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Barack Obama's first term saw the rise of the "light footprint" strategy as the new, defining element of American intervention around the world.

By his words, but truly by his actions over the first four years of his presidency, Obama made it clear that the days of lengthy US wars of attrition and occupation were over. He pulled out of Iraq, attempted a time-limited surge in Afghanistan and then sped the American pullback of forces. He declined to put boots on the ground in Libya or intervene except at the margins in Syria. Instead, he initiated a strategy of lightning-strike attacks that played to the US military's enormous technological advantage, while keeping American casualties low.

Drones decapitated al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan, where Obama approved, directly or indirectly, nearly 300 strikes, six times the number launched during President Bush's entire presidency. Cyberweapons were deployed against Iran, temporarily crippling its enrichment capabilities at the Natanz enrichment site. Special forces showed they could land undetected in the courtyard of the world's most wanted terrorist, a stone's throw from Pakistan's main military academy, dispatch him in minutes, and leave before the Pakistani military had time to respond.

The appeal of these operations needed no explanation: they were quick, they were covert, and they were inexpensive. As General David Petraeus, the war commander who went on to lead the CIA, asked while still at the spy agency, "What president wouldn't want a light footprint?" Best of all in President Obama's view, they did not cost a trillion dollars, they did not involve placing 100,000 American troops in harm's way, and they did not require years of effort to "rewire" societies, as the US tried, and failed to do twice in a decade.

Mr. Obama has appointed a second term national security cabinet that also prefers a light footprint – led by two Vietnam veterans, John Kerry and Chuck Hagel, who are deeply suspicious of America's ability to shape the world in its image. But the irony of their appointment is that they take office at the very moment that the light footprint may be losing popularity.

Even within Obama's inner circle, many question whether it is suited to the challenge of maintaining US leadership around the world. Senior military officials are quietly beginning to voice fears that over time the drones, no matter how valuable a tactical tool, are exacting a huge price, angering whole societies even as they decimate terror cells. Cyberwar is triggering cyber retaliation, as Saudi Aramco discovered when an attack, apparently begun in Iran, took thousands of their computers offline. Many wonder whether that attack, and others like it, are the leading edge of something more calamitous, especially in the absence of global rules about when and how this powerful new weapon should be used.

And over time, the "light footprint" has seemed, to many around the world, as something of an excuse for a United States exhausted by war, but reluctant to invest in shaping a new world.

The limits of the light footprint have been evidence in many places around the globe. But nowhere more than in Syria.

When the uprising against Bashar Assad gained steam, many in Washington expected President Obama to follow, at a minimum, the same path he took in Libya. There he sent in drones, helped take out Muammar Qaddafi's air defenses, and, when needed, ran bombing runs. It was an operation tailor-made for the light footprint: an attack from afar, with few Americans at risk.

The Libyan troops preparing to slaughter civilians in Benghazi were bombed before they could reach the city. As Obama later said in a speech, while he was "reluctant to use force" his own doctrine required him to employ it "when our interests and values are at stake."

In this case, American interests were remote. But American values certainly were at risk: Many members of Obama's cabinet, led by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and the ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, recalled their regret that the US acted too slowly in Rwanda, two decades ago. Obama never quite used the phrase "responsibility to protect," but he said a failure to act would betray "our fellow human beings."

But if you ask Syrians now being bombed and shot by government forces, that betrayal is underway. No one accuses Obama of deliberately ignoring their plight. But inside the White House, the cost seemed just too high.

With Syria, a "light footprint" is not possible in the way it was in Libya. It is impossible to bomb Syrian troops, embedded in the country's most crowded cities, without killing civilians, too. Putting US forces on the ground seems a certain recipe for awful casualties, at a time the American electorate had made it clear they are tired of 11 years of war.

And as the rebellion in Syria now approaches the two-year mark, the West has appeared increasingly impotent. Obama rightly says that the US cannot police the world in places

Walking away from war

Obama's "light footprint" strategy means fewer US boots on the global ground

By David E. Sanger

where its interests are distant; countries with much more at stake must take the lead, with the US in a support role. But in Syria's case, neither the Arab League nor NATO is willing to play the role it did in Libya.

By the beginning of 2013, it became clear that Obama was trapped by his own doctrine: the cost of intervention seemed greater than the cost of ignoring the values that Mr. Obama had talked in 2011. Would he intervene if Assad used chemical weapons? In the summer of 2012, Obama said that would "change my calculus." Today, it is uncertain whether even that would trigger the use of American force.

"He has got to find the happy medium between not committing us to a decade long ground war and choosing not to do anything," Anne Marie Slaughter, who was head of policy planning at the State Department in Obama's first two years of office, told me (see her article on drone warfare, page 19).

What accounts for this change? Those who participate in White House debates over intervention sense in Obama a greater awareness than he had four years ago of the limits of American influence. Inside the Situation Room, he often expresses his doubts that sending 100 troops, much less tens of thousands, will influence long-term outcomes – something very different than his conviction, in 2009, that a "surge" in Afghanistan could make a significant difference.

Obama's bitter experience with that surge helps explain his caution. New to the presidency, he yielded to advice from Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to make a stand in Afghanistan, and to show that America had resolve in a "war of necessity."

He came to regret that decision almost instantly. That led to a classic Obama move: to water down the objectives, so that America could leave. His aides created a committee inside the White House called "Afghan Good Enough" that, true to its name, reduced the expectations of what America could accomplish in the short term – and eliminated many of the grander long-term goals that Washington talked about so often over the past decade, from eradicating the drug economy to remaking the justice and education systems.

Now those goals are down to a very few: Keep Kabul from falling to the Taliban, retain a force in the region capable of intervening if Pakistan's nuclear weapons appear at risk of going loose.

But what of the bigger goals of stabilizing Afghanistan, building schools and justice systems, and assuring some level of political stability? They have all gone out the door.

"The situation is obviously not very confidence-inspiring," Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan's foreign minister, said in an interview in mid-January. "A responsible transition means that you have achieved your objectives and then you leave. It's not 'We leave in January.' It's 'We leave when the objectives are achieved.'"

In his second term, Obama's sense of caution is bound to collide with his desire for some legacy achievements. He wants to be remem-

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bered for far more than the fact of his election as America's first African-American president, and for more than stabilizing an American economy that he inherited at a time of crisis.


He knows that past presidents are remembered today for the building of big institutions: Roosevelt and Truman for spurring the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank and the Marshall Plan; Kennedy for the test ban treaty and, after his death, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Nixon for the opening to China.

So far, Obama's biggest accomplishments have been more purely defensive, starting with the decapitation of the central leadership of al Qaeda. It was an impressive feat, but not one that history can point to as an example of American leadership in building global institutions.

So in the next few years, the "light footprint" will have to be accompanied by something grander. Obama's early initiatives point the way: American leadership on global warming, on reducing the number of deployed nuclear weapons in America's arsenal, on containing Iran. But he will have to attempt those goals without much help from Congress, where he does not have the votes for big treaties, big trade deals or big dollops of foreign aid. He will have to pursue a foreign policy more like Eisenhower's, engineering world events in more subtle ways from the Oval Office, without the grand promises of the early days of his presidency. ■

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Soft? Hard? Smart? – Fast!

Speed has become an attribute of power and a necessary condition of success | By John Chipman

We live in the age of Fast Power. Our sense of stability, and indeed the rise of insecurity, is dramatically affected by the speed with which events happen and the very many different agents of power with which governments and the private sector have to deal with. Power today is more plural than ever before and adequate responses to its malign use have also to be more various.

Governments, and the defense and foreign ministries that serve them, have to be readier to act at speed if they are to shape, rather than be shaped, by changing events. In the past, strategists asked if a country had 'soft' power, 'hard' power, or 'smart' power. Today they must assess the quality of a state or of an alliance's 'fast power' if they are to make a proper appreciation of the capability to respond to threats and to change.

For strategists, military power is still the most important component of power because it has the greatest coercive influence when judiciously exercised. But military power mixes today with 'diplomatic', 'economic', 'financial', 'market', 'people' 'reputational' and 'idea' power. If there is a balance of power today, it is only the balance between these different types of power. This is the new reality with which leaders must cope, and the proof lies in the way battles were fought in 2011-2012.

The German state fought the power of the market, the Egyptian army the power of the people; states in economic decline found their international reputation weakened, those with financial power gained more diplomatic clout. Well promoted ideas, whether jihadist messages or nationalist appeals rallied quick support. Their perceived evil effects were often blunted by swift action, whether through drone attacks or use of cyber techniques.

These realities mean that our century has gained a neo-Darwinian flavor: it is not so much 'survival of the fittest,' as 'power to the most agile' that is the oper-

ating maxim. It is speed, rather than heft, that can determine diplomatic and even military victories – the creation of financial advantage and the establishment of political leadership.

Speed has become an attribute of power and a necessary condition of success in this fast-moving age. 'Fast power' – the ability to shape events at speed effectively – is seen as vital. Militaries prize rapid deployment forces, financial houses computer-generated trades, diplomatic establishments the quick 'win' of the special envoy.

'Fast power' of course risks being mistaken power, which is another reason why the sense of instability is heightened, as governments, businesses and others are forced to react at such speed to events that shift at such pace. And fast power, like any other form of power, is most effective when it operates in 'formation'. Yet the ability of governments to consult and settle on co-ordinated action seems perversely to have slowed, just when it is required to accelerate.

In 2013, the ability to deal with rising insecurity in many regions of the world will depend hugely on how diagnosis is harnessed to prescription, and speed to sound public policy, anticipating where possible, reacting where necessary. Yet if speed is necessary, so is momentum, and sometimes the maintenance of momentum requires strategic patience, the ability to exercise prudence in the cause of a more settled and long term solution. Balancing speed with patience and choosing correctly, will be the measure of effective strategy.

As always, inspiring others to be suppliers rather than mere importers of security will also be the sign of leadership, and has become all the more necessary as Western powers exhibit strategic fatigue from the long engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Speed was necessary this January in Mali. The chance that rebels might arrive at the capital city Bamako would have given them

too great an advantage and too large a lead in their efforts to establish a significant sanctuary for terrorist activity.

France acted as the 'catalytic power' in deciding on intervention; broadening the coalition of support to the Mali government and delegating to local actors became almost immediately the next phase. The priority to assist Malian forces to control their territory is one that other European powers will want to assist in, while the active deployment of special forces could conceivably engage other allies,

“ ...our century has gained a neo-Darwinian flavor: it is not so much 'survival of the fittest,' as 'power to the most agile'...”

including from the Gulf. Animating the relevant regional organization, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to take an increasing role will be essential.

Whereas in the past, 'regional solutions for regional problems' became a liberal slogan, it has now become a necessary purpose of well-judged Western policy. There is simply not the capability for the habitual exporters of military power – the US, UK, France, and a few others, to initiate, let alone sustain the operations so frequently called for. ECOWAS will have to hold territory, while a political solution that has region-wide support gets shaped.

Region-led initiatives have been the norm in Syria, not necessarily to the very best effect. But the absence of a UN consensus coupled with the fear of long term embroilment in the Levant has meant that individual states, especially from the Gulf, have done a good deal of the strategic running: the United Arab Emirates (UAE) organizing military forces, Qatar and Saudi Arabia supply-

ing funding and equipment, and Iran maintaining its support for the regime.

While the 'Lebanonization' of Syria continues amid huge loss of life, the geopolitics of the Middle East would be as profoundly changed by a surprise early solution to the conflict as by its lengthy extension. As the US and European powers will not be in the forefront of the security solution, the authors of a new dispensation will be primarily local.

The 'new local' is in fact, an evolving term of art to describe

concerning Iran and its nuclear program. Serious talks have been difficult to revive. The Supreme Leader is in charge, but with presidential elections scheduled to take place in the summer of 2013, it is hard to imagine a breakthrough deal maturing before, or one coming soon after, the polls are held. Most independent analysts continue to judge that 2014 is the more likely year for the Iranian nuclear program to reach a crucial stage; yet both Israel and Gulf Arab states will be nervous about an earlier breakout capacity.

The ever elusive 'grand bargain' with Iran that could include some loose co-operation over Afghanistan post-2014, will continue to be advocated by many as the correct goal of Western policy. However, the numerous domestic constituencies in the West, the Middle East and Iran itself that would need to be placated for such a bargain to be struck make it unlikely. Managing the Iranian nuclear program's challenges alongside a degenerating Syrian situation will require a large effort of diplomatic agility.

Europe's security chiefs in 2013 will be pre-occupied with the near-abroad challenges of Africa, the Middle East and South West Asia in a year in which the US is

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bound to reconfirm its 'rebalancing' towards Asia. Last year, the pivot, as it was first styled, was animated in part by the 'strategic demand pull' from America's Asian allies, some of whom were concerned that American indifference would leave them exposed to a self-confident China.

Since then, territorial disputes between China and Japan and China and other claimants to the South China Sea have worsened.

Both the US and Asians will want to know how Europe can contribute to Asia's delicate strategic balance.

The revised French defense White Paper will no doubt contain its own mini version of the pivot, but in general, Europe is seen as having declining influence and clout strategically. As close strategic allies of the US, and with huge interests in the high-growth Asia-Pacific, Europeans will be asked in 2013 what their role in Asia can be in the coming years. Asian security will depend on variable engagement by many different powers. That is no less true in the other regions of the world. Western states will on the one hand appreciate stronger regional roles played by local actors, but also worry that regional states might craft solutions or take initiatives that run counter to perceived Western desires. That is the reality of a more egalitarian strategic order.

A reasonable goal for Western players in these different regional theaters is to stay in the strategic management game and keep their relevance. That will often mean acting quickly to shape diplomatic outcomes and to influence security agendas.

Western states will inevitably see a decline in their relative 'hard power' as military budgets continue to shrink and the appetite for the use of military power dissipates. What they must continue to cultivate is their Fast Power. The intelligent and timely use of coercive force, coupled with agile diplomacy, joined by effective coalition building, can still be strategically significant.


Strategic extroversion is itself an asset. As the growth engines of the global economy shift southwards, Western countries need to retain their speed and flexibility of action abroad.

In a fast moving world, the absence of fast, decisive strategic thinking and diplomatic action will leave those in the slow lane out of the traffic. At the Munich Security Conference (MSC) that commitment to strategic agility should be compellingly reaffirmed. ■

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Rising powers, exaggerated hopes

The US and Europe still need to set (much of) the global agenda | By Volker Perthes

In today's globalized and multipolar world, major problems will no longer be solved, crises no longer managed, and rules no longer defined, let alone implemented, without the contribution of new or re-emergent great and middle powers. Not only China has become another indispensable power: Global governance, in order to be successful, also needs the active involvement of India and Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea and Mexico as well as Turkey, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt or Vietnam.

Some of these countries are still emerging economies. Politically, however, most of them have crossed the threshold that has long limited their access to the kitchen of international decision-making. And it is these countries and some others that are likely to trigger and produce the growth that the world economy needs in the years to come.

The power and ability to impose order or to solve problems of global relevance is more widely distributed today than it ever was since the formation of the state system. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council still defend their veto right, and their military power is unmatched.

However, they no longer command sufficient resources, competence, and legitimacy to cope alone with global challenges or crises with worldwide impact. Bipolarity is a thing of the past and is unlikely to re-emerge in a new Sino-American G2-form.

It is also very unlikely for the foreseeable future that any one club of nations, such as the G7 or G8, could again assume a quasi-hegemonic position in the world economy or in world politics. Even the G20 in its current composition may not really represent the forces that can and will shape the international order in the 21st century.

The conceptual and practical challenge for leaders and pundits in the United States, Europe, Japan and other members of the

“Old West” is neither to ignore the demands of rising powers to have more influence in global politics, nor to be overly enthused by the fact that these powers are gaining weight. Relative shifts in global power relations are a reality, and they need to be accommodated politically and institutionally.

There is no doubt, for example, that the Security Council needs to become more representative if it is to preserve, or regain, its legitimacy in matters of international peace and security. And it will be impossible to retain the de-facto monopoly of the United States and the EU over the chief positions in the IMF and the World Bank.

At the same time, however, it should be clear that any accommodation of shifting power relations, and of rising-power interests, is at best a means to better integrate these powers into international efforts at managing global problems. It is not, by itself, a recipe to solve any of the world's vital issues.

Thus, while it may be impolite to say so, more voice and weight for emerging powers in global governance institutions does not automatically make these bodies



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Strategic Order

more legitimate and effective. Increasing the number of players at the table will, while necessary, obviously also increase the difficulty of reaching decisions. And while the US or Europe may want to see certain rising powers represent their respective continents in global institutions, other regional countries tend not to see these powers as their representatives. On the contrary, in many cases smaller regional countries

feel threatened, or marginalized by the rise of their neighbors.

Moreover, while rising powers rightly demand more voice in international rule-making, they do not necessarily want to subject themselves to binding rules and regulations. Or, as Patrick Stewart from the Council on Foreign Relations has put it, they are seeking “greater weight in global governance, but not necessarily more global governance.”

Given the record of established powers, this is nothing to be astonished or morally indignant

“Most powers that are positioning themselves for a more active role on the world stage are democracies.”

about. It is simply a fact that needs to be taken into consideration in any effort to build inclusive regional or global regimes.

More importantly still, rising powers do and will continue to seek common platforms to demonstrate their increased international weight, but this doesn't mean that they do have a common agenda. The most visible grouping, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), clearly shows that well-marketed acronyms cannot paper over differences of interests.

Brazil, India and South Africa are using this format in a pragmatic way to pursue their interests. There is little agreement between them on the one, and Russia or China on the other hand, however, with regard to political values or to fundamental questions of international order. Consider the composition of the UN Security Council or the nuclear-arms privilege which the permanent members of the Security Council claim for themselves. China, after all, is the main opponent of India becoming a

permanent member of the Security Council.

The inability of the West to dominate the global agenda doesn't therefore imply that others would set this agenda or assume the responsibility to manage and resolve regional and international conflicts. The role of Western powers has not disappeared; it has just become more complicated. For the time being, the US and Europe will still have to provide most of the input – in terms of ideas, standards, and even resources – to shape the

of rising powers share our values yet still have different, but legitimate interests. The really good news for the West is that most powers positioning themselves for a more active role on the world stage are democracies.

Within the G20 only two states – China and Saudi Arabia – explicitly do not want to be liberal democracies, while a third one – Russia – has developed into an autocracy with a democratic façade. All the others may expose different shapes and forms of democracy, but they share the general principles of inclusive and competitive elections, responsible government, civil liberties, and human rights.

The not so good news is that even democratic rising powers often do not share the political agendas of established industrialized democracies. There are clear differences, for example, regarding the priorities of climate protection and economic development. Also, along with many other states in the global South, emerging democracies tend to defend the principle of non-interference, and they are generally reluctant to support any US or European attempts to project democracy or human rights into other countries.

Moreover, some of the most important of these states differ substantially with the US, and often also with the EU, about the right approach toward regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East. In 2010, Washington made a serious mistake when it disavowed a Turkish-Brazilian attempt to mediate in the conflict over Iran's nuclear program, rather than building upon those attempts.

Not too few policymakers in the United States and in Europe have been annoyed with the attempts of emerging democratic powers to pull their weight in world politics regardless of the approaches chosen by Washington, Paris, or Berlin. Partly, such reactions reflect old thinking, still rooted in the categories of the Cold War. In that era, it was clear

that democratic nations could differ over details, but would agree about the main questions of international politics. Those who pursued a different agenda on substantial matters were either not part of the “democratic camp” – or weren't important international players.

One of the realities of the globalized, multipolar world is that shared democratic values do not guarantee agreement about at least some of the burning questions of international politics. The more democracies there are, the more conflicts of interests and differences are likely to emerge between democratic states and powers.

There is little reason to be annoyed when states like India, Turkey, Brazil or South Africa are setting priorities different from those of Europe or the United States, or have different views about how to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran, development aid, democracy promotion or environmental protection. Sometimes they may simply have a point. The world is going to be more pluralistic, not only with respect to the domestic structures of an increasing number of relevant states, but also with regard to the agendas that democratic powers follow on the international scene.

The task here for established Western democracies is twofold: they still have to take the lead in building pragmatic and variable coalitions of the relevant – of all countries, regardless of their political systems, that need to contribute to solving or at least managing global problems. And they should at the same time learn to appreciate that other democratic nations may have quite different views on questions of regional and world order. Unless such “democratic differences” are accepted, we will hardly be able to translate those common values which rising and established democracies share, into common approaches to international issues. ■



Two years ago, at the Munich Security Conference, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen introduced the concept of “Smart Defense,” calling on countries to “pool and share capabilities, to set the right priorities, and to better co-ordinate our efforts.”

In principle, Europeans have accepted that closer defense cooperation is essential to maintain, and hopefully expand, existing military capabilities. In the Franco-German declaration “For a stronger European Security and Defense” of Feb. 6, 2012, for instance, the two governments state: “In times of strategic uncertainty and limited resources, joint defense projects are indispensable for a strong defense. We have to be willing to make the necessary decisions.” These kinds of statements and declarations have, by now, become rather commonplace throughout the EU.

But in reality decision-makers have not been “willing to make the necessary decisions,” remain unlikely to do so, and disagree about what that means. The concepts of “Smart Defense” and “Pooling & Sharing” – important as they are – have yet to gain real traction.

This is an unacceptable state of affairs, leading to massive losses in European capabilities – capabilities that are already very limited. In fact, the ability of Europe to be a reasonably capable security actor is very much at stake.

The memories of the Libyan intervention, where the two best-equipped European militaries struggled to get the job done, requiring massive US support “from behind,” are all too fresh. Ivo Daalder, the US ambassador to NATO, recently said that Libya exposed “worrisome trends” in Europe’s ability to act without relying heavily on US help. For him, the lack of necessary munitions was “a signal that there is a lack of investment in critical core capabilities by the alliance, and that the continuing cuts in defense spending raise, over time, serious questions about sustainability.” NATO would not be able to undertake a similar campaign in ten years’ time if this is



French fighters refuel over Libya, a conflict where “the two best-equipped European militaries struggled to get the job done.”

does pooling mean for the industrial base and the procurement process, which traditionally caters to national needs? How could a military engagement with pooled forces be authorized? Who would carry the ultimate responsibility?

Clearly, these are difficult questions. But the process of European integration must not stop at the gates of military barracks, even if getting there will be tough and complicated, involving different and difficult stakeholders.

In order to accompany and support this process, the Munich Security Conference, joined by McKinsey & Company, has started a new initiative – a conference series on “The Future of European Defense”. A first European “summit” in April of 2013 will aim at providing fresh impulses to Pooling & Sharing.

Last December, we organized a roundtable in Berlin, with representatives from the Foreign, Defense, and Economics ministries, members of the Bundestag, defense industry representatives, military leaders, and independent experts.

One of the few things most participants agreed on was this: We have to do much better, and it will be very difficult. But the degree of difficulty can never be an excuse. As former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in his farewell speech in Brussels in 2011: Getting European defense on track “will take leadership from political leaders and policy makers on this continent.”

