and China

are devising plans to secure their share. Yet no progress whatsoever has been made in setting up a water sharing mechanism. While crooked regimes in Pakistan, Nepal and Myanmar have cleverly played on Sino-Indian rivalry, no one knows how the two giants would interact should one of those countries experience a political meltdown.

For all the confidence-building measures and dialogues, this remains a matter of curing the symptoms and even distracts leaders from addressing the deep sources of distrust. Asia's future might not be so different from its turbulent past after all.

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### HAMBURG | GERMANY

PROJECT DATA	CONTRACTOR
 <b>S-440, Mixshield</b> Diameter: 6,570mm Cutterhead power: 450kW Tunnel length: 5,620m (2x 2,810m) Geology: gravel, clay, sand, silt	ARGE U4 HafenCity (HOCHTIEF Construction AG, E. Züblin AG, AUG. PRIEN BAUUNTER- NEHMUNG GMBH & CO. AG, HC HAGEMANN GmbH & Co. KG)

Hamburg is building metro line U4 to provide a direct and quick link between the new HafenCity and the city center. The journey from "Jungfernstieg" station at the inner Alster to "HafenCity Universität" station at the Elbe River will only take 4 minutes. The citizens of the Hanseatic city nicknamed the Herrenknecht S-440 tunnel boring machine (Mixshield Ø 6,570mm), which is excavating the two parallel tunnels, V.E.R.A. (German abbreviations for "from the Elbe River towards the Alster River").

The tunnelling specialists of the U4 HafenCity Consortium were able to celebrate the final breakthrough on December 3, 2010, one month ahead of schedule, after having mastered sometimes demanding geological conditions with bravura. This means that the final development phase of the tunnel tubes is advancing as scheduled and that the metro can presumably be put into operation as planned in fall 2012. After final completion of the HafenCity project, the Hamburger Hochbahn AG expects that 35,000 passengers per day will use the U4 metro line.

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# More than a military challenge

US strategy in Afghanistan: on the brink of disaster or the cusp of victory?

By William R. Smyser

President Barack Obama's strategy in Afghanistan is a complex mix of military, political and diplomatic tactics in a forbidding environment. Obama did not want to be a war president; yet he is now fighting a conflict that he inherited. He wanted to improve US relations with the Muslim world; yet he is fighting against a movement – the Taliban – which in part justifies its struggle on Islamic grounds.

Obama also does not want to become a colonialist and he pledged to begin withdrawing US forces from Afghanistan by July. Now, he must promise to keep at least some there until 2014; they may be forced and perhaps invited to stay even longer. Obama is thus now committed to turning around a situation that many believed – and some still believe – to be on the brink of disaster. He neither wants to, nor can he afford to lose.

In 2010, Obama therefore reluctantly committed 30,000 additional US troops to Afghanistan – 10,000 less than the Pentagon wanted but enough to bring US forces to the 100,000 level.

The single most visible element in US strategy for Afghanistan must therefore be the military effort. It will cost around \$120 billion this year, including an economic aid budget of \$4 billion.

US troops comprise about two-thirds of the NATO force. As might be expected, they bear the brunt of the fighting but they are not alone. Other nations' soldiers are also committed. But many non-US force contingents will be going home this year.

In addition, US military aid is designed to support a total of about 305,000 Afghan forces, about two-thirds military and one-third police. An increase to 378,000 by the end of

2012 has been recommended, but it has not been approved to date and may not be.

US and Western strategy goes by the acronym of COIN (COunter-INSurgency), which has been most strongly and persistently advocated by the allied commander in Afghanistan, US General David Petraeus. He believes he can stabilize the situation and begin showing progress by the end of 2011.

Unfortunately, however, the conflict in Afghanistan is one in which the West can win every battle but still lose the war.

US military strategy has primarily a political purpose. It is not expected to defeat or eliminate Taliban forces – especially as they have some sanctuaries in neighboring Pakistan – but to make it clear that the Taliban cannot prevail and must join in an Afghan political process leading to some form of common government.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai is ready to enter discussions with the Taliban and others toward a government giving appropriate representation to all sides. Washington supports that objective but does not want to see each faction allotted a negotiated share in any coalition; it wants each to have a chance to compete politically, but Karzai has not made his own plans clear.

Afghans might accept such a representative government. Many recall a time of peace and stability under the monarchy destroyed by a coup almost 40 years ago. Washington would probably accept that in its political strategy. US long-term political objectives in Afghanistan remain consistent: to have no more

al Qaeda bases or training areas in Afghanistan, and to leave Afghanistan stable and independent.

Washington also hopes that any Afghan will gain international approval, perhaps necessarily including political influence for neighbors and near neighbors. Some of them might exploit potentially rich Afghan mineral deposits, including copper, iron ore and rare earths. China is developing a major copper mine not far from Kabul.

Even if US military and political objectives seem clear, the diplomatic environment is fraught with potentially destructive complexities. Many leaders in the area – probably including Karzai and his Pakistani counterparts – believe that Washington's real purpose is not to defeat the Taliban but to have a strategic regional power base against Russia, China and Iran while protecting what Washington may fear to be an increasingly

shaky position in the wider Middle East. They do not share that purpose.

