

SECURITY STRATEGY

Business is business, security is not

Brexit is about more than just trade; it's also about security

BY WOLFGANG ISCHINGER
AND STEFANO STEFANINI

In mid-December the European Council authorized Brexit negotiations to move from a divorce settlement to forging a new relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom. The clock is ticking. Brussels and London have barely a year left to lay the foundations for their future partnership. Failure to do so would have disastrous strategic consequences for European prosperity and security.

There are areas, such as the Single Market, that do not lend themselves to cherry picking. The new relationship across the Channel will have to be consistent with the British choice to be in or out of it. The sphere of foreign policy and defense, including homeland and cybersecurity, will need to rely on strong and continuing EU-UK cooperation irrespective of Brexit. Trade can be transactional; security is not. This is why Theresa May's speech at the Munich Security Conference this year

will be watched very closely. The prime minister is expected to make the case for a close security relationship between the UK and the EU after Brexit. In response, the EU leaders should avoid making security a hostage of Brexit negotiations. Neither side stands to gain from trade-offs on security.

Indeed, there are many good reasons for remaining closely aligned: Between 25 and 30 percent of overall EU military capabilities fly the Union Jack, which is too modest for the UK to stand alone, and too much for the EU to do without. In times of shifting geopolitics, growing multiple threats and budget constraints, London should not delude itself and Brussels should not be in denial. European security will undoubtedly continue relying on NATO, with the UK's full participation, but there are and will be operations carried out by European forces alone, for instance in Africa or in the Mediterranean. London is hinting at supporting a credible European defense structure and capabilities, as long as they do not amount to a "vanity fair." In exchange we believe the UK should

get a comprehensive and generous offer from the EU to be associated with it, including access to the European Defense Fund and to the EU Defense Industrial Development Program.

Confronted with sharper international competition and rising protectionist winds, London and Brussels must get the trade negotiations right, stay clear of "who's winning" narratives and give themselves a generous transition period to minimize the inevitable bumps in the road.

On foreign policy and defense there is a strong rationale to keep a place for the British at the European table. London will certainly welcome it. It is up to the EU to think outside the box, come up with innovative solutions and address the concerns of those who fear that a decision-making role for the UK may compromise the independence of EU decision making. While diplomats must come up with a mechanism for coordination between London and the EU, the solution need not be a new institutional framework. What matters is to make it work; the EU has everything to gain and nothing to lose from

continuing constructive engagement and cooperation with the UK, a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The remaining differences must be solved lest Europe as a whole be weakened – especially at a time when the EU faces unprecedented challenges in international affairs. Europe must address a resurgent Russian military posture to the East, instability and asymmetric threats in the Mediterranean, economic competition from China and other emerging powers, as well as immigration pressures stemming from demography and climate change in Africa and elsewhere. There is serious concern over the resilience of arms control treaties – including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) – that have been the backbone of European security and stability. In less than one year, the new US administration has made three major decisions that are clearly at odds with European mainstream foreign policy: withdrawing from the Paris climate accord, decertifying the Iranian nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and moving the US Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. On all of these issues, London and the EU have found themselves squarely



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on the same side. The EU would benefit from enduring reinforcement from British diplomatic expertise.

In the current state of world disorder and European insecurity, the UK and the EU need each other more now than in the past. Brexit must not be allowed to create a security cleft across the Channel. On either side, Europeans will have common foreign policy interests and face identical security challenges – better to work together as closely as possible. ■

Germany: Good for the UN

In summer 2018, the 72nd General Assembly of the United Nations in New York will decide on Germany's application for a seat on the Security Council in 2019 and 2020. Germany's application for one of the non-permanent seats was announced in June 2016 by then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

As a German citizen, I like the idea that the Federal Republic has applied for one of the seats soon to be vacated; as the publisher of this newspaper, I would like to take this opportunity to give reasons why Germany would be a good choice for membership of the Security Council.

In the nearly 70 years since it was founded on May 23, 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany has become Europe's largest economy, providing its now 82.5 million inhabitants with a life of freedom, peace, unity, security as well as material and cultural prosperity. For the stability of these five pillars of a successful life, the people in this country can thank two things: their own effort and the goodwill of their neighbors and friends.

We, the citizens and their government, are willing and able to repay this goodwill to other countries that could benefit from our positive experience as they continue working to erect those five pillars and to enable their citizens to live successful lives.



Detlef Prinz, Publisher

Freedom: All is nothing without it. Peace: All is in doubt without it. Unity: There is no peaceful coexistence without it. Security: There is no peace without it. Prosperity: There is no dignity without it. But how does it all work? Tackle each goal separately, and then all of them as a whole? In facing this conundrum, Germany can apply and share its nearly 70 years of knowledge and experience.

Our country's membership of the United Nations Security Council would be a smart choice. It is precisely in unsettled times like these – and certainly in the next two years to come – that Germany would be perfectly suited to the UN Security Council.