Put simply: Europe’s ability to be a capable security actor is at stake. Americans won’t invest – and will not be invested – in European defense if Europe doesn’t start moving in the right direction. And the window for Europe to do something about this deficiency – by investing more, and by Europeanizing defense – is not going to stay open indefinitely. Hopefully, the European Council will announce meaningful new steps at its December meeting when security and defense are on its agenda. The time to act is now – in 2013. ■

The time to act is now

A make-or-break moment: Europeanizing our defense is the only sensible way forward | By Wolfgang Ischinger

not addressed, he said. And he is, regrettably, absolutely right.

Starting to Europeanize our defense is the only reasonable way forward, for three reasons in particular.

First, money. The defense sector is feeling a tightening of financial screws, partly as a result of the euro crisis. Capabilities affected by defense cuts since 2009 have been lost. Of course, most NATO states had already long failed to reach the self-declared goal of spending two percent of their respective GDPs on defense. Moreover, European taxpayers’ money is spent incredibly inefficiently: European fighting power amounts to a tiny fraction of the American military potential, although European spending makes up almost 40 percent of US defense expenses. We must produce “more bang for the buck” – and we can! The key is to finally introduce the idea of EU integration into the

way we organize our defense arrangements.

This does not imply immediate huge steps toward an EU military – multiple synergy effects can



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EU Defense Policy

be created in areas with fewer constitutional and political implications, such as training and procurement. And we should not hesitate to ask hard questions, such as how efficient it is for almost all 27 EU countries to maintain their own air force – sometimes composed of not more than a few dozen aircraft.

Second, as today’s security environment continues to become more complex and unpredictable, the demands placed on our armed forces have continued to expand. Dealing with these greater demands will require more and better interoperability, coordination and effectiveness of European militaries. It is undeniable that the crises that might directly or indirectly affect Europe’s security, and in which we may have to fulfill our responsibility to protect people from mass atrocities, are numerous, unpredictable, and complex.

Third, the necessity to be better prepared for complex and unpredictable crises is magnified by the United States’ pivot toward the Pacific. No doubt: this will put greater pressure on Europe to operate on its own in its own “neighborhood.”

Whether it is Kosovo or Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, or Mali: If we want to be able to react better

and more adequately to emerging conflicts, instabilities, or mass atrocities, we must pool and share military capabilities much more. If we fail to do so, the combination of scarce financial means, more complicated tasks, an unpredictable security environment and decreasing US focus on Europe will lead to a permanently weakened Europe as an actor on the global and regional security stage.

Pooling and sharing is a complex endeavor. We are talking about an area that has for centuries been part of the core of national sovereignty. And it requires dealing with tough and uncomfortable questions: How do the armed forces have to be structured – especially in the context of reforms that are under way in many countries – so that they can be completely or partly “European” in the future? Which capabilities might countries be willing to give up – and trust others to provide them? What

The coming era of diplomacy

Barack Obama’s cabinet nominees herald a new emphasis on persuasion | By William Richard Smyser

President Barack Obama’s most important cabinet nominees, John Kerry as secretary of state and Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense, reflect his recognition that we live in a new world – a world in which a surge of diplomacy that mirrors the changing global power pattern is overdue.

The changes in the world are of two kinds, both of which will require intense and far-reaching diplomatic efforts for the United States and other governments.

The first change is that many states are becoming more prosperous and more powerful. Standards of living are rising all over the world. And states are often strengthening militarily as well as economically.

The second change is that states are reaching further afield in their interests and contacts, no longer confining themselves to one area or one continent but looking for friends and often markets everywhere. This brings ever more countries into contact and perhaps into disagreement. Increases in national power and prosperity often promote argument, not agreement.

By ominous coincidence, the world must now deal with the same type of problem that Europe faced almost exactly a century ago and failed disastrously to solve. Then, more states rose to significant power and wanted larger territories and their own places in the sun. The Europeans fought World Wars I and II and almost destroyed themselves and each other.

Now the nations that are rising in wealth and power are all over

the world, not only in Europe but in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. They do not have the same destructive commitments that European powers had, but they have some major and potentially competing interests. Those could prove dangerous.

China, the major example of an emerging power, presents both a strategic and an economic challenge. Other rising states, whether Brazil, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan or Nigeria, to name just a few, present a similar though not identical mix. Their strategic and economic claims may vary and will almost certainly grow over time. They could conflict with others.

Recent books forecast a new era dominated by an Asian boom and by a shift in global influence toward the East. That will take some time, as the United States and Europe are still hefty players. But the age of the G-20 has definitively supplanted that of the G-7, with all that this may mean for the world and for perhaps tense relations between rising and declining states.

Each of the newly surging states will need



The British politician Sir Samuel Hoare (1880 – 1959) is often portrayed as the archetypal diplomat.

close and consistent diplomatic attention. US and other Western leaders must bring those rising powers into the global system at the appropriate level, not only to protect their own influence but to avoid the disasters that marked the rise of such states in the 20th century. They must practice dexterous diplomacy in potentially turbulent times. That will require wide engagement, flexible attitudes, and a readiness to adjust.

Asia presents a completely different geostrategic challenge from the confrontation in which the United States and NATO faced the Soviet Union during the Cold War in Europe. The Asian countries are not connected on land with easily identifiable borders. They may be separated by dozens or hundreds of miles of open ocean where ships and aircraft can (and do) travel and where any deployment, whatever its intention, could provoke a reaction.

An example of a potential risk is the dispute between China and Japan over tiny islands in the East China Sea (Senkaku in Japanese; Diaoyu in Chinese). Both claim those islands as their territory because the islands could


legitimize claims to wide ocean surfaces and trade lanes as well as to perhaps significant underwater mineral resources. Recently installed administrations in Tokyo and Beijing – like new governments anywhere – show no signs of yielding. Likewise, Washington’s shift of forces – including capital ships – to Asia has Beijing worried. Moreover, the US has treaties with many countries in the region.

Whatever the realities or the risks may be, states in Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere now sometimes appear to be moving toward wider relations and perhaps rivalries that could produce dangerous confrontations. Yet they have only limited experience in the kinds of diplomatic dialogue that could ease those confrontations.

Such potential crises go beyond any particular country and beyond any single continent. When terrorists kill a US Ambassador in Libya, when potentially powerful political forces emerge in Nigeria, or when a new terrorist threat arises even near such a remote spot as Timbuktu in Mali, a US President must think of how he can best protect his country’s interests – and also, how he can best prevent an incident from spiraling out of control.

But this is not only an American concern. As the world changes, it will be important for more states not only to develop closer relationships with others but also to make sure that those relationships lead to more cooperation instead of competition. That will almost certainly require many more diplomatic contacts and associations than in the past.

Obama will want to use his renewed incumbency to promote peace after America has lost thousands of men and women as well as trillions of dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has made clear that he wants to wind down US military engagements and con-



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Strategic Order

centrate on diplomacy. Although most Americans do not normally applaud diplomatic successes as enthusiastically as military victories, this may be a different time.

As the world needs to find its path into the new century, an era of strategic diplomacy will need to become part of that path. And one of its objectives will be to bring newly powerful states into the international system in ways that will add to strategic stability instead of conflict.

By selecting two decorated military veterans for his senior cabinet posts, Obama makes sure that the United States will not go to war lightly during his presidency, and that it will know how to conduct such a war decisively and victoriously once engaged.

Like other actions taken by Obama, it also reflects his determination to be his own man in diplomacy as well as in other matters. ■

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At loggerheads over US Pershing missiles: Germans protesting against NATO's Double Track decision in 1983.

Are America and Europe parting ways on how they view fundamental security matters?

Some might view the question as tiresome and simply respond: "Again?"

Certainly the security relationship has never been without its issues, and transatlantic views on these matters – even in the "good old days" of the Cold War – were frequently at odds.

Europe emerged from World War II exhausted, its once and future dominant power trending pacifist, and the continent's citizens demanding (and receiving) increased social services. Transatlantic debates over adequate levels of defense spending have been legend: recall US Defense Secretary Robert Gates' brutal characterization of nations "unwilling to devote the necessary resources...to be serious and capable partners in their own defense."

And there were bitter debates, sometimes spilling out in to the streets, about the wisdom of specific actions like the 1980s cruise missile and Pershing deployments. Not unlike their views on defense expenditures, some Europeans seemed more willing to be defended by nuclear weapons in Kansas or Wyoming than in Molesworth, Comiso or Wüschheim.

Tough issues. Heated debates. But I want to suggest that today is different. For the last half of the 20th century, whatever their diverging views on budgets or specific actions, Europe and America (occupying similar positions on the same long arc of culture and history) had similar ideas on the proper role of the state in security and when the use of force was legitimate. It is that latter consensus that is now eroding.

This became clear to me in the Spring of 2007. I had been invited

to the German Embassy to give a luncheon talk to a large group of European ambassadors. I intended to talk in a candid way, among friends, on some of the more controversial actions that had been undertaken by the CIA in the war on terror.

I felt obliged to set the stage and define the thinking behind our actions so I began with four core beliefs. The United States was a nation at war. We were in an armed conflict with al Qaida and its affiliates. This conflict was global in scope. And those charged with American security could only fulfill their responsibilities by taking this fight to the enemy wherever he might be. I added that I believed those four statements represented consensus thinking not just in my agency, but across my government and my nation.

It wasn't far into lunch before it was clear to me that no other country represented in that room

accepted the legitimacy of any of those four sentences. They not only rejected their legitimacy for themselves; they rejected their legitimacy for the United States.

Some may be tempted to dismiss this as simply the product of alleged Bush Administration "excesses" or excited American rhetoric ("old Europe – new Europe"... "freedom fries"... "with us or against us") that unnecessarily strained transatlantic relations. As troubling as all this might be, it was also transient, or so the story went.

In reality, though, the emotional content of these exchanges and insensitivities tended to obscure what was becoming a genuine divergence in fundamental thinking. It wasn't about style; it was about substance.

The failure to recognize that may be why many Europeans were surprised when President Obama, accepting a Nobel Peace Prize largely for not being George W. Bush, lectured his audience on just war theory and on his moral and constitutional responsibilities to defend the United States.

He did so because, despite campaign rhetoric to the contrary, he was as comfortable with my four lunchtime sentences as was his predecessor.

In September 2009, more than two years after my luncheon remarks and well into the Obama administration, gunfire from American special forces helicopters in southern Somalia killed Saleh Nabhan, a notorious al Qaida leader. Since this attack took place outside of an internationally recognized theater of conflict (like Iraq or Afghanistan), its "lawfulness" hinged on the unique American definition of the conflict.


The United States still walking

Diverging approaches to combatin

As it happened, this was an exclusively American operation, but there isn't an intelligence service in Europe (especially Western Europe) that would have passed locational data on Nabhan to the United States had they known the data would be put to this

judges with American information.

American policies have not been without controversy at home, but the obvious continuity between two very different Presidents suggests that the current American




Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)

purpose. For them, such action would have been illegal.

But similar targeted killings, more often with drones than with manned aircraft, have been routine over the past four years in places like Yemen and Pakistan. So too have been indefinite detentions, military commissions and a consistent American refusal to provide hostile European

approach is both bipartisan and enduring. Europeans who would downplay the differences as temporary and personality-driven should think again.

So too should those who might argue that the transatlantic "legitimacy gap" is confined to conflicting views on how to fight terrorism and therefore its effects,



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ates and Europe: g together?

g terrorism | By Michael Hayden

while painful and important, can be managed or isolated.

Actually, terrorism – both the threat and the response – may be the paradigm for the “new normal.”

In the industrial age, the important

undertaking that we entrusted it only to governments or government-run monopolies?) Threats generally came from nation states and we relied on nation states to deal with them. (For

much of the discussion here

I am deeply indebted to my friend, mentor and

and even to individuals. Most of us are old enough to remember when a religious zealot in a cave in the Hindu Kush did not represent much of a personal danger. No longer.

One could make an equally compelling argument that cyberthreats are but another expression of the same long term global trends, and it is no coincidence that we are now struggling to determine appropriate state action to defend citizens in this domain. And it's no surprise that one of the discussions during the Munich Security Conference will weigh the relative merits of a law-enforcement versus a military approach.


Similarly, despite good Mexican-American state-to-state relations, criminal cartels have made the southern border of the United States as threatened, violent and unstable as it has been in nearly a century, and significant swathes of Mexico are ungoverned. Although done under a patina of law enforcement, the Mexican army along with American drones and American supplied combat helicopters give much of this struggle the air of a battlefield rather than a crime scene.

All of which argues that this is not just about releasing prisoners from Guantánamo or responding to one or another suit or petition. Rather, it is about creating a new paradigm to define the extent and the limits of state action in a truly new security environment.

The attacks of 9/11 forced America to quickly act against one expression of this new environment. If Americans are open to charges of being too casual and too unilateral in developing new models, Europeans bear some burden for too



At loggerheads over Iraq: German chancellor Gerhard Schröder and US President George W. Bush in 2003.



John Locke (1632-1704)

pieces on the national security chess board were nation states, and players tended to move pieces around with one or another version of “hard power.” In the industrial age, most broad cultural, technological and economic trends tended to strengthen the state. (Remember when making a phone call was such a complex

former boss Brent Scowcroft, in particular his “A World in Transformation,” Atlantic Council, 26 April)

We still rely on states to defend us, but much else has changed. Many 21st century trends have eroded the power of the state. Information age connectivity has pushed power (and threat) down to sub-national units

quickly condemning those who had to act and who had to choose among imperfect alternatives.

How indeed does one counter an adversary who rejects Geneva's prime contention – the distinction between combatant and non-combatant – not just for its victims but for its followers as well? How are states to deal with lethal opponents who reject Westphalia's tacit understanding that states are the legitimate home of sovereign power and have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence?

With these two pillars rejected by those who are now so empowered to do us harm, how should that shape our definition of appropriate state behavior? Answers are needed, but they are neither easy nor obvious. And lack of movement now not only makes us less safe, but sets the stage for harmful overreaction when catastrophe befalls.

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Transatlantic Ties

If we still truly occupy similar positions on that long cultural and historical arc, there may be much to gain from unfettered but equally un-condemning dialogue between us. If not between us, then where? With whom?

Near the end of that discussion at the Embassy lunch in 2007, one European Ambassador reminded me that, “We are all children of the Enlightenment.” Recognizing that this was a subtle call for unity (and

a barely veiled criticism), I quickly responded that, although that was certainly true, at the moment we Americans were rather fixated on Hobbes whereas the Europeans seemed to be stuck on Locke.

As this is being written, French aircraft are attacking adherents of al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Mali. Although wrapped in the “legitimacy” of an earlier era (endorsed by the United Nations, requested by the Malian government and consistent with past French behavior in the “post-colonial space”), this action suggests some reason for hope with the regard to eventual convergence between American and European views toward new threats.

Perhaps our common cultural heritage still can serve our contemporary needs. Surely both philosophers (and both continents) would seem to have something to offer. ■



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The Obama doctrine

Americans are used to being the hawks in world affairs, and Europeans the doves – but those roles have reversed under President Obama | By Daniel Twining

The United States, protected by two oceans and with a global range of allies and interests, has found for a century that it must go abroad to shape and lead a dangerous world. But President Barack Obama seems, in some respects, to prefer to stay home. Whereas George W. Bush's foreign policy was maximalist, Obama's is minimalist.

A foreign policy assessment only halfway through his presidency is no doubt unfair – he may yet vanquish Iran's nuclear weapons program, put an overdue end to Syria's bloody civil war, stand down Chinese aggression in Asian waters, and oversee a historic wave of trade liberalization. But he has not yet. The Obama Doctrine appears less ambitious. Here are its elements to date.

Nation-building at home, not abroad: President Obama took office so determined to “end the war” in Iraq that he failed to negotiate a follow-on force to sustain stability there. In Afghanistan, after a decade of allied sacrifice and real gains, the administration astonishingly is now flirting with the “zero option” of leaving no US forces there after 2014. Obama prefers to focus on “nation-building at home.”

But will he be able to if Iraq or Afghanistan backslide into civil war, or if Syria's violent spill-over engulfs the Middle East? For all the tactical efficacy of drone strikes, the United States cannot possibly defeat terrorism without at the same time working to build free and prosperous societies in countries, like Pakistan, that nurture terror.

Resisting transformationalism: Notwithstanding excellent speeches about bridging the gap between America the Muslim world, President Obama has treaded more gingerly in his policies. He did not support Iran's Green Revolution and has stood back from the opportunities inherent in the Arab Awakening, allowing post-strongman societies in the Middle East to devise new political arrange-



ments for themselves. Obama has a nuanced understanding of the limits of power and the tragedy of international politics from his oft-cited reading of Reinhold Niebuhr. But the greater tragedy may be declining to use America's great power to more actively support Arab and Iranian liberals desperate to build free societies against fierce opposition from Islamist and ancien régime forces.

“Leading from behind”: In Libya, Syria, and now Mali, we have seen Washington's Euro-

pean allies push for, or carry out themselves, armed interventions to uphold human rights and regional stability. Americans are used to being the hawks in world affairs, and Europeans the doves – but those roles have reversed under President Obama.

This turns the transatlantic bargain on its head: Europeans now seem more concerned with policing out-of-area crises, with America playing a supporting role. But is such passivity really in Washington's interest? Can Europe really lead in matters of

war and peace without America at the front?

Rebalancing American power toward Asia: America's “pivot”

Daniel Twining is Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. These are his personal views.



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Security Doctrine

has been welcomed in much of Asia and across party lines in Washington. But as Joseph Nye argues, the United States has been pivoting to Asia since the end of the Cold War.

It would be more accurate to say that Obama himself pivoted away from seeking a G-2 condominium with China to balancing against it. His administration's support for liberalization in Myanmar has been historic – but senior US officials say the process is driven by Naypyidaw, not Washington. It is also unclear

if the pivot is more than a rhetorical policy; President Obama has already authorized defense budget cuts of nearly \$900 million and supports more.

Unsentimentality towards allies: Even amidst the rebalance, Asian allies like Japan and friends like India have felt neglected by this American president. Similarly, Obama's attention to the transatlantic relationship seems inversely proportional to the affection Europeans feel for him. Despite significant defense transfers, the US administration appears as concerned with preventing Israel from attacking Iran as preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Hard-headedness is a virtue in international relations. America's allies, however, expect it to be directed more at US adversaries than at our friends.

A trade policy high in ambition, if not results: President Obama commendably seeks to double US exports as part of an economic recovery program. His administration has sketched out a transformative vision of an Atlantic marketplace and a Trans-Pacific Partnership.

But movement on both has been very slow – at least as slow as the three years it took for Obama to send Congress free trade agreements with Korea and other countries negotiated by his predecessor. The potential for an ambitious trade opening is promising – if Obama can deliver.

President John F. Kennedy said America would pay any price and bear any burden in support of liberty. President Obama has made clear that under his leadership, America will not do quite so much. But strategic minimalism and a focus on the domestic, means problems abroad only grow, inevitably pulling America into crises on less favorable terms.

The world looks to America for strategic initiative to solve its thorniest problems. At the moment, demand for this leadership is greater than supply. ■

The Védrine doctrine

Or how to assert influence in the face of diminished resources | By François d'Alancón

Forty-six years after General de Gaulle's decision to leave NATO's military organization, France has finally settled its dilemma. Last November, former Socialist foreign minister Hubert Védrine submitted a report to French President François Hollande, emphatically stating the newly found French consensus regarding NATO: “France's (re-) exit from the integrated military command is not an option.” Instead, France should “assert itself much more in the Alliance and wield greater influence, while being vigilant and rigorous.”

Hubert Védrine coined the term “hyperpower” to describe the United States in the late 1990s and was critical when Nicolas Sarkozy engineered a stunning break with the “de Gaulle-Mitterrand legacy” by returning to the integrated military command in April 2009. A self-described “realist,” Védrine had all the credentials to make the argument against a re-exit.

In his recommendations, faithful to a classic neo-Gaullist vision, he calls for “vigilance” regarding a number of traditional French concerns. These include preserving “a military alliance focused on collective defense, acting as little as possible as a political and military alliance” and “based on nuclear deterrence.”

In typical fashion, he warns of the conceptual and theoretical risk of “phagocytosis,” a loss of French “ability for threat analysis, reflection and prediction of scenarios and even planning.”

Vigilance is also required toward the preservation of France's and Europe's industrial defense base. France does not want Ballistic Missile Defense and Smart Defense to become a vehicle for American military



Hubert Védrine (right) hands his report recommending France's continued membership of NATO's integrated military command to President François Hollande.

exports to the European market at the expense of France's and Europe's defense industry.

Other French reservations towards missile defense are well known and still stand: it should be complementary and not a substitute to nuclear deterrence, politically controlled by the Allies and should not jeopardize cooperation with Russia.

Trying to accommodate a wide spectrum of French political sensitivities, Védrine advocates a “Europeanization” of the Alliance, a “French and European” industrial strategy in NATO and, simultaneously, the construction of a “Europe of Defense” within the framework of the European Union.

Europe should seize the moment precisely because there

is “a certain willingness or desire on the part of the Americans for the Europeans to play a greater role in the Alliance.” In other words, the combination of the US pivot to Asia, American expeditionary fatigue and new cuts in the US defense budget “make it more necessary and less impossible for Europeans to play a larger role in their own defense.”

But Védrine's admonitions for Europe to take on more responsibility for its own security both within NATO and the EU will be hard to follow. Serious questions hang over the future of Europe's political will and capacities in a time of sustained defense austerity. Besides some modest achievements in Franco-British defense cooperation under the Lancaster House treaty of 2010, the French

project for common European defense seems remote, in the face of a British and German preference for the NATO framework. Once stretched by three simultaneous armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire and Libya, France faces the prospect of substantial cuts in its defense budget.

A new white paper on defense and national security will be sub-

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mitted to François Hollande by the end of February, followed by the adoption of a new “loi de programmation militaire” (LPM) for 2014-2020. French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian believes there are several ways for France to bridge the gap and maintain its “strategic ranking.” European Union Battlegroups created in 2007 could be deployed. A new impetus should also be given to European “pooling and sharing” of military capabilities and to the consolidation of the European Defense industry in spite of the failed deal between the British and the European defense companies BAE and EADS.

Initiated by the French, the incoming European Union military training mission in Mali

(EUTM Mali) was supposed to be an example of European action in support of an African-led military intervention. In practice, in spite of an early pledge to avoid direct involvement in its former colony, France, once again, finds itself in the position of deploying troops alone in support of a failing African state and directly confronting the Tuareg and Islamist militias allied with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Only the future will tell whether France has the reach and means to sustain this type of military campaign and mobilize a multinational engagement in nation-building. François Hollande has insisted that the French military role will only last until an African force can take the field in support of the Malian army. Still, it is not clear how and when the long-promised African intervention force will go into action.

Thus France may be unable to avoid a long engagement with its own military right out front. In Afghanistan, since having left Kapisa province, where the French army was deployed, Paris's attempt to play a role in promoting a political solution has not been very conclusive. Likewise, recent talk of a French/European stabilization mission in a post-Assad Syria remains hypothetical.