Moreover, relations between the principal states in the immediate area remain so troubled that Washington has not been diplomatically able to devise a commonly accepted purpose. The Pakistani army, for example, is deployed in the east to meet a potential Indian attack, not to help in Afghanistan.

Pakistan even supports the Taliban and offers it a safe haven in part because it fears that India may win influence over Taliban fighters and thus hold Pakistan in a deadly strategic vise. India in turn wants to sus-

tain its hold over Muslim Kashmir, frustrating the Muslims in Pakistan. Neither state has to date been able to break the cycle of mutual mistrust.

Local states thus pursue their own objectives irrespective of US interests. Pakistan harbors some Taliban forces and leaders in the tribal areas of North Waziristan along the Afghan border. US drone aircraft have been targeting Taliban leaders there but Pakistan will not turn against them as long as it fears Indian influence.

In January, meetings in Islamabad with US Vice President Joseph Biden, senior Pakistani officials urged Washington to seek pragmatic solutions instead of "trading charges." Biden privately assured prime minister Yusuf Raza Gilani that there would be no American "boots on the ground" in Pakistan.

Thus, although some of Afghanistan's smaller neighbors support US efforts, there is little prospect for wide regional assistance for US objectives and tactics in Afghanistan.

US strategy, as outlined in a State Department paper of January 2010, is to disrupt and defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban and to integrate a stable Afghanistan into its surroundings. Washington also hopes to maintain some political and diplomatic influence in the area, and perhaps even some modest military presence. But Afghan xenophobia and the almost astronomical mistrust among different players, not only toward each other but toward America itself, renders such a prospect brutally difficult.

Afghanistan poses far more than a military challenge. It represents only part of a combination of diplomatic, military, political and ethnic issues that is about as complex as any American president would ever want to face.



William R. Smyser, a former US diplomat, is Professor at Georgetown University.

Afghanistan



Which way? These US soldiers in Afghanistan are looking for directions to their next mission; Barack Obama and his allies are looking for a workable strategy for the country.

After almost a decade of Afghanistan deployment, the governments of all the ISAF force contributors, including the US, face the same dilemma: Popular support for the mission is at an all time low. The pressure on politicians to justify the continued military presence is growing. And in its 10th year, the deployment continues unabated.

"When will we finally get out of there?" That question dominates the Afghanistan debate in all the ISAF states, understandably. But it is also an incendiary question. An unbridled race to set the earliest possible date for withdrawal can only end in failure for the international community in Afghanistan.

Much is at stake. Above all, there is Afghanistan's future. This country has lived through 30 years of war and civil war, and it longs for peace and stability. It deserves the support of the international community.

Yet at stake is also the stability of a region that has an enormous potential for conflict and whose explosive force can affect the entire world. If Afghanistan fails, it could lead to breakdowns throughout the region.

The winners would be radical Islamists, who have taken root not just in Pakistan but also in adjacent Central Asian states to the north. The threat this poses to our security is still very real – another reason why we must not leave Afghanistan precipitously.

Ultimately, the question is also a fundamental one about the ability of the

Military advice is welcome, but political leaders must determine the course

By Frank-Walter Steinmeier

United Nations to act. The UN played a key role in helping to prevent and regulate international conflicts after the end of the Cold War, with the number of peacekeeping missions approved by the Security Council increasing many times over.

With this in mind, there would be far-reaching consequences should the international community fail in Afghanistan. It would be a grave setback for modern international law, and a blow to the UN's standing as an arbiter of conflict resolution and a peacemaker. That is another reason why it is so important to successfully complete the Afghanistan mission.

The political race to be the country that withdraws at the earliest possible date should be halted. It would be calamitous if individual states, acting on their own, were to bow out of the collective responsibility.

The resolutions adopted at the NATO Summit in Lisbon were the right steps to take. The ISAF states there agreed on realistic goals. Afghanistan must be empowered to take care of its own security, and reconstruction must be pursued with considerably greater efficiency and resolve.

The Afghan government must promote a political solution for resolving the conflicts in its own country, and the international community must work to ensure stability in the wider region.

NATO has set a tight schedule for reaching these goals. Responsibility for security is to be transferred wholly into Afghan hands by 2014, and participation by the international community in combat operations will cease as of that date. Transfer of security responsibility is to begin in the first half of this year. The US has pledged to start reducing

its troop numbers in mid-2011 as part of the handover preparations.

This schedule has a crucial function, giving all participating nations, and therefore all the citizens of the ISAF states, a clear time horizon and an answer to the pressing question: "How much longer?"

The timeline is not unrealistic. It is based on the declared intent of the Afghan government to ensure its own security by 2014. It is also based on observable progress in training Afghan security forces, and in the civilian reconstruction of the country.

That increases the pressure on all participants in a positive way: on ISAF to train the Afghan security forces; on the international community to rebuild the country; on the Afghan government to set up a functioning state and combat corruption and nepotism.

Political leaders who name target dates for withdrawing troops unfailingly provoke knee-jerk reactions. President Obama, Germany's main opposition party, the SPD, and even NATO

– after announcing its summit resolution – have all experienced it. The arguments from a chorus of military leaders, and some defense ministers, is always the same: "Preparations for ending the Afghanistan mission play into the hands of the radical forces there." Or to put it another way: we have the mission clock, the Taliban have the time.