PICTURE: ALLIANCE/AF PHOTO

How to win friends ...

... and influence peaceful resolutions:
Strengthening NATO's transatlantic bond



BY JENS STOLTENBERG

For almost seven decades, NATO has helped keep the peace in Europe. This zone of stability has not only benefitted NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic, but the broader Euro-Atlantic community and our neighbors as well.

Our Alliance has been successful because we have continued to adapt to the ever-evolving security challenges we face. Since 2014, the security landscape in Europe has changed dramatically, from Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea to the turmoil and violence across North Africa and the Middle East. Terrorism continues to pose a serious threat to the safety and security of our citizens. This is true even though most of the territory controlled by the Islamic State has been liberated. We know that the fight against terrorism is not over.

We also know that cyber warfare presents a major challenge, potentially enabling adversaries to steal our information, disrupt our democracies and attack the infrastructure critical for our societies, including banking systems, health systems, power grids and air traffic control.

Allies have responded to these new and emerging threats with strength and speed. Over the past four years, NATO has implemented the biggest increase in our collective defense capabilities in a generation. We have transformed our ability to respond to a crisis, whether it is on land, at sea, in the air or from cyberspace. Our forces have increased their ability to move quickly where they are needed. And we have deployed multinational troops and equipment in the east of our Alliance to deter aggression.

All of the steps we have taken have been strictly defensive, proportionate

and in line with our international commitments. Our aim is the same as it has always been: To prevent a conflict, not to provoke one. We do not want a new Cold War. Nor do we want a new arms race.

That is why we have pursued a dual-track approach towards Russia, combining strong defense and deterrence with meaningful dialogue. Over the past two years, the NATO-Russia Council has met six times. These discussions are not always easy, but it is precisely because they are difficult that we need to have them. I believe it is critically important to keep channels of communication open, to increase transparency and to prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations from spiraling out of control.

As we continue our adaptation to a more dangerous security environment, our summit in Brussels this July will be an important milestone. NATO leaders will make decisions about the next steps for our Alliance in five interrelated areas:

- Further strengthening our deterrence and defense;
- Stepping up efforts to project stability in our neighborhood, including the fight against terrorism;
- Making the partnership between NATO and the EU even stronger;
- Continuing to modernize our Alliance, including plans to update our military command structure; and
- Ensuring fairer burden sharing across the Alliance.

A critical factor in addressing all of these challenges is our commitment to spend more and better on defense. Increasing defense-related resources and capabilities will enable our Alliance to continue to adapt as the world changes in the years ahead.

This has been one of my top priorities since becoming secretary general in 2014. At our Wales Summit that year,

Allies agreed to stop the cuts, gradually increase defense spending and move toward spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense by 2024. Last year marked the third consecutive year of accelerating defense spending. In 2017, we estimate a real defense spending increase of 4.3 percent in Europe and Canada. This translates into an additional \$46 billion in spending compared to the past three years.

We are moving in the right direction, but we still have much more work to do.

This February, Allies will report on their specific defense investment plans covering three main areas: cash, capabilities and contributions. These national blueprints will spell out how Allies plan to meet their commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense; how they are investing in key military capabilities; and how they are contributing to NATO missions and operations.

Having adequate resources devoted to strengthening our defense and security will enable the Alliance to do even more to counter terrorism and protect the safety of our people. We will be able to do even more to help our neighbors build more resilient institutions and fight corruption. We will be able to do even more to deter aggression and preserve the peace. We will be able to do even more to strengthen our partnership with the European Union.

NATO and the EU are natural partners, with more than 90 percent of EU citizens living in a NATO country. Over the past 18 months, NATO and the EU have made unprecedented progress on a wide range of cooperative measures, including cyber, exercises, terrorism and military mobility. More defense-related resources will help us make even more progress.

With European Allies and Canada moving toward spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, our all-important

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, right, welcomes the Special Envoy for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Angelina Jolie at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Wednesday, Jan. 31, 2018.

transatlantic bond – which has underpinned the security of North America and Europe over the past seven decades – will be further reinforced. Europeans are grateful that the United States has significantly increased its presence in Europe, with more equipment, more exercises and more troops. The United States has more than 60,000 service members in Europe. And Europe relies on the United States for its ballistic missile defense.

European Allies and Canada have been stepping up. We are moving in the right direction. I expect all Allies to continue this forward momentum. Doing so will bolster our transatlantic bond even more by showing American leaders and taxpayers that Europeans are doing their fair share.

As NATO Allies prepare for our Brussels Summit in July, and as we continue to adapt to changing security challenges, we can draw strength and inspiration from knowing that we have overcome stern challenges throughout our history. After all, NATO helped to end the Cold War without firing a shot. That demonstrates the value of a strong deterrence and defense. I am confident that a cohesive transatlantic community, united by our shared values of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, will continue to safeguard our nearly one billion citizens in Europe and North America for many decades to come. ■

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