As Hubert Védrine said in his report, the success of a proactive French policy to “achieve greater influence” will not only depend on the political will of its European partners but foremost on maintaining “a certain level” of military capability while at the same time reducing the debt and improving its economic competitiveness. Finding a way out of this Gallic conundrum will be a tough call. ■

Each presidential term since 2000, Vladimir Putin has had a new foreign policy doctrine. In the early 2000s, this was an alliance with the United States, coupled with the “European choice.” In the mid-2000s, it was replaced by a policy of defensive self-assertion, manifested in the Munich speech. Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency, which was de facto Putin’s third term, was marked by a reset with Washington and the quest for “modernization resources” in the West. Putin’s formal return to the Kremlin has ushered in yet another iteration of his foreign policy, which might be called sovereignty.

Above all else, Mr. Putin has moved to consolidate power at home, challenged by big city protesters in the winter of 2011/12. Seeing the protesters as pawns of the US State Department which did indeed finance some civil society and democracy building programs, Putin ordered the cancellation of USAID activities in Russia and the legal branding of Russian NGOs which accept funding from abroad as “foreign agents.” The Kremlin went even further when, in response to the US Magnitsky Act, which applied sanctions against Russian officials suspected of having caused death in detention of a corporate lawyer, it ended the practice of adoption of Russian children by US foster parents.

Actually, President Putin himself is introducing something like Magnitsky-in-reverse by legally restricting Russian officials from owning assets and property abroad. Evidently, Putin wants both to do away with the vestiges of Russia’s unequal status vis-à-vis the West rooted in the 1990s – foreign aid recipient, democracy class drop-out, orphans-for-adoption country – and to reduce the exposure of Russian officialdom to potential pressure from the outside – so that these same officials are better controlled by the Kremlin inside. Control is the true objective sovereignty is the slogan and nationalism is the soul of this policy.

In terms of foreign policy per se, Putin’s main project is Eurasian economic integration. The Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, in operation since 2009, is being upgraded to a single economic area of the three, with the goal of an economic union by 2015.

The Putin doctrine

The New Putin Doctrine: Control is the true objective, sovereignty is the slogan and nationalism is the soul of his policy | By Dmitri Trenin



Russian President Vladimir Putin observes troops during strategic command staff exercises in the Caucasus region in September 2012.

Putin has been working hard personally to expand the integration effort to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; and he has offered Customs Union membership to Ukraine, which is torn between the appeal of short-term gains in the east and its long-term aspirations to join the west.

Moscow has also been cultivating Tashkent hoping to engage Uzbekistan, a key country in Central Asia. This is not the beginning of a new Soviet Union, to be sure; and a degree of integration between Russia and some of its neighbors makes sense in economic terms. Putin, however, also seeks to enhance Russia’s geopolitical standing vis-à-vis its two biggest neighbors in Eurasia: the European Union to the west and China to the east.

Moscow’s approach toward the EU, meanwhile, has changed fundamentally. Europe is no longer



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regarded there as a mentor or even a model. Russia no longer seeks a relationship with it that would have, in Romano Prodi’s memorable phrase, “everything in common except the institutions.”

Instead, the relationship is getting more transactional, symbol-

ized more by adding new pipelines and bickering over visas than by professing common values. Indeed, Moscow has not only accepted the values gap between itself and the EU, but has begun to proudly advertise its own more traditional values, such as national sovereignty, religious faith, and traditional family – in contrast to Europe’s unchecked freedoms which, in its view, erode society and eventually doom it.

Putin has also moved to re-reset relations with the United States. Eliminating elements of perceived inequality has been mentioned. Politico-military issues, including arms control, which featured prominently in the Medvedev interlude, have been assigned a back seat. Putin’s own priority is expanding trade and economic

cooperation with Americans on the model of the 2011 Rosneft-ExxonMobil deal.

Over the years, the Russian President has come to prefer the company of Western CEOs to that of Western politicians. In a highly symbolic gesture, Putin missed not only the Chicago NATO summit, but also the G-8 meeting at Camp David – something no other world leader had done before. Having stopped pretending that Russia is affiliated, however loosely and indirectly, with the West, Putin felt free to take a more robust posture internationally.

The crisis in Syria has given him an opportunity to demonstrate that posture. Russia did not like US-led military interventions before, whether in the Balkans

or in Iraq. It acquiesced in Libya, hoping to strengthen what Dmitri Medvedev called “modernization alliances” with the West, but was bitterly disappointed as the imposition of a no-fly zone morphed into regime change.

On Syria, Moscow is standing firm, giving no pretext for intervention to those who want to push or ease Bashar al-Assad out of power. Russia also continues to give Damascus material assistance and moral support.

In its view, an Islamist takeover of Syria must be prevented by all non-military means available. Nearly two years into the Syrian uprising, Assad is still holding out, and Washington is negotiating the future of Syria directly with Moscow – something not seen since the end of the Cold War.

Finally, Putin has also “pivoted” to Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok was the most visible, but not the only sign of the east-west geopolitical rebalancing now taking place at the Kremlin. Moscow understands the importance of the rise of Asia, and of China in particular, and is seeking to find ways to develop its eastern provinces, which otherwise risk tilting, economically, toward the great neighbor across the river.

Thus, while taking great care to maintain good relations with Beijing, Moscow is reaching out to others in the region, from Tokyo and Seoul to Delhi and Hanoi, to expand trade and investment and develop political contacts. At some point, driven by the same logic, Russia may even discover the value of trans-Pacific ties with North America.

Dealing with Russia in the next few years will mean dealing directly with Vladimir Putin, and it will not be easy. There will be calls to opposing the Kremlin’s authoritarianism, and dire warnings against any return to realpolitik. Yet, opposing Russia, or simply ignoring it, will carry its own price. Russia is, and will continue to be, for the Russians themselves to fix.

Western values need to inform Western interests, not to replace them. The only possible solace will be that even though the relationship between Russia and the West may become more contentious than it was in Medvedev’s halcyon days, at least there will be no disillusionment in the end. ■

The Merkel doctrine

Unlike her Defense Minister, Chancellor Merkel rules out German combat deployments | By Peter Dausend

Lieutenant General Hans Werner Fritz looks at the world differently since he started his latest job nine months ago: Now he scans it for crisis zones. As director of the German Defense Ministry’s newly established Strategy and Deployment (SE) department, he has to look today at where German soldiers could be deployed tomorrow. His boss, Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière, wants Germany to meet the security policy expectations the international community is placing on Germany. The problem is, Angela Merkel doesn’t.

More economic clout, more political influence, more military responsibility – in a time of global power shifts, this triad sets the tone for security policy debates. Behind a rhetorical façade of unity, the German chancellor and her defense minister are responding very differently to a situation where fear of an overly mighty Germany has transformed into a powerful pressure of expectations.

Whereas de Maizière would like to get the German public used to the idea that Germany’s armed forces could be deploying to, and fighting in crisis zones more often, Merkel does not want to be responsible for any more combat missions. The defense minister believes it’s time for a thorough public debate about the concept and role of the Bundeswehr as a globally active deployment force – yet the Chancellor is saying nothing.



Chancellor Angela Merkel is determined to keep German troops out of combat deployments. Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière wants to “take responsibility.”

Federal elections are due this fall, and Merkel knows that voters like their chancellor but dislike far-flung deployments. Merkel has no intention of risking her popularity.

Yet this latent dispute between the minister and his boss is about more than election year politics. As the US realigns toward the Pacific, de Maizière believes that “we Europeans have to accept that burdens will be shared differently.”

Merkel passes these burdens to third parties, immediately. Even with a new army, Germany

“cannot solve all the problems of security,” the chancellor said at the latest Bundeswehr conference. She appealed to “other countries, especially those of growing economic importance” to take more responsibility. “We are acting in our interest when we help partners work effectively to maintain and regain security and peace in their regions,” Merkel said. She meant, by giving them German advisers to train their soldiers and the tools that German industry produces for fighting effectively, namely: German weapons.

“Thou shalt equip, not intervene,” might therefore be Merkel’s first commandment of security policy. “Take responsibility” would be de Maizière’s. On the record, the Defense Minister uses his boss’s rhetoric. Loyalty is a cardinal virtue to him.

Internally, however, he seems to be equipping himself. It’s common knowledge, he often says, that Germany “is a leading power in Europe and NATO.” Germany’s enlarged economic and political presence automatically begets a greater responsibility for security

policy, de Maizière believes. “The price of greatness is responsibility,” Churchill said,” the minister recently told a German newsweekly, adding: “One can vary that: The price of influence is responsibility.” De Maizière believes that responsibility means the Bundeswehr may even have to intervene where German interests do not immediately hang in the balance, and has gone on record saying so. Alliance partners’ interests could suffice, he said.

In Mali, that kind of argument could justify far more than a logistics and training mission – if it weren’t for Merkel.

In security policy, Angela Merkel has travelled far. Her journey began in the summer of 2002, in the dispute over the Iraq war. Merkel reproached Chancellor Gerhard Schröder for refusing to join the war, took sides with US President George W. Bush, castigated the SPD-Green coalition for what she called its anti-American attitude and spoke of how postwar Iraq could flourish like postwar Germany did. She kept doing so until Schröder won re-election.

Merkel’s journey then took her through the war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. She saw blood-stained fatigue. She saw military futility. And she saw that voters didn’t like any of it – the blood, the hopelessness, the defense of German interests in the Hindu Kush mountains. And so Merkel’s journey ended in absolute distrust of military deployments.

In the case of Mali, she has offered Bundeswehr planes to transport Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces to the capital Bamako. The deployment of German troops to Mali as part of an EU training mission cannot be ruled out. It is also possible that the Bundeswehr might provide the Malian military with logistical and strategic



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DIE ZEIT

Security Doctrine

advice. That would help repair the damage done when Germany voted no to the UN intervention in Libya.

With a chancellor wanting no part in combat missions and a defense minister who cannot rule them out, Germany – that leading European power – is undecided about what kind of security policy it wants. For the next eight months, that won’t change. De Maizière will remain loyal – he has no other option. Especially since Merkel’s security policy campaign stance has long been decided: She’s doing a Schröder. Saying no to combat missions is the way to win elections in Germany. ■

Burdened with leadership

Germany struggles to accept its new role as the undeclared European hegemon

By Stefan Kornelius

Germany's biggest foreign-policy problem could be an old acquaintance – Germany itself.

While the world frets over the dangers emanating from Syria, or tries to understand the history of the Senkaku Islands, the sounds of a familiar chant are audible in Europe – one that doesn't appeal to German ears. It is the old song of the hegemon, of the predominant power.

In the background, melodies murmur about balance of power, alliances, Pan-Germanism. And despite the sweet harmony of events like the anniversary celebrations of the Elysée Treaty in Berlin, it is impossible not to hear the growing discord: Germany has become too strong to submit to the will of the majority in Europe. Yet it is too weak to fashion that will on its own.

"Semi-hegemonic" is how the historian Ludvig Dehio once described this predicament. And even if the parallels to Dehio's analysis of the late 19th and early 20th century power struggles don't extend very far, the specific observation stands: In recent years, and quite against its will, Germany has stumbled into a leadership role for which there is no model in the postwar era.

It was a gradual process, beginning, for all intents and purposes, on the day of reunification – a day that François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher feared for precisely that reason. It doesn't take much historical understanding to identify the sheer size of a united Germany, and especially its economic strength as a source of irritation in European power politics.

Hardly surprising, therefore, that the jury is still out on the minor historical controversy of whether Helmut Kohl offered the euro as a kind of insurance policy for the control of German economic power, in return for which he was allowed to unify the country. (That political pragmatists began considering the idea of a common currency long before unification – and that Jacques Delors warned against the dangers of monetary union without appropriate political structures well before 1989 – has done little to inhibit this debate.)

Today, more than 20 years later, the economic imbalances have become obvious. They are the cause of much political tension, as well as the perception of Germany as a neo-hegemonic power that not only imposes its version of economic policy on the rest of the continent but, thanks to a common market and relatively cheap currency, is dominating Europe's export business as well.

This is also the source of Germany's political leverage. Whoever finances the crisis, whoever, in case of doubt, pays the debts and, beyond any doubt, vouches for the stability of the currency, gets to set the rules and the process for long overdue reforms.

Consequently, the euro crisis is not only about sovereign debt, economic mismanagement and lack of competitiveness in the southern peripheral states: It is also about a leadership crisis for Germany. Ultimately, it is a major political and national security problem for Germany. Because if there is one thing the political class in Berlin has internalized it is this: German exceptionalism within Europe is bad for the country.

Germany doesn't know what to do with its new strength. The public perception of the problem makes this glaringly obvious: Germans don't like having fingers pointed at them, or having the can of responsibility kicked their way. The majority of Germans still see the euro crisis as the other



PICTURE: ALLIANZ/BERNDROW/ALONHEIM

The devil is in the detail: Germans and their EU partners alike are wary of the need for Berlin to shoulder more responsibility.

countries' problem. At the center, the crisis is yet to really arrive.

A diametrically opposed view reigns in the crisis-hit countries, where Merkel has been burning in effigy for months and Nazi clichés are back in fashion. One Spanish commentator said the country's treatment in the crisis smacked of Versailles. In Italy, Merkel is ridiculed as the Kaiser of Europe.

Throughout the continent, the German chancellor has become the "cover monster" of choice for European periodicals.

Still, as a geo-economic power Germany does not only elicit fear among its neighbors. The labor market reforms enacted under the SPD-Green government of Gerhard Schröder a decade ago remain exemplary; Italy's prime minister is one of many



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Germany in Europe

who acknowledge Germany's culture of stability. The German model is the subject of business best-sellers, its people's alleged national characteristics of industriousness, persistence and a quest for perfection reap ongoing admiration. In the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, Thomas Paulsen attests to Germany's "soft power" attributes, an entirely new export for a nation that prefers to reduce itself to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Johann Sebastian Bach.

And yet, unease remains on several fronts. First, Germany's strength is not evenly distributed. That can be dangerous. The country's economic clout is not accompanied by a willingness to shoulder more responsibility in dealing with international security problems. Just as the shock over Germany's decision to sit out the Libya conflict was fading, Berlin kept the West on tenterhooks again after France launched its Mali intervention – before eventually seeing fit to dispatch two Bundeswehr Transall cargo planes. France deserved more, including immediate political support. In crisis-wracked Europe, the impression could take hold that Germany is perfectly willing to leverage its own economic interests while ducking its allies' national security needs.

Second, Europe's fixation with itself (and Germany) means the quiet departure of a political heavy-weight – the US – has gone practically unnoticed. As a European power, the United States was an immovable constant in Europe's postwar arithmetic.

Given the lack of strategic challenges on this side of the Atlantic, America's realignment is hardly surprising. For Germany and Europe, however, it also poses a danger as long as Helmut Kohl's foreign policy wisdom applies that Europe's unification and transatlantic partnership are two sides of the same coin.

In scrutinizing their own malaise, the Americans must also recognize that they are suffering from the same symptoms as the nations of Europe: low competitiveness; globalization blues; excessive debt. Perhaps the two sides could learn a few things from one another or at least sideline one problem by working to establish a transatlantic free trade zone.

Third, the greatest danger may be that Germany's new power will provoke a countervailing power and divide the European Union. No matter how well meaning Berlin's euro-crisis-policy might be, what counts is perception – and the battered nations of Europe have the distinct impression their role is simply to follow orders.

The German government can invoke the spirit of Adenauer and de Gaulle as much as it wants to, claim that no solution is possible without France, and that there will have to be agreement about the right economic model for Europe. In the end, the words of the British playwright William Somerset Maugham apply to states as well: "Our natural egotism leads us to judge people in their relation to ourselves. We want them to be certain things to us." ■

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Foggy Bottom's new Brahmin

Patience and diplomatic finesse: John F. Kerry's life has been a preparation for the post of US Secretary of State | By Martin Klingst

John Kerry was nervous; no trace left of the otherwise unflappable poise. "Wait and see what the next 90 minutes bring," he said gruffly, looking down at the restless flock of reporters from his six feet four inches. The President had prepared "meticulously" for his second debate against Mitt Romney, Kerry told them. Barack Obama's lethargic performance in the first outing would be a thing of the past, he added.

The Senator from Massachusetts knew what was on the line that night. If, in the coming minutes, something were to again go wrong for Obama against his Republican challenger, Kerry would carry much of the blame. He had helped the president prepare for the debates, playing the role of Mitt Romney in practice sessions. Like two sparring partners, they had rehearsed every attack and counterpunch.

So much depended on this second performance: Obama's re-election, America's future direction – and Kerry's prospect of becoming Secretary of State. Only if Obama remained in the White House did Kerry stand any chance of succeeding Hillary Clinton, who had said repeatedly she would not stay for a second term. The rest is history. John Kerry will become the 68th US secretary of state. His confirmation by the Senate is a mere formality.

"Finally," he might think. Kerry had worked tirelessly for the President. As early as 2004, during his own bid for the presidency, Kerry handed Obama, then a largely unknown state senator from Illinois, the coveted keynote speaker slot at the Democratic Party's national convention, making him famous overnight. When Obama ran for president four years later, Kerry became one of his early supporters, despite Kerry's friendship with the Clintons.

Still, he was not Obama's first choice for State. The President would have preferred to give that office to Susan Rice, his outspoken ambassador to the UN. Somehow the 69-year-old senator and

powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was too conventional, too much an old-school diplomat. Even within his party, Kerry's upper-crust tastes for fine food and fabrics have earned him a reputation as a "Boston Brahmin."

Yet the senate Republicans let it be known that they would do everything in their power to block the nomination of Rice as secretary of state. Obama backed down. Already facing battles with congressional Republicans over the national debt, immigration and tougher gun laws, he had no interest in one more battle of wills.

Kerry's moment had arrived. And given the multitude of dangerous flashpoints in today's world, he was the necessary choice anyway. North Korea remains unpredictable, Iran is still working to get a nuclear bomb, Israelis and Palestinians are united in mutual hatred, China is arming



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Presidential Picks

and seeking hegemony in Asia, Syria threatens to collapse under its civil war, the future of Egypt and a string of states in the Middle East and Africa remain uncertain – and no one knows what will become of Afghanistan and Pakistan when NATO and US forces soon pull out.

John Kerry has a huge advantage over all his rivals. Hardly anyone can match the extensive list of political contacts all over the world that he has amassed over the years.

Kerry will not have to arduously learn foreign policy. It was practically put into his cradle. His father was a diplomat. At age 11, young John was sent

to a Swiss boarding school and learned several foreign languages. France became a second home. As a boy he bicycled through divided Berlin. At a conference in Brazil in the mid-1990s his second wife, the enormously wealthy Teresa Heinz, took a liking to Kerry not only because he spoke so persuasively about the environment but also because, at a Catholic mass, he sang hymns in Portuguese. Teresa Heinz, the ketchup heiress, was reminded of her own childhood in Mozambique.

In fact, Kerry has already been serving as America's de facto shadow foreign minister for the past four years. Obama and Clinton repeatedly sent him on delicate missions. When, in 2009, Afghan President Hamid Karzai refused to admit that his reelection had not been free and fair, Kerry began working on him. For at least 20 hours he pressured, cajoled and pleaded with the intransigent President, accompanied him ceaselessly through the palace garden and drank, by Kerry's own account, at least 300 cups of tea. In the end, Karzai agreed to call a second round of voting.

Kerry's legendary patience and diplomatic finesse were also in demand in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. The country's military and intelligence services felt duped by the Americans. Relations were profoundly jeopardized. For nearly two weeks, Kerry soothed the Pakistanis' enflamed emotions. The result was a joint statement that consisted of little but empty phrases, yet kept the Pakistanis on side.


Kerry also shares European concerns over climate change. In 1983 he visited Germany's Black Forest to study the effects of acid rain. He understands that destruction of the environment, that floods, droughts and scarce water can cause wars and mass migrations, and that they directly influence foreign policy. His commitment to environmental protection has not won him many friends among Republicans.

However, like his predecessor Hillary Clinton, Kerry will not enter his new job with an own agenda, let alone a grand design. To a large extent, US foreign policy is determined by the White House and unpredictable occurrences. Also like his predecessor, Kerry is a pragmatist and internationalist. If anything, he is even more opposed than Clinton to imperialist saber rattling.

If there is one profound insight that Kerry shares with the president and the next secretary of defense, Chuck Hagel, it is that military interventions, especially deployments of ground troops, are bad options and should always be the very last option. If one were to sum up the Obama administration's creed in three terms, they would be disengagement, containment and multilateralism. In other words: ending wars, limiting conflicts and strengthening military and diplomatic alliances.

In fact, all three men were forged by the Vietnam War. Kerry and Hagel fought there as soldiers, were wounded and repeatedly decorated. It would take the more conservative Hagel many years to grasp the senselessness of that war. The left-leaning Kerry joined the protest movement as soon as he returned, throwing his medals in the mud in front of the Capitol Building during one demonstration. Like Hagel, Kerry voted in favor of the Iraq War after the 9/11 attacks – and soon regretted it.


When Kerry was commanding a Swift boat in Vietnam, Barack Obama was still a small boy. Yet the bitter disputes and the psychological and political effects of the war also marked him. In 2004 Obama was elected to the Senate and given a seat on the Foreign Relations Committee. There he met the Vietnam veterans Chuck Hagel and John Kerry. Their distrust of military interventions impressed him deeply. His trust in their judgment has led to their nominations to head up the Pentagon and the State Department. ■



Taming the Pentagon

The next US Defense Secretary – Chuck Hagel? – faces daunting budgetary, as well as military challenges

By Christoph von Marschall



Barack Obama is looking to push the reset button on US defense policy. The Pentagon, he believes, must incorporate strategic lessons from anti-terrorist operations while slashing costs. The man the US president wants to carry out those reforms is Chuck Hagel. But the nomination of Obama's choice for defense secretary is no shoo-in.

In the decade since 9/11, the US defense budget has more than doubled. The aggregate of the Pentagon's "base budget" and "supplementals" for its wars climbed from \$316 billion in 2001 to \$687 billion in 2011. Given Washington's debt problems, that figure now has to shrink.

George W. Bush responded to threats that he believed stemmed from the "terrorist safe havens" in Iraq and Afghanistan by using mainly big deployments of ground forces. The Obama administration now views the costs and risks associated with this traditional means of waging war with skepticism.

Today the government's attitude can be summed up as "look before you leap." Obama's people have embraced special operations, ranging from extensive use of unmanned drone aircraft to track down and kill al Qaeda commanders to computer worms that disrupted Iran's nuclear program. The administration is looking hard at what the battlefields of the future will be like, what role

cyberwars could play and what it all means for the training and equipping of the US armed forces. Also, the geostrategic focus is shifting from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region.

In Washington, however, these issues – together with all others, it seems – are deadlocked between the political camps. So far, Democrats and Republicans have failed to find consensus in both their assessment of the situation and the priorities they set. And whenever answers are forthcoming, they are practically irreconcilable.