The hidden reproach here, that politicians heedlessly disregard the military situation with specific timelines, is one I certainly take seriously. But political experience also tells me that this argument sometimes reflects a tendency among military actors, not only in the USA, to grab the initiative and dictate to politicians how they should act.

That cannot be and should not be. Military advice is necessary and welcome. But it would be going down the wrong track for politicians and diplomats to adopt a wait-and-see stance until such time as a militarily-defined status quo is reached.

The primacy of politics must be maintained without restrictions. The military course of action must follow the political guidelines, in Afghanistan as elsewhere.

The other side of that coin is that politicians must face up to their responsibility. The primacy of politics will be that much stronger if it can develop and implement convincing initiatives that lead to a political resolution of the conflict.

I note with concern that such initiatives are lacking. True, the Afghanistan contact group has enjoyed increasing popularity, and there are many behind-the-scenes conversations. At the highest political level, however, courageous initiatives are lacking.

The time is not yet ripe for an "OSCE for Central Asia." Putting it on the table at this juncture is beyond all foreign policy reality. But we must urgently find a way to fill the dangerous political vacuum in this region. Ensuring that Afghanistan is no longer misused as a proxy location for regional conflicts means reconciling the often violently competing interests within the country.

That means it is necessary to make a concerted effort to deal with Afghanistan's neighbors, to make overtures to them and to involve them actively in the process. Neither geography nor history should be allowed to stand in the way. Those who wish to see Afghanistan stand on its own two feet after 2014, and do so permanently, need to set the course now. Otherwise this troubled country will stand alone in three years, in a region filled with unresolved conflicts.



Frank-Walter Steinmeier is the Social Democratic Party floor leader in the Bundestag and a former German Foreign Minister.

Afghanistan

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# More sovereignty through cooperation

If the EU wants to remain relevant in defense and security policy, it needs to look for joint solutions | By Hilmar Linnenkamp



EUrozone rescue funds, financial market regulation, reform of the international monetary system – when it comes to their common currency, the EU member states stand together. They know it's the only way to counter the risks. That is no less true for European security and defense policy, especially in the wake of a financial crisis that has left no country untouched.

Germany's armed forces are currently undergoing far-reaching reforms. Compulsory military service is being abolished, and Bundeswehr personnel will be reduced by a quarter, or perhaps even by a third. In the middle of these radical changes, the Defense Minister has discovered the European dimension to national military planning – a late discovery, but still.

In December 2010, he proclaimed "the hour of Europe." Like its European partners, Germany faces the challenge of finding a balance between its strategic goals and increasingly scarce national resources. The necessary military capacities can no longer be provided purely at the national level. Redundancies exist, and not every state can continue to maintain a "complete military portfolio."

This understanding reflected decisions announced on Dec. 9, 2010 by the EU Foreign Affairs

Council: Europe's Defense Ministers pledged information-sharing ("as appropriate") and transparency, especially in light of current and future cuts to military budgets. They also undertook to examine the effects such cuts will have on military capability development. They set themselves the goal of considerably expanding cooperation. Four instruments are available to do so, two bilateral and two multilateral.

The first is the initiative taken by the Swedish and German Defense Ministers, initially sketched out in September 2010 during an informal meeting in Ghent, and described in a joint paper on "Intensifying Military Cooperation in Europe." It calls for a systematic comparative analysis of the various national military capacities. The idea is to establish how the interoperability of military capacities which need to be maintained at the national levels can be increased. At issue is how existing capacities can be pooled, and where participation (or sharing) is possible in the existing capacities of partner nations. Finally, the possibilities for sharing roles internationally should be sounded out, which would be a step toward deliberate interdependence between the member nations.

In the first six months of 2011, the results are to be summarized and presented in a report to EU

High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton. That would be the place to put forward long overdue proposals with respect to joint capacities, including the fleet of military transport aircraft, the helicopter pool, and satellite communications.

Secondly, the Defense and Security Cooperation Treaty signed by France and the UK in November 2010 already includes specific cooperation measures in research and development, equipment, and coordination of military operations. This contract, dubbed the "entente frugal," points to two things. One is that pressure to economize in London and Paris has had more influence on this project than the French desire to woo the UK away from its skepticism about European cooperation. The other is the British wish to renew the impetus toward bilateralism which emerged from the St. Malo meeting in late 1998.

Public interest in this "entente" may be mainly due to Franco-British plans to cooperate in two areas that symbolize world power status: nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, the list of cooperation proposals includes all the elements of the EU Foreign Affairs Council's pronouncement:

- promoting interoperability: this is a key aspect of the agreed Combined Joint Expeditionary Force;

- pooling forces: combined logistics support in operating the A400M military transport aircraft; and
- capacity sharing – such as French use of UK airborne refueling capacities.

Thirdly, the Council's decision gives the European Defense Agency (EDA) a supporting role in identifying areas where cooperation can be increased. Yet this is nothing new. The Steering Com-

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SWP



## Bundling EU Capacities

mittee of the EDA had already presented a Capability Development Plan (CDP) in July 2008, treating it as the basis for long-term cooperation between member states. Work on the CDP, however, has not as yet taken into account the deep changes in member states' plans that have been unleashed by the financial crisis.

