It is hard to disentangle the Libyan civil war from the migration crisis that hit Europe in 2015 and provoked a significant rise in populist anti-EU sentiment.

In Libya, the EU must demonstrate its willingness to become a true geopolitical actor that affects them - this realization comes at the worst possible time. It will help stabilize Libya! The agreement reached in Berlin will not suffice. It must also be enforced. A potential ceasefire must be monitored, while violations to the arms embargo must be sanctioned.

And most importantly: How can the future parties be motivated to agree to a verifiable ceasefire? Thus is how it becomes necessary to remember the hard lessons learned in Bosnia in 1995: A meaningful cease-fire must be reached in Berlin will not suffice. It must also be enforced. A potential ceasefire must be monitored, while violations to the arms embargo must be sanctioned.

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