Earlier, such situations could be resolved in a politically seductive, if costly manner: To prevent any side from being harmed, old programs were kept running while financing was found for new ones. That is no longer an option.

As a result, the conflict is coming to a head in the battle over Chuck Hagel's nomination. His confirmation by the Senate is anything but certain. Personal rancor is adding heat to conflicting stances on the issues. The conservatives hardly care that Hagel is both a Republican and a decorated Vietnam veteran. What counts for them is that he's turned his back on the party mainstream and joined the opposing camp. The president has praised Hagel's independent thinking. As a senator from Nebraska he voted for the war in Iraq in 2002 but opposed the Iraq troop surge in 2007.

The looming decision to cut the US military presence in Afghanistan to only 6000 after NATO pulls out in 2014 could facilitate a resurgence of the Taliban. His critics regard Hagel's advocacy of resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis diplomatically without jeopardizing contacts through tougher sanctions and saber-rattling as a dangerous form of appeasement. His distanced relationship with Israel has been criticized both by Republicans and influential

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Presidential Picks

Democrats including Senator Chuck Schumer – although he recently came out in favor of Hagel's nomination.

Regardless of whether the nomination passes the Senate or Hagel falls victim to a coalition of Israel supporters and senators who don't share his strategic priorities, any US defense secretary would face the same challenges, especially the financial ones.

This year the Pentagon will have to cut an additional \$52 billion from its already reduced budget, and a total of \$500 billion over

the next five years – if Democrats and Republicans fail to agree on cuts elsewhere in the budget, triggering "automatic cuts" for the military.

Shrinking the budget from \$690 billion in 2011 to \$616 billion in the current fiscal year was achieved without any major cuts in weapons acquisitions. The drawdown in Iraq and reduced operations in Afghanistan cut costs on their own. Now, previously untouched items could also be affected.

Does the Pentagon really need 1.4 million professional soldiers and 800,000 civilian employees? Who's keeping an eye on the legion of private "contractors"? Will the warships already ordered meet the requirements for conflicts in the future? As drones keep multiplying, shouldn't the number of conventional warplanes be reduced? Who should have authority over the drone program and its lethal operations – the CIA as now or, as earlier, the Defense Department?

Hagel also supports slashing the country's nuclear arsenal by 80 percent. That alone could save \$100 billion over ten years, one-fifth of the Pentagon's required savings.

The nominee's hearings in the Senate will provide an opportunity to explore such issues. Whether lawmakers use that opportunity in today's polarized political climate is another question. ■

Missile defense is feasible

Iron Dome can reduce missile threats, protect human lives, and gain time and political latitude in a crisis

By Karl-Heinz Kamp

Another round of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis ended in November last year in a familiar way: a ceasefire was agreed upon, with both sides claiming victory and with hardly any chance for a lasting peace settlement.

However, at least one good piece of news emerged from this otherwise endless story of conflict in the Middle East: the Iron Dome missile defense system, developed by Israel against the threat posed by Palestinian missile attacks, had worked very well. Almost 90 percent of the missiles aimed to detonate in Israeli villages were intercepted before they could harm the civilian population, according to some estimates.

This success has consequences far beyond the immediate region directly involved in the crisis. First, it proves that missile defense is indeed possible, and can be successfully employed in a conflict even

could never work in practice; and that, even if a defense capability were to be built up, it could be easily neutralized by countermeasures. In such a scenario, incoming warheads would be accompanied by decoys, which would effectively puzzle detection radars.

Opponents of missile defense hold that tests proving the opposite were manipulated by the arms industry. They even claim that missile defense is dangerous, as it could ignite arms races based on mass procurement of missiles so as to saturate defenses.

Moscow in particular seems to see missile defense as an aggressive step by NATO and the US, raising the need for a Russian countermove. Finally, there is the argument that even a work-

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NDC

Iron Dome

ing missile defense could never offer one hundred percent security: it would provide at best the illusion of security, which is just not worth the money.

What is most surprising is that the critics have not changed their arguments much since the time of Ronald Reagan, even if the Cold War is now history, the world has changed completely, and cell phones today have greater capabilities than the supercomputers of the early 1980s.

Missile defense is indeed an extremely ambitious project because, as someone put it, the aim is to shoot down a rifle bullet with a rifle bullet – but this is exactly what happened late last year on the Israeli border with Gaza. The US and NATO have continuously developed their capabilities to detect and destroy incoming missiles. Missile defense is feasible – on the regional as well as on the strategic level. Even a defense system that is less than one hundred percent foolproof can provide political decision-makers with room for maneuver, which they would not have with missiles constantly detonating in their cities.

This is not to say that missile defense is a silver bullet for all the security problems of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, but it remains one crucial element in a broad spectrum of means and tools. The first tool of transatlantic security – the first line of defense, so to speak – will always be the use of diplomacy to defuse crisis situations and prevent missile threats from emerging.

Should this effort fail, deterrence can be the second line of defense, communicating to a potential aggressor that the price to be paid for attacking will always exceed any benefits he might hope to gain by doing so. Should deterrence too prove unsuccessful, the Atlantic alliance will still have the reassurance of missile defense as its third option to guarantee the safety of allies' and partners' territories.

For the supporters of this third line of defense, the recent confirmation of Iron Dome's reliability was of fundamental importance. In this sense, the implications of its success extend far beyond the Middle East, and will have an impact on the entire Atlantic alliance.

Debunking the missile defense hype

Even if independently confirmed, Iron Dome's much-vaunted success does not prove that missile shields work

By Subrata Ghoshroy

Iron Dome may well prove to be a step forward in defense systems of its type. But Israel seems to have shared little information to date, and so there is no way for outside observers to know how successful it actually is.

But let's debunk the myth that Iron Dome – even if as successful as advertised in the Gaza conflict – constitutes proof that missile defense, writ large, works. Terminology is important here. Iron Dome is primarily a rocket defense system, and rockets are fundamentally different from missiles.

Rockets do not have a guidance system; missiles do. Rockets follow a trajectory that is determined by the position and angle of the launcher and the propellant. So, once they are fired, and the radar detects their launch, they are easily tracked. Tamir – Iron Dome's interceptor missile – has its own small radar, which provides final guidance toward the target rocket and its warhead, before the interceptor ignites its own payload near the rocket. The resulting explosion creates a shrapnel cloud that, if successful, punctures the rocket warhead, which explodes several kilometers high in the air.

[...]

The reported success of Iron Dome appears to be generating interest in other countries, with Brazil, India, Singapore, and South Korea among those described as interested in acquiring the system. That supposed success also seems to have been conflated with proof that missile defense in general works. NATO is deploying Patriot batteries in Turkey to intercept Syrian missiles. And missile defense true believers are pushing lasers again, even though billions of dollars have been spent on

failed attempts to build lasers that reliably shoot down large missiles.

Raytheon, for example, is advertising a "Laser Phalanx" as the weapon system of the future that could replace everything in the tactical battlefield from Iron Dome to the current Phalanx system, used by the Navy and adapted as a land-based system that has been called extremely effective in stopping rocket attacks on the Green Zone.

This enthusiasm for missile defense – and particularly laser missile defense – glosses over decades of expensive failure. Like Israel, the United States has aimed to produce a layered system, including land- and sea-based platforms that will intercept incoming missiles in various phases of trajectory – boost phase, mid-course, and terminal phase. The cumulative sum spent so far is about \$200 billion. Yet, there are still major challenges to fielding an effective system.

Although very little data is in the public domain, some analysts question the 90-to-95 percent intercept rate advertised by the Israeli military. The Israelis need to be forthcoming with Congress, providing data to back up the claims of such an astronomical success rate. There should also be independent investigation of those claims. ■

An extended version of this article was published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists on Dec. 13, 2012 under the title:

Iron Dome: Behind the hoopla, a familiar story of missile-defense hype

For the full version see: <http://the-bulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/iron-dome-behind-the-hoopla-familiar-story-of-missile-defense-hype>

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MIT

Iron Dome



PICTURE: ALLIANCE/OPA

■ An Israeli Iron Dome defense system fires a missile to intercept a Palestinian rocket fired from the Gaza Strip in November 2012.

Security Flashpoints

Bamako is the real problem

Tribal elites in Northern Mali are backing jihadist groups for opportunistic reasons. The solution is effective government and military reform | By Wolfram Lacher

The widespread assumption that intervention in Mali is about fighting extremists in the North is misleading, for two reasons. First, the conflict is fundamentally between rival elites in northern Mali. Second, the biggest obstacle to progress in the North is the political deadlock in Mali's capital Bamako – an obstacle

war in the north until the March 2011 military coup.

The conflicts in northern Mali during the 1990s and since 2006 were conflicts between these groups. The rift between the MNLA and Ansar Dine leadership already emerged during the 1990s and in 2006 – it reflects the personal ambitions of rival political leaders rather than ideology.

For northern leaders, the costs of associating themselves with extremists have risen sharply with the French intervention. A probable scenario is that the extremist groups dissolve into their respective ethnic constituencies. Many fighters, and even some leading figures, will re-hat themselves to escape the French offensive. A core of regional jihadists would emerge. Precisely that may also be the ideal scenario for French military strategists.

But the question is, what happens then? Attempts to break the alliances between local tribal elites and hardcore extremists will lead to the emergence of armed groups along ethnic and tribal lines. These groups will continue to pursue their individual political interests and will not be able to accept that their negotiating position has eroded by a re-conquest of northern Mali – particularly if the military forces driving this conquest include the ethnic militias against whom the armed groups took up arms in the first place.

This conflict within northern Mali is likely to be much lengthier and more protracted than the idea of a straightforward campaign against extremist groups would suggest. This is the conflict any external actor intervening in Mali will get involved in – be it an African-led force, be it an EU training mission.

Two preconditions for success in tackling the conflict within northern Mali are the emergence of an effective government in Bamako, and the reform of the Malian army. The political deadlock in Bamako has long been neglected by external actors focusing on the North. Since the military coup, there has been almost no progress on a transition toward constitutional order.

Even agreement on the framework of the transition is lacking among Mali's key political forces. The government is internally divided and does not have the legitimacy nor the support needed to engage in any negotiations with northern groups. The army is ridden by internal strife, but mostly controlled by the coup leaders – who act as a counterweight to the interim president. None of this had caused much irritation to external actors, who pressed on with plans for an African-led intervention regard-

less. Even when the coup leaders in December 2012 forced out the prime minister, preparations for an EU mission to rebuild the Malian army continued.

The French intervention will also change the balance of power in Bamako. It remains to be seen whether France will use its military presence to prevent meddling in politics by the coup leaders, and support the re-establishment of clear military command structures. Attempts to do so could backfire in the form of renewed tensions within the army, or a popular backlash against neocolonial interference in Malian affairs.

But even if France succeeds in curbing the coup leaders' influence, other political forces will still have to agree on a transitional framework, and an effective government will still have to be formed.

Finally, there is the issue of financial resources: since Western governments suspended development aid after the coup, the Malian state is quickly going bankrupt. If funds earmarked for development aid are reallocated to the African-led and EU missions, how much longer will there be a Malian government that these missions are intended to support?

A purely negotiated solution in northern Mali is unrealistic. Any strategy to re-establish state control over the North will have to include a military component. But an African-led force provides no quick fix to the problems outlined above. Military action is doomed to fail in the absence of a capable Malian government that reaches out to the parties to the conflict in the north.

Only a military offensive that is embedded in a Malian-led political process can achieve progress in the North. The Malian army that is to lead this offensive needs to be one that has been thoroughly reformed, with militia structures dissolved and clear command structures established. It also needs broad political backing. The problem, and the solution, lies in Bamako. ■



Flashpoint MALI

that external actors have yet to adequately acknowledge.

What kind of conflict are we looking at in northern Mali? The common interpretation is that three extremist Islamist groups, drawing on fighters from across northwestern Africa, have established a reign of terror.

This is a superficial reading of the situation. Assuming French military action succeeds in weakening the extremist groups as such, and dispersing them, the war is likely to reveal itself as what it really is: a conflict between rival elites within northern Mali.

Some tribal elites have, for the past year, backed one of the three extremist groups, for largely opportunistic reasons. Other northern elites are behind the secessionist National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), or behind the Arab and Tuareg militias that fought the government's



War in Northern Mali

- Important presence of MNLA fighters
- Mineral resources
- Under French control (as of Jan. 27)

Old friends, new foes

Turkey's security situation has been stood on its head.

By Michael Thumann

The Turks live in the most explosive region on earth. On their eastern border with Iran, an international conflict with Israel and the US could break out at any moment. To their south, in Syria, a savage civil war is raging.

Two years ago the Turkish Prime Minister and the President of Syria were such close friends that they vacationed together. Today Recep Tayyip Erdogan wishes Bashar al Assad straight to hell and has called him a new Hitler. Clearly, Turkey's security situation has changed radically in those two years.

The Arab revolts have swept aside old certainties and toppled longstanding authoritarian allies. Western commentators' prejudices about Turkish foreign policy ("in the same boat as Iran") have been shattered along with Turkish dreams of a region with peaceful relations and "no problems." Alliances have been broken and Turkey now stands at the threshold of two wars, in Syria and, perhaps, Iran.

More than 100,000 Syrian refugees have sought shelter in Turkey. More arrive every day. Artillery shells from Syria have repeatedly fallen on Turkish territory. At the request of NATO-member Turkey, German and Dutch troops have been taking up positions with Patriot anti-missile batteries in Turkey close to the Syrian border.

Syria's civil war is tearing apart that country and the surrounding region. All states there have interests, especially the Iranians, who are propping up the Assad regime with practically every means at their disposal to maintain their vital Mediterranean bridgehead. Tehran has intervened with militias, advisers and arms shipments. Opposing them are Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Arab states. Finally, the global powers loom in the background: the US on the rebels' side, Russia and China supporting Assad.

No country can escape this new cold war anymore. No one can stand aside, let alone mediate because they are all being pulled in somehow, including Turkey. This Mideast conflict is not about Sunnis and Shiites or religion and ideology; it is a power struggle chiefly about the hegemony that Iran is seeking in the Arab world.

As a result, Turkey has gained both new friends and new enemies. Ankara's focus is, of course, on Syria. Before the uprising against President Assad, the country was supposed to become Turkey's gateway to the Middle East



Not long ago the Turkish Prime Minister and the President of Syria were close friends. Recep Tayyip Erdogan (right) shakes hands with Bashar al Assad in Aleppo in April 2007.

– economically through exports, politically through the co-opting of Assad, strategically through Syrian dependence on Turkey. The goal remains the same, but the partners have changed. Assad has been discarded; Erdogan began planning without him long ago.

For more than 20 months, Turkey has systematically bolstered the opposition. The Syrian National Council is based in Turkey. Ankara has close ties with the newly established Syrian National Coalition in Cairo. The Free Syrian Army uses Turkey as a staging area, replenishes itself with weapons and other supplies there and, also on Turkish territory, receives training from the US and the Gulf states. Ankara has long advocated intervening militarily in Syria by establishing a protected zone in the north of the country, and resents Washington's reluctance to do so.

Ankara has three objectives in Syria:

First, it wants to see the Alawite regime give way to the Sunni-dominated opposition coalition, which favors close ties with Turkey.

Second, the Turks regard Syria's Kurdish population as a threat and would keep it in check through the Sunni-Arab Free Syrian Army and, if needed, Turkish security forces. The quasi-autonomy of the Kurds in northern Syria greatly irritates Ankara, especially since a Kurdish party associated with the PKK sets the tone there.

Third, Erdogan hopes that a post-Assad Syria will be dominated by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which his AKP party supports. As in Egypt, a friendly political faction would come to power.

These goals put Turkey on a collision course with Iran. Tehran is doing everything in its power to prop up Assad. In Syria, Turkish agents operate against Iranian militias. Turkish NGOs face battalions of Iranian advisers. But the confrontation between the region's

two major powers has long since become more direct.

As a NATO member, Turkey has allowed the alliance to establish a major radar complex for its anti-missile system near the Iranian border, against Iran and Pakistan. That and the NATO Patriot installations on the Turkish-Syrian border have led to public tirades by the Iranian military brass.

That was conclusive proof that Turkey and Iran are rivals in the region and that Western observers were completely wrong with their assessment that an alliance was in

the making. They were taken in by Erdogan's pained and continuing efforts to maintain ostensibly amicable relations with Tehran.

Meanwhile the conflict with Iran is also straining ties with Iraq. Two years ago Erdogan's government was signing one contract after another with the administration of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Baghdad. Most remained on paper only. Maliki is an ally of Iran who is working to set up an authoritarian Shiite regime in Iraq. Relations broke down completely when Turkey granted asylum to Tariq al-Hashimi, a former Iraqi Sunni vice-president sentenced to death in absentia in Baghdad. Maliki and Erdogan have been sniping at each other ever since.

In the wake of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has come into conflict along its southern and eastern borders with Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran. Ties with Moscow in the north are likewise strained.

Ankara's new friends cannot fully compensate for these ten-

sions, but at least they give Turks a feeling of not being isolated in the region.

Ankara's warming ties with the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq is the most important and astonishing development for Turkish security. Turkey has become Iraqi Kurdistan's closest trading partner under President Massoud Barzani. The Iraqi Kurds have begun supplying Turkey with oil and gas. Barzani visited the party conference of Erdogan's AKP. The Turkish foreign minister travels regularly to Erbil.

Ankara is also trying to improve relations with the Kurds on its own territory and push the PKK toward peace. A new initiative even includes the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Prime Minister Erdogan seems to have recognized the error of his policy over the last 20 months, during which he tried to resolve the Kurdish issue by military means. His rivals in Damascus and Tehran used the campaign to their own advantage; now Erdogan is trying to shore up that flank and seek a compromise solution.

Egypt – the largest state affected by the Arab revolt – is actually another of Ankara's rivals for hegemony in the region. But since Hosni Mubarak's fall, Erdogan has been seeking common ground. The electoral triumphs of the Muslim Brotherhood catapulted a party with close ties to the AKP into power. Cairo and Ankara share their rejection of Bashar al Assad and distrust of Iran. Turkey is helping Egypt with loans in hopes of gaining a new export market. Egypt has become a figurehead for post-revolution Arab countries, where conservative, religious politicians now hold power. Turkey's relations with Tunisia and Libya have improved.

A glance at the map shows that Turkey's new friends in North Africa and the Gulf are farther away than the neighbors it no longer calls friends. That could become a problem for the country's security.

Erdogan has bet everything on the Free Syrian Army defeating Assad. If they succeed, Turkey would have extensive influence on Syria – a key country in the Middle East.

If the insurgency fails or Syria collapses, Turkey will have to seek peace within a much more hostile environment. That is also why pacifying the cross-border Kurdish conflict is so important. However, membership in NATO will remain the chief pillar for Turkey's security. ■

Showing solidarity

NATO's deployment of Patriot missiles on Turkey's border with Syria is more a diplomatic than a military exercise | By Nikolas Busse

The Patriot air defense system, which NATO has now deployed in Turkey, is high-end military equipment. It is being used in the world's most dangerous flashpoints including the Middle East and East Asia. For NATO, though, the deployment is more a diplomatic than a military exercise. The main idea is to show solidarity with an ally and to gain some influence over Ankara's decision-making.

From the outset, NATO was careful not to get directly involved in the Syrian crisis. There were many statements from the Secretary General and from allies, condemning the Assad regime for slaughtering its people. But nobody in the alliance showed any appetite for a military intervention.

The Afghan experience is still looming large in many national capitals, and there is also a widespread feeling that Syria poses a more complex strategic challenge than Libya, where NATO actively supported an Arab spring rebellion. After all, events in Syria will inevitably have an impact on Iran and Israel, which could not be said about Libya.

The developments on the ground, however, did not permit NATO to completely detach itself from the ongoing civil war on its southeastern border. The shooting-down of a Turkish fighter jet by Syria, as well as frequent cross-border shelling from northern Syria into Turkey forced the alliance to stand by its ally with official statements last year.

It quickly became clear that this would not be enough. Two fac-

tors seemed to have contributed to the decision last December to get actively involved in the defense of Turkey.

The first was a growing concern that the conflict might spill over into Turkey. As early as last autumn, high-level decision-makers in NATO started to fear that a desperate Assad regime

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might in its final hours try to internationalize the conflict by firing missiles into Turkey. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Syria has three battalions armed with SS-21s and another three with Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. This could well be several hundred missiles on mobile vehicles that could reach many parts of Turkey.

A big concern of the military in NATO is that these missiles might get loaded with chemical warheads, even though it is

not entirely clear if Syria has the technical means to do so. There is no doubt, however, that the regime has a considerable stockpile of chemical weapons, and it has already fired missiles inside the country. Turkey lacks an air defense system able to cope with such a threat.

The second factor was not much talked about in public, although it seems to have been the decisive one. Many officials in other NATO countries noticed the huge domestic pressure that the Turkish government was facing over the shelling from Syria. Although it was appreciated that Turkey showed restraint and moderation in its response, there was a growing concern that the government might one day feel obliged to engage more actively in Syria, not least because of the Kurdish issue.

Deploying Patriots in Turkey was an easy way for the allies to get access to the decision-making in Ankara. Now, NATO can ask for consultations on any major step by Turkey because it may affect its troops in the country.

The scope and details of the deployment are a reflection of these two factors. NATO has

deployed six Patriot batteries. Each of them carries 16 missiles and can defend an area of 15 to 20 kilometers against ballistic missiles. They are deployed near three large population centers in the southwest (Kahramanmaraş, Adana, Gaziantep), and supposed to protect some 3.5 million people.

The Patriot batteries are by far not enough to defend all of Turkey's southern border.

In this regard, the deployment is deterrent old style: Its main purpose is to signal to the potential aggressor that the stakes are high, and to the Turkish population that the alliance has not forgotten them.

Interestingly, setting up operation "Active Fence" did not create the kind of internal tensions which have become so common in NATO in recent years. Only three allied nations have the modern PAC-3 Patriot system with hit-to-kill technology required for the job in Turkey: the United States, the Netherlands, and Germany.

But even Germany, which is always very hesitant when it comes to military operations, supported the deployment after surprisingly few hiccups in Berlin.



Flashpoint
TURKEY



A German Patriot missile in its launcher.



A Syrian man holds the body of his son, killed by the Syrian Army, near Dar El Shifa hospital in Aleppo, Syria, Wednesday, Oct. 3, 2012.

PICTURE ALLIANCE/AP IMAGES

The Syrian impasse

Assad must go but the opposition is not a credible alternative to the existing regime | By Guido Steinberg

In early January 2013, the UN announced its latest casualty toll for the Syrian civil war: 60,000 killed. That is a considerably higher number than previously thought. As a consequence, the dilemma posed by the events has become even more difficult to solve.

If the US and its allies don't intervene more forcefully, many more Syrians are likely to die in the coming months and years. If they do support the rebels, it is just as likely that the civil war could become even bloodier.

Although the call for intervention will grow louder in the coming months, the Obama administration's reluctance to get more directly involved is the most reasonable reaction. Even providing parts of the insurgency with more money and arms would be a step fraught with unforeseeable risks and few if any benefits.