Fourthly, the cursory reference to the "permanent structured cooperation" (PSC) established by the Lisbon Treaty evokes skepticism and a sense of déjà vu. PSC was and is conceived as intro-

ducing a long overdue dynamic into the pre-Lisbon era requirement for unanimity in common security and defense policy. The idea being that member states committed to moving forward more quickly with permanent and specific security and defense policy integration, should not be hindered from doing so by the veto of non-participants. While this instrument would seem a good idea, implementing it has been arduous. Despite an intense academic debate, the political will to move from the possible to the real has been lacking.

What can be done? The basic question posed by all the respective national armed forces is: "How many of what kind of forces, equipped to what level are needed; and for what?" The answer needs to come at the European level. The headline-goal process provided some first approaches, though the latest version, articulated in a European Council decision reached at the end of 2008 during the French presidency, was an extremely demanding variant.

Further elements of an answer can also be found in the EDA's "Long-Term Vision" (2006) and CDP (2008), as well as in the "European Security Strategy" (2003) and its accompanying "Implementation Report" (2008). All of these predate the financial crisis. A European

"Strategic Defense and Security Review" seems appropriate.

Who would be responsible for it? It is apparently primarily the responsibility of the High Representative, on behalf of all the member states, to draft such a foundational document. As she is at the same time head of the EDA, it would be natural to use this institution as a forum, focus point and catalyst for a debate on European security and defense. Suggestions for PSC (as in the Swedish-German initiative), as well as the Franco-British Cooperation Treaty, would find the necessary framework within this discourse.

Since modern nation-states were first formed, armed forces have been the expression of state sovereignty. In this regard, every level of organized dependence, on a continuum from cooperation to integration, or from interoperability to interdependence, remains delicate and difficult. Nevertheless, the view has come to prevail that interoperability is necessary and interdependence (the division of tasks) is tolerable.

This realization modifies the very notion of sovereignty. For cooperation to be successful, it must be seen as supporting rather than diminishing sovereignty. Because sovereignty must be based on the ability to wield influence. Planned capacity sharing serves sovereignty better than remaining proud but weak. ■

It is an unprecedented military pact providing for genuine strategic cooperation, including joint operation of aircraft carriers, the creation of a 5,000-soldier joint expeditionary force and coordination of nuclear weapons research. On Nov. 2, 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed the far-reaching security accord under pressure of rapidly decreasing defense budgets. But their approach is the beginning of a long overdue process.

Taxpayers in Europe receive little defense efficiency for their money. European states are incapable of maintaining modern armed forces at controllable costs since virtually every nation attempts to organize its defenses autonomously. The result: They are not in a position to equip their troops to interoperate with US forces in the four-dimensional military theaters of the 21st century. This potentially fatal state of affairs must be dealt with as soon as possible and there is only one means of doing so: Europe must pool its defense efforts.

Given that resources are limited, there is clearly no longer any justification for every European state to maintain the entire range of land, air and naval forces. The collective execution of Europe's tasks both within NATO and the EU, with more division of responsibilities and role specialization, would allow a more cost-effective approach.


Europe must be capable of strategic action. Only a bundling of European components can provide the continent with a limited capacity to respond to the global challenges and enable Europe to act in tandem with the US. This approach would tighten the transatlantic link.

In terms of practical implementation, a European division of tasks embedded within a transatlantic alliance would involve establishing European components which are fully interoperable with those of the USA and which, by "flanging" American components, could become NATO Component Forces. A strong Europe could also cooperate more closely with Russia – based on the principle that peace and stability can only be achieved by working with and not against Moscow.

# Time to pool resources

A new approach to military spending in an age of budgetary austerity

By Volker Rühle, Klaus Naumann and Ulrich Weisser



The badge of the Eurocorps, to which 60,000 soldiers from Germany, France, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg have been assigned. It was set up in 1993 on the basis of the German-French brigade. Its headquarters is in Strasbourg.

We face a future full of uncertainties. What can we expect and which dangers and threats must Europe prepare for? What new tasks will emerge as a result? What tasks can best be performed collectively or to whom should they be assigned? How can we collectively meet jointly defined material requirements? NATO's new strategic concept will have to spell out the answers to these key questions.

Europe's security will continue to require a fully functional structure of nuclear-armed forces to deter other nuclear powers. NATO should work with Russia to build up a land and/or sea-based missile defense system to counter the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles.

Simultaneously, we are experiencing a renaissance in maritime policy. The significance of naval forces capable of operating on the outskirts of Europe is on the increase. In view of the potential for crisis and conflict, as well as terrorist

activities in the southern arc of crisis, Europe must shift its strategic focus to the South and South-East.

Finally, the new threats make it imperative for Europe to equip itself with strategic and operative means of intel-



From left to right: Volker Rühle, former German Minister of Defense; General Klaus Naumann (ret.), former Chairman of NATO's Military Committee; Vice Admiral Ulrich Weisser (ret.), former German Defense Planning Chief.

## Bundling EU Capacities

ligence gathering, enabling it to dispatch and lead light combat units over long distances and keep them in theaters over extended periods.

