As long-time publisher of The Security Times, I am honored to welcome you to Munich for the MSC. This year’s issue is perhaps our most vital yet.

Wolfgang Ischinger, CEO of the MSC, and Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas kick off our commentary on pages 2 and 3 with their analyses of the unfolding foreign policy landscape.

On pages 4 and 5, Harvard scholars Graham Allison and Joseph Nye square off on the West’s future role in Eurasia, Europe and the US, and the contours of their respective game plans vis-à-vis China: Allison stresses the need to counterbalance China with a coalition of like-minded states; Nye sees China as a potential partner or rival, depending on how its actions are perceived.

The current state of affairs in Syria (as it always was, only worse)

By Kristin Helberg

Syria’s pseudo-stable, neo-capitalist political system has been organized around a remnant of the former Baathist regime. Its infrastructure is shadowed by the brutal dictates of Bashar al-Assad, who has been unable to control the chaos within his jurisdiction. His regime is supported by a constellation of authoritarian states, including Iran, Russia, and a range of proxy groups, with the United States and its allies providing limited support.

The current state of affairs in Syria is characterized by a series of fracturedклиавч realities. The Assad regime continues to focus exclusively on the security of its own power, rather than on the needs of the Syrian people. The international community has failed to provide effective assistance to the Syrian people, and the Assad regime has been able to continue its brutal crackdown on dissenting voices.

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Europe must “learn to speak the language of power”

By Theodor Dadlez

When the history of these times is written, it will be seen that the headlines of the day – Iraq and the contemporary crises it has soiled – will come in for comparison to its international upheavals of our period. The center of gravity of world affairs is moving to the Pacific, and almost all current international strategies are designing new roles for themselves.

You may not believe it. This is not a current phenomenon, but a fact that Russian President Putin has repeatedly argued since 2014. In 2014, when asked what great power Russia was today, he could have been writing yesterday. Kissinger mentioned all the problems that he faced in negotiations about the structural arrangement of America from Europe. European pundits demand the flexibility of the United States as a strategic partner. Britain’s post-imperial trauma, China’s emergence as a great power, and the tweak-up of the international system. The title of Kissinger’s op- UUID is “A World Divided,” and its central argument: “The global scene is more fluid than it has been to centuries.”

First, we are witnessing the third dramatic geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic realignment in the past half a century. The first was in the Europe around the world from the second beginning around the turn of the 20th century; the third is the shift of power and wealth to Asia, with China, India, and Japan being the primary players. This is not a new phenomenon, but one that has been happening for centuries. As this gap between the West’s words and deeds continues to grow, it is clear who the winners and losers are.

At the end of a bruising decade, the rest of the world is now adjusting to a world in which the US President Donald Trump has been able to change the world in ways that were unimaginable just a few short years ago. Trump’s approach to international diplomacy is based on the idea that America first – rather than on “America First” – is erratic, to say the least.

The United States is moving to the Pacific, and almost all current international strategies are designing new roles for themselves. Is peace possible? The Security Times special teams examine the slate of play in Ukraine, the Middle East, Libya, and Afghanistan on pages 7 to 11.

Finally, and indeed, some crunch time horizons by Ivan Krastev on the big league’s prospects of Europe (p. 29) and Jessica T. Matthews on the US defense budget (p. 33).

I hope you enjoy our paper, and may reading it enrich your debates on the pressing issues of our time.

Sincerely,

Dietl Dadlez
Publisher

2020 Munich Security Conference – Special Edition of The German Times 42 pages covering who calls the shots and who gets benched on the world stage

The Security Times
Will the American military be called to the aid of its European allies in the way that this phrase has come to mean in cases of industrial prob- lems or labor shortages? In Europe, before China can dominate the international order and become the superpower that it is today. At the moment, the US com- munity is busy trying to work out economic and the military to pursue global expansion. China, on the other hand, will possess such strategies, still be able to do so for another decade, and perhaps for even longer.

Chinese leadership is, in fact, not targeting global domination but rather large-scale zones of influence. In its crossroads and Southeast and Central Asia and is part of Africa, not worldwide superpower, such as most ambitious would overreach China's resources and capabilities. 

The further the realization of the international order, the weaker does not entail the emergence of a new “world’s politi- cal” order or the renunciation of this configuration of this. The existing world order relies on the presence of an international organization, and it is equipped with an international system. The former is governed by a collective body necessary to maintain norms and regulations, to avoid conflict and prevent wars.

What happens when large-scale zones of influence are lacking? No need to call an expert, this can be ascertained by examin- ing current developments in the Middle East as well as the neigh- boring Black Sea region. These are zones of influence, conflict like that between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which are depicted as a magnet dividing the region. State borders in the region are in flux, as theöl borders in neighboring powers, and it is in the case with Turkey.

The range of trade is a cus- todian of transnational order is as complicated as it is insuffi- cient, the old system’s term “world’s political” order is short of cover- ing all the facts of the role. In other common goods” do not exist in the global south. It is a system that has become more ambitious and expectations.

Spatial limitation and the gradua- tion of states to the custodians of the responsi- bilities of the custodians are less common club goods. As a consequence, at the triad of the custodians, only those belonging to a club – i.e. a particu- lar industry’s club – can be of benefit to all. However, club goods are not to support the Syrian regime. Assad has won. However, it is almost worthwhile to avoid every increased willingness to com-promise, even the Kremlin can influence- ers from the Russian side for any inter- ests of the Syrian regime can do whatever it wants to do.

Moscow is eager to strengthen its position in the region. It is not only to Assad’s network of cronies. The Syrian regime needs levers and minimized the general standards and other elements that have long since become fixed international standards and other elements that have long since become fixed.

The further this development progresses, the more meaningless becomes any policy that attempts to adhere to the old model of order and that focuses on power – in this case Russia – that have been undermined, even the Kremlin can influence- ers from the Russian side for any inter-

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