It remains obvious that the Assad regime should be removed from power. This already became

clear in the first months of the conflict, when peaceful protests were met with brutal repression – a policy that triggered the emergence of an armed insurgency.

However, during the conflict, the opposition movement has not proved itself to be a credible alternative to the existing regime, deserving the support of the US and its allies. The opposition-in-exile, first represented by the Syrian National Council and, since December 2012, the National Alliance, has not only never managed to win the trust of the religious and ethnic minorities in the country – among them most Alawites, Christians, Druze, and Kurds – but it has also proved incapable of exerting sufficient influence on insurgent groups on the ground.

The rise of jihadist groups, like the Jabhat an-Nusra, is only one dangerous outcome of this failure. The United States and its allies are correctly trying to isolate the jihadists among the insurgent

factions, but even if that policy succeeds, the ideological worldview of the other insurgent groups would pose grave problems.

Many of them are firmly rooted in the intellectual traditions of Syrian Islamism and propagate a violent anti-Alawite ideology. This, together with the regime's withdrawal to its Alawite power base, has slowly changed the nature of the conflict, which has become increasingly sectarian. If the rebels gain ground, large-scale violent retributions against the Alawites and other minorities are highly likely.

Add to this the regional dimension. Qatar and Saudi Arabia are the main supporters of the Syrian opposition, financing political work and arms shipments and turning their respective media empires into blatant instruments of anti-Syrian propaganda. The Qatari leadership in particular has openly stated that it sees Islamists and Salafists as its future political allies in Syria and the Arab world,

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and that it does not necessarily consider groups like Jabhat al-Nusra a threat.

Qatar is thus most likely to support exactly those forces. Saudi Arabia is promoting regime change in Syria primarily because it wants to topple an Iranian ally.

The Syrian civil war is increasingly developing into a proxy conflict of a larger regional cold war, in which Saudi Arabia and Iran are the protagonists. It will not help to reach the Saudis' and their Western allies' most important goal, though, namely stopping Iran

from arming itself with nuclear weapons. Proxy wars, sanctions, and containment will not change the Iranian strategic calculation.

Instead, the only remaining options are a Western military strike, or accepting the nuclear armament of Iran. As a consequence, as soon as the last efforts to negotiate have proved futile, the US and its European allies should destroy all relevant parts of the Iranian nuclear program with airstrikes.

Intervening in Syria might very well limit future options in this regard. Even if the US intervenes only indirectly by stepping up military aid for the Syrian rebels, Iran might feel provoked to react in kind and intensify its support for the Assad regime – perhaps even by sending troops.

This might start a process of escalation leading to more direct Western intervention, with Western troops in Syria or its immediate neighborhood being confronted by powerful militant

adversaries. The Hizbullah, the PKK, al-Qaeda or newly formed pro-Iranian groups would try to draw these forces into an asymmetric fight and thereby tie the US down just as happened in Iraq after 2003.

Therefore, although the terrible Syrian death toll might suggest otherwise, the right policy towards the Syrian civil war is one of restraint. The West should continue to explore possible compromise solutions. Although they are not feasible for the time being, other opportunities may arise in the future.

It should also be prepared for a long and bloody war, intensifying its humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees in the neighboring countries and within Syria. At the same time, contingencies might arise such as the deployment or loss of control of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. Only in such a scenario, could a limited military intervention quickly become mandatory. ■

The Arab Spring for Dummies

How and why the West misinterpreted the uprisings | By Florence Gaub

For two years, the Arab countries have been roiled by revolution and sectarian blood feuds. The Arab Spring seems to turn into a long Arab Winter.

Two years have passed since Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation led to the events now known as the Arab Spring. Four toppled governments, 72,000 dead, a NATO operation in Libya and a civil war in Syria later, it is still not clear where the events of 2011 will lead. One thing however is obvious: our own understanding of them was flawed from the beginning.

Its name: The term Arab Spring emerged first in the magazine *Foreign Policy* and proliferated even before the departure of Egypt's President Mubarak to European media outlets, using a variety of references ranging from the Prague Spring of 1968 to the European Spring of 1848. It is hence a Western term coined for Eastern events, takes inspira-

tion from European history and describes how outsiders perceive what is going on on the inside. By default, it is not only seasonally inaccurate – it all began in December, after all – but also suggests that, like the European events it is named after, it expresses a demand for political liberties. But was the Arab Spring really about that?

Its goals: As we looked at the Arab Spring through our own lens of liberal capitalist democracy, we were quick to label its demands as freedom, human rights and dignity. While this view is not completely wrong, it still misses the important socio-economic dimension, which drove the events of 2011 – and overestimates the role of the demonstrators in the ensuing political process.

Those who won the elections in Egypt and Tunisia did not win them on a liberal democratic ticket, but by promising

rectification of social injustice; opinion polls show that the number of people supporting democracy in Arab countries actually decreased from 2011 to 2012; a majority of people continued to choose strong

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ARABELLION

economy over democracy, whereas free speech and elections ranked 5th and 6th in Egyptian priorities (behind economic conditions, law and order, fair judiciary and uncensored media). In other words: the Arab Spring might have started with one set of goals – it ended up pursuing another.

Its causes: In an attempt to understand the rapidly evolving situation in North Africa and the Middle East, Western media were quick to develop an oversimplified recipe for social dislocation: dictatorship plus young population plus unemployment equals uprising. Social dynamics are of course more complex than a mathematical addition – rather, it resembles extraction of roots where causes meet catalysts topped by a trigger. But mostly, the simplified model lumps together several different cases and glosses over the fact that the precise reasons were vastly different from case to case.


Why does it matter to us that it was the effects of a five-year drought in Syria, unemployment amongst the educated young in Tunisia, and dissatisfaction with social stratification in Bahrain? Well – if we don't understand what is going on exactly, how are we going to react appropriately?

Its tools: The Arab Spring was not driven by Facebook and Twitter. Although there was mobilization via social media to some extent, 21 percent of Egyptians and 5.5 percent of Libyans had access to the Internet – and although it is true that most Arab users of Facebook were Egyptians, only 5.1 percent of the Egyptian population was on the network in 2010, and only 2.8 percent of Libyans.

This is not surprising given that Facebook has been offered in Arabic only since 2009, not to mention literacy rates in these states. Our exaggeration of Facebook had more to do with our desire to identify with the Arab Spring and establish an emotional connection with what was going on there than the actual facts. Mobile phones, satellite news broadcasters such as Al-Jazeera, and workers' unions in Egypt played a much more important role in spreading the news than social networks

– Libya reached 100 percent mobile phone penetration in 2008, Egypt had 72 percent in 2010. If anything, the Internet's and Facebook's popularity in the Arab world have increased as a result of the Arab Spring.

Its outcome: Although some commentators predicted the fall of all authoritarian Arab governments, one should not forget that only a fifth of the Arab League's member states have actually seen a regime change, excluding the still ongoing conflict in Syria. Authoritarianism is still the norm, not the exception. As for the newly elected governments, their laundry list is long – not only did they inherit states in bad shape, the uprisings have dangerously damaged security just as much as the economy (the Arab Spring is estimated to have cost \$55 billion according to the consultancy Geopolicity). To say it bluntly: we have to brace ourselves for a long Arab winter. ■



The great divide

Egyptians, disillusioned by growing political factionalism, are losing faith in elections | By Stephan Roll

The political climate in Egypt is poisoned. Since President Mohamed Morsi went ahead with a referendum on the country's draft constitution in December against the will of the opposition, the governing Muslim Brotherhood and the "non-Islamic" opposition have split into irreconcilable political camps.

This factionalism should not disguise the fact that both groups are extremely heterogeneous. The parliamentary elections, due to be held in April according to the new constitution, are likely to include a multitude of parties vying for the voters' favor. Whether these parties will manage to form electoral alliances is far from certain. More importantly, it is questionable whether they will manage to agree on common positions once the new parliament opens for business.

Within the Islamist camp, the Muslim Brothers and their Freedom and Justice Party are clearly the dominant political force. As progressive and mostly younger figures have left the movement – sometimes forcibly – since Egypt's political upheavals began in early 2011, the Brotherhood has solidified its conservative profile and largely avoided policy struggles.

However, both the presidential election and the referendum have demonstrated that the Muslim

Brotherhood cannot achieve an absolute majority on its own. The movement has therefore sought support primarily among the

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Salafists, who espouse a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. The Brotherhood's powerful "Deputy Supreme Guide," Khairat el-Shater, was given the task of forging this alliance. The Nour Party ("Party of the Light"), by far the most prominent of the Salafist political groupings, became the Brotherhood's key partner.

However, alliances like this could grow more unwieldy. Prominent leadership figures have left the Nour Party and founded a new one with the support of the radical politician Hazem Abu Ismail, who enjoys substantial popularity among Salafists. More splinter parties will likely follow. This process of fragmentation cannot but encumber the Brotherhood's efforts to establish viable

alliances, especially as the Salafists have grown more strident and reluctant to compromise in their political demands.

The "non-Islamist" opposition has likewise been hobbled by conflict among its parties and movements. In the course of the showdown over the constitution it initially seemed that liberal, leftist and nationalist-conservative opposition parties might agree on a common platform. Led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohamed El-Baradei, former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa and leftist leader Hamdin Sabahi, a former presidential candidate, most opposition parties closed ranks to form the "National Salvation Front."

Yet as the parliamentary polls approach, cracks have appeared within this coalition. All attempts so far to overcome political divisions and present common positions have failed. The various factions also disagree on the important question of whether, and to what extent, leaders should cooperate with forces of the old regime. First and foremost, however, the "non-Islamist" opposition has proven unable to reach out to devout Muslim voters.

In this respect, an alliance with a moderate Islamist such as ex-Muslim Brother and presidential candidate Moneim Fotouh could prove helpful. Yet Fotouh has

been busy positioning his Strong Egypt Party between the Islamists and opposition as a potential mediator, and has refused to cooperate.

Most Egyptians, meanwhile, have watched the political establishment's tactical maneuvering and growing fragmentation with bitterness. Two years after the fall of Hosni Mubarak, many no longer feel they have a stake in politics. They suffer as Egypt's economic and social conditions continue to deteriorate. The persistent political turf wars have been sapping energy and resources from the task of enacting long overdue reforms.

The result has been that growing segments of the population have turned their backs on politics, a trend made plain by the constitutional referendum. In the 2011 parliamentary elections, more than half of eligible voters turned out. The vote on the draft constitution failed to draw even a third of the electorate to polling stations. Both the opposition and the better-organized Islamists experienced difficulties in getting out the vote.

This trend is likely to continue in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Voter turnout could prove substantially beneath last year's figures, observers fear. Even if the political camps succeed in forging majorities for much-



November 2011: Women voters wait to cast their ballot in Egypt's first parliamentary elections after the ouster of Hosni Mubarak.

needed new legislation and reform projects, it remains doubtful if the populace will accept them. The truly striking rift in today's Egypt does not run between the political camps, but instead between the political establishment and the population.

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Waiting for Obama

Palestinian and Israeli leaders seem incapable of any initiative | By Avi Primor

The recent confrontations between Israel and the Islamists in the Gaza Strip were followed by unexpected results. Both parties claimed victory, but no one is entitled to it.

In fact this is also meaningless. What on the other hand is meaningful is that negotiations between Israel and Hamas, which both sides categorically rejected, have become a daily reality.

It is true that Hamas claims to never recognize Israel and to always strive for its destruction. And that Israel claims to never negotiate with an "Islamist, anti-Semitic, terrorist" organization.

But secret negotiations between both sides have already taken place in 2005. At that time, the then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon planned to evacuate Gaza unilaterally. He refused to hand Gaza over in an organized

cal and pragmatic cooperation between the two sworn enemies.

Even though peace negotiations and mutual recognition between Israel and Hamas are out of the question for the foreseeable future, the pragmatic cooperation between the two sides can also stimulate peace negotiations that should take place between Israel and the Palestinian government in Ramallah. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is basically interested in a compromise and a definite peace agreement with Israel. His fear is that he does not have enough maneuvering power because of the extremists on his own side who are constantly breathing down his neck. A Hamas involved in cooperating with the Israeli enemy has fewer options to exercise pressure on Mahmoud Abbas against peace negotiations.

Public opinion polls indicate that a solid majority of Israelis wish to separate from the West Bank, allowing the establishment of a genuinely independent Palestinian state within the framework of a credible peace agreement. That same majority thinks, however, that its wish cannot be realized. Most Israelis believe that in spite of the good will of the Ramallah government there is no one on the Palestinian side who can guarantee Israeli security once the Israeli army evacuates the West Bank.

For most Israelis the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan were possible because those countries possessed the means of imposing security on their borders with Israel. The Palestinians do not have that capability and it must be feared that withdrawing from the West Bank would lead to the same results as in 2005 after the Israeli evacuation of the Gaza



Victims in Gaza of an Israeli missile strike (above). Israel under Hamas rocket fire (below).



manner to a Palestinian authority. But he had one problem: How to guarantee that the Israeli settlers or army would not suffer casualties caused by snipers, mines, or other methods during the retreat. Although Hamas was at that time not yet in power, Sharon knew that only they could guarantee him a peaceful retreat should they have an interest in doing so.

Indeed Hamas did have such an interest, because it wanted Israel out of the Gaza Strip. Mutual interest produced an agreement, which was perfectly respected. Not one shot was fired during the Israeli evacuation.

Today both sides continue to swear to negate each other eternally. However, mutual interest drives them to ever more secret negotiations and technical cooperation.

Hamas' overriding interest is to remain in power. For that they have to satisfy the population. There is only one means to achieve this goal and that is to improve the miserable living conditions of the Gazans. A goal achievable only with the good will of Israel.

Israel, on the other hand, needs calm and security for the Israeli cities and villages along the Gaza border. Everything Israel has done to achieve this, short of cooperation with Hamas, has failed. Hence, today's enforced techni-

cal and pragmatic cooperation between the two sworn enemies. However, such negotiations are not taking place. The Palestinians are convinced that the Israeli offer to hold direct negotiations without preconditions is not sincere. It has only one aim and that is to win time and ease international pressure on Israel, they believe.

The Palestinians are not wrong in their analysis. The Israeli gov-

Strip: The seizure of power by the Islamists and constant rocket attacks on Israel. Pulling out of the West Bank would be many times more dangerous for Israel than the Gaza withdrawal.

Only an international force, preferably under US leadership with a clear mission to impose security in the West Bank, in perfect cooperation and coordination with both the Israeli and Palestinian security authorities, could convince Israeli public opinion to support a credible peace agreement. No Israeli government can engage in serious negotiations without the widespread support of its own citizens and no administration can avoid talks if a determined public demands it.

The key is therefore in the hands of the re-elected American president. In his first term of office he proved very keen to try and solve the Middle East conflict. But he chose the wrong tactic and failed in his efforts.

In the last year of his mandate, he had to abandon his efforts altogether because of approaching elections. Now, free of the need to stand for re-election, it is to be hoped that he will try again – adapting more suitable tactics – to use his overpowering influence on both Palestinians and Israelis.

Whether President Obama is actually ready to encourage the two sides to resume genuine negotiations is another question. ■



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Flashpoint
MIDEAST CONFLICT

ernment of Benjamin Netanyahu, only narrowly reelected on Jan. 22, has neither the ideological will nor the political ability to honestly negotiate a peace agreement that would inevitably lead to painful compromises.

Under the present circumstances therefore we find both potential partners to negotiations, the Palestinian authority and the Israeli governments, incapable of any initiative. There is only one way out of this stalemate: the intervention of the international community under the leadership of the United States with firm support from the European Union.

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 Fourteen monitors, 4 keyboards:
 US drone command center in New Mexico.
 When the order comes, the cyber soldiers kill.

Waging joystick war

Drones make it possible to engage enemies without the risk of friendly casualties. But the new generation of weapons could remove all accountability | By Jochen Bittner and Ulrich Ladurner

At the White House, the second day of the working week has come to be known as “Terror Tuesday,” insiders say. That’s when, in the Oval Office, President Barack Obama receives a list of individuals who his intelligence services have classified as terrorists. The president then sits in judgement over life and death. If he checks off a name, a drone soon fires its missiles accordingly – in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen or an African country.

Armed with missiles, indefatigable and deployable pretty much anywhere on earth from computer terminals in Florida or New Mexico, military drones have become the weapon of choice for the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Barack Obama. In his book “Conceal and Confront,” *New York Times* correspondent David E. Sanger vividly depicts how routine the act of ordering extrajudicial killings has become for the President.

During the tenure of George W. Bush, between 2004 and 2007 there were 18 attacks by armed drones in the Afghan-Pakistani border areas. Under Obama, that figure was reportedly 122 just in 2010. The CIA alone has killed 2560 people using drone attacks in the past eight years, according to *The Long War Journal*, a site analyzing the war on terror.

Is that permissible? Is it wise? Throughout history, different groups have believed they had attained the ultimate weapon: the slingshot, the longbow, the rifle, the cannon. Armies have always sought to outdo each other on who could kill from a greater distance. Occasionally, scruples got in the way. In 1139 Pope Innocent II banned the use of crossbows because their bolts could penetrate a knight’s armor and thus threatened the entire nobility as a class. The weapon was used regardless. However, new weapons have always tended sooner or later to hit those who invented them.

Today, drones symbolize the technological superiority of the West. Only it – for the time being – can eliminate its enemies by remote control. This unmanned crossing of borders distinguishes these weapons from all others that have come before. Wars have always required the combatants to enter the field of action. What would it mean for future wars if anyone, anytime, could attack anywhere – from the safety of home?

As yet, international law has no real response to this elimination

of borders. If the Pentagon uses drones in war zones, such as in Afghanistan, these means are still considered appropriate because they are part of military warfare. Also, drone projectiles can be delivered more accurately than, say, bombs from jets, although this does not mean that the killing of innocents can be avoided.

The real problem under international law is when the CIA uses killer drones over the territory of allied states, such as Pakistan. Then Washington is violating the sovereignty of another state, even one on America’s side.

There may be a justification in the case of particularly dangerous extremists who are beyond the reach of justice – but who decides if and when that is so? And what possibilities do the offenders on Obama’s kill list have to defend themselves against the intelligence services’ “verdict”?

Waging war by joystick is enormously popular in the US, and for good reasons: drones kill the enemy without putting America’s own troops in harm’s way. Using them is far cheaper than deploying thousands of invading soldiers. That takes a load off America’s depleted state coffers. It also satisfies an unspoken but broadly felt sentiment among Americans: of no longer having to deal with those annoying, backward societies that produce terrorists and refuse US help. The conflict in Mali could become the next example.

The sentiment among Germans is not much different. Essentially, “anything but ground forces” was Berlin’s initial reaction to the French intervention in Mali. For the past decade the Germans have tried to help stabilize Afghanistan, investing plenty of manpower and treasure, but without real success. With the troops due to withdraw soon, the German attitude is one of “we wanted to help, but they didn’t want us.”

The problem is that, even after the military drawdown, Afghanistan could still pose a threat to the West – according to Western governments. Wouldn’t it be wiser to give up the costly and inefficient idea of nationbuilding and just liquidate the jihadists via our monitor screens? Not everyone agrees. “Faith in the efficiency of drones is nothing but a substitute for strategy and policy,” warned the Green Party’s Omid Nouripour, a Bundestag deputy and security policy specialist.

German Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière sees the matter differently. He wants more drones, including armed ones,

for the Bundeswehr. A Defense Ministry strategy paper entitled *Airpower 2030* says: “The capabilities (...) of unmanned aircraft systems must be optimized and its spectrum of missions expanded (...) in all fields of reconnaissance-command-effect.” “Effect” is a bit of Bundeswehr jargon that obfuscates more than it says. It means “fire.”

Whenever German troops in Afghanistan come under attack, until now their superiors at the command center in Mazar-i-Sharif can only, as one of them put it, “just watch and wish them lots of luck.” The drones that the Bundeswehr currently uses

forces’ most eye-catching new acquisition since World War I’s Big Bertha cannon.

With its 40-meter wingspan, the RQ-4 Hawk matches that of a Boeing 737. It was conceived by the US as a replacement for the legendary U-2 spy plane. With 30 hours of fuel on board it has an operating range of 23,000 kilometers. Starting in early 2013, up to five of the giant reconnaissance planes are to be based at Jagel Air Base near Schleswig in northern Germany. From an altitude of 20 kilometers the Euro Hawk can identify and record practically any electronic signal: cell phone calls, text messages, TV shows,

army became the first to use unmanned aerial vehicles as killing machines, in this case in the Gaza Strip, the US Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, distanced himself from the practice: “The United States government is very clearly on record as against targeted assassinations... They are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that.”

Two months later came September 11, 2001, and everything changed. As they always have, events alter perceptions of what is and is not permitted.

What is actually so wrong with eliminating enemies before they themselves can strike? First of all, the enemy must be identified. When that’s done by intelligence services, the results are doubtful per se. Moreover, how dangerous do people earmarked for death have to be?

In September 2012, a drone attack in Yemen killed a man named Anwar al-Awlaki. He was a preacher of hate who inspired a series of terrorists to commit their deeds. That was enough for a death sentence. Also, Awlaki was a US citizen. Not even that status shielded him from Obama’s drones. The President celebrated Awlaki’s death as a “milestone” in the fight against al Qaeda.

In the late 19th century, the European colonial powers’ most effective instrument of conquest was the Maxim gun. With this self-loading, fully automatic machine gun, the British, French and Germans in Africa wiped out indigenous armies in brief, lop-sided encounters. “Whatever happens / we have got / the Maxim gun / and they do not,” wrote the Anglo-French author Hilaire Belloc.

Despite their technological prowess, however, the Europeans could not hold their colonial empires, not least because with each automatic shot fired, they sowed more hatred. “Wars cannot be decided through technology alone,” says Christian Möllning, military specialist at the Berlin-based SWP Institute for International and Security Affairs. “War is a social and political event, not a purely technological process.”

Drone attacks in Pakistan today are replicating the effects of the Maxim gun in the old colonies. They kill enemies but, over the longer run, also increase hatred of the US. Every missile that the US fires onto Pakistani territory also further enflames extremism.

“Are we capturing, killing and deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and radical clerics are

recruiting, training and deploying against us?” asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in a memo back in 2003.

Drone attacks that also kill innocent people are a major reason that the US and its allies risk losing this contest. In May 2009 David Kilcullen, a former senior Pentagon adviser, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, advocating a moratorium on drone strikes. Between 2006 and 2009, the killing of 14 terrorists using drones resulted in the deaths of 700 dead civilians, he estimated: “This is 50 civilians for every militant killed, a hit rate of 2 percent.” Kilcullen concluded that using drones produces far more militants than it eliminates.

There is another boomerang effect. An estimated 60 states are currently developing their own unmanned aerial vehicles. Last year the Iranians “hijacked” a US RQ-170 stealth drone. They piloted it down from the sky intact, probably using a manipulated GPS signal. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards proudly put their trophy on display.