Europe needs to organize its defenses so that tasks which can be completed more effectively and cost-efficiently at European level are carried out within EU structures. It needs to merge its forces and collectively finance its equipment needs. Integration, complementarity and multinationality must be the decisive factors when planning European components. The obvious choice for our armed forces in Europe would be to give priority to the creation of common components in the enabler and force multiplier fields.

Financial resources are extremely limited everywhere and new weapon systems are expensive. Since action is only taken collectively, nothing could be more obvious than to merge armed forces, to jointly define and finance the demand for military capabilities, and to bundle them into specific "pools" from which task forces can be drawn. However, the prerequisites for creating such a system of mutual dependencies are lacking. Political leadership is needed.

Typical future tasks arising from the new range of threats and requiring joint action include: missile defense in conjunction with Russia; cyber defense; counter-proliferation incorporating strategic intelligence; special forces and a common EU cruise missile component; creation of limited European projection capacities by deploying European intervention forces from the UK, France, and other EU countries willing to provide suitable contingents. This, in turn, necessitates sea transport capabilities as well as a pool of European air transport planes including air-to-air refueling capacity.

This approach seeks to avoid spending money on defense capabilities that were meaningful during the Cold War but are now obsolete. It also seeks to prevent our defense industry gradually falling behind global competitors because their products do not address the military and security needs of the 21st century. This approach can become a reality if our politicians summon the courage to make decisions now that, though uncomfortable, would offer our states and their citizens the best possible protection.



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# A long way off

But Global Zero will remain a realistic and constructive objective | By Richard Burt

**H**as the wind gone out of the sails of Global Zero, the international effort to eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide?

At first glance, this might appear to some as an odd question. Barack Obama, since he first announced his Global Zero goal early in his presidency, moved quickly to enlist Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and other international leaders in the effort. Those steps were followed up last year by a 41-nation nuclear security summit in Washington and the completion of a new Russian-American strategic arms reduction treaty.

But in the aftermath of a difficult debate over ratifying the new START Treaty in the US Senate late last year, a growing number of observers on both sides of the Atlantic are concluding that the momentum behind Global Zero is slowing down. In Washington there are suggestions that the intensity of last December's arms treaty debate may lead the Administration to become gun-shy over pushing ahead with the arms control agenda.

Similar reservations also exist in Moscow, where strategic analysts argue that limits on missile defense are necessary before undertaking further reductions in offensive arms. The Russian military, in particular, voices concerns about the weakness of its conventional capabilities and stresses that a large number of nuclear weapons are still necessary to deter China in particular.

As a result, neither the United States nor Russia seems to be in a particular hurry to follow up the START Treaty with a more ambitious negotiating effort.

At the same time, the conceptual pathway for future nuclear arms reductions is becoming clearer, at least among strategists in the United States, Europe and Russia. It consists of two large negotiating steps that could be taken during the next five years or so.

The first would be to follow up the new START Treaty with a more far-reaching US-Russian agreement that would not only seek fewer numbers of nuclear weapons, but more comprehensive coverage of these arms. Even with the new treaty, Russia and America still possess over 90 percent of the world's nuclear arsenal.

Accordingly, a new negotiation could focus on reaching an agreement that, for the first time, would constrain strategic nuclear warheads, shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons (where Russia has a large advantage), and nuclear weapons held in reserve or in storage (where the United States is superior). The overall ceiling on these different categories could be as low as 1,000 weapons for both sides.

Such an outcome would be difficult, but not impossible to achieve. Strengthened verification procedures would certainly be necessary. More importantly, it will be necessary to address Russian concerns over US programs to develop and deploy missile defense. Probably the best way of doing this will be to find creative ways to involve Moscow in cooperative approaches with the West to solve the missile defense challenge. A tentative step in this direction was taken, in fact, at the NATO Summit last November in Lisbon.

A new, more comprehensive US-Russian arms accord would clear the way for the second large step towards Global Zero. If the two nuclear giants could bring their forces down to 1,000 weapons then this would create incentives for other nuclear powers, particularly China, to enter the process. The result would be a new, multilateral framework for nuclear reductions which would aim for Global Zero through a series of phased, proportionate steps.

A multilateral forum for nuclear reductions would represent a major political and military achievement. On the one hand, it would provide a means of dealing with the interlinked nuclear dynamics between Russia, China, India and the United States as well as coming to grips with the Indo-Pakistani arms race. But perhaps more importantly, an agreement by the international community's exist-

ing nuclear powers to engage in multilateral reductions would serve the critical function of creating much stronger barriers to the spread of nuclear arms to new states.

In the end, this is what Global Zero is all about. In the 21st century, the threat is not the Cold War nightmare of a super-

power nuclear exchange. It is the acquisition of nuclear weapons by failing states or rogue states or even by terrorist groups.

Ironically, however, the existing nuclear states will play a critical role in stemming proliferation. This will require enhanced political cooperation on a broad range of issues, and the prospects for this seem to be improving.

President Obama's continuing leadership on Global Zero will be essential. So, too, will be his administration's effort to "reset" relations with Moscow, a process that will be reinforced by broader Western efforts to integrate Russia into the global economy. China's evolving role will also be important. During President Hu Jintao's important visit to Washington last month, the Chinese sent encouraging signals about Beijing's future participation in multilateral nuclear reductions.