Last fall, by its own account, Tehran repeated the coup, this time with a small US reconnaissance drone. The announcement that the captured hardware would be duplicated was also a threat. On October 6 Hizbollah, Iran’s proxy army in Lebanon, steered a drone 200 kilometers into Israeli territory. An Israeli jet shot it down a mere 30 kilometers from the Dimona nuclear reactor.

Meanwhile, Western arms technicians are working on the next upgrade. Soon, they believe, they can take the step from the automatic to the autonomous: drones would recognize and eliminate targets by applying their own data analysis. In collaboration with Harvard Law School, the NGO Human Rights Watch has released a study called “Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots.” In demanding a ban on drones, it details how autonomous weapons could leave no one accountable for conflicts and cripple international law.

Anyone wary of human rights activists on this issue might listen to the military instead. David Deptula, a former US Air Force general who headed intelligence and surveillance operations, has told the British military journal *Jane’s Defence Weekly*: “Technologically, we can take (autonomy) pretty far. But it won’t be technology that is the limiting factor, but policy.” So perhaps it’s time the policymakers gave the matter some serious thought. ■

Germany to deploy armed drones

German Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière has expressed support for equipping the Bundeswehr with armed drones, despite controversy over their use. “Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are no different in their impact from manned aircraft. It is always a person who decides to fire a missile,” de Maizière said in an interview with the newspaper *Bild* on January 25.

In late January, a government reply to a parliamentary question from the opposition Left Party revealed government plans to purchase armed UAVs. The statement stressed that military commanders had requested the weapons: “It is clear from the Bundeswehr’s combat experiences that sustainable armed overwatch is absolutely essential to provide protection against sudden and serious changes in the situation on the ground.”

Until now, the Bundeswehr has deployed only unarmed drones for aerial reconnaissance. German forces serving in Afghanistan and Kosovo have access to around 60 UAVs, according to official statistics. A final decision is expected in the spring.

KJL



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provide live images of the action but cannot support the troops. Twenty decisive minutes can pass before air support arrives.

The planners in Berlin want drones that could constantly accompany ground troops as sharpshooters in the sky. The mere possibility would itself act as a deterrent, they say. The senior commander of Germany’s air force, Lieutenant General Karl Müllner, believes the best drone for the Luftwaffe would be the US Predator B model.

Soon, the biggest unmanned aircraft in the world could be a regular sight in the skies over Germany. The giant drone is called the RQ-4 Global Hawk (in Germany the Euro Hawk). It may be the German armed

not to mention rockets and radar stations.

Five remote controlled long distance drones that could fly from Germany to New Zealand – what use would the squadron be? Never and under no circumstances, de Maizière and his staff insist, would drones be used the way the Americans do. Flying a drone from Schleswig to Pakistan or Africa to kill terrorists is “simply inconceivable.” The Bundeswehr would use fighting drones as close air support in foreign operations. De Maizière has said publicly that US drone attacks in countries where no US troops are stationed are a “strategic error.”

A decade ago, the US adopted a similar position. After the Israeli



PICTURE ALLIANCE/DPA
A US Air Force Predator drone.

Drone strikes need rules

The absence of checks and balances is troubling | By Anne-Marie Slaughter

The US is sowing a dangerous harvest with its use of drones. The advantages are undeniable; far better to target an individual who has been identified as a member of a terrorist organization at war with the United States than to send a missile or a bomb that would indiscriminately destroy his street, his neighborhood, even his village. And better to use selective air strikes than to send in soldiers on the ground, with the wholesale destruction that pitched battles between two opposing armies typically brings. Moreover, drones may be the only effective weapons against guerrilla groups hiding out in vast areas of mountain and desert that are impossible to police on the ground. How on earth are nations to protect themselves against the radical Islamist groups that have taken over Northern Mali and are spreading across the Sahel, some of the most inhospitable terrain known to man? Only eyes in the sky will work, eyes in the sky with none of the needs and vulnerabilities of human pilots.

At the very least, a drone war can keep the enemy underground and on the run. Reports of al

Qaeda operatives describe them as constantly fearful, moving houses, avoiding normal lines of communication, using decoys. The remnants of al Qaeda and both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are already deeply dug into their caves in the high mountains; reports from Mali already describe the construction of a vast underground network of supply depots and hideouts.

The image that immediately comes to mind is the network of tunnels constructed by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam war. They were fleeing B-52s and napalm rather than drones; still, the architects of US drone policy would do well to recall that continuous bombing never succeeded in destroying the Vietnamese will to fight.

The constant specter of death from above may wear on the prospective targets, but once they

are killed the fury of the survivors at a faceless, seemingly omniscient and omnipotent enemy just burns all the hotter. Think of adventure movies where a small band of heroic humans battle droids, or transformers, or bionic aliens – the supposedly indestructible fighting machines are always the bad guys.

A better approach would be to combine drone tactics that keep enemy fighters continually on edge with a genuinely attractive set of terms that would allow them to lay down their arms. Leaders whose lives are increasingly frayed and anxious have greater incentives to come to the negotiating table while they are still alive, but only if an actual deal is in the offing. The US has tried to pursue this policy off and on with the Taliban, but the diplomatic track does not seem to have been closely coordinated with the military track. With



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drones as with any other military initiatives, war and diplomacy are complements, not mutually exclusive alternatives.

Alongside questions of efficacy are issues of both morality and legality. The moral dimension concerns the ethics of killing without being exposed to reciprocal risk. As the mother of teenage sons who are often glued to video games in which they press a button and explode the enemy on the screen, it is hard not to see drone warfare as a grown-up and lethal version of the same game.

But war should never be a game. History is rife with examples of ceasefires among the trenches, when the soldiers from each side came together for a moment in recognition of their common humanity. Understanding that the “enemy” are actual men – sons, fathers, husbands, brothers – is an essential part of a path to peace. Drone warfare risks seeing individual terrorists – or those the US government has decided are terrorists based on the best evidence it can muster – as turbaned caricatures on a deck of cards.

Such power is corrosive under any circumstances. But it is particularly corrosive when it runs unchecked in the US executive. I believe that the men and women I worked with in government do their very best to apply the strictest possible scrutiny to decisions as to which individuals should be on the target list. But I also

believe that they are human, and thus prone to error.

The result is the killing of specific individuals without any of the safeguards of the criminal justice system. The absence of checks and balances disturbs me deeply as a US citizen accustomed to constitutional protections. But the procedures the US follows are all the more disturbing as a precedent for other nations – the nations that already have drones and the many more that will acquire them over the coming decade.


In the end, I expect that drones are here to stay. The advantages of their use are simply too tempting. But if so, then the US must take the lead in working with other nations to create a new set of rules to govern drone warfare. Without explicit and public rules, the US and its allies will nevertheless establish some process and guidance as to when and how drones can be deployed. But its future enemies will not. Then all of us may be continually scanning the skies, or the ground, or indeed the walls and windows of our own houses, wondering who is watching and when they might strike. ■



MQ-9 Reaper, successor to the Predator. Used by the US Air Force in Iraq and Afghanistan.



Unarmed surveillance drone Euro Hawk. Wing span 40 meters, range 23,000 kilometers.



Unarmed drone Heron TP, leased by the German Armed Forces from Israel, employed in Afghanistan.

A dangerous model

The US should reveal its legal rationale for drone attacks | By Letta Tayler

Let's think of 10-year-old Dawlah Nasser Saleh of Yemen. Dawlah and her parents were among 12 civilians killed in a botched airstrike on Sept. 2 last year near their village in al-Bayda, a remote Yemeni province. An explosive intended for an alleged al Qaeda member struck the villagers' van, setting it afire and flinging bodies from the vehicle.

But there were no militants in the van, just farmers and their children. Rescuers found Dawlah's body clasped in her dead mother's arms, dusted with flour and sugar that the villagers were bringing home from the market.

Farmers who saw the strike told Human Rights Watch that two aerial drones and two warplanes were flying overhead and that one of the planes carried out the deadly strike. Only the US is known to operate drones in Yemen.

But the only admission of responsibility for the killings came from anonymous US officials, who told *The Washington Post* that the US military carried out

the attack with a drone or fixed-wing aircraft. There has been no public US confirmation, apology or compensation to the families of the dead, including Dawlah's six orphaned siblings who are too young to care for themselves.

Such secrecy has become a dangerous hallmark of the US targeted killing program, President Barack Obama's weapon of choice against al Qaeda and its affiliates. In Obama's first term, the US reportedly carried out as many as 425 airstrikes with drones, warplanes or cruise missiles on militant targets in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, killing upward of 2,700 people. The US also has ratcheted up drone strikes in Afghanistan and is mulling their use in Mali. The attacks are carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency and special forces within the US mili-



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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

tary that are almost as secretive, with no effective oversight.

On the face of it, targeted killings are an appealing counterterrorism technique. With correct intelligence, drones in particular can strike with surgical precision, dramatically limiting civilian casualties, and they do not involve the unpopular deployment of US troops.

But US secrecy, combined with the difficulties journalists and independent organizations face

in reaching targeted areas, make it almost impossible to determine whether the killings comply with international law, and how many of those killed are actually militants who pose an imminent threat to the US. While insisting that civilian deaths are “exceedingly rare,” US officials refuse to disclose casualty figures or steps they take to minimize civilian harm. Nor will the US detail its criteria for placing suspected militants on its kill lists.

What is clear is that local outrage when attacks go wrong stokes anti-American sentiment that could bring more recruits to groups like al Qaeda.

The Obama administration contends it has authority to conduct targeted killings because the country is at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates and it is exercising its right to self-defense against

an imminent threat. International law permits targeted killings of enemy fighters in battle zones and of people posing an imminent risk to life in law enforcement situations. However, the administration has failed to explain how it makes this determination in areas that are far from a traditional battlefield.

The US Congress has shown scant interest in compelling Obama to set the record straight. A Senate intelligence panel is expected to question Obama's counterterrorism tsar, John Brennan, on targeted killings during hearings Feb. 7 on his nomination to be CIA chief. But it is unlikely to condition Brennan's confirmation on frank replies. Brennan has said he favors limiting the CIA's role in targeted killings, but as CIA chief he may be tempted to shroud the program in greater secrecy.

US federal court judges have not ruled on whether the killings exceed presidential authority; when they have ruled, it is to deny public access to information on the program.

The US should reveal its legal rationale for these strikes. Washington should also be pressed to fulfill its international legal obligations to investigate and provide redress for unlawful attacks – and to consider compensation even for lawful collateral damage. In Afghanistan, NATO members including the US have recognized the value of compensating civilians for loss of life or other damage even when attacks are lawful.

Legality and effectiveness are not the only issues. The secrecy surrounding targeted killings creates a dangerous model for abusive governments around the world to take out anyone whom they label a terrorist – including legitimate political opponents – in any location. The next stop could be Paris, London, Tokyo, or even Munich. ■

The true benchmark for maturity and stability

Afghanistan will need constant pressure, advice and incentives from the Americans to keep Karzai on track

By Ahmed Rashid

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the communist President Najibullah ordered his 100,000 strong army and a similar number of militia to adopt a 'Fortress Kabul' strategy. This meant giving up large parts of the countryside to the Mujahedin, but holding on to all the major towns and cities and keeping some key roads open. Contrary to CIA assessments that he would last a few weeks, Najibullah lasted three years and would have continued longer if the Soviet Union had not itself collapsed and his sources of money and arms dried up.

The present Afghan army is likely to adapt the same Fortress Kabul strategy after US and NATO forces withdraw in 2014 – despite the \$10 billion plus a year for the past four years that the US has spent on building up a 200,000 strong Afghan army and 150,000 man police force. Even though NATO will leave behind a small military force after 2014 and pay for the entire Afghan defense budget for the next five years at a cost of \$4.1 billion year – few Afghans accept that the Afghan army will stand up for long against the Taliban.

With a 90 percent illiteracy rate and a 30 percent desertion rate the army also lacks the critical ideological motivation; who are they defending? Last year alone,

more than 60 US and NATO troops were killed in insider attacks by fellow Afghan soldiers or policemen, which means NATO forces cannot trust the very Afghans they have spent so many years training.

The Taliban will quickly take the Pashtun belt in the south and east. (The majority of Taliban belong to the Pashtun tribes that straddle the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.) Already the geographically daunting provinces of Kunar and Nuristan on the border with Pakistan have been abandoned by the Afghan army to the Tal-

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iban and al Qaeda. Other provinces whose capital cities are too difficult to defend will follow. Meanwhile apart from the army, much of the \$90 billion spent in reconstruction and development in the past twelve years has been wasted in corruption and poorly implemented projects, leaving state institutions barely stronger than they were in 2001.

Military failure could be coupled by a political breakdown between Kabul and the Northern warlords belonging to the non-Pashtun ethnic groups. The most likely cause would be if the government and President Hamid Karzai once again decided to rig the presidential elections set for April 2014, as they did in 2009. Karzai cannot be a candidate in 2014 but he will want to ensure that a Pashtun loyal to him wins the presidency so his family is protected for the future. Such a move could lead to a multi-dimensional civil war.

So stark is the reality of such a breakdown that John Kerry, who patched up the near failure of the 2009 Afghan presidential vote, warned in his Jan. 24 senate confirmation hearings for the post of US secretary of state, of the risks attached to the next election: "If it doesn't have legitimacy, if we don't succeed in that effort, its going to be very, very difficult to convince the American people, and to convince the alliesto stay engaged in this effort."

Such an internal meltdown will persuade neighboring states to once again arm and fund their various Afghan proxies as they did in the 1990s, thereby fuelling a civil war. There will be a mass exodus of refugees, especially of the best-educated and -qualified, while there is already a massive capital flight. The West, hammered by economic recession is

rushing for the exits and will not turn back to try and put the Afghan pieces back together again. Last year, more active duty US soldiers committed suicide (349) than died in combat (295) – a clear indicator of the stress of war on Western armies.

The above scenario is the gloomiest on the horizon and probably the most commonly predicted off the record by US and NATO officers, as well as by most people in the region. But the truth is that none of the major players wants to live with such a scenario or see a continuation of the civil war in Afghanistan. Everyone wants peace and that includes the Taliban, the northern warlords and the neighboring states.

So the real question is, can the US and its allies expend sufficient diplomatic energy, and bring to bear enough high-powered intervention and inventiveness to help generate a ceasefire in the present war followed by a political deal between Kabul, the Taliban and their protectors in Pakistan? Can the allies also convince the wider region which includes Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, India, China and Russia that no single state will have an undue advantage in Afghanistan and no state will interfere in Afghanistan's future?

For months now there has been excessive Western media focus on the timetable for a NATO forces withdrawal and the question of

how many troops will be left behind after 2014. The Pentagon favors a long drawn out timetable, with the maximum number of soldiers being left behind, while the White House favors a speedier withdrawal and fewer forces left behind in Afghanistan.

However the debate in Washington about troop numbers is misplaced. The real issue, which should top the agenda for the US and its allies now, is a transition to a ceasefire and a peace plan rather than an exit strategy.

Any such plan will have to simultaneously tackle three intensely complicated moving parts. The first and most important issue is the urgent need for talks for a negotiated cease fire between the Taliban, the US and the Afghan government so that NATO troops can exit with dignity and the horrendous levels of violence be reduced. Afghanistan cannot be stabilized by fighting to the last day as some US generals and think tank pundits believe.

Secret talks between US representatives and the Taliban began in Doha, Qatar in 2011. But they floundered in 2012 over the first confidence-building measure each side was supposed to take. Since then there have been meetings of the Taliban and members of the Afghan High Peace Council which is the body nominated by Karzai to talk to the Taliban in several Arab and European

locations. However these have been talks about talks rather than negotiations.

Now that Presidents Obama and Karzai have agreed to allow the Taliban to open an office in Doha, there is renewed efforts to get the US-Taliban and the Taliban-Kabul talks going again, although now its Karzai who keeps throwing spanners into the ongoing efforts. Simultaneously there are several levels of regional talks going on among Afghanistan's neighbors led by Turkey, Britain, France and others. The delay in all these efforts was due to the US elections which put everything on hold for months. Now all the players are hoping that John Kerry hits the ground running and quickly appoints a new Af-Pak negotiator and mediator.

Talks for a ceasefire need to be sequenced by further negotiations between the Taliban and Kabul over a political power sharing arrangement that will enlarge the space for the ceasefire, integrate the Taliban into state structures, allow them to take part in political processes and end in an ultimate political agreement between the two to end the conflict.

Finally Karzai must urgently hold a relatively free and fair presidential election in April 2014 and starts preparing for that now bringing all political forces into the process – something he has yet to do. Every detail of the voting

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The French army left Afghanistan in 2012. It's still not clear exactly when other ISAF forces will follow.



preparations being carried out by the Afghan Independent Election Commission is being contested by Karzai and their schedule is lagging behind dangerously.

Moreover the elections will take place in the midst of the NATO troop withdrawal, leaving the alliance with little leverage in Afghanistan. What needs to be done needs to be done now rather than later. This will be the true benchmark for Afghan maturity and stability and it will need constant pressure, advice and incentives from the Americans to keep Karzai on track.

Finally there is the need to ensure that Pakistan, which gives sanctuary to the Taliban leadership, cooperates with rather than undermines any peace process and allows the Taliban to hold talks with Kabul on their own terms rather than terms Pakistan may impose. For the first time Pakistan's military and its all powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) – which has allowed the Taliban to mobilize resources for its war against the Americans from Pakistani soil for a decade – also appears to have changed its attitude.

Army chief General Ashfaq Kayani now says that ending extremism in Pakistan is its main aim rather than opposing India or trying to exert influence in Afghanistan. As such it supports all peace talks and initiatives taken by anyone with the Tal-

iban. The ISI is in the process of freeing some one hundred Taliban whom it earlier jailed, either for maintaining secret contacts with Kabul, the United Nations or the Americans or those who did not dance to the ISI's tune.

Most of such Taliban are so called moderates who support an end to the war. Now the same ISI is pushing these freed Taliban to renew their contacts and talk peace with their adversary.

For the first time in a decade, Kabul and Islamabad are cooperating rather than abusing each other. British Prime Minister David Cameron is overseeing an intense series of meetings between the presidents and the army chiefs

of the two countries. US officials are still sceptical of the ISI's intentions so it becomes vital for Pakistan to play further positive cards that will persuade the Taliban to resume talks with the Americans and Kabul.

As a consequence there is also a vastly improved US-Pakistan relationship, which broke down last year when a series of incidents including the US raid to kill Osama bin Laden snapped the relationship cold. (Pakistan still has to explain the presence of bin Laden on its soil.) The US, Pakistan and Afghanistan have created 'a core group' which meets regularly to discuss all aspects of the peace process.

The secret talks the US conducted with the Taliban in Doha in 2011 partly broke down because of the divisions within the Obama administration on offering concessions to the Taliban. Obama gave the go-ahead for the talks yet never asserted himself in those talks or made any effort to bridge the gap between the Pentagon and the State Department.

Now, according to US officials all the departments of the US government agree on the need for talks and both John Kerry and Chuck Hagel as the nominated secretaries of state and defense, know the region well and understand what is at stake. Kerry and

Hagel have high standings in the region and are the best possible figures to break the logjam, but they must be fully and openly supported by the president.

In 2011 the Kabul government was also divided on talking to the Taliban and several cabinet members tried to sabotage talks by offering negative advice to Karzai. True to form, Karzai was both adamant and ambivalent about the need for talks and he still needs to be pushed to the table by the Americans and the Afghans.

The stability of Afghanistan will depend on a peace plan being implemented. The key to that is whether the second Obama

administration will muster the diplomatic resources, energy and political will that is needed to forge one. Or will other pressing crises such as Iran, Syria and Mali consume the limited diplomatic and foreign policy space that Obama is willing to spare in his second term?

Afghanistan needs a massive amount of international attention, both before and after NATO forces withdraw. If that is not there, expect the Taliban to return to Afghanistan in force and in their wake will be al Qaeda and other global jihadist groups ready to destabilize Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. A great deal is at stake. ■

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
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Not thriving but not failing

Pakistani democracy is flawed but barring economic collapse likely to stumble on.

By Anatol Lieven



Pakistani Sunni Muslim cleric Tahir-ul-Qadri leaves Lahore to lead an anti-government march to the capital Islamabad on Jan 13, 2013. Qadri, who returned from Canadian exile in December, is demanding sweeping election reforms before the next national poll.

Pakistan is heading toward new elections, and – barring some unforeseen disaster – the first transition between democratically elected governments in its history. This is important, but not as important as many Pakistani observers would like to think. Pakistani democracy – or perhaps one should say quasi-democracy, for its rules are in many respects different from those in the West – is of great importance because it marks Pakistan off from the dictatorships (former and remaining) of the Arab world, and makes it far less likely that Pakistan will experience revolutionary upheavals like the Arab Spring. And this is all to the good, for a revolution in Pakistan would tear the country apart and plunge it into a whirlpool of unending religious and ethnic strife.

Yet the resilience which democracy helps to give Pakistan is also intertwined with the rule of political elites, and patterns of corruption, patronage and kinship. These help to hold Pakistan together and prevent revolution, but also prevent economic and social development and entrench a range of terrible social oppressions, especially as far as women are concerned.

In Pakistan, unlike Iraq, Syria, Libya and even Egypt, it has been possible to replace the existing government (albeit often by unconstitutional means) without destroying the existing state. Even under military rule (with the partial exception of General Zia's dictatorship), Pakistani governments have been far less savagely controlling than those of the Middle East. This has something to do with the British legacy of parliamentarism and the rule of law, but also a good deal to do with the fact that the Pakistani state is simply too weak for a really effective dictatorship.

For better or worse, every reformist Pakistani government, whether civilian or military, has sooner or later made compromises with the local political elites and held elections returning some faction of them to power. The good side of this is that it has

greatly moderated the potential ferocity of government. The bad side is that it has perpetuated the aforementioned networks of corruption, patronage and kinship.

The sheer size and poverty of Pakistan has a good deal to do with this. In the much smaller, and relatively wealthier states of the Middle East, it was possible for dictatorships to create secret police forces that reached into every corner of society, striking terror and enforcing obedience – until the day when the masses, infuriated by this oppression, rose in revolt and overthrew the whole system.

In Pakistan, the chief military intelligence service, ISI, can indeed be savage (as the struggle to crush the separatist ethnic rebellion in Balochistan demonstrates), but it is far too small to exercise control over the whole country, or even a large part of it. Thus in influencing elections, it does not try to rig them across the whole country but rather to bring pressure and favors to bear on specific votes. Elections do therefore act to some extent as a genuine expression of popular will, at least insofar as getting rid of one unpopular government and replacing it with another.

Thus in January, Tahirul Qadri, a Canada-based cleric with a middle-class reformist agenda (and almost certainly encouraged in secret by the army) led a mass march on Islamabad to demand the resignation of the government of President Asif Ali Zardari and its replacement by a caretaker administration including representatives of the military. His call, however, was not for military government as such, but only for a neutral and honest government that would prevent rigging of the elections by the incumbents.

The military, for its part, does not at present – and perhaps for a long time to come – desire to take over the government. As a number of officers have said to me, that would mean taking responsibility not only for unpopular civil wars against the Pakistani Taliban and the Baloch insurgents, but also for the miserably economic situation, inflation, power cuts, corruption,

and the myriad small and large oppressions which the police, the courts and local officials visit upon the unfortunate Pakistani citizenry.

So Pakistan will have an election by the summer of 2013, and the result will be another coalition government, most probably led by the main opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PMLN) which is led by

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Flashpoint PAKISTAN

the Sharif dynasty just as the Pakistan People's Party is led by the Bhutto-Zardari dynasty. The PMLN is also run by rural and urban bosses, but its electoral backbone is the northern Punjabi middle classes and big farmers.

To judge by its past record, under the PMLN, the government would take on a more conservative religious cast, but without anything like an Islamic revolution. Economic management would get somewhat better, but without anything like an economic revolution. In other words, an elite-ruled Pakistan would trundle on much as before.

The wild card in this election is the Tehrik-e-Insaf, or Justice Party, of the aristocratic former cricketer turned populist politician Imran Khan. Because of popular disgust with the other main parties, he may do better than ever before, at least in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, where identification with the Pakhtuns of Afghanistan and hatred of the USA is especially strong. But Imran too is no revolutionary, and as he makes more and more compromises with the existing elites, his more idealistic followers have already abandoned him. So it is extremely unlikely that whatever the results, the elections will produce a government,

which offers a truly new path for Pakistan.

What of the militant Islamist rebels, grouped together in the loose alliance of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP? In order to understand the nature and limits of the threat from Islamist extremism, the first critical distinction is between terrorism on the one hand, and insurgency and revolution on the other. Terrorism is now a grave and – alas – probably permanent menace across Pakistan – but to the best of my knowledge, no state has ever been overthrown by terrorism. To overthrow a state from within, you need at least one of three things, and preferably a combination of them: widespread insurgency in the countryside; a mass movement on the streets of the cities; and mutiny in the army.

How likely are any of these scenarios in Pakistan? Insurgency has been going on in some of the Pashtun areas since 2004, but does not in itself threaten the existence of Pakistan. These Pashtun insurgencies looked much more menacing in the years before 2009, because of their apparent ability to spread from one area to another without the army being able to stop them. Since the army counter-offensive in Swat in 2009, the military has however demonstrated that it is willing and able to push the insurgents back.

The existential threat for the military and Pakistan will come if unrest spreads to northern Punjab, not in the form of insurgency – the flat, open plains of this region are hardly the right kind of terrain for that – but of massive protests in the cities. Punjab has some 56 percent of Pakistan's population and 70 percent of its industry; but above all, the province, and especially the northwestern districts of the Potwar plateau provide a majority of Pakistan's soldiers, and especially its infantry. They have demonstrated again and again their willingness to shoot down members of other Pakistani ethnicities, but would they shoot down fellow Punjabis?

Tahir-ul-Qadri's movement shows the potential for mass

demonstrations in Punjab, but could mass unrest led by radical Islamists lead to Islamist revolution and the destruction of the state? For mass protests to lead to revolution and the collapse of the existing order would require an organized revolutionary force capable of leading the masses to seize the institutions of government, and then of taking control of those institutions itself; something like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, or the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria in the early 1990s. In Pakistan, such a movement would need two things: a genuinely revolutionary spirit and program, including a willingness to use ruthless force; and deep roots in the province of Punjab.

A glance around Pakistan's Islamist groups makes clear how difficult this would be for all of them to achieve, above all because of Pakistan's deep ethnic differences and Punjab's deep religious ones. Of the two Islamist political parties, the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) is overwhelmingly Pashtun with very little Punjabi support. The Jamaat Islami (JI) does have Punjabi support, but it is restricted to relatively narrow social strata in the towns.

As to the militants, their problems in mobilizing masses of Punjabis are also formidable. The groups making up the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP), like the JUI, are overwhelmingly Pashtun and in addition highly localized and tribal-based. The chief militant allies the TTP have found in Punjab as of the start of 2011 are the old anti-Shia sectarian parties, the Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) and its even more violent offshoot, the Lashkar-e-Janghvi (LeJ). The mass appeal of the sectarian groups is however limited to central and southern Punjab (though they have enough support elsewhere to carry out savage acts of terrorism).

The groups with wider prestige are the militants who took part in the jihad against India in Kashmir, a cause that has great public sympathy in northern Punjab. Of these groups, the most powerful is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and its extensive social welfare wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa.

So far, however, the Pakistani military has been able to keep the LeT from joining the Islamist rebellion in Pakistan, not by the threat of repression, but as a result of an explicit or implicit deal on certain terms. These terms go to the heart of the dilemma confronting Pakistan and the West when it comes to Pakistan's role in the struggle against terrorism.

As far as India is concerned, since 2008 the LeT has been held in reserve, and has carried out no further attacks. The Pakistani military also seems to have been able to persuade the LeT/JuD leadership that attacks on the West would be absolutely catastrophic, bringing with them the certainty of massive US retaliation against Pakistan. On the other hand, LeT appears to have been given free reign to send its activists to fight against the US and its allies in Afghanistan.

So far, this approach on the part of the Pakistani military has in fact been successful both in preventing LeT from rebelling against the Pakistani state and army, and in preventing LeT terrorist attacks against the US, United Kingdom and (since 2008), India.

Barring complete economic collapse – which the US, China and Saudi Arabia would probably combine to prevent – Pakistan therefore seems likely to stumble on, without revolution but also without the reforms that are necessary to ensure its long-term survival, above all in the face of ecological change. If the state collapses in the near future, this is likely to be not because of the strength of the Islamists, but because the US has been goaded into actions against Pakistan that propel parts of the army into Islamist rebellion. But that danger is well understood in Washington, and the only thing that could lead to such a move would be a really severe terrorist attack by Pakistanis within the US itself. Fortunately, the Pakistani Army also understands this danger very well, and is working with the CIA to prevent it. We must all hope that they continue to be successful. ■

Island issues

China seeks to undermine US alliances in maritime East Asia

By Carlyle A. Thayer

Recent tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea and the naval standoff between China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea have exposed the dark side of China's so-called "peaceful rise." In both disputes China has shown a willingness to use not only heavy-handed political and diplomatic pressure but also economic sanctions and coercion.

China aims to recover islands and rocks, which it claims were

suspending the import of bananas and cancelling Chinese tourist charter flights.

When the Philippines sought support from fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN's dialogue partners, China's political ally, Cambodia, acting as ASEAN Chair, did its best to scuttle Philippine initiatives. Cambodia even went to the extent of inserting wording into the final statement of the ASEAN Summit that its members agreed not to internationalize territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

The Philippines objected and the offending reference was dropped. China then dispatched Fu Ying, its deputy foreign minister, to Manila to read the riot act. She told the Philippines foreign secretary that China objected to efforts by the Philippines to internationalize the issue by taking the matter to the United Nations, raising it with third parties including allies and holding high-profile press conferences.

The Philippines, as a treaty ally of the United States, has sought backing from Washington for its dispute with China. The US has provided defense assistance to the Philippines to build up its capacity for a minimal credible deterrence. US nuclear attack submarines have made symbolic port calls to the Philippines.

But in reality the US has been equivocal about how it would react to an incident at Scarborough Shoal on the grounds that the shoal was claimed by the Philippines after their Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1951.

China has announced that it will maintain a permanent presence at Scarborough Shoal. In sum, China virtually has annexed the rocks without firing a shot. It is clear that the United States will not intervene militarily and this has led some members of the Filipino elite to raise doubts about the efficacy of the US alliance.

China also employed heavy-handed tactics in dealing with Japan over the Senkakus. When the Japanese government bought out private owners of several of the rocks to prevent them from falling into the hands of Japanese ultra-nationalists, their Chinese



counterparts staged large-scale public protests. Several of the demonstrations turned violent and targeted Japanese business interests.

The Chinese government, under domestic pressure, began a campaign of intimidation by dispatching up to ten CMS and other civilian enforcement vessels to the Senkakus. The Chinese ships deliberately entered Japanese waters and confronted Japanese Coast Guard vessels.

China has kept up unrelenting pressure since September last year when the Senkaku issue emerged. Its CMS ships regularly intrude into Japanese territorial waters where they stay for several hours

before departing. China's State Oceanic Administration recently has begun to fly propeller driven surveillance planes into Japan's air identification zone. This has prompted Japan to scramble F-15 jet fighters to prevent intrusions into its airspace. The Japanese media has reported that the Ministry of Defense is considering authorizing the F-15s to fire warning shots.

The United States is on public record that its security treaty with Japan covers the Senkakus. But it is an open secret that the US is urging restraint on Japan and does not want to be drawn into a conflict with China over a group of rocks in the East China Sea.

The tensions over the Senkakus and Scarborough Shoal are more than bilateral disputes. They involve China deliberately attempting to undermine US security guarantees to two of its treaty allies.

The security situation in maritime East Asia will be exacerbated in coming years as China builds up the capacity of its civilian paramilitary enforcement agencies and gives priority to modernizing its South Sea Fleet. In a foretaste of what is to come, last year China conducted a joint exercise between its civilian enforcement agencies and its navy to deal with likely incidents in disputed waters.

PICTURE ALLIANCE/DPA
Minamikojima, Kitakojima and Uotsui islands, part of the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which China and Taiwan also claim.

Two Japanese coastguard vessels challenge a Chinese fishing boat on Aug. 15, 2012.

DOP IMAGES/AP



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Flashpoint
MARITIME EAST ASIA

taken from it in the century of humiliation during the colonial era. China's recovery of lost territory is part of a larger drive to become the dominant power in East Asia.

To achieve these goals, China has become aggressively assertive in East Asia's maritime domain. China has also sought to trip up the United States' rebalancing of its military force posture by undermining US alliances and strategic partnerships.

Last year China and the Philippines became involved in a standoff over Scarborough Shoal. China first deployed China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) ships to prevent the Philippines from arresting Chinese fishermen illegally operating in its waters.

When the Philippines refused to give ground and raised its concerns in public, Beijing responded by dispatching nearly a hundred fishing craft and additional civilian enforcement ships to occupy Scarborough Shoal and its surrounding waters. The Chinese even erected a barrier to prevent the Philippines from gaining entry to the shoal. They added further pressure on the Philippines by



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Cyberwarfare: hype and fear

So far, online attacks have not killed anybody. Does offense really beat defense?

EVEN as anxiety about jihadi terrorist threats has eased, thanks to the efforts of intelligence agencies and drone attacks' disruption of the militants' sanctuaries, fears over Western societies' vulnerability to cyberassaults have grown. Political and military leaders miss no chance to declare that cyberwar is already upon us. America's defense secretary, Leon Panetta, talks of a "cyber-Pearl Harbor" (see page 26). A senior official says privately that a cyber-attack on America that "would make 9/11 look like a tea party" is only a matter of time.

The nightmares are of mouse-clicks exploding fuel refineries, frying power grids or blinding air traffic controllers. The reality is already of countless anonymous attacks on governments and businesses. These seek to disrupt out of malice, or to steal swathes of valuable commercial or security-related data. Some experts believe that such thefts have cost hundreds of billions of dollars in stolen R&D (Research and Development).

Related topics

Many of these attacks are purely criminal. But the most sophisticated are more often the work of states, carried out either directly or by proxies. Attribution – detecting an enemy's fingerprints on a cyberattack – is still tricky, so officials are reluctant to point the finger of blame publicly. But China is by far the most active transgressor. It employs thousands of gifted software engineers who systematically target technically advanced Fortune 100 companies. The other biggest offenders are Russia and, recently, Iran (the suspected source of the Shamoon virus that crippled thousands of computers at Saudi Arabia's Aramco and Qatar's RasGas in August).

America and its allies are by no means passive victims. Either America, Israel or the two working together almost certainly hatched the Stuxnet worm, found in 2010, that was designed to paralyze centrifuges at Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The Flame virus, identified by Russian and Hungarian experts this year, apparently came from the same source. It was designed to strike at Iran by infecting computers in its oil ministry and at targets in the West Bank, Syria and Sudan.

Boring, not lurid

For all the hype, policies on cyberwarfare remain confused and secretive. The American government is bringing in new rules and a clearer strategy for dealing with cyberthreats. Barack Obama is said to have signed in October a still-secret directive containing new guidelines for federal agencies carrying out cyber-operations. It sets out how they should help private firms, particularly those responsible for critical national infrastructure, to defend themselves against cyberthreats by sharing information and setting standards.

The directive is partly a response to the stalling of cyber legislation in the Senate. Republican senators argue that it imposes too great a regulatory burden on industry, which is already obliged to disclose when it is subject to a cyberattack. It is also meant



Young Chinese netizens playing online games. Will some of them become hackers?

to govern how far such bodies as the Department of Homeland Security can go in their defense of domestic networks against malware attacks.

The Pentagon is also working on more permissive rules of engagement for offensive cyberwarfare, for example to close down a foreign server from which an attack was thought to be emanating. General Keith Alexander heads both Cyber Command (which has a budget of \$3.4 billion for next year) and the National Security Agency. He has often called for greater flexibility in taking the attack to the "enemy". The emergence of new cyberwarfare doctrines in America is being watched closely by allies who may follow where America leads—as well as by potential adversaries.

However, Jarno Linnell of Stonesoft, a big computer security firm, says that all levels of government in the West lack strategic understanding on cyberwarfare. So, although questions abound, answers are few. For example, it is not clear how much sensitive information about threats or vulnerabilities government agencies should share even with private-sector firms that are crucial to national security. Often the weakest link is their professional advisers, such as law firms or banks who have access to sensitive data.

Almost all (roughly 98 percent) of the vulnerabilities in commonly used computer programs that hackers exploit are in software created in America. Making private-sector companies more secure might involve a controversial degree of intrusion by government agencies, for example the permanent monitoring of email traffic to make sure that every employee is sticking to security rules. Government hackers may also like to hoard such vulnerabilities rather than expose them. That way they can later create "backdoors" in the software for offensive purposes.

Also controversial is the balance between defense and attack. General Alexander stresses that in cyberwarfare, the attacker

has the advantage. Linnell says that, although America has better offensive cybercapabilities than almost anybody, its defenses get only three out of ten.

Setting rules for offensive cyberwarfare is exceptionally tricky. When it comes to real, physical war, the capability may become as important as air superiority has been for the past 70 years: though it cannot alone bring victory, you probably can't win if the other side has it.

China has long regarded the network-centric warfare that was developed by America in the late-1980s and copied by its allies as a weakness it might target,

a think tank, argues that with some exceptions cyberwarfare neither directly harms people nor destroys equipment. At best it "can confuse and frustrate... and then only temporarily". In short, "cyberwarfare can only be a support function" for other forms of war.

Four horsemen

Besides the cyber element of physical warfare, four other worries are: strategic cyberwar (direct attacks on an enemy's civilian infrastructure); cyberespionage; cyberdisruption, such as the distributed denial-of-service attacks that briefly overwhelmed Estonian

attacks. If that is the best that two first-rate cyberpowers can do against a third-rate industrial power, notes Libicki, it puts into perspective the more alarmist predictions of impending cyberattacks on infrastructure in the West.

Moreover, anyone contemplating a cyberattack on physical infrastructure has little idea how much actual damage it will cause, and if people will die. They cannot know if they are crossing an adversary's red line and in doing so would trigger a violent "kinetic" response (involving real weapons). Whether or not America has effective cyberweapons, it has more than enough conventional ones to make any potential aggressor think twice.

For that reason, improving attribution of cyberattacks is a high priority. Nigel Inkster, a former British intelligence officer now at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, highlights the huge risk to the perpetrator of carrying out an infrastructure attack given the consequences if it is detected. In October Panetta said that "potential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the capacity to locate them and hold them accountable for actions that harm America or its interests."

He may be over-claiming. Given that cyberattacks can be launched from almost anywhere, attribution is likely to remain tricky and to rely on context, motive and an assessment of capabilities as much as technology. That is one reason why countries on the receiving end of cyberattacks want to respond in kind—ambiguity cuts both ways. But poor or authoritarian countries attacking rich democratic ones may not have the sorts of assets that are vulnerable to a retaliatory cyber-attack.

The difficulty is even greater when it comes to the theft (or "exfiltration", as it is known) of data. For China and Russia, ransacking Western firms for high-tech research and other intellectual property is tempting. The other way round offers

thinner pickings. In 2009 hackers from an unnamed "foreign intelligence agency" made off with some 24,000 confidential files from Lockheed Martin, a big American defense contractor. As a result they could eavesdrop on online meetings and technical discussions, and gather information about the sensors, computer systems and "stealth" technology of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. This may have added to the delays of an already troubled program as engineers tried to fix vulnerabilities that had been exposed in the plane's design. Investigators traced the penetrations with a "high level of certainty" to known Chinese IP addresses and digital fingerprints that had been used for attacks in the past. Less than two years later, China unveiled its first stealth fighter, the J-20.

Theft from thieves

As Libicki asks, "what can we do back to a China that is stealing our data?" Espionage is carried out by both sides and is traditionally not regarded as an act of war. But the massive theft of data and the speed with which it can be exploited is something new. Responding with violence would be disproportionate, which leaves diplomacy and sanctions. But America and China have many other big items on their agenda, while trade is a very blunt instrument. It may be possible to identify products that China exports which compete only because of stolen data, but it would be hard and could risk a trade war that would damage both sides.

Cyberdisruption has nuisance value and may be costly to repair, but it can be mitigated by decent defenses. Cyberterrorism has remained largely in the imagination of film-makers, but would be worth worrying about if it became a reality. Stonesoft's Linnell reckons that, though al-Qaeda and its offshoots show little sign of acquiring the necessary skills, they could buy them. Libicki is more sceptical. Big teams of highly qualified people are needed to produce Stuxnet-type effects, which may be beyond even sophisticated terrorist groups. Also, the larger the team that is needed, the more likely it is to be penetrated.

The Obama administration's attempt to develop a more coherent—and perhaps less secret—doctrine of cyberwarfare is sensible so long as it is not just an excuse for hyping something that, as far as is known, has yet to kill anybody. The idea that offence beats defense is also suspect. If more attention were paid to fixing the security flaws in Western software, cyber-attackers would have fewer entry points. And more effort should be put into solving the attribution problem. Getting caught is a deterrent that state actors take seriously. But given that the essence of cyberwarfare is ambiguity and uncertainty, gaining clarity and certainty will be exceptionally difficult. That makes policy both hard to construct and harder still to explain. ■


“ For all the hype, policies on cyberwarfare remain confused and secretive. ”

particularly as military networks share many of the same underpinnings as their civilian equivalents. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) talks about "informationisation" in war, "weakening the information superiority of the enemy and operational effectiveness of the enemy's computer equipment". China's planning assumes an opening salvo of attacks on the enemy's information centers by cyber, electronic and kinetic means to create blind spots that its armed forces would then be able to exploit. Yet as the PLA comes to rely more on its own information networks it will no longer enjoy an asymmetric advantage. Few doubt the importance of being able to defend your own military networks from cyberattacks (and to operate effectively when under attack), while threatening those of your adversaries.

But to conclude that future wars will be conducted largely in cyberspace is an exaggeration. Martin Libicki of the RAND Corpora-



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 "Our mission is to defend the nation", says Leon Panetta. "We deter, and if called upon, we take decisive action to protect our citizens."

The next Pearl Harbor – from cyberspace?

This blood-curdling scenario is just as real as terrorism, nuclear attack or Mideastern turmoil | By Leon E. Panetta

Today we have to address a new domain that we must secure to have peace and prosperity in the world of tomorrow.

Cyberspace has fundamentally transformed the global economy. It's transformed our way of life, providing two billion people across the world with instant access to information to communication, to economic opportunities. Cyberspace is the new frontier, full of possibilities to advance security and prosperity in the 21st century. And yet, with these possibilities, also come new perils and new dangers.

The Internet is open. It's highly accessible, as it should be. But that also presents a new terrain for warfare. It is a battlefield of the future where adversaries can seek to do harm to our country, to our economy, and to our citizens.

I know that when people think of cybersecurity today, they worry about hackers and criminals who prowl the Internet, steal people's identities, steal sensitive business information, steal even national security secrets. Those threats are real and they exist today. But the even greater danger -- the greater danger facing us in cyberspace goes beyond crime and it goes beyond harassment.

A cyber attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremists groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11. Such a destructive cyberterrorist attack could virtually paralyze the nation. Let me give you some examples of the kinds of attacks that we have already experienced.

In recent weeks, as many of you know, some large US financial institutions were hit by so-called Distributed Denial of Service attacks. These attacks delayed or disrupted services on customer websites. While this kind of tactic isn't new, the scale and speed with which it happened was unprecedented.

But even more alarming is an attack that happened two months ago when a very sophisticated virus called Shamoon infected computers in the Saudi Arabian State Oil Company Aramco. Shamoon included a routine called a wiper, coded to self-execute. This routine replaced crucial systems files with an image of a burning US flag. But it also put additional garbage data that

overwrote all the real data on the machine. More than 30,000 computers that it infected were rendered useless and had to be replaced. It virtually destroyed 30,000 computers.

Then just days after this incident, there was a similar attack on RasGas of Qatar, a major energy company in the region. All told, the Shamoon virus was probably the most destructive attack that the private sector has seen to date. Imagine the impact an attack like that would have on your company or your business. These attacks mark a significant escalation of the cyberthreat and they have renewed concerns about still more destructive scenarios that could unfold.

For example, we know that foreign cyber-actors are probing America's critical infrastructure networks. They are targeting the computer control systems that operate chemical, electricity and water plants and those that guide transportation throughout this country.

We know of specific instances where intruders have successfully gained access to these control systems. We also know that they are seeking to create advanced tools to attack these systems and cause panic and destruction and even the loss of life. Let me explain how this could unfold.

An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these kinds of cyber tools to gain control of critical switches. They could, for example, derail passenger trains or even more dangerous, derail trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities or shutdown the power grid across large parts of the country.

The most destructive scenarios involve cyber-actors launching several attacks on our critical infrastructure at one time, in combination with a physical attack on our country. Attackers could also seek to disable or degrade critical military systems and communication networks.

The collective result of these kinds of attacks could be a cyber Pearl Harbor; an attack that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life. In fact, it would paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense of vulnerability.

As director of the CIA and now Secretary of Defense, I have

On October 11, 2012 the former CIA director and outgoing US Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta addressed a meeting of Business Executives for National Security. Excerpts from the speech on cybersecurity he gave at the Intrepid Sea, Air and Space Museum in New York – a basic document on an issue that is gaining ever more significance.

understood that cyber-attacks are every bit as real as the more well-known threats like terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation and the turmoil that we see in the Middle East.

But the good news is this: We are aware of this potential. Our eyes are wide open to these kinds of threats and we are a nation that, thank God, is on the cutting edge of this new technology. We are the best and we have to stay there. We are acting aggressively to get ahead of this problem, putting in place measures to stop cyber-attacks dead in their tracks. We are doing this as part of a broad whole of government effort to confront cyberthreats.