Needless to say, the goal of Global Zero remains a long way off. But if a sustained effort is made to first launch negotiations on a new, more comprehensive US-Russian nuclear accord and then to create a multilateral framework for arms reductions, Global Zero will remain a realistic and constructive objective. ■



Richard Burt, former US ambassador to Germany and chief US arms control negotiator, is US Chairman of Global Zero.

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## Global Zero?

# No nukes? Not yet

Neither the US nor Russia are in a hurry to free Europe of nuclear weapons | By Christoph Bertram

**O**n the face of it, the European region would seem an ideal place to dispose of all nuclear weapons previously stationed there. A new military conflict between NATO and Russia involving the use of nuclear weapons is close to inconceivable. And it is here that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev by common agreement removed a whole category of nuclear weapons, the so-called Intermediary Nuclear Forces (INF) in the late 1980s.

So the path to a nuclear-free part of the world should be less steep here, where East and West once confronted each other with the whole panoply of advanced means of mass destruction, from conventional to nuclear forces.

Today, the obvious candidates for the next step are those nuclear weapons that fell below the ceiling of both strategic and intermediary systems, then called "tactical" but today more precisely termed "sub-strategic" nukes.

Measured against Cold War Statistics, their number in Europe today is modest. In the West, some 200 US gravity bombs are deployed, deliverable by NATO aircraft stationed in five European countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) – out of a total of 500 operational warheads in the US arsenal. Russia is believed to have around 2,000 deployed sub-strategic weapons which are allocated in almost equal portions to air-delivered bombs and missiles, air-defence and naval roles and not only in the European part of that large country.

Their military usefulness, however, already questionable in Cold War times, has become practically irrelevant. The old idea that nuclear war could be limited and therefore that smaller nukes would be more "useable" than strategic devices was always an illusion; the launching of any nuclear device would most probably have triggered armageddon, regardless of its label. Still, in the construct of nuclear doctrine, the existence of these systems might just have slightly ameliorated the inherent credibility lack of extending to Europe the umbrella of the US strategic deterrent. Today, even that rationale for the West is gone.

For Russia, given the present shortcomings of its conventional forces, disposing of the much larger number of sub-strategic weapons may provide some emotional discomfort. Yet the notion, expressed in the new military doctrine announced last year, of launching nuclear weapons against a conventional aggressor "if the very existence of the state" is threatened, suggests a recourse to strategic rather than sub-strategic means. Hence both Russia and NATO have an arsenal of sub-strategic systems that have lost even the feeble rationale they may once have had.

What is more, the arsenal is ageing and in need of a potentially costly overhaul. NATO dual capable aircraft, largely F-16s and Tornados, are rapidly approaching the end of their service lives. For Germany, modernization will have to be undertaken before the middle of the decade. It cannot be taken for granted that Belgium or the Netherlands will allocate new aircraft to the nuclear role and even seems unlikely given ever tighter defence budgets.

Thus there should be, at first glance, a realistic chance for "regional zero." The weapons systems have lost their raison d'être and will shortly be in need of costly modernization. Why not give them up altogether?

A closer look, however, reveals a different truth: Neither NATO nor Russia want to take that step at the moment. On the contrary, while neither would think of obtaining those kinds of systems if they did not exist, their very existence promotes justifications for retaining them. Russia justifies its own by conventional military disparities in Europe. NATO's Secretary General has declared that the presence of American nuclear weapons in Europe "is an essential part of a credible deterrent." Strategists concerned lest Tehran acquire a nuclear capability, eagerly attribute to NATO's sub-strategic systems a deterrent role against an Iranian attack.

Not surprisingly, therefore, unilateral disposal, always the easiest method for arms control, was firmly rejected by most NATO allies when Germany advocated it last year. Nor does the idea of negotiated reductions command much urgency. In NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept the allies declare that "in future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russia's agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and

relocate them away from the territory of NATO members." But "any further steps should take into account the greater Russian stockpiles in short-range nuclear weapons."

Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has responded to calls for negotiations by insisting that the first step should be "removing all tactical nuclear weapons to the territory of the state to which they belong" – scarcely a sign that Moscow is much concerned over the NATO arsenal or willing to pay a price for removing it.

Thus the door to Regional Zero has not even opened. The symbolic value of the remaining sub-strategic weapons stands firmly in the way of relinquishing them: for NATO's Eastern European members they represent the US security commitment, to others a possible deterrent against future nuclear threats from outside Europe, for arms controllers a pawn in future deals, and for Russians compensation for assumed non-nuclear inequalities. The more governments focus on them, the more they seem to gain in value.

That, of course, is a familiar feature in all efforts at de-nuclearization. The obstacles to doing away with sub-strategic nukes in Europe are no different from those that present themselves at the level of strategic arms. If progress has been made there, it is due to two essential aspects which have been missing in the European case: US leadership and a sense of political urgency shared by the parties concerned. Had Barack Obama decided to make the removal of sub-strategic arms the next step in his quest for a nuclear-free world, the many hurdles set up in Europe could have been overcome; there are enough instruments in the arms control toolbox to handle the problems of nuclear and other discrepancies between NATO and Russian forces. But the president already had his hands full pushing a fairly modest new START Treaty through the Senate. Moreover, in contrast to the remarkable INF agreement over two decades ago, neither the US nor Russia are under political pressure to move forward on the European nukes.