The Department of Homeland Security has the lead for domestic cybersecurity, the FBI also has a key part to play in

“ A cyber attack would paralyze and shock the nation, creating a new sense of vulnerability. ”

investigating and preventing cyber-attacks. And our intelligence agencies, of course, are focused on this potential threat as well. The State Department is trying to forge international consensus on the roles and responsibilities of nations to help secure cyberspace. The Department of Defense (DoD) also has a role. It is a supporting role but it is an essential role.

It does not mean that the Department of Defense will monitor citizens' personal computers. We're not interested in personal communication or in emails or in providing the day-to-day security of private and commercial networks. That is not our goal. That is not our job. That is not our mission.

Our mission is to defend the nation. We defend. We deter, and if called upon, we take decisive action to protect our citizens. In the past, we have done so through operations on land and at sea, in the skies and in space. In this century, the United States military must help defend the nation in cyberspace as well.

To ensure that we fulfill our role to defend the nation in cyberspace, the department is focusing on three tracks.

First, developing new capabilities. DoD is investing more than \$3 billion annually in cybersecurity because we have to retain that cutting edge capability in the field.

Following our new defense strategy, the department is continuing to increase key investments in cybersecurity even in an era of fiscal restraint.

These systems rely on sensors; they rely on software to hunt down the malicious code before it harms our systems. We actively share our own experience defending our systems with those running the nation's critical private sector networks.

In addition to defending the department's networks, we also help deter attacks. Our cyber-adversaries will be far less likely to hit us if they know that we will be able to link to the attack or that their effort will fail against our strong defenses.

The department has made significant advances in solving a problem that makes deterring cyber-adversaries more complex: the difficulty of identifying the origins of that attack. Over the last two years, DoD has made significant investments in forensics to address this problem of attribution and we're seeing the returns on that investment. Potential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the capacity to locate them and to hold them accountable for their actions that may try to harm America.

But we won't succeed in preventing a cyber-attack through improved defenses alone. If we detect an imminent threat of attack that will cause significant, physical destruction in the United States or kill American citizens, we need to have the option to take action against those who would attack us to defend this nation when directed by the president.

For these kinds of scenarios, the department has developed that capability to conduct effective operations to counter threats to our national interests in cyberspace.

Let me be clear that we will only do so to defend our nation, to defend our interests, to defend our allies.

Which brings me to the second area of focus, policies and organization. Responding to the cyber threat requires the right policies and organizations across the federal government.

As part of that effort, the department is now finalizing the most comprehensive change to our rules of engagement in cyberspace in seven years. The new rules will make clear that the department has a responsibility, not only to defend DoD's networks, but also to be prepared to defend the

nation and our national interests against an attack in or through cyberspace.

Three years ago, the department took a major step forward by establishing the United States Cyber Command. Cyber Command has the capacity to conduct a full range of missions inside cyberspace. And we're looking at ways to strengthen Cyber Command as well. We must ensure that it has the resources, that it has the authorities, that it has the capabilities required to perform this growing mission.


And finally, the third area is to build stronger partnerships.


As I've made clear, securing cyberspace is not the sole responsibility of the United States military or even the sole responsibility of the United States government. The private sector, government, military, our allies - all share the same global infrastructure and we all share the responsibility to protect it. Therefore, we are deepening cooperation with our closest allies with the goal of sharing threat information, maximizing shared capabilities and determining malicious activities. Ultimately, no one has a greater interest in cybersecurity than the businesses that depend on a safe, secure and resilient global, digital infrastructure.

To defend those networks more effectively, we must share information between the government and the private sector about threats in cyberspace. We've made real progress in sharing information with the private sector.

Information sharing alone is not sufficient. We've got to work with the business community to develop baseline standards for our most critical private-sector infrastructure, our power plants, our water treatment facilities, our gas pipelines. This would help ensure that companies take proactive measures to secure themselves against sophisticated threats, but also take common sense steps against basic threats. Although awareness is growing, the reality is that too few companies have invested in even basic cybersecurity.

The fact is that to fully provide the necessary protection in our democracy, cybersecurity legislation must be passed by Congress. Without it, we are and we will be vulnerable. ■





Binary battlefield

Iran has become a proving ground for offensive and defensive cyberwar techniques | By James A. Lewis


Iran has entered the ranks of cyberpowers. Its capabilities are basic, but in the last year it has moved far ahead of many nations in strategy and organization. In turn, the Persian Gulf has become an epicenter for cyberconflict. This is not “cyber war” but an outgrowth of larger tensions over Iran’s nuclear program and of regional disputes, where the contending powers now use cybertechniques as a new tool for coercion.

Much of Iran’s development of cyberpower is a reaction to the vulnerabilities created by the Internet. Like China and Russia, Iran’s leaders fear free access to information and the power of networks to unleash something like the Arab Spring. “Satellites and Facebook are the electronic means of a ‘soft war’ by the West to cause the Iranian family’s collapse,” said Iranian Interior Minister Mostafa Najar.

Control of cyberspace is of central importance to them. During the 2009 Green Revolution, Iranian security forces expanded their ability to monitor and disrupt online dissent. Iran developed hacking capabilities to extend its security forces’ surveillance and control capabilities, the most notorious example being the 2011 hack of the Netherlands Internet company DigiNotar that allowed Iran to surreptitiously read dissidents’ emails.

Iran’s efforts to control the Internet are second, perhaps, only to China’s. Like China, from whom it buys telecommunications equipment and probably

James Andrew Lewis is a senior fellow and director of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.



receives advice, Iran struggles to insulate itself from the Internet. Iran joined Russia and China at the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in December to call for tighter political control of the Internet.

Tehran plans to create a domestic Internet disconnected from the global network on which only approved material will appear, a closed network for security forces and economic agencies, and even a religiously sanctioned search engine (“Ya Haq”). These are ambitious initiatives with parallels in Russia and China, but implementation faces major and perhaps insurmountable obstacles. The Internet’s political effect remains an existential problem for the regime.

Iran’s leaders realized in the last two years that cyberspace had become a key vulnerability exploited by its many foreign opponents for intelligence purposes and, in the case of Stuxnet, for attack. Like North Korea, another power experimenting with nuclear weapons, missiles, and cyber, Iran sees cyber attack as part of the asymmetric military capabilities it wishes to acquire. Stuxnet did not open Pandora’s Box. The Iranians were already well on the road to cyberpower because of their need to suppress dissent. The repeated foreign intrusions, however, led to high-level attention to cybersecurity and the creation of a sophisticated organizational structure to manage cyberconflict.

“We have equipped ourselves with new tools since cyberwar in the cyberspace is more dangerous than physical war,” said Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) Deputy Commander, Abdollah Araqi. “Iranian officials, especially Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution (Khamenei) have all cited this point, therefore we are prepared for soft and physical wars.” These new tools include a March 2012 decree from Khamenei creating a “Supreme Council of Cyberspace” to provide a coordinated cyber effort for both offense and defense. Council members include senior officials from the security

and intelligence services and the Ministers of Culture and of Communications.

Three military organizations play leading operational roles: – Iran’s “Passive Defense Organization,” the Basiji and the IRG. The Passive Defense Organization is responsible for Iran’s “Cyber Defense Strategy” and houses Iran’s cyberdefense headquarters, which coordinates efforts by the armed forces, the intelligence services, and the telecommunications ministry. Iran held its first national cyberdefense exercise in late October 2012.

The Basiji, a civilian paramilitary organization, manages the Iranian “Cyber Army,” which Basiji leaders say has 120,000 volunteer hackers. The number is certainly an exaggeration, but the Basiji, created to control dissent, use already close connections with universities and religious schools to recruit a proxy hacker force. The Basiji are controlled by the IRG; the Cyber Army, at the IRG’s direction, is the likely source of a recent series of troubling incidents aimed at western companies

The most important involved a major disruption of computers at Saudi Aramco and the Qatari company RasGas. The trigger for these incidents was a cyberattack on Iran’s major oil terminal at Kharg Island. Iran appears to have cleverly modified cybercrime

malware for the attack. All the data on 30,000 Aramco computers was erased and the malware may have infected (but did not damage) refinery control systems. The Aramco incident, while not as sophisticated as Stuxnet, was second only to Stuxnet as a disruptive cyberattack. Simultaneously with the Aramco incident, there were massive “denial of service” attacks against US banks. The combination of the attacks on Aramco and the bank is best seen as a test by Iran of its new capabilities and of the US reaction.

The likely triggers for the bank incidents, which came in two waves, were the imposition of new sanctions by the US Congress. The denial of service attacks was nowhere near as damaging as the Aramco attack. Denial of service is a form of online protest, where the target network is flooded with spurious traffic, such as the attacks from Russia used against Estonia in 2007. The attacks against American banks, however, were ten times larger than the attacks on Estonia and overwhelmed the banks’ ability to respond. Attacks of this size require computing resources that, in a country where the Internet is tightly controlled, mean government approval if not direction. In this, the Iranian efforts follow the pattern set earlier by Russia, and there is a murky collaboration in cyberactivities between Iran

and Russia that appears linked to larger efforts to undercut US espionage programs and influence.

The consensus view of US officials, based on intelligence sources, is that Tehran is responsible for the attacks. In response, US Defense Secretary Panetta gave a speech in October 2012 that laid out a new preemptive policy (see page 26). The US would use its own cyber capabilities to stop cyberattacks that threatened human life or significant economic damage. This was intended to signal Iran to curtail its efforts. There was indeed a brief slowing of attacks against banks, but they have now resumed in full force. If the speech was intended to deter, it shows the limits of cyber deterrence. Having signaled Iran, what does the US do now when Iran ignores the signal?

Iran’s technological capabilities for cyberattacks (as in other areas of its military technology) are basic and routinely exaggerated, but a confrontational style and penchant for covert hostilities make it a troubling opponent. Iran’s use of its cyber capabilities will be shaped by the larger regional political and security context, but cyberattack has become another flashpoint for an already dangerous situation. This is a space for conflict where the rules are unclear, and the risks not yet measured.



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Spying then and now
Today's espionage operations
are conducted by geeks
at screens full of code

The for Red October

Global cyber
moves onto

By Eugene

How do you imagine a spy? Maybe you conjure up a tall athletic young man in a suit and sunglasses who can hit his target with two guns simultaneously while shooting from the hip and operate every type of vehicle from a tank to a helicopter. You may also recall a certain handsome gentleman wearing a black tie who prefers his vodka martinis shaken, not stirred; or an undercover agent with a fake identity who's been living in another country for years?

Well, today's spy is none of the above. These days he or she is the classic computer geek – likely to

be bespectacled, unkempt, too fond of coffee and fast food, and someone who spends hours staring at screens full of code. Nowadays it's these geeks who can be responsible for massive espionage campaigns conducted over the Internet. Campaigns like Red October – one of the first conducted on a global scale and, interestingly, developed before Stuxnet.

Red October was an extremely complicated and quirky cyber-espionage campaign targeting diplomatic, scientific, trade and governmental organizations, and oil and gas companies in dozens of countries – mostly in eastern

Eugene Kaspersky is the founder and CEO of Kaspersky Lab, and a leading global expert in the field of information security.

PRIVATE



Europe and the former USSR, but also in Western Europe, Central Asia and North America. It was active for at least five years, presumably had access to classified information all that time, and had been stealing data from personal mobile devices and network

equipment too. This campaign was still in full swing when we published our research, with the stolen data still being sent to a number of command-and-control servers.

Kaspersky Lab's experts began their threat research into this campaign in October 2012 at the request of one of our partners. At the first stage we had information about just a few computers infected with a new malicious program. But by analyzing the attack and malware modules, we soon understood the colossal scale of this cyber-espionage network, which we named "Red October" (after the novel "The

Hunt for the Red October" by Tom Clancy) or "Rocra." Our researchers continue to investigate and reverse all the variants of the malware, and have been coming to some interesting conclusions.

The attackers used a unique approach in the development of the malware and the way it attacked. They actually created a multi-functional platform, which was designed for rapid and straightforward adjustment to different system configurations of each infected user. This platform was unique to Rocra, and had nothing in common with previous cyber-espionage cam-

paigns identified by Kaspersky Lab such as Flame or Gauss.

Before initiating an attack, the hackers collected as much information as possible on the target organization. After that, an assault was carefully prepared and tailored to the specific characteristics of the victims. For instance, the initially infected documents sent as email attachments were customized to make them especially appealing to the victim, and every single module was specifically compiled with a unique victim ID inside.

Later on, there was plenty of interaction between the attacker and the victim, with the opera-

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tion being driven by the kind of configuration the victim had, which type of documents they used, installed software, native language and so on. Compared to Flame and Gauss, which were highly automated cyber-espionage campaigns, Rocra was a lot more tailor-made to exploit its targets.

The main malware body acted as a point of entry into the system, which could later download modules used for lateral movement. After the initial infection, the malware didn't propagate by itself – typically the attackers gathered information about the network for

some days, identified key systems and then deployed modules that could compromise other computers in the network.

In general, the Rocra framework was designed for executing “tasks” provided by its Command & Control servers. Most of these tasks were received from the server, executed in memory, reported back to the server, and then immediately discarded. Several tasks however needed to be constantly present in the system, like waiting for a cell phone to connect.

Our investigation uncovered over 1000 modules belonging to 34 different module categories.

The most recent module was compiled on January 8, 2013; however, one of the command & control server domains was registered in 2007 – revealing how long this campaign has been in operation. The main goal of the attack was to steal and secretly send classified information to the remote server.

The attackers were focused on stealing documents, and the information stolen was of the highest classification level and included geopolitical data of embassies and other governmental organizations. For example, we identified that the malware targeted files with the extension “acid*” that

appears to refer to the classified software “Acid Cryptofiler”, used by several entities from the European Union to NATO.

Such a complicated campaign required significant resources – in terms of personnel, know-how and time. We assume that a team of approximately 20 worked on the Rocra campaign on a daily basis for five years.

As usual with malware, it's impossible to tell for sure who the attacker was. However, based on numerous hints left in the code of the malware, there is strong technical evidence to indicate that the attackers had Russian-speaking origins.

Kaspersky Lab, in collaboration with international organizations, law enforcement agencies and Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) is continuing its investigation of Rocra. We provide technical expertise and resources for the investigation.

Detection of such a complicated espionage network is yet further evidence that the Internet is now a battlefield. Rocra was one of the largest and most significant espionage campaigns we have ever revealed. It lasted for at least five years, required fine-tuning of the malware for every user, and required a stable and solid budget.

Espionage has always existed, but now it's shifted to the cyber-world. That means that any company or organization, regardless of origin or field, should implement cybersecurity. We are all potentially endangered. James Bond's time's up. Now the computer geeks have the stage.

But I choose to stay optimistic. And I have good reason to. The attackers used known vulnerabilities – fixed by vendors and stopped by most antivirus vendors. We assume that the victims had either outdated security software, or didn't have antivirus at all. So maybe the battle's not all lost just yet? ■

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Shifting the cybersecurity paradigm

Why Germany is switching the emphasis from active to passive online defense | By Sandro Gaycken

Cybersecurity per se does not fall within the remit of foreign policy. But international relations and security policy do: war and peace, international stability and prosperity, and ensuring the independence of domestic politics from the influence of foreign nations. As of late, cyberattacks can threaten all of these areas.

More than 120 nations worldwide have begun to develop an interest in offensive hacking capabilities within their militaries and secret services. Most of them will soon be able to deter, to influence, to manipulate, and to erode any other country using this new tool – at a low cost and with barely any risk.

So now, foreign policy includes cybersecurity. It has its own unique set of challenges and solutions. The main concern is strategic nation state cyberattackers, not criminals and activists. The tools are primarily strategies and policies, not laws and technologies. But foreign policy actors need to acknowledge this new responsibility, and start working on it, so the threat will not outpace effective policies by too much.

For the design of a cybersecurity foreign policy, a few alternatives can be identified. One important distinction is between active and passive cybersecurity strategies. Until now, approaches to cybersecurity have stressed active defense: cyberattackers should be lawfully prosecuted, or deterred by a threat of military, political or economic retaliation. This approach seemed realistic in the past, when most cyberattacks were carried out by criminals, and it would preserve the traditional balance of powers.

Passive defense, on the other hand, has been considered too difficult. It would consist of plain and simple deterrence by denial through secure information technologies.

But computers have grown too complex. And our dependencies and demands upon the benefits of this complexity are deemed to be too strong and too specific to allow even a partial reform of this environment.

Yet while active, aggressive stances might spare us the costs of reinventing the computer, this approach brings its own set of risks, once the much more sophisticated, almost invisible and highly potent nation-state cyberattacker is taken into account.

Identifying such an attacker will remain a highly speculative undertaking, no matter what technical progress is made. There will always be a host of tactical options to create plausible deniability, to plant false traces, even to stage whole false flag operations. And without definite identification, it remains doubtful if this paradigm will ever actually deter anyone at all.

Assigning blame for a cyberattack on the grounds of vague suspicion is more likely to create misunderstandings and escalations, destabilizing international security in uncertain ways. Also,

any technical attempts to enhance, even slightly, the small chances of identifying this kind of attack, immediately imply massive, in-depth surveillance of the Internet and control of its nodes – in effect globally ending privacy and Internet freedom, and disrupting technological sovereignty.

None of this is desirable. As a consequence, the German Federal Foreign Office is currently exploring a different strategic approach to cybersecurity foreign policy. It will reconsider passive defense as the primary option to cope with the problem.

This approach is in line with the Federal Foreign Office's declared principles for cyber foreign policy in general. The Foreign Office considers IT and the Internet an important asset, a hugely beneficial innovation in many respects, most of all for freedom and prosperity. Since these benefits deserve and require careful protection, some guiding principles were formulated.

The first principle is the protection of freedom. Freedom is our uttermost priority in all Internet- and IT-related matters. Preserving and extending it must be considered an important and undeniable goal.


The second principle is the continuation of self-regulation. IT and the Internet became what they are through the joint entrepreneurial power of an open civil society and an open market, and that is how we believe it should

stay. However, self-regulation has to be responsible and cannot put others at risk. It must be monitored and evaluated, with the option to introduce statutory regulation if there is a failure to act responsibly.

The third and final principle is to foster knowledge and transparency. IT and the Internet are complex technologies, with difficult and multiple interactions with society, the market and politics. Yet we still know too little about these interdependencies. Secrecy and lobbying further blur the picture. Shedding more light into the thicket of the cyber-jungle will help regulators and the lay public to understand their own roles and futures and to determine how to implement the values they cherish in any future development.

This set of priorities holds for our policies regarding Internet freedom matters and the IT-economy, and it also applies to cybersecurity. It translates into a set of strategic security demands, which currently guide our thinking on cybersecurity foreign policy. First of all, security must preserve as much freedom as possible and respect the need for privacy, even if the resulting solutions are more costly or complicated.

Secondly, security can be implemented through self-regulation, but it will have to be verified wherever critical national assets are concerned. We will need proof that a security solution provides the degree of protection we require to remain independent



Sandro Gaycken is a computer scientist specializing in strategy and cybersecurity and currently a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the German Foreign Office.

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tions, destabilizing international security in uncertain ways. Also,



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Cybercrime Facts



SOCIAL CYBERCRIME

1/6

OF SOCIAL NETWORK USERS REPORT THAT SOMEONE HAS HACKED INTO THEIR PROFILE AND PRETENDED TO BE THEM



CYBERCRIME GOES MOBILE

31%

RECEIVED A TEXT MESSAGE FROM SOMEONE THEY DIDN'T KNOW REQUESTING THAT THEY CLICK ON AN EMBEDDED LINK OR DIAL AN UNKNOWN NUMBER TO RETRIEVE A "VOICEMAIL"

HIGHEST NUMBER OF CYBERCRIME VICTIMS FOUND IN:

RUSSIA 92% CHINA 84% SOUTH AFRICA 80%

556 MILLION VICTIMS PER YEAR
MORE THAN THE ENTIRE POPULATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION



THE GLOBAL PRICETAG OF CONSUMER CYBERCRIME



Source: Norton Cybercrime Report 2012

from foreign influence through military-grade hackers.

And finally, knowledge and transparency will have to provide the facts and options needed for sound political decision-making. More knowledge should be gained by industry-independent, empirically oriented research, clearing up the fog of uncertainty surrounding many questions of cybersecurity, and offering verifiable solutions.

Greater transparency can be achieved by publicizing more facts

on incidents and attackers. Both the state and the private sector must find ways to share security-critical information, to inform and to catalyze a public discourse about the kind and the depth of cybersecurity needed and wanted.

These requirements are an inevitable conclusion of the German approach to cyber foreign policy. And they suggest a paradigm shift in strategic foreign cybersecurity policy for Germany. Our approach explicitly prioritizes passive defense and dismisses the

use of active defense as a dominant strategy element.

This path will enable security – protection and independence from foreign influence – in a more efficient and verifiable manner, contributing to international stability instead of degrading it through speculative accusations. It requires much less surveillance, control and censorship, thus enhancing privacy and Internet freedom wherever it is applied. It will also interfere less with civil society and the market,

as only critical assets would need on-site regulation.

We are currently considering a variety of diplomatic and strategic measures to realize this paradigm. A priority will be a strong support for approaches that create a sovereign, high-security, non-complex and minimally networked information technology infrastructure for all critical areas.

Other measures might include: innovative agreements for software quality improvement; reporting models that encourage

more open disclosure of cyberincidents; an internationally agreed “arms control” regime to monitor the open and legal “exploit” market, as well as more conventional diplomatic tools such as the formulation of norms and escalatory dynamics; the design of communication to avoid misperceptions and ensure dialogue; and the provision of expertise and other support to smaller countries.

The price tag for some of these measures might be high. But it is at least a monetary cost and

not one in lives and liberties. With good incentives and clever politics, a shift toward passive cyberdefense might not even be a financial burden, but could become a huge opportunity for a new kind of IT-economy.

Everything depends on wise policymaking. With the right political levers set to the right places, the passive defense path out of the cybersecurity crisis could become a win-win-win solution for security, freedom and prosperity alike. ■

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Installed power: 3,600kW	Dodin Campenon
Tunnel lengths: 2x 3,860m	Bernard
Geology: bunter sandstone, sandstone, shell-bearing limestone	

The new high-speed railway link between Strasbourg and Paris is being rapidly extended. The "Tunnel de Saverne" is currently under construction on the 106 kilometer long section between Vendenheim just outside of Strasbourg and Baudrecourt in Lorraine. The most complex part of the project passes under the narrowest section of the Vosges and will reduce travel time between Alsace and the French capital by 30 minutes. A Herrenknecht TBM is paving the

way for TGVs so they can reach speeds of up to 320 kilometers per hour in the future. The convertible Earth Pressure Balance Open Mode Shield broke through the first of two almost 4 kilometer long tunnels, on June 19, 2012 – two months ahead of schedule. The second tube of the "Tunnel de Saverne" will be completed by April 2013. Covering up to 46 meters a day, the high-tech machine "Charlotte" is well on the way to achieving this goal.

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