That does not have to be the end of the road. NATO and Russia should now explore whether they can at least try and make sure that the sub-strategic warheads are less likely to weigh on any future crisis. That could include measures on the nuclear front, such as greater transparency regarding the nuclear arsenals on both sides, confidence-building through reciprocal inspections, and a no-first-use commitment for these systems.

In the end, however, there will be no regional nuclear zero without a new arrangement for conventional forces. As long as nukes in Europe are still seen by many governments, Russia included, as security reassurance they will be around for some time yet. ■

Christoph Bertram is a former director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and the former director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.



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## Regional Zero?

# No farewell to arms

The US and Russia are modernizing their nuclear arsenals. End of a dream?

By Oliver Thränert

Barack Obama has made a world free of nuclear weapons an important objective of his presidency. His Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev seems much less enthusiastic about the elimination of all nuclear arms, but agrees to Obama's Global Zero initiative as a long-term goal. With the New START Treaty about to enter into force, both leaders have accomplished a first disarmament success.

However, in order to convince Republican senators to ratify the new agreement, Obama committed himself to spend almost \$100 billion on modernizing the nation's nuclear weapons complex to ensure that a shrinking nuclear arsenal would still be effective. In his famous Prague speech of April 2009, in which he announced his Global Zero vision, the US president had already made clear that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the US would maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of its allies. Russia also continues to prioritize the modernization of its strategic nuclear forces. Does this mean that the leaders of those two countries still possessing the largest nuclear arsenals are only paying lip-service to the vision of Global Zero? Are we instead witnessing yet another US-Russian nuclear arms race?

In fact, both the US and Russia are modernizing their delivery systems for nuclear weapons, but at a slow pace. In its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of April 2010, the Obama administration points out that retaining a (smaller) triad of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), land-based ballistic missiles (ICBM), and heavy bombers would be best suited to maintain strategic stability. To that end, the US Navy plans to replace its Ohio-class submarines, first deployed in 1981, with a new class of submarines beginning roughly in 2027. Their overall number

could then be reduced from 14 to 12. Key components, such as electronics of the Trident II D5 missiles deployed on submarines, are modernized on a continuous basis. These missiles are planned to last until 2042. Likewise, the Minuteman III ICBMs, first deployed in 1970, are undergoing a life extension program, which essentially resulted in a new missile. It could serve until about 2030. The US heavy bomber fleet consists of B-2s and B-52s, the former being a relatively new system first introduced in 1997. It is being upgraded to improve its survivability and mission

effectiveness. The B-52s carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) that were first deployed in 1981. By 2030, the Air Force plans to deploy new ALCMs. In addition, a new generation of long-range bombers is scheduled to be developed by 2018, but it is unclear whether the new bomber would be nuclear capable or instead be used for conventional missions only.

For Russia, ICBMs are much more important than for the US. Currently, Moscow continues to retire large numbers of its older ICBM fleet. At the same time, Russia is introducing

new variants of its SS-27 ICBM, known as Topol-M and RS-24. This newest road-mobile system, first deployed in the summer of 2010, is capable of carrying up to three nuclear warheads as opposed to the single one on top of the Topol-M. Moreover, Moscow intends to deploy new strategic Borey-class submarines as well as new SLBMs. But the respective program is not running smoothly. The new Bulava (SS-N-32) SLBM had test failures on a

number of occasions. Tests with another SLBM, the Sineva, an improved version of the SS-N-23, have been more successful. One can expect this missile to be deployed on upgraded Delta IV submarines. Finally, a small number of Russian Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers are receiving major modernizations, and a new ALCM (Kh-102) is being developed.

So much for delivery systems, but what about nuclear warheads themselves? Most experts believe that despite advanced computer simulation technologies, at least some nuclear testing remains inevitable to develop a brand new nuclear warhead. But the last nuclear test by the Soviet Union took place in October 1990; Russia as its successor has not conducted any nuclear tests since then. The US, in turn, conducted its last nuclear test in September 1992.

Although the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has yet to be ratified by the US Senate and eight additional states to enter into force, it is reasonable to assume that both Russia and the US have no intention of resuming nuclear testing given the international public outcry that would follow. In fact, the Obama administration committed itself in its NPR not to conduct nuclear testing and to pursue CTBT ratification. Russia on its part ratified the CTBT in June 2000.

More importantly, the Obama administration affirms not to develop new nuclear warheads. Life extension programs on several nuclear warheads

will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs. They will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities. The US is instead investing in its aging nuclear infrastructure. Respective programs are focusing on the nuclear weapons laboratories' science and technical base, advanced computer modeling, new experimental facilities, and studies on the aging of warhead materials to help inform future stockpile stewardship approaches. Such a

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## Nuclear Overhaul

modern nuclear infrastructure is seen as a precondition for further nuclear reductions. Only if the US retains a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise can it afford to reduce its nuclear arsenal to lower numbers.

Russia also wants to keep its nuclear weapons functional. It is reproducing existing warhead designs as opposed to the US approach of life extension programs. New military missions are most likely not part of these programs.

What does all this tell us? Both Russia and the US are indeed modernizing their nuclear arsenals, particularly their delivery systems. It should not come as a surprise that as long as nuclear weapons exist, both countries do not want their weapons simply to decay. But the respective modernization programs should in no way be confused with Cold War style nuclear arms races. After all, even if your new car does not need to be faster than that of your neighbor, you would still want it to be as reliable as possible. ■



"Are they only paying lip service to the vision of Global Zero? Are we instead witnessing yet another US-Russian nuclear arms race?" Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama at a bilateral meeting last November in Yokohama.

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# Stealth war on the Internet

Nations must act together to promote cyber peace

By Myriam Dunn Cavely and Oliver Rolofs

For more than a decade, different forms of cyber conflict have accompanied every political, economic and military confrontation. Criminal and espionage activities carried out with the help of computers happen every day. Given the constant high-level of coverage for such events, it is not surprising

they often accompany conflict-like situations. In fact, in the history of computer networks there are only very few examples of severe attacks that had the potential to, or did disrupt the activities of a nation state. There are even fewer examples of attacks that resulted in physical violence against persons or property.

the realm of national security and military actions is to subject it to the rules of an antagonistic zero-sum game in which one party's gain is another party's loss. In addition, though deterrence language does not really work in the realm of cyberspace, many states have begun to toughen up rhetori-

cyber capabilities generally and cyber weapons specifically.

What should states do in this situation? First, instead of starting a verbal and physical cyber arms race in the era of Global Zero (the movement for the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons), government officials and politicians are well advised to use the more measured language of cyber security or cyber crime when addressing the issue. Not only will this reduce the security dilemma, it also takes into account that not every cyber threat falls within the definition of national security.

Conventional response capabilities are of little use. The main problem with any cyber incident is

the lack of clarity. Most perpetrators can and will remain unknown, if they want to. The difficulty of clearly identifying either the source or the possible attackers and their motives means that there is a high danger of retaliation against the wrong target or for the wrong reasons.

For more clarity, it is necessary to carefully investigate each incident; this means that it is always the law

enforcement community that should act first – and not the defense community. Such a focus will also ensure that cyber defense is not understood as a military issue (only), but (mainly) as a civilian one. There is a need for close cooperation with the private sector, which owns most of a country's critical infrastructures nowadays, good computer forensic capabilities and international legal cooperation. One key issue for all countries alike is the harmonization of laws to facilitate the prosecution of cyber criminals.

Secondly, developments in the last couple of months have shown that it is high time that governments started talking earnestly about cyber peace to avoid a Wild West scenario in the Internet realm. The avenues currently available for arms control in this arena are primarily information exchange and norm-building, whereas attempts to prohibit the means of cyber war altogether or restricting the availability of cyber weapons are likely to fail.

However, these difficulties should not prevent the international community from pushing all countries to adopt responsible limits and self-restraint in the use of cyber weapons and from thinking about new and innovative ways to enhance protection of vital computer networks without inhibiting the public's ability to live and work with confidence on the Internet. The time is ripe for cyber diplomacy to strengthen an additional aspect of international cooperation in the digitalized world of the 21st century. ■



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## Cyber War or Cyber Diplomacy

that cyber war has become a media and political buzzword: A rapidly growing number of countries considers cyber attacks by non-state or state actors to be one, if not the major (future) security threat.


Last year, the tenor of the debate changed discernibly. The main culprit is the worm also known as "Stuxnet," a sophisticated programme believed to have been written to sabotage systems that control and monitor industrial processes. Though the world may never know for certain who is behind this piece of code, Stuxnet has irrevocably shifted the cyber war paradigm. The majority of strategic planners out there are willing to believe that one or several state actors – Israel? The US? – were behind the computer virus and that they deliberately released it to sabotage the Iranian nuclear programme. For those people, cyber war is no longer pie in the sky – it is reality; a 'digital first strike' has occurred.

This belief has become so strong that it seems almost pointless to rally against it. The phantom of cyber war has great appeal because it seems modern; because it promises quick wars without suffering and immense budgetary advantages; because it enables governments to get rid of outdated and inefficient Cold War defense equipment while at the same time investing in human capital and knowledge to keep their countries safe.

In addition, the term is frequently used for almost any phenomenon involving a deliberate disruptive or destructive use of computers. And because there are so many of these occurrences every day, it does indeed look as if the developed world is facing an enormous problem.

But most of these events have very little to do with war, though

Though dubbing these activities cyber war might be an often thoughtless and essentially harmless act by most, the use of the word "war" by state officials in the international arena bears an inherent danger: Implicitly or explicitly moving an issue into



The Israeli Cyber Command is located near the country's nuclear center at Dimona. The computer worm Stuxnet's attack against the Iranian enrichment plant at Bushehr is reputed to have been engineered from this place in the Negev desert.

## On Cyber War



Excerpts from the Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adopted in Lisbon, November 19, 2010

Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organized and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and

Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organized criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks. [...]

We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety

and security of our populations.

Therefore, we will:

- develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under central-

ized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;

- ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account.

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